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Abstract 
Since 1994, Mexico has seen a proliferation of largely indigenous social 
movements asserting their right to land and territory, most notably 
within the southern part of the country. This thesis seeks to analyse 
why this has been the case by placing these movements within a theory 
of the production of space, and examining its role within the global 
political economy. It is submitted that events in southern Mexico 
can be explained as a clash between two distinct spatial projects; the 
spaces of capital on the one hand, and the spaces of resistance on the 
other. In order to make this argument, the inherent expansionary logic 
of capitalism as a mode of production is rendered, and it is detailed 
how the search for profit leads to constant alteration in socio-spatial 
relations. 
Using this framework, changes within the realm of production since 
the 1970s are investigated to reveal new socio-economic geographies, 
and the central role of class struggle in this process is asserted. The 
insertion of Latin America into global circuits of accumulation is then 
examined in relation to these arguments before the specific example 
of Mexico is turned to. Gramsci's concepts of passive revolution and 
hegemony are then deployed in order to analyse how spatial develop-
ments have been accomplished in Mexico though processes of state 
and class formation. 
Lastly, two regional case studies of the southern Mexican states of 
Oaxaca and Chiapas are explored in light of these theoretical con-
tentions. These states serve to highlight not only the means by which 
capital is currently seeking to expand accumulation, but also underline 
the conflicts that arise from this process as new spaces of resistance 
have emerged that seeks to contest and remake space in radically new 
ways. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
On January 1st 1994, in the southern Mexican state of Chiapas, an indigenous 
rebel group calling itself the Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional (EZLN, 
Zapatista National Liberation Army) rose up in response to the government's 
new economic orientation, signalled most visibly with the signing of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that was due to come into effect on 
that very day. The Zapatistas have, since this time, taken over (or recuperated as 
they put it), hundreds of hectares of formerly privately held lands and constructed 
an autonomous form of governance where the official state law is not recognised 
nor government programs accepted. Instead, upon entering into their territory 
one is greeted with a sign that reads 'Aqui, manda el Pueblo' (here. the people 
command).l 
In the summer of 2006, in another southern Mexican state of Oaxaca, the 
violent dislodgement of the annual teacher's plant6n (encampment) led to the 
creation of a broad collection of social movements, trade unions and civil society 
organizations coming together under the banner of the Asamblea Popular de 
los Pueblos de Oaxaca (APPO, Popular Assembly of the Peoples of Oaxaca). 
Barricades were erected throughout the city and public buildings and symbols of 
power were taken over as a state of 'ingovernability' was declared. Since this time, 
social movement activism in the state has proliferated, centred on opposition to 
l'Territory' here is taken to mean a specific area upon which a regime of political authority 
is constructed. Like space and scale, territory should not be thought of as fixed and ahistorical 
but rather as something produced through collective agency. 
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neoliberal development projects and localised authoritarianism. Instead. drawing 
on the state's indigenous cultural practices, there have been attempts to reinvent 
community and reorient development. 
What both of these cases represent are efforts to craft new geographical re-
lations of power, calling into question the legitimacy of the state as the corner-
stone of political praxis as well as the efficacy and desirability of representative 
democracy. Moreover, they pose a challenge to the viability of capitalist social 
relations. In light of this, as well as numerous developments within the region, 
Jean Grugel's (2002: 170) assertion that the rise of neoliberalism in Latin Amer-
ica has rendered 'utopian debates' about politics irrelevant, seems premature to 
say the least. Rather what we are witnessing is the reinvention of utopia. 
This thesis seeks to explore these spaces of resistance, understand why they 
have arisen, and distill what they mean for comprehending (geo )politics today. 
In order to do this we need to work backwards through different levels of analysis. 
It is argued that to fully understand these movements in Chiapas and Oaxaca 
we have to be attentive to their specific histories. However, these specific histo-
ries cannot be considered without knowledge of processes of state formation and 
socio-economic development within wider Mexico. The development trajectory of 
Mexico is itself informed by the particular regional dynamics of Latin America as 
a whole, and the shared legacy of colonialism, state-led industrialisation and neo-
liberal transition. As should be obvious, this suggests that Latin America must 
likewise be placed within the broader context of the global political economy, 
based as it is on surplus value extraction in the form of capital accumulation, 
which has constantly sought to extend its logic in the region. It is at this point 
that we have to begin to push our inquiry into the spatial and its role within 
the global political economy, by establishing the nexus between capitalist social 
relations and the production of space. This thesis is thus a study of geopolitics 
in the widest sense of the term. 
Disentangling these issues and putting them into a manageable framework is 
done by drawing from the work of Neil Brenner (2004: 18-21). Borrowing from 
his methodology, this thesis seeks to construct its analysis at three separate levels. 
These are the abstract level, the meso level and the concrete level. As Brenner 
(2004: 21) notes, these are not to be thought of as ontologically separate. but 
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rather they represent "analytically distinct, if dialectically intertwined, epistemo-
logical vantage points." As its name suggests, the abstract level involves drawing 
together key systemic features of a system, and outlining a theoretical framework 
within which we can operate in order to conduct our empirical investigation. The 
meso level, by contrast, is concerned with broad periodisations of institutional 
configurations that coalesce within time and space, underpinning dominant ideas 
about, and practices of, 'development'. Lastly; the concrete level looks at the 
precise ways in which these wider forces unfold within specific contexts, whether 
this be at a national or sub-national context. Saskia Sassen (2007: 7) has rightly 
pointed out that studying the global "entails not only a focus on what is explicitly 
global in scale. It also calls for a focus on locally scaled practices and conditions 
articulated within global dynamics." It is at these scales we can observe disjunc-
tures and contradictions within material social practises and also think about 
processes of resistance and alternatives that are constructed within these inter-
stices. Following Lefebvre (1976: 18), this work is thus attentive to the differences 
and tensions involved in the production of scalar hierarchies. Indeed, this is vital 
to making an original analysis of the emergent spaces of resistance inspired by in-
digenous subjectivities. Noel Castree (2004: 137 nt.6) has highlighted that "few, 
if any, critical geographers have focused in-depth on the broader, international 
context for specific indigenous struggles." This thesis is a response to this lacuna. 
In addressing questions of place, space and scale it adopts an historical sociolog-
ical approach (explained in greater detail below). This is done primarily for two 
interrelated reasons. First, as Marx (1852/1996: 847) attested, ~ ' T h e e tradition 
of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the living." This method 
helps not only therefore to denaturalise the present by showing how it has grown 
out of past conditions, but also allows us to see what past and present conditions 
could inform future trajectories (Ollman, 2003: 2-3, 124). In the words of Joel 
Wainwright (2008: 2, 7), this allows us to 'decolonise development' by showing 
how this term has simply become a synonym for the furtherance of capitalist 
rule. Second, it allows us to focus on the production of agents of resistance and 
transformation. Beverley Silver (2003: 20, 6) has argued that a key intellectual 
task is to identify subaltern responses to capitalist development, emphasising that 
the recomposition of capital on a global scale also leads to the recomposition of 
3 
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labour. This thesis, while re-asserting the importance of class struggle within 
the global political economy, will, through its focus on indigenous and peasant 
resistance, argue that this concept must be widened from its focus solely in re-
gard to resistance at the point of production. Instead, the historical sociological 
method can highlight how alternative histories and practices of constructing so-
cial relationships can provide a useful well of experiences to draw upon. and can 
be reconfigured as an important tool for social movements. 
The introduction is organised in the following manner. First the contributions 
of the thesis to knowledge are outlined. Second, the social purpose of academic 
inquiry is reflected upon. Third, the problematic of space is discussed before, 
fourth, the mode of academic inquiry adopted throughout the thesis is explained 
and the precise methodology used to conduct this research is detailed. Certain 
ethical issues are also discussed. Lastly, an outline of the overall thesis is provided. 
1.1 Contributions of the thesis to knowledge 
This thesis claims to offer a number of contributions to knowledge. First, it 
demonstrates the continued importance of the spatial and spatial planning within 
the global political economy, drawing attention to the role that uneven and com-
bined development plays within this process, whilst extending this concept to 
multiple scales of analysis. It thereby highlights how the continual production of 
space through the transformation of the biophysical environment is a pre-requisite 
for the current economic system to function. It also provides a detailed account 
of the social agency of such a process, as well as linking this to crises in economic, 
political and environmental spheres. Second, the theoretical insights of Antonio 
Gramsci, Henri Lefebvre and David Harvey are deployed in a novel way to aid 
in understanding processes of modern state formation in Latin America, and, 
in even more detail, Mexico and two specific federal states within Mexico. In 
particular Gramsci's notions of passive revolution and hegemony are drawn upon 
to show how spatial and scalar configurations have been historically produced 
within Mexico and for what social purpose (see also Morton, 2011). A spatially 
nuanced explanation of the concept of hegemony is offered which draws from the 
work of the new cultural historical studies in Mexico that emphasises 'everyday 
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forms of state formation' (Joseph and Nugent, 1994). In contrast to approaches 
that stress a purely 'national' level to the operation of hegemonic projects (Jessop. 
1990: 196-219) the thesis demonstrates the interplay between global, regional. na-
tional and localized articulations of power in the production of space and scale. 
This is done by developing the novel notion of 'uneven and combined hegemony'. 
The purpose of this concept is also to offset a contemporary trend within cur-
rent Mexican studies literature that focuses on power dynamics solely at the local 
level without linking this scale to wider processes of class formation (see inter alia 
Bobrow-Strain, 2007; Cornelius et al., 1999; Rubin, 1997; Smith, 2009). Finally, 
the thesis underscores the contestations involved in the production of space and 
looks towards the potential for alternative geographical projects based upon the 
epistemologies of the excluded (see also de Sousa Santos, 2006). These issues have 
often been elided in more structuralist accounts of capital, where a detailed en-
gagement with specific resistance movements has not been undertaken (see inter 
alia, Harvey, 2006b, 2010; Smith, 2008). The thesis lays particular stress on the 
agency of indigenous communities. Indigenous subjectivities have largely been 
excluded from dominant debates about development in Latin America, frequently 
being regarded as an anachronism that would be absorbed through the twin pro-
cesses of mestization2 and/or proletarianisation. However, in recent decades (and 
in particular since the quincentennial remembrance of the Spanish conquest), in-
digenous resistance has risen to prominence and managed to challenge many of 
the long held axioms of traditional leftist thought, such as the centrality of the 
state, and the working class (defined in terms of a fixed sociological category) 
as the agent of political transformation. As mentioned earlier, the thesis draws 
its empirical focus from resistance movements that have emerged in the southern 
states of Oaxaca and Chiapas, most notably since the neoliberal reforms of Carlos 
Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994). One of the chosen case studies - the Zapatistas 
- have already been extensively written about, yet relatively scant consideration 
has been devoted to analysing the spatial and scalar dimensions of their political 
praxis, which is remedied by this research. The other case study focuses on the 
2 Although this refers literally to the miscegenation of indigenous ethnicities with white 
Europeans to produce the figure of the mestizo, this, by itself, is quite misleading as it is 
equally about the negation of indigenous cultural practices through assimilation into wider 
western norms. 
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state of Oaxaca. Whilst in recent years this state has seen more scholarly re-
flections (see inter alia Chassen-Lopez, 2004; Overmyer-Valazquez, 2006; Smith, 
2009) these studies have focused on either the period leading up to the Mexican 
Revolution, or the period of state formation immediately following this. The 
analysis bought to bear in this thesis is thus the first detailed engagement in the 
English language that deals with contemporary state formation and resistance 
in Oaxaca that also considers these aspects from the perspective of the longue 
duree. Such an approach offers an important contribution to debates surround-
ing the historical sociology of international relations which have hitherto had a 
largely Eurocentric focus (e.g. Lacher, 2006, Rosenberg, 2006, Teschke, 2003). 
As noted above, within Mexican studies there is an emergent literature on sub-
national political processes and Gerardo Otero (2004: 342) has recently called 
for further comparative research across Mexico. This is important to avoid what 
Stein Rokkan (1970) has called 'whole nation bias' or what John Agnew (1994) 
terms 'the territorial trap'. Richard Snyder (2001: 94) has further argued that 
"subnational comparisons better equip researchers to handle the spatially uneven 
nature of major processes of political and economic transformation." However, 
as will be explained in the section below on methodology, this does not entail 
having to adopt the positivist comparative method championed by Snyder that 
conceives the social world as separable and controllable units of analysis. 
1.2 Intellectual production and the social pur-
pose of academic inquiry 
Before beginning any investigation it is necessary to reflect critically on the mo-
tivations and intended social purpose of such an undertaking. Robert Cox (1981: 
128) famously opined that, "Theory is always for someone or some purpose ... there 
is no such thing as theory in itself, divorced from a standpoint in time and space." 
All academic interventions are thus conceived of as serving a social function of a 
particular kind, whether the authors' recognise it or not. This conforms to the 
definition of an intellectual offered by Antonio Gramsci (1971: 5-23) as anyone 
who seeks to organise, direct, educate and inform. With regards to this latter 
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point, the words of Bertell OIlman (2003: 20, emphasis added) are prescient when 
he argues that, we do not choose to participate in the class struggle. as to one 
degree or another we are all implicated in this by virtue of our participation in the 
social world of capitalism. Instead, "What can be chosen is what side to take in 
this struggle." In agreement with Marx (1845/1996: 799) scholarly activity is not 
thought of as a passive description of the world, but seeks to aid efforts to change 
it. 3 As Lefebvre (1961/2008: 19) points out, "Critique implies possibilities, and 
possibilities as yet unfulfilled. It is the task of critique to demonstrate what these 
possibilities and this lack of fulfilment are." This work thus makes no claim for 
neutrality, and rejects the separation between subject and object. Rather it is 
consciously anti-capitalist in its orientation for reasons that will become clear as 
the argument progresses. Whilst not claiming to offer a recipe for change, the 
hope is to render more legible, a system of exploitation that seeks to hide this 
fact (see also Harvey, 2010: 241) as well as looking towards alternatives.4 
1.3 Globalisation and its discontents: lost • In 
space 
In recent years much scholarly debate has turned to analysing processes of neolib-
eral restructuring, commonly referred to as 'globalisation' (see inter alia Harvey, 
1990, 2005a; Held and McGrew, 2000; Dumenil and Levy, 2004). One recent the-
orist has defined this process as an 'epochal shift' that is reconfiguring the world's 
previous spatial order (Robinson, 2004a: 4). In Robinson's view, economic re-
structuring has led to a situation whereby 'transnational space' now exerts a 
hegemonic influence over national space. The import of this development is that 
it implies (in Robinson's thinking) that resistance must now operate at this level 
as well (Robinson, 2003, 2004a, 2008). Indeed, this call for a transnational form 
of resistance has also been asserted in the influential works of Michael Hardt and 
Antonio Negri (2000; 2004). In contrast to this, other theorists have called for a 
3For a collection of essays inspired by this point see Castree et al., 2010. 
4As OIlman (2003: 4) cogently argues in regard to this point; "If most of its inhabitants don't 
even see capitalism, the system, then any efforts to explain how it works must be accompanied 
by an equally strong effort to display it, to show that it exists, and what kind of entity it is." 
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politics of 'localisation' as a means to deal with emergent global problems (Hines, 
2000). Still others have questioned the very narrative of globalisation, claiming 
that it is a disempowering discourse that hides the fact that the state retains 
key powers to regulate these 'global' forces should it choose to do so (Hirst and 
Thompson, 1999; Weiss, 1998). Another school - the so-called global transforma-
tionalists - claim reforms to global capitalism below the nation-state level and at 
supra-national level will serve to kerb its current excesses and serve to humanise 
it, whilst still being able to utilise the power of the market to create a form of 
global social democracy (Held, 2004; Held and McGrew, 2002). An adequate 
understanding of the dynamics of capital accumulation thus becomes an urgent 
task if we are to address questions of how an alternative politics can begin to 
articulate itself. This process-based perspective is imperative if we are not to 
engage in a form of 'spatial fetishism' (Harvey, 1996: 353; Massey, 2005: 101). 
As David Harvey (1990: 218) counsels, "Any project to transform society must 
grasp the transformation of spatial and temporal conceptions and practices." It 
is precisely this challenge that this research seeks to undertake. 
It is widely recognised that the process commonly referred to as 'globalisa-
tion' (a term itself highly imbued with a sense of the spatial) has led to profound 
shifts in geographical restructuring. As Neil Smith (2008: 1) asserts: "one can 
hardly look at the world today without perceiving that, at the hands of capi-
tal, the last two decades have witnessed an emerging of geographical space more 
dramatic than ever before." However, the term 'globalisation' remains a heav-
ily contested one, with scholars remaining locked in profound debate about its 
meaning and scope. If academic enquiry is to have any utility, then, concur-
rent with Justin Rosenberg (2000), we must take care not to confuse 'explanans' 
with 'explanadum,.5 In other words, globalisation (defined here as the deepen-
ing transnationalisation of production and finance) is itself the object that needs 
to be explained. Taken on its own terms 'globalisation' does not possess any 
power of causality. Recognition of this fact suggests a particular methodological 
approach for research. Specifically it is submitted here that we employ the di-
alectical method of Marx to 'read history backwards' (OIlman, 2003: 118). Here, 
5'Explanadum' is the phenomenon that needs to be explained whereas the 'explanans' is the 
solution or answer to a particular problem. 
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surface appearances are not simply taken for granted, but rather what exists 
in the here and now is treated as a set of contingent social relations that also 
require explanation. A dialectic approach is thus one that focuses on social pro-
cesses rather than 'things' (Harvey, 1996: 49). To hold otherwise is to ignore 
the past whilst becoming stuck in the present. Marx and Engels (1845/1996: 
836) contemptuously wrote of those who were not prepared to understand the 
ephemeral nature of their current circumstances stating that: 
The selfish misconception that induces you to transform into eternal 
laws of nature and reason, the social forms springing from your present 
mode of production and form of property - historical relations that 
rise and disappear in the progress of production - this misconception 
you share with every ruling class that has preceded you. 
It is only through the practice of abstraction and historical excavation that we 
are able to examine what processes have led to the situation we are now faced with 
as well as helping us point towards future tendencies. As Lefebvre (1961/2008: 
Ill) correctly illustrates, this method does not postulate absolute necessity, but 
also rejects the idea of absolute chance. Thus, in order to explore what lies at the 
heart of the recent changes in the geography of the world economic order, we are 
required to look at the social relations specific to the capitalist mode of production 
(as will be explained in further detail in Chapter 2). This necessitates that we 
therefore go beyond surface appearance and engage in an act of defetishisation. 
This is an important intellectual task, as far too often these changes are presented 
as part of a transhistorical march of progress which we can do nothing about. 
We are told, to borrow Margaret Thatcher's famous maxim, that "There is no 
alternative". However, as Doreen Massey (2005: 84) has pointed out this is a 
discursive exercise which hides the nature of contemporary globalisation as a 
political project. 
That the global restructuring of space that has occurred since the 1970s is not 
without contradiction and friction is certain. The unresolved tensions encapsu-
lated within this process are summed up perfectly by Henri Lefebvre (1991: 351) 
who asks: 
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How and why is it that the advent of a world market, implying a 
degree of unity at the level of the planet, gives rise to a fractioning 
of space - to a proliferation of nation-states, to regional differenti-
ation and self-determination, as well as to multinational states and 
transnational corporations, which, although they stem this strange 
tendency towards fission, also exploit it in order to reinforce their 
own autonomy? Towards what space and time will such interwoven 
contradictions lead us? 
Building upon this question, the thesis will draw upon the concept of 'uneven 
and combined development' as a vital explanatory tool with which to understand 
the capitalist production of space. Propelling this is the contradiction between 
the need for capital to embed itself into the built environment in order to produce 
surplus value on the one hand, and the necessity to seek out new profitable areas 
for accumulation on the other (Harvey, 2006b: 380, Brenner, 1998). According 
to Lefebvre (1961/2008: 3), "uneven development remains the prime law of the 
modern world, and there is much to learn and be said about it." Neil Smith (2008: 
155-159,187) has outlined how uneven development involves a contradictory dy-
namic, leading to the equalization of the conditions of production across space 
on the one hand, whilst accentuating the differentiation of space on the other. 
The spatial, in other words, should be seen as the geographical expression of class 
struggle or, as Henri Lefebvre (1991: 55) has decisively put it, "Today, more 
than ever, the class struggle is inscribed in space." This astute observation will 
be a leitmotif of the thesis, demonstrated through empirical investigation. It is 
precisely this issue of spatial transformation and contestation in the present that 
is in fact missing from the recent literature on uneven and combined develop-
ment within the historical sociology of international relations. Justin Rosenberg 
(2006: 316), for example has sought to extend the term so that the world, and 
therefore world history, can be understood as an ontological whole. Uneven and 
combined development in this usage therefore collapses the false distinction be-
tween the domestic and the international, but nevertheless allows us to focus on 
its very real sociological constitution (Rosenberg, 2006: 327). Extending this 
analysis, Rosenberg has sought to provide a social theory of the international b ~ ' '
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stressing that uneven and combined development is in fact a 'general abstraction 
that is foundational to what development actually is (for a debate around this 
issue see Callinicos and Rosenberg, 2008). Uneven and combined development is 
thus posited as a universal law of human history (Rosenberg, 2010: 179-184).6 
This argument is made by extending the philosophical arguments back to hunter-
gatherer societies and the original establishment of political societies. Elsewhere, 
the term has gained currency in examining the geo-politics of the inter-state sys-
tem though an analysis of social property relations (Lacher, 2006; Teschke, 2002, 
2003, 2005). As Bruff (2010) summarises, this has meant the current literature 
is most comfortable when intellectual efforts are devoted to the study of pre-
contemporary history which marks their substantive field of inquiry. However, 
as Neil Smith (2006: 181-184) has trenchantly argued, this has the danger of re-
moving the social purpose of the concept of uneven and combined development, 
which was originally deployed by Thotsky "to analyse and evaluate the possi-
bilities and trajectories of revolution." Smith contends that approaches to the 
concept that are de-spatialised are also de-politicised. Mindful of this point, the 
thesis seeks to be cognisant of spatial concerns throughout. Indeed, just as David 
Harvey (2006b: xix) has submitted that historical materialism should really be 
re-conceptualised as historical-geographical materialism, the arguments crafted 
throughout the thesis aim to highlight that historical sociology should likewise 
seek to transform itself into historical-geographical sociology. 
1.4 Methodological issues 
As has already been mentioned, this thesis adopts a historical-sociological ap-
proach to its excavation of the spaces of capital and the spaces of resistance 
that draws upon the dialectic method of inquiry. More specifically, it utilises 
both Michael Burawoy's (1998) 'extended case method' and Phillip McMichael's 
(1990) notion of 'incorporated comparison'.7 As was alluded to above, the ex-
tended case method is sharply distinguished from positivist science which seeks 
6This argument was in fact originally made by Ernest Mandel (1968: 91) but Rosenberg 
seems unaware of this (or at least has not cited the text). 
7The relevance of this method to current debates in historical sociology was introduced by 
Morton (2010). 
11 
1.4 Methodological issues 
to separate subject and object as well as fact and value. Instead, this method 
does not deny that we bring our own assumptions to the study of key academic 
questions. Rather, it is stressed that through reflexivity, these assumptions are 
"more like prisms than templates and they are emergent rather than fixed" (Bu-
rawoy, 1998: 11). The extended case method is an explicitly critical method 
of inquiry that forms 'situated knowledge' that is consciously interventionist in 
the social world. The purpose of the extended case method is thus to draw 
links between the unique and the general, and to move from the micro to macro. 
thereby extending outward from one spatial scale to another (Burawoy, 1998: 5). 
Closely related to this standpoint of seeking casual connections between cases 
is the method of incorporated comparison. This draws some inspiration from 
the 'encompassing' comparative methodology associated with scholars such as 
Immanuel Wallerstein (1974) and Charles Tilly (1984) in that it seeks to show 
the interconnections between social phenomena across time and space. However, 
the incorporated comparative method takes neither the whole (world system), 
nor its constituent parts (regions, countries etc) as fixed units of analysis. In-
stead, this method is attentive to the dialectic relation between them, and does 
not claim either as the prime locus of explanation. In McMichael's (1990: 386) 
words, the incorporated comparison method "progressively constructs the whole 
as a methodological procedure by giving context to historical phenomenon." The 
stress is on the cumulative process of history. Comparison therefore, "is 'internal' 
to historical inquiry, whereby process instances are comparable because they are 
historically connected and mutually conditioning" (McMicheal, 2000: 671). This 
approach therefore has the advantage of allowing us to appreciate the totality of 
capitalist relations whilst being attentive to its different articulations at differ-
ent spatial scales. Borrowing from Gramsci (1971: 117) capitalism can thus be 
thought of as a "universal concept with geographical seats. ,; 
Following the critical orientation of this research, Latin America is focused 
upon due to the fact that the region has, and continues to offer, the most com-
pelling site of resistance and alternatives to neoliberal capitalism. There are 
left, or left of centre governments in Venezuela, Bolivia, Cuba, Brazil, Argentina, 
Ecuador , Uruguay and Nicaragua. Moreover, the region has provided some of the 
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most dynamic and innovative experiments in radical democracy from the partic-
ipatory budget and inception of the World Social Forum (\VSF) process in Porto 
Alegre (Brazil), to the many vibrant social movements including among others. 
the Zapatistas (Mexico), the Sem Terra (Brazil) and the Piqueteros (Argentina). 
The specific narrowing of focus to Mexico is made for a number of reasons. 
It was the only country in Latin America before 1950 to undergo a profound. 
protracted and bloody revolution, yet in spite of this it has also been the Latin 
American country which has most vigorously pursued the path of capitalist de-
velopment (Weinert, 1981: 115; Hansen, 1971: 95). This was further enhanced 
by the signing of NAFTA in 1994, signalling most evidently the commitment to 
a neoliberal accumulation strategy. Moreover, and of necessity related to this, 
the country has produced some of the most visible and vibrant resistance move-
ments that have sought to contest and remake political space, as well as inspiring 
globally, ideas about how neo-liberalism can be challenged and concepts such as 
'globalization' or 'revolution' re-imagined (Holloway, 1998). Mexico thus provides 
fertile ground for considering the twin pillars of this research, the spaces of capi-
tal and the spaces of resistance. With regards to Oaxaca and Chiapas they have 
been chosen as case studies as they have been key sites of resistance in recent 
years, whose social struggles have had resonance both throughout Mexico and in 
the wider world. 
Moving from research methods to techniques, the research for this thesis was 
done in three main ways. The first was through the use of secondary sources. 
These sources were utilised to aid the process of concept formation. As Gerring 
(2001: 350) states, formulating strong concepts "lies at the heart of all social 
science endeavours." Additionally, secondary research provided invaluable infor-
mation on the background of the core research issues, both theoretically and 
historically. The challenge was then to combine these into an original analysis 
whilst constructing a coherent narrative. The second method employed was the 
consultation of primary data, in the form of statistical information. Utilising 
information of this kind helped provide empirical evidence for key theoretical 
claims that the thesis makes. Empirical data can also serve as a useful visual aid 
with which to present information to the reader to help demonstrate trends or 
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particular salient comparisons (for example the fortunes of a particular economic 
sector, or inter-country comparison). 
LastlYl the research questions were addressed through extensive fieldwork. 
This fieldwork was undertaken in two parts. First, in 2008 a pilot trip was taken 
to Mexico in order to build contacts and conduct preliminary inten'iews. This 
period of fieldwork lasted for one month, during which time the states of Chia-
pas, Oaxaca, Puebla, Tlaxcala and the Distrito Federal (Federal District) \\'ere 
visited. This short trip also enabled lessons to be learned from experiences in 
the field that would be applied to the second period of fieldwork. For example. 
the first trip underscored the need to work intensively on learning Spanish. It 
also led to an appreciation of cultural nuances that would be important when 
seeking to engage interviewees. The second, more intensive fieldwork trip was 
then taken in 2009 for the duration of four months, during which the majority 
of time was split between Oaxaca and Chiapas. This allowed for sufficient re-
search to be carried out on the two case studies. The case study method, as 
Giovanni Sartori (1991: 252) explains, can serve as a useful heuristic device that 
can facilitate theory building. Once again, this does not imply we need to sign up 
to a positivist methodology, as the reflexive extended case study method makes 
clear (Burawoy, 1998). The primary method used to collect data was though 
semi-structured interviews. The purpose of conducting interviews is to provide 
subjective insights into certain issues rather than seeking definitive truth. In-
terviews aid in interpreting existing research and can help shed further light on 
new topics. They can also help establish networks and provide access to other 
individuals and communities (Richards, 1996: 200). A semi-structured interview 
format was employed that meant although a prior list of questions was drawn up 
pertaining to major themes to be addressed, the topics covered during the inter-
view could also be relatively fluid; depending on the particular responses from 
the interviewee (for example follow up questions might be raised in relation to a 
certain answer). Interviews were conducted with academics, Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs). social movement activists. community members, journal-
ists and social commentators (a list of which can be found in the bibliography'). 
Interviews were generally recorded. This was done for a number of reasons. First. 
it allows the full attention of the interviewer to be focused on what the intervie\Yee 
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is saying. Second it meant that a reliable transcript could be obtained (Richards. 
1996: 202). However, due to the politically sensitive nature of some of the in-
terviews, and the more ad-hoc nature of others, this was not ahyays possible or 
desirable. In this case notes were taken at the time and then immediately written 
up in a more comprehensive fashion following the interview. ~ I o s t t of the inter-
viewees are cited by name in the thesis. In these cases, the nature of the research 
has been explained and permission granted to use their names. In other cases, 
people are alluded to without specific names being attached. This was done due 
to interviewees wishing to keep their identity secret owing to security fears, or due 
to the more casual nature of the interview, taken down as part of fieldwork notes. 
This was obviously a chief ethical concern in reporting the research findings as 
some individuals or communities find themselves in vulnerable situations which 
this research would not wish to exacerbate. 
1.5 Thesis outline 
The thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 begins by underscoring why a concern 
with the spatial is important. It also makes the case for focusing on two concepts 
related to the tradition of historical materialist thought, namely 'class struggle' 
and 'mode of production'. Once this has been done a theory of the production of 
space is outlined. A discussion of the characteristics of feudal/ absolutist space is 
then offered before going on to consider what is distinctive about the production 
of space under capitalist social relations of production. Lastly, the contradic-
tions involved in the actual or attempted capitalist transformations of spaces are 
highlighted, and the role of space for a politics of resistance is briefly discussed. 
Chapter 3 turns to analysing specific changes within world order: in particular 
the transition from the era of embedded liberalism to neoliberalism. The purpose 
of this is to extend the theoretical discussion from Chapter 2 to an analysis of 
developments in the international political economy. In particular it seeks to ex-
plore what is novel about spatial production in the epoch of neoliberalism. what 
role the state plays within this process and what the implications this has for a 
politics of resistance. It does this by subjecting one particular set of explanations 
of globalisation - the so-called 'transnationalisation thesis' - to critical scrutiny. 
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In particular it does so by considering another important contemporary school of 
historical materialist thought; that of uneven and combined development. Chap-
ter 4 turns to analysing the production of space in Latin America. It highlights 
the manner in which Latin America has both been integrated to, and itself been 
a site, through which the global economy has been produced. It explores the 
region's development trajectory in terms of a contradictory spatial project and 
draws attention to the manner in which particular spatial divisions of labour 
have been constructed within the region. In particular it highlights the rise of 
neoliberalism in Latin America as an attempt to offset contradictions inherent 
to the capitalist mode of production by means of a spatial fix, drawing attention 
to the class basis involved in such a process. Chapter 5 deepens this analysis of 
state, space and class formation though an investigation of modern Mexico. Here 
Gramsci's key concepts of passive revolution and hegemony are utilised to explain 
the nation's development trajectory whilst situating these within the conditions 
of worldwide capitalist development. Chapters 6 and 7 offer detailed case studies 
of the states of Oaxaca and Chiapas respectively. These chapters analyse how 
spatial reconfigurations have come about, reflecting the changing way in which 
these states became integrated within the international political economy and 
also the changing accumulation strategies of the national state. Furthermore, 
these chapters have a detailed discussion of movements of resistance and their 
attempts to defend place and produce alternative geographical spaces that are 
not based on the logic of capital. It will be noted that Chapters 6 and 7 are sub-
stantially longer than the previous chapters. This is a conscious decision taken 
for a number of reasons. First, it was submitted above that current literature 
on uneven and combined development is remiss in not giving full consideration 
to issues of space in its theorisation. Likewise it was charged that historical 
geographical materialism had neglected engaging in a substantial manner with 
movements of resistance. In order to successfully counter this, a detailed exam-
ination is necessary which requires a lengthy exposition of the history of spatial 
production and contestation. Second, if a case is to be made that differing modes 
of production produce different spaces (as will be argued in Chapter 2), this needs 
to be substantiated empirically, again requiring that a large amount of histori-
cal information is covered. Finally, in contrast to Richard Sennett"s (2002: 42) 
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method of post-holing which digs deeply into specific moments in order to depict 
the sweep of historical forces, this thesis by contrast seeks a wholesale historical 
excavation of space in order to reveal its sedimented layers which continue to 
influence current topographies and contribute to fissures. 
The conclusion reviews the key arguments that have been made, and sum-
marises its main findings. It also reflects on its limitations and presents problems 
for future research. 
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Geographical Politics and the 
Politics of Geography 
The spatial is not just a matter of 
lines on a map; it is a cartography 
of power 
Massey, 2005: 85 
This chapter seeks to critically engage with debates surrounding the 'pro-
duction of space' under capitalist social relations of production. The aim is to 
construct a theoretical framework whereby changes in the geography of the global 
economy, and resistance to these changes, can be understood. Furthermore, the 
framework developed here should allow us to examine these changes through a 
multi-scalar analysis. Rather than simply focusing on global, national or local 
changes, this chapter seeks to develop an approach which can integrate analyses 
on a variety of spatial scales. In short, it aims to serve as a framework of analysis. 
helping to explain why it is that struggles over space, and what particular spaces 
contain, are likely to become an ever more prominent feature of political life. 
A central issue that this research seeks to address is the role of the spatial 
within the global political economy. Linked to this are ancillary arguments about 
state and class formation and their central role in these processes. This chapter 
thus lays the theoretical foundations for explaining the changing scalar organi-
zation of the world economy since the 1970s, viewed from a macro-structural 
18 
perspective and what this means for a politics of resistance (Chapter 3), how 
this impacted upon the space of Latin America as well state formation in the 
region (Chapter 4), the changing historical sociology of the state form (Chapter 
5), and finally. it allows us to understand processes of geo-political conflict and 
class struggle around particular local spaces that are currently being targeted as 
sites for increased capital accumulation (Chapters 6 and 7). As ,,,as set out in the 
introduction, the first task is to make the theoretical argument in the abstract. 
before flesh can be put on these bones through empirical investigation. As Neil 
Brenner (2004: 18) has stated in relation to this: "consideration of the abstract 
level enables scholars to examine the general, systemic features of a given histor-
ical system." Noel Castree (2000: 10) usefully illustrates how it is in the realm 
of abstract argumentation that we organise our worldviews and then come to act 
out our everyday practices. Our conceptions of the world thus clearly matter, and 
motivate us towards action (Gramsci, 1971: 323-325: Harvey, 2010: 38). This 
chapter. whilst providing the beginnings of a theoretical framework, d e l i b e r a t e l ~ ' '
does not close that framework, as it is cognisant of the fact that theory is a l \ Y a ~ " s s
modified and informed by the manner in which it works itself out in the real 
world. including processes of struggle (an issue to be returned to later). The 
'concept' and the 'lived' in other words, remain inseparable and we cannot do 
without either (Lefebvre, 1976: 20). 
An over arching focus on issues of 'space' can seem at first appearance to be 
something of an abstract concern. However, a 'politics of space' occupies a cen-
tral part of our daily lives and promises to have profound effects on our future. 
One may think here of the peculiarly modern phenomenon of urban slum pro-
liferation, the tragic plight of those who each year, fleeing political or economic 
persecution, mortgage their lives in the backs of trucks or other precarious means 
of transportation, only to be turned back at demarcated and fortified border 
lines, or the relocation of corporations to far-flung parts of the globe - to high-
light just a few examples of how the politics of the spatial permeates conflicts 
and struggles throughout the world. Since the 1980s. we haye also seen a rise in 
claims for spatial exclusiveness in terms of nationalism, or regional and localist 
identity (1Iassey. 1994: 4). A so-called 'clash of ci,"ilizations' thesis has gained 
19 
increasing credence (most notably since the events of September 11 th 2001), espe-
cially among 'intellectuals of statecraft' to explain this phenomenon (Agnew and 
o Tuahtail, 1992; Huntingdon, 1993). This research seeks to construct an alter-
native framework for understanding geopolitical conflict. A central issue under 
investigation in this chapter is therefore the importance of the spatial in dis-
tinctly capitalist processes of development. After all, capitalism is the dominant 
socio-economic model for development in our time. Since the fall of the SO\'iet 
Union and the collapse of 'actually existing communism' in Eastern Europe, and 
following the reforms of Deng Xiaoping in China, there is little doubt that more 
of the world has become capitalist. Indeed, Francis Fukuyama (1992) has gone 
as far as to say that liberal-capitalism represents the 'end of history' in terms 
of a developmental paradigm, as it now has no ideological competitor (although 
he left open the caveat that history was always open to begin again). In the 
wake of the world credit crisis (the latest in a wave of financial crises that have 
afflicted the world with increasing frequency and intensity since the 1970s), it has 
once again become acceptable to discuss 'capitalism', and it indeed appears that 
people (in certain parts of the world more than others) are beginning to question 
what sort of history we wish to create. It is imperative therefore, that we under-
stand why particular spaces are produced in the manner in which they are. Can 
we discern an internal logic to this process and, if so. in what general direction 
is this heading? Moreover, is this a process free of contradiction, or can we infer 
general tendencies from which we may make certain assumptions about the fu-
ture, as well as uncovering potential agents of change? Furthermore, what does 
the changing geography of capitalist production imply for a politics of resistance? 
These are all issues which this research seeks to address. The empirical detail of 
these questions will be addressed in the forthcoming chapters when a meso level 
analysis will be conducted with regard to the global political economy and Latin 
America's relation to it. The concrete level of 1Iexico's incorporation into these 
structures is discussed in Chapter 5 before we go on to discuss the dialectic of 
incorporation and resistance in the cases of Oaxaca and Chiapas (Chapters 6 and 
7, respectively). 
The argument will proceed as follows. First. a general discussion of hO\\' to 
approach the problem of space will be rendered, and an argument will be made 
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for considering the relevance of class struggle to it. Second. it will be clarified 
what it means to talk about the 'production of space' and W h ~ T T the term 'mode 
of production' can serve as a useful heuristic device to explain spatial patterns. 
Third, a discussion of the difference between feudal and capitalist space \ \ ~ i l l l
be examined, with reference to the different class relations that these modes of 
production embody, and thus the different social purpose that the spatial selTes 
in each mode. This will serve to illuminate key tendencies for spatial production 
under capitalism that will then be further theoretically and empirically analysed 
in terms of the transition to neo-liberalism in the following chapter. Fourth, 
the role of resistance in shaping the production of place, space and scale will be 
discussed. before finally some conclusions are drawn. All of these above points 
will underscore the key claim that struggles over space are ever more integral to 
the modern world. 
2.1 A crisis of subject matter? 
As mentioned in the introduction, within the historical-materialist geographical 
tradition, approaches to political economy and world order have focused almost 
exclusively on the power of capital and issues of capital accumulation (see inter 
alia Harvey, 2006b, 2010; Smith. 2008). Although serving a useful function in 
pointing out some inherent antinomies of capital, there is also the danger here that 
the explanation of contemporary phenomena like globalisation are presented in 
highly structuralist and teleological terms, which focus only on the dominant (and 
therefore singular) narrative, thus eliding the multifaceted processes of contesta-
tion and subversion that have concomitantly been taking place, and unwittingly 
giving intellectual coherence to such a process. Whilst recognising the importance 
of discerning a logic to the movement of capitaL this chapter is equally concerned 
with highlighting the dialectically related power of those who capital employs, 
seeks to employ, or else relies upon in other forms (such as the unemployed v,ho 
can function as an industrial reserve army), as possible agents of change. It is 
also concerned with the potential of those who refuse to be dispossessed. 
In concurrence with John Holloway (2002a: 40) it is argued that: "'Yhat \ye 
want is not a theory of domination but a theory of the ,'ulnerability of domina-
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tion." This changes the focus somewhat of who the subject of a given piece of 
research is. All too often, intellectual production is solely geared to analysing 
processes of capitalist expansion. Capital, in other words, becomes the subject 
of study, whereas people and places affected by this are viewed as the passive 
objects (Lebowitz, 2003; Chassen-Lopez, 2004: 17).1 Focussing upon the crisis-
ridden nature of the structure of capitalism, John Holloway has offered a different 
type of paradigm, whereby we put 'crisis' at the forefront of our thinking. This 
change in perspective fundamentally affects one's research agenda. As Holloway 
(2008, personal interview, Cholula) explains; 
Crisis is important first and foremost as a methodological approach. 
What interests us is not the question of how capitalism works, but 
rather the question how on earth we get out of it. When we are talking 
about living in a crisis, we are not claiming that capitalism is about 
to collapse, but rather stressing that the question is one of crisis, 
the question is not one of domination. If you start with domination 
you close the world all the time. It seems to me, if you start with 
domination, there is absolutely no way out. 
The approach developed here, whilst concurring with the spirit of Holloway's 
argument, demurs slightly, by arguing that in fact we do need to understand how 
capital works to understand how to get out of it. Without an understanding 
of the overarching field of force, we are unable to understand present fault-lines 
that are capable of being transformed into future earthquakes. Marx (1852/1996: 
847) was profoundly aware of this need to explore the potential for the future 
from the standpoint of the present, writing: "Men (sic) make their own history, 
but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under circumstances 
chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and 
transmitted from the past." The spaces of capital and the spaces of resistance in 
other words cannot be separated from one another. As Bieler and Morton (2001) 
have argued, structure and agency can therefore be thought of as analogous to a 
Gordian knot. 
IThis rejection of the singular narrative has been at the heart of much of post-colonial theory 
(see Ashcroft et at., 2002). 
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It will be argued below that appealing to Gramsci's notion of hegemony al-
lows us to both understand the structural power capital is able to wield, \yhilst 
at the same time being attentive to the manner in which this process is a c t i y e l ~ ' '
shaped by subaltern groups. Hegemony is defined by Gramsci (1971: 57) as the 
spiritual and moral leadership which the dominant class is able to exercise over 
society as a whole. Holloway (2005: 270) derides this concept, labelling it as a 
cop-out which crosses over to bourgeois theory. He further objects that it does 
not contain a theory of its own gravedigger and reinforces rather than dissolves 
relations of domination. However, this is based on a misreading of the w a ~ ' ' in 
which Gramsci deployed the term, viewing it as a continuous process rather than 
an accomplishment. 2 Hegemony does not remove the contradictions inherent in 
capitalist society. What it illuminates is the manner in which economy. politics 
and culture are interwoven, and how political power is constantly renegotiated as 
new social needs are produced and demands created (Lefebvre, 1947 /2008: ~ 9 ) . .
Capitalism can thus be viewed as an inherently unstable form of power which is 
modified by subaltern class struggles and relies upon consent more than any sys-
tem before it (Gramsci, 1971: 52-55; Lefebvre, 1991: 57; Rosebury, 1994). This 
brings us to the question of values. As David Harvey (1996: 10-11) has argued: 
"meaningful political action (and for that matter, even meaningful analysis) can-
not proceed without some embedded notions of value, if only as a determination 
as to what is, or is not important to analyse intellectually let alone to struggle 
for politically." However, Harvey asks us not to conceive of values in timeless, 
non-dialectical terms. Rather we need to look at "processes of valuation." As 
stated in Chapter 1, in order to do this, we need to read history 'backwards', 
taking as our starting point the relative 'permanences' that exist in the here and 
now and examining the processes and flows that make up these permanences and 
which are essential to sustaining them (ibid: 63). It is only through doing this 
that we can grasp the essential point that place, space and scale are in fact, social 
relations (Massey, 1994: 2-4). 
2The concept of hegemony does not necessarily remove the idea that capitalism creates its 
own grave diggers. It does however move away from the yulgar l\larxist view that this is pre-
determined and bound to the 'iron laws of history'. Moreover, it can help highlight how the 
gravediggers themselves can fall into the very graves they have dug. 
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That place and space are products of our interrelations and are thus dependent 
upon particular social processes to sustain them can be witnessed by examining 
any historical city of splendour that now serves as a tourist attraction under the 
name of ' r u i n s ~ ~ (Massey, 2005: 3). Concomitant with this is also a change in the 
place's social function. For example, Machu Picchu clearly had a highly differ-
ent social purpose when it was the main seat of monarchical power in the Inca 
Empire than it does now as a commodified global attraction. l\Iore recently, the 
breakup of the Soviet Union and the re-structuring of global capital, which has 
seen the decline of former Fordist heartland cities with the onset of deindustrial-
ization in the West, and the converse surge in the development of industry in the 
emerging economies, also points to the contingent and thus changeable nature 
of space. The question that one must therefore ask, is, what are the dominant 
processes constructing modern forms of space? The approach adopted here 1 when 
answering this, is rooted in the historical materialist tradition of understanding 
the social world through processes of class struggle. It should be noted that with 
the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, 
as well as the increasing neo-liberalization of China, issues of class have come to 
be viewed as an anachronism that the social sciences can do without. If indeed 
the "past is a foreign country" where people do things differently, as LP Hartley 
(1953: 9) famously stated in his classic novel The Go-Between, then it has been 
conjectured that the language of class could only be understood there. However, 
Lyotard's (1984) invective against meta-narratives notwithstanding, it is submit-
ted here that notions of class and class struggle remain vital for our understanding 
of the modern world. Without appeal to such concepts, our understanding of con-
temporary sources of structural power is highly blunted (Jameson, 1991: 349). 
Likewise without an analysis of class we are blinded to one of the most perni-
cious and pervasive forms of exploitation that exists today.3 As Smith (2000: 
1011-1016) rightly points out, the social sciences stopped using the term 'class' 
3Harvey (2010) refutes those who have claimed that the modern world has become too 
complicated for issues of class to be relevant any longer due to the multiplicity of subject 
positions we occupy, arguing: "Class is a role not a label that attaches to persons. We play 
multiple roles all the time. But we do not say that because most of us play the role of both car 
driver and pedestrians that it is impossible to plan a decent city around an analysis of relations 
between drivers and pedestrians." 
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precisely at a time when its relevance was being re-asserted with a vengeance in 
terms of global class formation, most notably in Eastern Europe, Asia and Latin 
America. Indeed, class remains the big 'non-issue' within the global economy. 
This stress on class struggle should not be interpreted as some wistful longing 
for a politics of certainty, but rather an imperative explanatory device able to 
illuminate key issues in today's often opaque world. Frederic Jameson (ibid: 331) 
succinctly explains the connections between class politics and political mobiliza-
tions, postulating that, 
What is sometimes characterised as a nostalgia for class politics of 
some older type is generally more likely to be simply a 'nostalgia' 
for politics tout court: given the way in which periods of intense 
politicisation and withdrawal are modelled on great economic rhythms 
of boom and bust of the business cycle, to describe this feeling as 
'nostalgia' is about as adequate as to characterise the body's hunger 
before food as a 'nostalgia for food'. 
Thus, concurrent with David Harvey (2006a: 202) when explaining geographi-
cal processes of restructuring, it is argued here that, "if it looks like class struggle 
and acts like class war then we have to name it unashamedly for what it is." 
The further case for this assertion will be made over the rest of this chapter and 
subsequent chapters. This does not mean of course accepting that other struggles 
around issues such as gender, sexuality, the environment etc are not important, 
merely that they largely predate capitalism, and thus the form they adopt within 
capitalist society is one dominated by an ever deepening class antagonism that 
is shaping society (Lebowitz, 2003: 151; OIlman, 2003: 162-3). In other words, 
it is hard to discuss these without also engaging in a wider debate about class. 
An understanding of modern capitalism for example cannot proceed without a 
discussion of natural resource exploitation or an understanding of how class strug-
gle has been both racialised and gendered (Smith, 2000: 1013-1015). This does 
not mean we can be insensitive to issues such as cultural difference. Rather, it 
is to assert that these questions are frequently inseparable from place-specific 
constructs of political-economic power (Harvey, 1993: 21). This point shall be 
taken up in detail when indigenous struggles in southern Mexico are considered 
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in Chapters 6 and 7. In relation to these issues, 1Iarx (1843/1996: 766) perhaps 
put it best when he argued: "It is by no means sufficient to ask: who should 
emancipate and who should be emancipated? Criticism has to be concerned with 
a third question. It must ask: What kind of emancipation is involved and what 
are its underlying conditions." 
The central issue therefore, as Michael Lebowitz (2003: 186-7) points out. 
is whether these new social actors take part in collective struggles against cap-
ital's role as mediator of social life, and help identify new organizing centres 
of resistance (on the relation of this to environmental politics. see in particular 
O'Connor, 1998). These struggles therefore become class projects when they en-
tail "a direct challenge to the circulation and accumulation of capital" (Harvey. 
1996: 401). 
As well as seeking to contribute to an understanding of space and class for-
mation under capitalist social relations, this chapter also seeks to make an inter-
vention into the debates surrounding the future of geo-politics. A concern with 
what the development of capitalism implies for the future of the state form and 
issues of inter-state conflict has long played an important role in historical ma-
terialist writings (Kautsky, 1914/1970: 151; Lenin, 1917/1987a). Within recent 
Marxist circles the future of geo-politics has once again become a central cate-
gory of debate (see inter alia Anievas, 2010; Harvey, 2003; Robinson, 2004a, 2007; 
Wood, 2005). However, many of these debates (the protestations of the authors 
notwithstanding) actually view geo-politics in rather state-centric terms. That 
is to say they fail to come to terms with novel processes of de-territorialisation 
and re-territorialisation and thus continue to focus only on conflicts taking place 
between nation-states, thereby ignoring internal and/or sub-national forms of 
geopolitical conflict (Callinicos, 2007; Harvey, 2003; Van der Pijl, 2007). Others 
commit the opposite error of assuming processes of complete de-territorialisation 
and thus construct an aspatial view of globalization which assumes there is now 
simply one form of global society (Ohmae, 1999; Hardt and Negri, 2000; Robin-
son, 2004a, for a critique of this position see Brenner, 2004: 47-56; 1Iassey. 2005: 
82). These theories thus fail to engage in a substantial manner with any theory 
of the spatial as an ongoing site of change. This chapter, whilst mindful of the 
key role of the state in the production of space under capitalist social relations. 
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is also attentive to the manner in which the scalar organization of the state is 
itself a contingent phenomenon that is currently being reconfigured under con-
temporary patterns of geographical restructuring to include both supra-national 
and sub-national articulations of hegemony (a point to be taken up in greater 
detail in Chapters 6 and 7). Drawing from the tradition of critical geo-politics. 
this chapter thus aims to deploy the term in the wider sense of the meaning e.g. 
the struggles to shape place, space and scale for a particular social purpose. This 
entails that we not only take cognisance of the role of the state in inducing partic-
ular transformations, but also take the historical geography of the state form as a 
contingent set of social relations that is subject to evolution and change (a theme 
to be taken up in more detail in Chapters 3, 4 and 5). It will be demonstrated 
here that a differentiated geography remains vital to the political functioning of 
capitalism, and likewise that it is through the creation of this geographical differ-
ence that the politics of capitalism expresses itself most vividly. As David Harvey 
(2010: 161) argues in relation to this point: "Geographical diversity is a neces-
sary condition for, rather than a barrier to, the reproduction of capital. If the 
geographical diversity does not already exist, then it has to be created." Whilst 
this is an important point we must keep in mind, it is equally vital that processes 
of resistance are also recognised as vital to geo-politics and the production of 
space. If there was no resistance there would be no need for a political project 
(0 Tuathail, 1996: 12). Moreover, as will later be explained, resistance is itself 
the pre-supposition and major force of spatial difference. Lefebvre (1966/2009: 
1979/2009) refers to this process of resistance as autogestion. This is defined 
as an anti-statist collective struggle to shape social life in the interests of the 
subaltern classes that aims to overcome alienated conditions of existence under 
capitalism. Rather than an end condition, autogestion is theorised as a process 
that at the same time serves a reflexive, auto-pedagogical function. Thus, "'Each 
time a social group ... refuses to accept passively its conditions of existence, of life, 
or of survival, each time such a group forces itself not only to understand but to 
master its conditions of existence, autogestion is occurring (Lefebvre, 1979/2009: 
135). A utogestion aims at the creation of a genuinely differential space, ""which 
represents for capitalism an antagonistic and ruinous tendency" (Lefeb\Te. 2003: 
27 
2.2 The production of space 
98). This idea of alternative spaces of resistance will be developed in detail in 
Chapters 6 and 7. 
2.2 The production of space 
"Geography", Gearoid 0 Tuathail (1996: 1) argues, "is about power. Although 
often assumed to be innocent, the geography of the world is not a product of 
nature but a product of histories of struggle between competing authorities over 
the power to organise, occupy and administer space." Perhaps the figure who 
has done most to inspire thinking on space and its importance for everyday life 
is Henri Lefebvre (see in particular Lefebvre, 1947/2008, 1991, 2009). In the 
opening pages of his classic treatise The Production of Space, Lefebvre (1991) 
highlights how 'space' is a much-misunderstood concept. He seeks to make the 
distinction between the classic Euclidian or Cartesian concept of space which 
views the world in terms of a fixed, timeless and mappable essence; somehow 
'out there' and simply occupied by actors, and conversely social space that is 
an ensemble of social relations that is produced through human agency (see also 
Brenner, 1999: 41). The key point that Lefebvre wishes to stress is that, contrary 
to how some philosophers have conceived space, it is not simply imagined into 
being, nor does it exist independently of social action. Rather, spaces are created 
and transformed through material activity. Mental spaces and social practice 
according to this conception can thus not be divorced (Agnew and 0 Tuahtail, 
1992; 0 Tuathail, 1996: 51, see also Bieler and Morton, 2008).4 Space in other 
words is a social product and should not be conceived as the "passive locus of 
social relations" (Lefebvre, 1991: 26, 11). Rather 'space' needs to be seen as 
4Lest this be thought of as something of an abstract discussion, numerous authors have 
shown that the way in which we conceive of space has direct political effects. For example 
European colonial expansion could be justified on the basis that particular territories appeared 
blank on European maps (0 Tuathail, 1996: 25). As Doreen Massey (2005: 4) powerfully 
argues with regard to this mindset, it is to ignore the essential multiplicity of the spatial and is 
a systematic means of denying other cultures and peoples their own history (cf. 'Volf, 1997). It 
is this very type of discourse however that dominates modern developmentalism. Thus spaces 
that have not subjected themselves to capitalist social relations are derided as 'backwards' and 
in need of transformation or opening (as well be explored in detail in Chapters 4 and 5). Once 
again then, we see that mental conceptions are intimately connected to political beha\·iour. 
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the embodiment of these very relations. This is because "the social relations of 
production have a social existence to the extent that they have a spatial existence: 
they project themselves into a space, becoming inscribed there. and in the process 
producing that space itself' (Lefebvre, 1991: 129, see also f\,lassey, 1995; ~ l a s s e ~ · . .
2005: 9). Rather than the realm of stasis. the spatial instead therefore needs 
to be rethought as a site of ongoing production (Massey, 2005: 9-12). Space is 
thus not an empty stage onto which social relations are projected, but rather 
it is these relations themselves that contribute to the changing mise-en-scene 
of development. It is therefore through a reading of the spatial that the power 
relations of society can be uncovered. Once this point is recognised, it is a logical 
step to inquire about what production processes dominate society: how social 
relations are organized under that particular type of production process. and 
how these in turn affect the manner in which space is produced. The central 
question we must therefore ask is; "If space embodies social relationships how 
and why does it do so? And what relationships are they?" (Lefebvre, 1991: 27). 
For Lefebvre (ibid: 51) the important point to recognise is that all modes of 
production occupy particular spatial patterns and furthermore every society or 
mode of production produces its own space and rhythms of life (see also Jameson, 
1991: 364). This is necessary for society's reproduction. David Harvey (greatly 
influenced by the work of Lefebvre) clarifies with regard to this point; "Objective 
conditions of time and space are necessarily created though material practices 
that serve to reproduce social life" (Harvey, 1990: 204). 
The concept 'mode of production' thus becomes a key term for our investiga-
tion, although as Lefebvre (1976: 61-63; 2003: 88) qualifies, this does not mean 
reducing space solely to the generic features of a mode of production: nor should 
the concept be 'rigidified: and coherence stressed at the expense of contradiction. 
Instead, as Eric Wolf (1997: 76) has outlined: "the utility of the concept does not 
lie in classification but in its capacity to underlie the strategic relations involved 
in the deployment of social labour by organized human pluralities.': It further-
more reveals "the political-economic relations that underlie, orient and constrain 
interaction." This captures the proper dialectical relationship bet\yeen being and 
becoming. Understanding spatiality through an analysis of modes of production 
thus reveals a fundamental point that whilst, on one hand. spaces are actively 
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produced through human agency. on the other hand they conversely exert, once 
created, a powerful influence serving to shape the rules and boundaries of our 
interaction (Peck and Tickell, 2002). It is in this sense we can draw upon Gram-
sci's notion of hegemony: the means by which class forces are able to exercise a 
leading role within society. Indeed, Gramsci is profoundly m\Tare of how spatial 
forms serve to influence public opinion from architectural forms to street layouts 
(Gramsci. 1971: 30-33; Bieler and Morton, 2008: 118, see also Jessop, 2005).5 
Lefebvre (1991: 26) draws upon this concept to proclaim that space: "in ad-
dition to being a means of production is also a means of control and hence of 
domination, of power." 
In the need to uncover the relationships embedded in spaces we need to move 
from analysing things 'in space' to analysing the production of spaces themselves 
(Lefebvre, 1991: 89). Drawing upon Marx's analysis of commodity fetishism, 
where Marx (1867/1974: 76-87) took the everyday appearance of the commod-
ity and abstracted backwards to show the social relations it concealed, so too 
does Lefebvre seek to uncover the relationships that lie behind the production 
of particular spaces. This calls for a dialectical method of investigation in \vhich 
the properties of the totality or social whole are sought to be rendered explicit. 
All too often in the realm of modern academic inquiry space is not treated as 
a conceptual whole, but rather particular pieces of it are examined. This is an 
explicitly bourgeois method of investigation that ignores the vital role of inter-
nal relations that relate these constituent parts to one another (Lefebvre. 1991: 
91, 107; Ollman, 2003).6 Moreover, as Eric Wolf (1997: 18) has definitively 
demonstrated, it is a fallacy to believe that particular spaces have ever existed 
in isolation independent from "larger encompassing relationships, unaffected by 
larger fields of force." This does not mean spatial differences are ignored. Rather 
it requires that we are attentive to how spatial differences are produced (cf. Trot-
sky, 1930/1962: 22-25). As a methodological approach this requires that we are 
5Perhaps the paradigmatic example of this would be Haussmann's redesigning of Paris under 
Louis Napoleon to deal with concerns about potential insurrectionary activity (Scott, 1998: 61). 
However, a stroll through any major Mexican city (as just one example) reveals the manner in 
which street names foster a sense of collective national identity bearing as they do the names 
of larger than life characters of the country's history as well as symbolic dates. 
6Michel Foucault, in his work on the prison (1979) and the clinic (1989). although tracing the 
genealogy of these spatial developments, fails explore the possibilities for their transgression. 
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cognisant "of processes that transcend separable cases. moving in, through, and 
beyond them, and transforming them as they proceed" (Wolf. 1997: 17) .. -\s ,,,as 
set out in the introduction, this requires that we utilise the concept of uneven 
and combined development as a social theory able to grasp this phenomenon, 
whilst being attentive to its particular characteristics under capitalism as a mode 
of production (a point to be elaborated later in the chapter). 
Thus far, we have established that it make sense. and indeed is vital to recog-
nise that 'space' is a socially-produced phenomenon. The case has also been made 
for analysing space in terms of a dominant mode of production. We need to move 
now from the abstract to the concrete and look at the very type of social relations 
that predominate under the capitalist mode of production to see what (if indeed 
anything) is particular to this kind of space. In order to draw out the unique 
nature of capitalist spatiality, it is essential that we contrast it with the spatial 
patterns of feudalism, as the transition from one mode to another ought to imply 
that rather different types of space are produced (as each mode mobilises social 
labour in a distinct manner). This step is vital to the dialectic method of inquiry. 
as it helps explain essential preconditions of capitalist accumulation and in doing 
so itself illuminates an essential element of capitalism's character (OIlman, 2003: 
149). As Marx (1867/1974: 668) writes in relation to this point: "The economic 
structure of capitalist society has grown out of the economic structure of feudal 
society. The dissolution of the latter set free the elements of the former.·' This 
shift should consequently exemplify a novel articulation of spatial forms (Lefeb-
vre, 1991: 46). 
2.3 Kings, nobles and churches: the Holy Trin-
ity of feudal space 
With regard to feudalism, Lefebvre (1991: 53) is quite clear that, "medieval 
society - that is, the feudal mode of production, with its variants and local pe-
culiarities - created its own space... l\lanors, monasteries, cathedrals - these were 
the strong points anchoring the network of lanes and main roads to a landscape 
transformed by peasant communities." 
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When discerning the logic to this spatiality, it is vital to note that under feu-
dal and absolutist property relations "the strategies for expanded reproduction 
of the ruling classes, organized in the patrimonial state, remained tied to the 
logic of 'political accumulation'" (Teschke, 2002: 11). Although they contained 
differences, both feudalism and absolutism can thus be classified as variants of 
a tributary mode of production where extra-economic coercion pertained as the 
dominant method of mobilizing social labour. This brought with it specific geo-
graphical patterns that were relatively fixed. As l\Iarx outlines (1844/2007: 61) 
"The serf is the adjunct of the land. Likewise the lord of an entailed estate, the 
first born son, belongs to the land. It inherits him." Drawing upon this idea, 
Lefebvre (2008/1947: 30-31) argues therefore that labour and everyday life were 
far more interwoven in this period, giving a particular rhythm to life as well as 
providing for a form of collectivity. 
Another key aspect of feudal space was the preponderance of religious power, 
with Jerusalem believed to be at the centre of the world and representations of di-
vine order dominating the cities in the form of ecclesiastical property (0 TuathaiL 
1996: 3). This dominant iconography also corresponded to the organization of 
political power. As Lefebvre (1991: 266-67) succinctly illustrates: "the social 
edifice resembled a cathedral" and indeed these imposing monuments themselves 
helped sustain "the belief that the tops of the cities grazed the vault of Heaven 
and embodied the celestial virtues; the belief that those at the top of the social 
pyramid rubbed shoulders with divinity." 
This production of space inculcated with notions of the divine holds true 
for almost all tributary forms of society. One may think of the Aztec city of 
Teotihuacan, or the Ancient pyramids of Egypt to realize this is not simply a 
European phenomenon. Indeed, this claiming of a divine right of power is an 
essential hallmark of all tributary societies where those at the apex of political 
power not only seek to separate themselves from the rest of the population, but 
"claim supernatural origins and validation" (Wolf, 1997: 83). The key point 
to recognise is that class relations were very much legible within this mode of 
production. It was a type of space that was "imbued with social meaning" (Smith, 
2008: 107). As Lefebvre (1991: 267) concludes, this mode of production "if not 
utterly transparent. certainly had a great limpidity." No one could observe the 
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Hacienda or the estate and not see the social relations involved. To borrow from 
Marx and Engels (1845/1996: 814), everywhere the ruling space was the space of 
the ruling classes. Indeed as a method of political control this was an essential 
feature of feudalism. One can thus discern that the social function of space was 
to reinforce a narrow form of class rule through the projection of fundamentally 
unequal social relations that had to be naturalized for the system of exploitation 
to function efficiently. Furthermore, space during this epoch was f a l l a c i o l l s l ~ ' '
viewed as an object that could be captured, rather than something that was 
constantly produced. This was highly interwoven with the dominant property 
relations of the era which governed the form of spatial integration.7 
Although, as Eric Wolf (1997) has documented, long-distance trade routes 
existed prior to this era of European expansion, we can note here that outright 
plunder became the dominant form of spatial integration, leading to the creation 
of a global scale for the accumulation of wealth, from the sixteenth century on-
wards (Lefebvre, 1991: 280; Sassen, 2006: 82). This was directly related to the 
expansion of European empires. With empire building in Europe itself proving 
too expensive, new 'peripheral' sources of wealth were consequently sought out. 
In seeking to explain this production of space and spatial relations, it is helpful, 
following Leon Trotsky (1930/1962: 10), to ask the question of what the 'social 
needs' of a government are. As well as relying upon extra-economic coercion as 
the primary means of obtaining surplus, the prevailing economic philosophy of 
this epoch was one of mercantilism, which implied a fixed limit to the world's 
wealth. Under this system, territorial accumulation was seen as a key source of 
income. With limits on the amount of tribute that could be extracted at home, 
new wealth had to be sought abroad. This was necessary to enhance the pres-
tige of the dynastic states, helping to consolidate the rule of particular leaders 
as continuing economic growth was essential to maintaining their support from 
rival claimants to power. Furthermore, this was a distinct class strategy that 
7Kees van der Pijl (2007) has recently made the case for looking at historical forms of spatial 
integration through the concept of 'modes of foreign relations'. However, this is to ignore the 
fundamental question of why it is that societies spread beyond their immediate locale. Modes 
of foreign relations can thus be better understood as arising from the imperatiws generated 
from the mode of production as this chapter will seek to demonstrate. 
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served to reproduce these particular social property relations (Teshcke. 2002: 11-
12). Taken together, these 'social needs' translated into aggressive geo-political 
competition between proprietary kingships that fought one another for wealth 
and trading advantages in a perceived zero-sum game ( A g n e w ~ ~ 1994: 65; Sassen, 
2006: 84; Teschke, 2002: 22). 
Principles of territorial exclusivity - much taken for granted today - were far 
more fluid in this epoch, governed as they were by multiple overlapping spatial 
domains of power, occupied by various groups including kings, lords, nobles and 
church authorities (Sassen, 2006: 146). However, with the increasing accumu-
lation of wealth from the sixteenth century onwards - and the accompanying 
growth of commercial centres - previous spatial forms such as medieval towns, 
fiefdoms, city states and principalities were slowly subordinated to the space of 
the nation (Lefebvre, 1991: 280). Highlighting the historical significance of these 
developments, Sassen (2007: 5) argues that: 
Notwithstanding different origins and starting times across the world, 
the history of the modern state can be read as the work of render-
ing national just about all the crucial features of society: authority, 
identity, territory, security, law and economic accumulation. Periods 
preceding those of the ascendance of the national state saw rather 
different types of scaling, with territories subject to multiple systems 
of rule rather than the exclusive authority of the state 
The production of national space had the corollary of constructing things 
such as capital, state, gender, age, and of course, class ( G h a n i ~ ~ 1993: 56). This 
development not only implied the development of a larger market and commercial 
relations that could draw in pre-existing ones, it also entailed a particular class 
strategy of violence as it presupposed "a political power controlling and exploiting 
the resources of the market or the growth of productive forces in order to maintain 
and further its rule" (Lefebvre, 1991: 112). A spatial division of labour was also 
established between the town and countryside (Lefebvre, 1991: 256; 2003: 84). 
The development of the space of the nation was thus tightly interwoven with 
the increasing accumulation of wealth. The a n a l ~ T s i s s of Eric \Yolf (1997: 99-109) 
concurs with this point, demonstrating how the boundaries of modern European 
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nation states - largely unquestioned today - could, and indeed \\·ere. drawn yery 
differently in the past, for example with sea-based empires. or combinations of 
various power alliances. However, the emergence of the nation-state as we know 
it today was intimately bound up with the expansion of trade and markets. This 
not only necessitated an organization larger than any single merchant, guild, 
or body of soldiers, but also required an apparatus of control and coercion to 
maintain tributary forms of power and commit this form of social labour to a 
particular goal. The origin of the modern state-system was therefore inseparable 
from the furtherance of class rule. 8 The development of national and global 
markets also led to the rise of new social groups such as merchants, bankers and 
manufacturers who would later begin to consolidate themselves as a class opposed 
to the restrictive forms of property relations that inhered under feudalism (Sassen, 
2006: 87). The important point to note here is that the international system of 
states in fact preceded capitalism. To borrow Hannes Lacher's (2006: 16) phrase, 
capitalism was 'born into' a particular form of spatiality in many ways inimical 
to its form of social relations.9 This is in contrast to the received wisdom that 
associates the rise of the space of the nation-state directly with the development of 
capitalism, an argument that in fact elides much of what is novel about its spatial 
dynamics. The fallacy of this position is to confuse the development of wealth 
with the development of capital. As Marx (1867/1974: 668) is at pains to point 
out though: "In themselves money and commodities are no more capital than are 
the means of production and of subsistence." Contrary to those who therefore see 
a linear path from merchant wealth to modern capitalism, Wolf (1997: 85, 87) 
argues capitalism actually represents a qualitatively new form of mobilising social 
labour. On this basis we must take care to distinguish between merchant wealth 
and capital. This is because, as Wolf continues (1997: 87), the merchants of 
this time "did not yet buy labour power in a market in which workers compete 
BEngels (1935: 333) offers a useful periodisation to show how particular periods of class 
rule display corresponding changes in state formation, from the ancient societies of the Greeks, 
through the I\Iiddle Ages to the present. This nexus between the state and class power will 
be thoroughly discussed when the notion of passive revolution is introduced in Chapter 3, and 
continued in in the proceeding chapters. 
9This point is surprisingly not considered by Harvey (2001: 326) who rejects claims that 
"a prior theorisation of the rise of the capitalist state is necessary to reconstruct the historical 
geography of capitalism." 
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for available jobs, and he did not yet control the actual labour process. Surplus 
was not extracted not as surplus value but through unequal exchange within the 
framework of monopolistic and quasi-tributary relationships." \Ye therefore need 
to recognise that capitalism came to be incubated within a spatial structure not 
of its own making. However, as Sassen (2006: 15) has demonstrated, it \"as 
the development of institutional capabilities in this era that would then become 
dislodged into a new type of organising logic. This would entail a long process 
of class struggle and a reconfiguring of this state form, leading to fundamentally 
different forms of spatial and scalar organization. The key question, therefore, 
is what is the specific geography that characterises capitalist society. and how is 
this geography altered as capitalism progresses (Smith, 2008: 3). Additionally. 
how are these spaces of capital contested by the spaces of resistance? 
2.4 Spaces of capital 
To understand how capitalist space contrasts with that of feudalism it is essential 
to clarify what the distinguishing features of this mode of production are. l\Iarx 
(1894/1977: 879-80) identifies the hallmarks of capitalism as: generalized com-
modity production by 'formally free' wage labourers, surplus value as the "aim 
and determining motive of production" and lastly competition between individ-
ual capitals leading to a continual investment in the means of production in order 
to expand profit. Although all modes of production seek to fashion space accord-
ing to their own particular dictates, "Under the social relations of capitalism ... all 
elements assume a commodity form" (Harvey, 2006b: 223). Capitalism can be 
distinguished from previous class societies to the degree "it has integrated all ma-
jor (and, increasingly most minor) life functions into a single system dominated 
by the law of value and the accompanying power of money, but also in the degree 
to which it seeks to hide this achievement" (Ollman, 2003: 3, emphasis added). 
This is a point worth dwelling upon. In contrast to the space of feudalism \vhich 
explicitly sought to project relations of domination in order to achieve social con-
trol, under capitalism, which relies on the formally free exchange of equivalents 
on the market this relation of class dominance must be hidden (Lefebvre. 1991: , 
311). The fact that we therefore need to uncover the social relationships inscribed 
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in space is a phenomenon specific to the production of what Lefebvre calls the 
'abstract space' of capitalism. For 11arx. the rise of capitalism involyed the in-
creasing domination of exchange value over use value leading to a situation ,,,here 
we 'fetishise commodities'. This is the process whereby the specific social rela-
tions that cornmodities contain are obscured and instead we come to endow them 
with an objective reality of their own (for example the idea that money exists 
independently of labour power). Rather than our interactions being mediated 
by actual relations, they come increasingly to be mediated by 'things'. The k e ~ ' '
point to note is that this can only occur when labour itself is transformed into 
a commodity that can be bought and sold, losing its creative character and be-
coming an empty universal, measurable by time (abstract labour). Just as ~ I a r x x
sought to show that, rather than things, what we really needed was a theory of 
the social relations that these things contained, so Lefebvre (2003: 87) argues 
that when people talk about and describe spaces, what we need is a theory of the 
production of space. 
Lefebvre (1991: 49) shows how the transformation of class relations also leads 
to a particular spatial form: "It was during this time that productiYe activity 
(labour) became no longer one with the process of reproduction which perpet-
uated social life; but in becoming independent of that process, labour fell prey 
to abstraction, whence abstract social labour - and abstract space." In must be 
stressed that the term 'abstract' does not in any way imply that this space is any 
less real. As Merrifield (2006: 133) states: "Abstract space is a reality insofar 
as it is embedded in absolute space." Space is thus 'abstract' in the sense that 
all spaces produced under capitalism, although they may differ in appearance, 
increasingly are moulded to the same social purpose; to produce surplus value. 
This creates space that is both homogenous and fractured. It is homogenous 
in the sense that commodity and capital circulation requires that within space: 
things are equivalent and interchangeable, and fractured in the sense of space 
being broken down into various forms of private property (Lefebvre. 2003: 87). 
The transition to capitalism, as discussed above. involves an essential change 
in the form of class rule, from that of the landed nobility to that of the bourgeoisie 
who are able to command social labour by \'irtue of the fact they own the means 
of production and control the flow of money power. Lefebvre (1991: 11) implores 
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us to recognise that space does not remain unaffected by this new organizing logic. 
Rather, the production of space is the sine qua non for the reproduction of cap-
italist social relations (Lefebvre, 1976). The geography of capitalism therefore 
entails "the increasing displacement of inherited pre-capitalist landscapes \\'ith 
specifically capitalist sociospatial configurations" (Brenner, 2004: 33-3-1). Thus 
feudal space, dominated by monasteries cathedrals, manor houses/haciendas, and 
landscapes dotted with peasant communities gives way to a space "founded on 
vast networks of banks, business centres and major productive entities ... also on 
motorways, airports and information centres" (Lefebvre, 1991: 53). As numer-
ous scholars have shown, the production of the built environment through fixed 
capital formation is a necessary precondition for the extraction and circulation 
of surplus value (Harvey, 2006b: 380; Smith, 2008: 6; Brenner, 1999: -1-1--15). For 
example, capitalist manufacturing industry necessitates the geographical form of 
the factory, that workers live within accessible distance to the place of work, the 
places which sell the goods produced, as well as the roads and infrastructure to 
move commodities from one area to another. However, as well as relying on a 
certain form of fixity, capital must also remain in motion in order for it to be able 
to seek productive outlets (Brenner, 1998). Whereas past modes of production 
had an essential conservative basis to their spatial form, seeking to hold down 
transformation where possible, and relying for political control on an essential fix-
ity of space, capital develops as a revolutionary mode of production that actively 
needs to transform space for its own survival. Thus, capital is forced to create 
"new objective conditions of time and space in its search for profits" (Harvey, 
1996: 240). Capitalism in other words has to constantly produce 'the new'. This 
process involves contradictions as well as problems of how to contain this socially 
(Lefebvre, 1976: 11). For example, the manner in which space is transformed 
can profoundly alter the character of particular places creating opportunities for 
some whilst dispossession for others. These transformations therefore frequently 
become the object of intense struggle (against de-industrialisation, highway or 
airport construction, the closure of mines etc.). This revolutionary and unset-
tling dynamic that capital brought with it ,,'as captured famously by i\Iarx and 
Engels (1848/1996: 828) in the Communist Manifesto when they "Tote \\'ith re-
gard to this transition: "All that is solid melts into the air, all that is h o l ~ ' ' is 
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profaned, and man [sic] is at last compelled to face ,yith sober senses his real 
conditions of life, and his relations with his kind." 
However, it must be remembered that this process unfurled, and continues to 
unfurl unevenly across space. This is, at times elided by scholars such as Benno 
Teschke (2002: 31) who characterises the shift from absolutism to capitalism in 
Europe as representing the transition from political to economic accumulation. 
However, whilst this may be true as an over-arching ideal type sociological clas-
sification, it ignores the fact that the political accumulation working in symbiosis 
with economic accumulation remained an essential pre-condition for capit alism 
as well as an ongoing endemic feature.lO Teschke in other words relies on a far too 
simplistic periodisation, viewing the transition from one mode of production to 
another in highly rigid terms. However, as was stressed earlieL the sociological 
term 'mode of production' should not be thought of as all-encompassing as it 
includes not only emergent but also residual counter-forces and tendencies (an 
important point to be returned to not only in the next chapter when the 'transna-
tional thesis' is critically examined, but also when we consider indigenous 'spaces 
of resistance' in Chapters 6 and 7). It is this amalgam of social forces that ne-
cessitates the construction of what Gramsci (1971) referred to as historical blocs 
of class forces under capitalist social relations. This is what makes a hegemonic 
project necessary (Jameson, 1991: 406). Ignoring the continuance of political 
accumulation alongside economic accumulation thus omits an essential element 
to the production of capitalist spatiality, namely the role of colonial and impe-
rialist practices (see Lenin, 1917/1987a; Ghani, 1993: 52-53). With regard to 
the importance of extra-economic conditions as a pre-requisite for capitalism, we 
need to examine the process of what }'Iarx refers to as 'primitive accumulation'. 
In the previous section it was discussed how feudal work contained an explicit 
spatial referent for serfs in the form of being tied to the land. However, with the 
gradual erosion of Lordly power, peasants became de-facto owners of the land 
they worked. This link between the control of the land and peasant labour mit-
igated against individuals wanting to alienate their labour to a third party (an 
essential requirement of capitalist accumulation). To arrive at this situation thus 
lOThis is what David Harvey (2003: 145-6) has usefully termed 'accumulation by disposses-
sion'. This concept will be returned to in detail in Chapters 6 and 7. 
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necessitated a form of political intervention. As Marx (1867/197--1: 668) puts it: 
"The capitalist system pre-supposes the complete separation of the labourers from 
all property in the means by which they can realise their labour. .. The so-called 
primitive accumulation, therefore, is nothing else than the historical process of di-
vorcing the producer from the means of production" a process that :0.Iarx reminds 
us is written "into the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire." Historically 
speaking therefore, capitalism cannot be reduced to an economic logic but rather, 
from its inception, has been a 'political-economic phenomenon' (:0.Ic\Iicheal, 2001: 
204). A pre-condition for the production of the 'abstract spaces' of capitalism 
was therefore also the production of particular 'absolute spaces' - those of priYate 
property and spatial exclusivity (Smith, 2008: 116). In the context of Britain 
(the birthplace of capitalism), the forcible expropriation of the peasantry though 
the 'Acts of Enclosure' paved the way for peasant migration and the rise of ur-
banism, a hallmark of capitalist geography. 'Freed' serfs were thus transformed 
into wage workers for nascent manufacturing, as a new type of city began to be 
constructed in the image of corporate rather than church power. 
The capacity of the state was vital to this project of transformation; a process 
James Scott (1998: 82) refers to as 'internal colonization'. However, the clyOnamic 
for this transition came from the absolutist social property relations pertaining in 
Europe that fostered aggressive geo-political competition. With tributary soci-
eties finding their ability to reinvest surpluses in war making capabilities limited, 
the British development of capitalism provided a model for others to follow, in 
which the newly developed credit system had proven to be more capable of financ-
ing war making capacities (Teschke, 2002: 32). As Marx (1867/197--1: (11) noted 
with regard to other nations of the time in the transition to capitalism: "they all 
employ the power of the state, the concentrated and organized force of society. to 
hasten, hot-house fashion, the process of the feudal mode of production into the 
capitalist mode, and to shorten the transition. Force is the midwife of every old 
society pregnant with a new o n e " ~ ~ Sassen (2006: 92) notes how the institutional 
capabilities developed in a past era were dislodged into a ne,\" organizing logic. 
Thus, "key capabilities developed in earlier phases can become foundational to 
a subsequent phase but only as part of the new organizational logic that in fact 
also foundationally repositions these logics." For example, in the English context. 
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structures of authority developed into a process of state formation that in turn 
facilitated the passage of laws to protect the emerging bourgeoisie. Howeyer. a ~ ~
Marx (1867/1974: 703) reminds us, "revolutions are not made by laws." Rather 
the rise of the modern state in England needs to be viewed as the result of a 
process of class struggle between the old nobility and the developing bourgeoisie 
who sought to establish themselves as a historical subject. It "'as owing to the 
restrictive form of property relations that the bourgeoisie were able to become 
hegemonic, that is to say, a class force that is able to lead through a modicum of 
consent rather than the use of pure force. Holloway (2002: 180) notes that the 
transition from feudalism was in many respects an escape from a mode of dom-
ination that was no longer acceptable to either side. Social change thus results 
when "the existing structure of society no longer satisfies the needs of people 
formed within that society" (Lebowitz, 2003: 163). A key element to introduce 
at this stage, however, is the uneven nature of the process of development and 
also therefore to state formation (this will be discussed in detaiL in relation to 
Latin America, in Chapter 4 and, Mexico, in Chapter 5). Within the context 
of England, for example, economic growth and accumulation had been quasi-
spontaneous. A compromise between the feudal nobility and the bourgeoisie in 
this context was reached in the process of state formation (Lefebvre, 1964/2009: 
57). However, this relationship was not repeated worldwide. ·'It is evident", 
Lefebvre (ibid: 58) consequently concludes, "that the problem of the state does 
not arise at all in the same way in a country where the state follows growth, 
where the crystallisation of the state follows economic development, and in coun-
tries where it precedes economic growth." State formation thus occurs within the 
dynamic of uneven and combined development. 
A central issue with the decline of feudal obligation to dynastic and religious 
authorities was that of political control (Agnew, 1994: 61). Gearoid 0 Tuathail 
(1996: 53) argues that it was through appeals to the notion of the 'state' as an 
entity locked in competitive struggle that both the violence of internal repression 
and the violence of imperial expansion were justified. 1Iarx (1843/1996: 775. 
769) noted that in relation to this, consciousness became split into public and 
private, and the state. although supposedly embodying the collective spirit of 
mankind, is used in actuality to preserve indi\'idual, egoistic rights: 
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Where the political state has achieved its full development, man leads 
a double life, a heavenly and an earthly life, not only in thought or 
consciousness but in actuality. In the political community he regards 
himself as a communal being, but in civil society he is active as a pri-
vate individual ... he is an imagined member of an imagined sovereignty. 
divested of his actual individual life and endowed with an unactual 
uni versali ty. 
As an ideological force then, the state takes over previous ideologies (Lefebvre, 
1975/2009: 99). The development of the capitalist state also became a mimetic 
form others sought to emulate (Trotsky, 1919/1962: 174). Again we see that 
one cannot understand the processes of state formation without considering the 
concomitant processes of class struggle. The key point to recognise however 
is that new relations of domination begin to be constructed within the previous 
spatial structure of power. The nation-state was thus used as a protective shell to 
incubate the bourgeois classes, consolidating their hegemony on a limited spatial 
scale before expanding outward.l1 Giovanni Arrighi (1994) argues in relation to 
this point that hegemonic orders are articulated on ever expanding spatial scales, 
from city-states, to nation-states, to supra-national institutions (this argument 
regarding the scalar organization of accumulation will be taken up in greater 
detail in the following chapter). This process, however, entailed the construction 
of a far greater degree of spatial exclusivity than had been seen hitherto, as a new 
organizing logic built on modern notions of parliamentary sovereignty began to be 
constructed (Teschke, 2002: 8; Brenner, 1999: 47). The space of the nation-state 
thus needs to be firmly historicised. Rather than being a 'natural phenomena' 
it was in fact a space produced and transformed in line with a particular social 
purpose - that of furthering class rule. At the foundations of the modern state 
there is "the forced equivalence of non-equivalents: the (forced) equalization of the 
unequal, the identification of the non-identical." From its inception the nation-
state has a logic of homogenisation about it, and plays a dual role both "as 
a reducer (of diversities, autonomies, multiplicities, multiplications. differences) 
and as the integrator of the so-called national whole" (Lefebvre, 2009/1975: 108). 
11 As McMicheal (2001: 204) puts it, capitalism was constructed not only on a territorial scale 
but at the same time was a 'world-historical entity'. 
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However, although within Europe, transformations in the dominant manner 
in which social labour was mobilized began to be consolidated with the move 
towards purely economic accumulation, political accumulation in the form of 
colonialism also remained vital to the genesis of capitalism. Furthermore, the 
processes of uneven and combined development meant that autocratic states now 
found themselves "armed with all the material might of the European States" in 
which both parties could find mutual benefit (autocratic states in the maintenance 
of their power, European capitalist states with the high rate of return of usurious 
interest) (Trotsky, 1962/1919: 175, 182). Lenin (1917/1987) also highlighted 
the role of imperialism in the production of space, documenting in particular 
the way in which capital was exported and railway networks expanded in order 
to better take control of other nations' resources, as well as industry and the 
more arduous productive activities being established in the colonies. Scholars 
such as Teschke, are thus guilty of writing from a highly Eurocentric viewpoint 
when they discuss the transition to capitalism, as they ignore the persistence of 
tributary relationships in the periphery. Under the pressure of continuing force 
for example, India was produced as an export platform for British trade with 
China. This extraction of colonial tribute was vital to the construction of the 
modern capitalist world system. As Eric Wolf (1997: 261) succinctly explains; 
Indian surpluses enabled England to create and maintain a global sys-
tem of free trade. Had England been forced to ban imports from the 
United States and Germany and to compete with them in foreign mar-
kets, American and German industrialization would also have been 
significantly slowed ... Under English domination, India became a key 
foundation of the emerging worldwide capitalist edifice. 
Thus far, then, we can conclude that from its inception capitalism grew 
through a process of uneven and combined development, in which the state played 
a strategic role in both the genesis and maintenance of the capitalist mode of pro-
duction (Wolf, 1997: 100). The expansion of the capitalist mode of production 
did not therefore occur on a smooth terrain free of past relations, but in fact 
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developed in symbiosis with other modes of production. 12 This is an important 
corrective to those such as Teschke (2002) who view the transition to capitalist 
modernity as an all-embracing movement. As Doreen Massey (2005: 63) argues, 
on this reading the very term 'modernity' becomes imbibed with a spatialising 
character. World history and spatial differences are subsumed and simply reduced 
to the pressure of European expansion without due consideration of processes of 
contestation and struggle (this one-sided narrative of history is indicative of a cer-
tain liberal interpretation of the colonial period, e.g. Ferguson, 2004). However, 
the material pre-conditions for this very modernity were founded on distinctly 
pre-modern forms of exploitation which remained essential to the origins of cap-
italism. Just as Europe produced these countries, so too did this relationship 
produce Europe. This was a point recognised early on by Marx (1867/1974: 705, 
711) who argued with regard to the origins of capitalism that; "The treasures 
captured outside of Europe by undisguised looting, enslavement, and murder, 
floated back to the mother country and were turned into capital", thus "the 
veiled slavery of the wage workers in Europe needed, for its pedestal, slavery, 
pure and simple in the new world." Drawing upon Doreen Massey (1993: 61) we 
must therefore remain attentive at all times to the 'power-geometries' of social 
relations across space. As well as examining movement and flows, we should be 
mindful of the manner in which they affect particular people and places, and the 
way in which they produce uneven and combined development within processes 
of world history. 
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Unlike the space of feudalism, under capitalist social relations; "we do not live, 
act and work 'in' space so much by living, acting and working we produce space" 
(Smith, 2008: 15-16, emphasis added). This is what Lefebvre (1991: 89) means 
12Trotsky (1919/1962: 175) discusses this problem with regard to the role of state formation in 
Russia, demonstrating how the absolutist state evolved, relying on advanced forms of technology 
and social control developed in the West to sustain backwards forms of social relations, leading 
to rising contradictions and eventually revolutionary outbreak. Adolfo Gilly (1983) drawing 
upon Trotsky applies the same argument to Mexico. 
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when he characterises the shift from feudalism to capitalism as involving the tran-
sition from producing things in space to producing space itself. From its very 
beginnings, capit al has had a geographically expansionary nature. This was de-
termined by both the search for profit and efforts to universalise the value form: 
which spatial integration is vital for (Harvey, 2006b: 375).13 Through the capital-
ist mode of production, nature itself is transformed and indeed produced (Smith, 
2008: 48-81; Castree, 2000; Harvey, 2010: 75-85). Thus, despite appeals from or-
thodox political economy to notions such as 'comparative advantage', arguments 
for development based upon 'natural resources' are increasingly outdated. As 
Smith (2008: 140) points out, although appeals to natural advantages in climate 
or resources may have been useful in explaining an initial path of development, 
such explanations become increasingly redundant as capitalism progresses (see 
also Massey, 1994: 53). One may think here of industrialisation in Latin America 
(discussed further in Chapter 4), or the growth of world cities built on finance 
capital to empirically understand the point made by Lefebvre (1991: 49), that the 
development of capitalist social relations "smashed naturalness forever and upon 
its ruins established the space of accumulation." The import of this point is that 
any notion of environmental degradation must be considered in a more integral 
sense, and furthermore it must be related to the production of space (Lefebvre, 
1976: 13, 105). On this basis, problems of the 'environment' can refer equally to 
those of global warming as they can a lack of urban housing, or access to social 
services. It should be clear that this also requires that we understand the term 
'production' not just in terms of workers in a factory but also in a wider sense. 
It was mentioned earlier that space is fundamentally being transformed through 
the increasing search for surplus value. This restless search for profit is the his-
torical mission of the bourgeoisie as a class. As Marx (1867/1974: 558) famously 
put it: "Accumulate, Accumulate, that is Moses and the Prophets." The two 
levers which the bourgeoisie use to enhance their profits are through increases 
in absolute or relative surplus value, usefully characterised by Holloway (2002: 
208) as the extension of property or the intensification of labour. Both forms 
have explicitly geographical implications. In terms of the extension of property. 
13For all commodities to be exchangeable they need to be comparable (e.g. be an increment 
of labour power). 
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capital's internal dynamic to grow beyond its current barriers was c l e a r l ~ · · rec-
ognized by l\farx (1858/1973: 408) who wrote that "the tendency to create the 
world market is directly given in the concept of capital itself." The explanation of 
this tendency is more explicitly theorized in the Communist Manifesto where the 
spatial implications of capital accumulation are contrasted with previous modes 
of production. Here it is claimed that: 
The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the 
instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, 
and with them the whole relations of society. Conservation of the 
old modes of production in unaltered form, was, on the contrary, the 
first condition of existence for all earlier industrial classes. Constant 
revolutionising of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social 
conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bour-
geois epoch from all earlier ones... The need of a constantly expanding 
market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the entire surface 
of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish 
connexions everywhere (Marx and Engels. 1848/1996: 828). 
To understand why this is the case we must recognise that the essential class 
antagonism capitalism is founded upon, with those who control the means of pro-
duction able to detain the commodities produced while those who are forced to 
sell their labour power must buy back the commodities they themselves produce. 
As OIlman (2003: 149) notes, the primary contradiction Marx sees in capitalism 
is between the increasing capacity of social production on the one hand, and its 
private appropriation on the other. This leads to profound spatial changes as 
the competition between individual capitals (identified earlier as a key element of 
capitalism as a mode of production) causes firms to pursue locational advantages 
in order to increase their profit rates (through either cheaper labour or a shorter 
turnover time). What certain spaces contain by way of their social relations thus 
becomes an essential component of capitalist production. Thus we can under-
stand Harvey's (2006b: 440) point that "the production of spatial configurations 
is necessarily an active moment in the dynamics of accumulation." However, al-
though capital seeks to overcome barriers in production. we must remember too 
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that capital is also a process of circulation. It is here that the narrow social re-
lations that the system is built upon create its own limits (Harvey, 2006b: --126). 
As I\1ichael Lebowitz (2003: 11) puts it: "the barriers capital faces in the sphere 
of circulation are not only external - they are inherent in its own nature." The 
private ownership of the means of production and the search for increasing profit 
thus cause the bourgeoisie to expand surplus value more than their ability to 
realise this surplus in circulation. In other words, the very exploitation of wage 
labour that is a pre-condition for the existence of capital is also its very limit to 
growth. This contradiction leads towards 'over-accumulation' and the tendency 
of the rate of profit to fall. Over-accumulation is defined by David Harvey (2003: 
88) as "surpluses of capital (in commodity, money or productive forms) and sur-
pluses of labour power side by side, without there apparently being any means 
to bring them together profitably to accomplish socially useful tasks." 
These crises of over-accumulation can be solved in two fundamental ways. 
The first of these is to invest in technologically innovative processes (to increase 
the turnover time of capital circulation) or in other forms of fixed capital. These 
are forms of 'temporal fixes'. The second manner is to expand the process of 
capital accumulation itself, though the investment in new regions or areas of life 
into which the commodity form has not been extended (spatial fixes). This is 
helpfully defined by Robinson (2004: 7) as the extensive or intensive enlargement 
of capitalism. Lefebvre (1976: 21) submits that it is through this dynamic that 
capitalism has, contrary to the predictions of the early prophets of Marxism, been 
able to reproduce its social relations through the process of economic growth: "We 
cannot calculate at what price, but we do know the means, by occupying space, 
by producing a space." 
Thus we can see that capital as a mode of production is "an inherently mo-
bile form of domination" (Holloway, 2002: 190). The concrete agents of this 
change thus include developers, urban planners, architects, landowners, bankers 
and political authorities (Lefebvre, 2003: 93). 
However, it is essential that we recognise that this mobility is itself predicated 
on the strength of the subaltern classes to resist exploitation in particular areas. If 
capital is forced to move from one area to another. this necessarily implies that a) 
there is a limit to its form of exploitation in the place it seeks to move from and b) 
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this limit is thought to not exist or pose a lesser threat in another space. In other 
words, the uneven development of class struggle is itself postulated as a necessary 
basis on which capitalism must grow, as it is the uneven terrain of social relations 
that allows capital to resolve crises. Indeed it is only through a restructuring of the 
space economy of capitalism that new rounds of accumulation can begin (Harvey. 
2006: 390; Smith, 2008: 177)). Recognising this point, Lefebvre (1991: 335) 
states clearly that uneven development, "so far from being obsolete, is becoming 
worldwide in its application - or more precisely, is presiding over the globalization 
of the world market." 
In contrast to recent claims for the utility of uneven and combined develop-
ment as a transhistorical concept (Rosenberg 2006, 2010), Neil Smith (2008: J) 
argues that it must be viewed as the geographical expression of specifically capi-
talist development. This of course does not mean that prior to capitalism there 
existed evened development among tributary modes of production, but rather 
that capitalism produces a distinct type of uneven development that is essential 
to it as a mode of production (Smith, 2008: 134). This fact necessitates that we 
hypothesise class struggle as being central to the ontology of space (Massey, 1994: 
22). If spaces contain different social relations, they must imply different levels 
of struggle in the first place. Unless this fact is admitted, we must consider wage 
differentials between countries as somehow fixed and natural. However, as has 
already been argued, nature is itself socially produced. 14 Harvey (2006b: 431) 
is at pains to point out that, these 'spatial fixes' in no way overcome the con-
tradictory tendencies of capital. This is because ultimately only two outcomes 
can occur: there can be renewed accumulation - in which case crisis tendencies 
towards over-accumulation are exacerbated, or the value invested in the built 
environment becomes devalued as the investment turns out to be unproductive. 
In each case there is a place specific form of devaluation. However, thus far we 
14Drawing from this idea of produced nature, or what is sometimes referred to as 'second 
nature' offers a useful way out of the current debate as to whether uneven and combined 
development should be considered a 'general abstraction' applicable to all human history, or 
whether appeals of this sort become essentialising (Callinicos and Rosenberg, 2008). Utilising 
this approach would allow us to see that uneven and combined development may originally 
have been based in the natural world and thus can be posited as universal to human history. 
Nevertheless, as we increasingly produce nature under capitalist social relations of production, 
so do we produce a second order of uneven and combined development. 
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have assumed that capital does not encounter problems simply re-Iocating and 
transforming space. Indeed, for some scholars, this fact is simply presented as a 
given. Smith (2008: 7, 186, 208), for example, is keen to assert that capital pro-
duces a world in its own image. However, whilst it is certainly true that capital 
"endeavours to mould the space it dominates" using "violent means to reduce 
obstacles and resistance it encounters there" (Lefebvre, 1991: 49), it is by no 
means certain that it can simply impose its logic as it pleases. Indeed, 1,Iassey 
(1995: 7) powerfully rebukes such mechanistic approaches, arguing that ;;shifts 
in spatial structures are a response to changes in the nature of class relations, 
economic and political, national and international. Their development is a social 
and conflictual process ... The world is not simply the product of capitars require-
ments. o, It is thus the attempt at the imposition of a social logic that seeks to 
compel surplus labour and control resources that forms the unavoidable essence 
of the 'spaces of capital'. On the other hand 'spaces of resistance' are formed by 
the struggles of the subaltern classes to refuse the domination of this alienating 
spatiality and transform their social conditions. This conflict, waged at a variety 
of spatial scales forms the essence of contemporary geo-politics. These conflicts 
cannot but intensify as capitalism progresses and crises grow. Concomitantly, 
as we are beginning to see, bearing the costs of devaluation or dispossession in 
order to restart private accumulation is becoming unpalatable to a substantial 
part of the population. 15 Space, then, is central to the reproduction of capi-
talist social relations but is also the terrain on which oppositional struggles are 
launched. It is the site for the "revolt of the 'lived' against abstractions, of the 
everyday against economism, of the social and civil society against the 'high rates 
of growth' whose demands are upheld by the state" (Lefebvre, 2009/1975: 114). 
Lefebvre (1996, 2003: 88, 97) argues that it is in the realm of everyday praxis 
that counter-projects and counter-spaces can be formed, which would include 
the right to control investment and create space based on human need, rather 
1.5 At the time of writing strikes are increasing throughout Europe and riots have been seen 
in Greece as a response to the government's austerity measures. In Mexico, the Sindicato 
Mexicano de Electricistas (SME, Electricity Workers Union) remains engaged in intense struggle 
against attempts to liquidise a state-owned electricity company and thus fire 44,000 workers. 
Latin America witnessed similar such protest during the 1980s and 1990s that spawned a 
variety of leftist social movements and helped push the country towards more social democratic 
governance. 
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than simply blind growth. This is theorised as a fundamental questioning of the 
state as a force superimposed over society, which thus includes an overcoming of 
alienation, and moves towards societal self-determination, in which users of space 
retake control of their own lives and political activity is no longer solely associated 
with fleeting, privileged moments (Lefebvre, 1966/2009: 147-150, 1947/2008: 92: 
Marx. 1875/1996: 892). 
The following chapter, building on the analysis developed here. will consider 
in detail the theoretical implications of this for the scalar organization of capital, 
by empirically examining the changing geographical restructuring of capital that 
has taken place since the mid 1970s. Drawing on the key themes developed in 
this chapter, the implications for the state form, and a politics of resistance will 
be examined. 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter set out to demonstrate in theoretical terms how we could discern 
the logic of the spaces of capital. It did this by first highlighting that two terms 
integral to Marxist political economy - namely 'class struggle' and 'mode of pro-
duction' are essential to understanding the production of space. Following this, 
the characteristics of a tributary mode of production in the form of feudal space 
were highlighted, whilst delineating the specific form of geo-politics connected 
to it. Lastly, the distinctiveness of capitalist spatiality was revealed. Included 
in the discussion here was the revolutionary nature of capitalism as a mode of 
production, its class basis and crisis tendencies and its novel form of uneven and 
combined development. At a reasonably high level of abstraction therefore, we 
have the first step in understanding the 'spaces of capital'. The following chapter, 
building on the analysis developed here, will consider in detail the theoretical im-
plications of this for the scalar organization of capital, by empirically examining 
the geographical restructuring of capital that has taken place since the mid 1970s. 
Drawing on the key themes developed in this chapter ~ ~ the implications for the 
state form, and the role of class agency will be drawn out. This will illuminate 
further the contemporary spaces of capital and allows us to make some tentati\"e 
claims as regards the spaces of resistance. 
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The Production of (Neoliberal) 
Space 
It is not that the strategic front 
has been redrawn, but precisely 
the opposite: that it has been 
extended to the world scale. 
Lefebvre, 1976: 81 
This chapter seeks to explore the changes in space and scale associated with 
the wave of neoliberal restructuring that began to take place in the early 1970s 
with the move towards what is commonly referred to as globalization. The aim 
is to construct a critical ontology of neoliberal hegemony that is attentive to the 
various spatial scales through which capitalism now operates. 
The purpose of this chapter is to extend the theoretical analysis that was ren-
dered in the previous chapter, by integrating it with an empirical discussion of 
trends within the global economy. In particular it will engage with the explana-
tions of the changing spatial and scalar order offered by the 'transnational thesis' 
scholars (see inter alia Hardt and Negri, 2000, 2005; Robinson, 2003, 2004, 2005; 
Sklair, 2001). Chapter 1 stressed how current debates within the historical soci-
ology of international relations displayed a profound lack of spatial awareness in 
their theorising, yet nevertheless correctly emphasised the importance of uneven 
and combined development as integral to any explanation of geopolitics. At stake 
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here is whether the transnational thesis can overcome this lack and provide a co-
herent rendering of the spaces of capital and the spaces of resistance. Through a 
critical discussion of these key ideas the chapter also therefore serves as a critical 
intervention on current debates within historical sociology. 
It lays the basis for considering the integration of Latin America into this 
changing world order (Chapter 4), before the specific case of Mexico is analysed 
(Chapter 5) therefore also helping to shift the current debate from its current 
Eurocentric focus. Furthermore, as this research is directly concerned with re-
sistance movements, it seeks to examine where exactly the site/s of action need 
to be for such movements and whether this needs to be re-examined in light of 
globalisation (issues that will be taken up in detail in Chapters 6 and 7). This 
chapter advances discussion of three key issues of concern: 1) How can we define 
the current 'spaces of capital'?, 2) What role does the state play in this process? 
and 3) How does this affect how we theorise a politics of resistance? 
Whereas the previous chapter focused on constructing an argument about 
the production of space in the abstract, this chapter now moves towards the 
meso level. As Neil Brenner (2004: 20) has outlined, this level is concerned with 
"relatively durable institutional arrangements, regulatory frameworks, and ter-
ritorial configurations that underpin distinct periods of historical development." 
An analysis of scalar configurations is important as a methodological approach 
to complement the theorisation of space that was offered in the previous chapter. 
If, as was illustrated there, space is made up of social processes, then we need to 
understand how these are transformed into relative 'permanences' (Harvey, 1996: 
63, 81). Spatial scale in other words can be thought of "as the geographical 
resolution of contradictory processes of competition and co-operation" (Smith, 
1993: 99). It is owing to the existence of these contradictions that space and 
scale must be firmly historicised, and all theoretical pronouncements be made 
highly contingent and open-ended as they remain the object of profound social 
struggles. 
Within current discourses on globalization, issues of 'space' are a recurring 
motif. Thus within the slogans of the leading transnational corporations we 
find evocations of a harmonious business-friendly space with a global logic un-
derpinning them ("HSBC - the world ~ s s local bank" or Siemens "global network 
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of innovation" to name but two examples). Conversely, within strategies of re-
sistance to neoliberalism, there are even more overt spatial metaphors such as 
reclaiming the streets, or the opening up of some abstract political space. l The 
very term 'globalization' is imbibed with spatial connotations, perhaps given best 
expression though David Harvey's (1990) now famous phrase, 'time-space com-
pression' - meaning that our experience of geographical distances. and the time 
it takes to cross these distances is greatly reduced. Drawing upon this idea of a 
breakdown in spatial and temporal barriers, recent theorists of globalization haye 
defined it as an 'epochal shift' that is reconfiguring the previous spatial order 
of the world (Robinson, 2004: 4). In Robinson's view, economic restructuring 
has led to 'transnational space' now coming to exert a hegemonic influence over 
national space. The corollary of this view is that resistance must operate at the 
transnational scale as well (Robinson, 2003, 2004, 2008; see also Hardt and Negri, 
2000, 2005). Following the arguments laid out in the previous chapter, it will be 
argued that a clear understanding of the spatial configuration of neoliberalism is 
a vital task in order to adequately address the issue of where exactly the site of 
action should be for a politics of resistance and transformation, a central question 
this thesis seeks to engage with. 
The previous chapter theorised how changes within the built environment 
must be related to the class struggles arising from distinct modes of production. 
However, it was also clarified that modes of production should not be treated 
as static concepts as they necessarily evolve like the rest of nature. 2 This evolu-
tion is particularly marked in capitalistic processes of accumulation owing to its 
restless search for increased profits. The task of this chapter is to examine how 
and why the latest round of world order (commonly referred to as neoliberalism) 
was created. what its integral features are as a spatial project and whether it 
1 The Zapatistas for example, although fighting to reclaim the physical space of land in 
Chiapas, have also spoken about the need to create the political space in which civil society 
can nurture its own decisions (see Benjamin, 1995: 61) 
2Drawing from a footnote in Marx's Capital, Harvey (2010: 123) argues that there are seven 
distinct activity spheres through which capitalism evolves. These are: 1) technological and 
organizational forms, 2) social relations, 3) institutional and administrative arrangements, 4) 
production and labour processes, 5) relations to nature, 6) the reproduction of daily life and 
the species, 7) mental conceptions of the world. 
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can be considered a stable order. As mentioned above, the transition to neolib-
eralism has been defined by some scholars as the emergence and dominance of a 
transnational scale for economic accumulation that necessitates the operation of 
resistance on this level as well. However, this chapter will endeavour to highlight 
that rather than the dominance of one spatial scale over another, as in the case of 
the transnational thesis, "capitalist spatiality can never be simply immediately 
global (or local or national)" (Lacher, 2006: 113). In contrast. it is submitted 
that it is necessary to be attentive to the dialectical interplay between the yarious 
spatial scales (local, national, regional and global) and the social relations that 
are constitutive of these (see Dirlik, 1997: 84-104; Massey, 2005: 83; i\Ic1Iichael, 
1990). We therefore need to remain cognisant of the fact that these scales are 
themselves socially produced and re-made (Brenner, 2004: 7). 
In order to make this argument the shift in the dominant mode of world 
order from the Keynesian post-war system of 'embedded liberalism' to that of 
neoliberal globalization will be explored, and related to the theoretical premises 
established in Chapter 2. The purpose of this analysis is offer another window 
into the 'spaces of capital' by offering an empirical investigation into the changing 
scalar organization of the world economy. This is also essential to understanding 
the proliferation of new spaces of resistance. 
Following the arguments about the production of space rendered in the pre-
vious chapter, it will be argued that the shifts in the spatial relations of the 
global economy must be understood with reference to the class struggles taking 
place through evolving capitalist social relations of production. This argument is 
powerfully put forward by diverse scholars of the transnational thesis (as will be 
explained in more detail later). However, whilst acknowledging some of the key 
contributions that this set of authors make to our understanding of neoliberalism 
and world order, this chapter will highlight their lack of a thorough engagement 
with spatial theorising. 3 Unintentionally perhaps, this leads them to a totalising 
conception of the transnational which ignores key spatial differences and therefore 
3Whilst Robinson (2001: 555) argues that "the relationship between space and development 
need to be reconsidered" he admits that he is "unable to specify in theoretical terms with sat-
isfaction the relationship between the two." This problem stems in part because in his analysis 
geography and social development are considered separately (Robinson, 2001: 530, 2008: 4.5). 
The analysis of Chapter 1 by contrast showed how these categories must be integrated. 
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over-emphasises the coherence of capital at the expense of the continued spaces 
for resistance. In contrast, the ontology of globalisation that this chapter \yishes 
to construct is based upon the complex terrain of uneven and combined devel-
opment that was demonstrated in the last chapter to be an inherent aspect of 
capitalist space. In concurrence with Peck and Tickell (2002: 388) it is therefore 
imperative to build an approach that is "attentive to both the local peculiarities 
and the generic features of neoliberalism." 
The chapter is structured as follows. First, some key theoretical underpinnings 
are revisited and further elaborated with regards to the production of space. 
Second, the era of embedded liberalism is discussed in relation to its spatial and 
scalar referents. This is done so that, third, we can analyse the production of 
neoliberal space in contra distinction to it (utilising the method of incorporated 
comparison). It is here the claims of the so-called transnational school of historical 
materialism are examined, by fourth, fifth and sixth, exploring their claims with 
regards to the transnational capitalist class, and the transnational state, and 
what this implies for a politics of resistance in the global age. Seventh, these 
claims are subjected to critical scrutiny, before finally conclusions are drawn. Let 
us first begin however, revisiting the production of space. 
3.1 The production of space revisited 
As a heuristic device, Lefebvre (1991: 33) devises a triadic matrix to show how 
space is dialectically created. The three elements comprising this are; spatial 
practices, representations of space and representational spaces. Spatial practices 
refer to the spatial norms of any given social formation that ensure a degree of 
continuity and cohesion. Thus, the physical layout of areas including factors such 
as roads and infrastructure as well as housing would be included under spatial 
practices (see also Lefebvre, 2003: 84). This is closely associated \yith perceived 
space. In other words it relates to our reflexive a,,'areness of our surrounding 
environment. Representations of space on the other hand are tied to ideology, 
signs and codes. This is the realm of conceived space. Spaces of representation 
are in this manner related to the dominant ideology of society and this area is 
therefore synonymous with class rule in a particular time and place. Lefebyre 
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(1976: 29) argues that representations become ideological when they contribute 
"either immediately or 'mediately' to the reproduction of the relations of pro-
duction." Architects, urban planners and advertising executives would be prime 
exemplars of this aspect of space. Lastly we have representational spaces. This 
is the realm of directly lived experience. Spatial practices and representations 
of space can combine to "facilitate the manipulation of representational space" 
(Lefebvre, 1991: 59). However, this side of space is associated with subjectiye 
feelings or thought and can thus be linked to the more clandestine side of life 
where resistance can begin to emerge from. It is a cultural sphere concerned with 
our imagination and therefore has the ability to change and appropriate space. 
Lefebvre is insistent that these moments cannot be separated from one another. 
David Harvey (1993: 17-19) has usefully given the example of Times Square in 
New York City to illustrate how we must understand this seemingly abstract and 
complex schema. In terms of spatial practices it was dependent on the develop-
ment of a mass transportation system as well as rapid money flows and increasing 
consumer culture of modern life. Closely tied to this, the Square reflected in its 
representation of space the ideology of the bourgeoisie in its effort to encourage 
mass consumerism and commercialization. However, despite this intent it has 
become a place appropriated by the public as the symbolic heart of New York 
City. As Harvey (1993:18) writes: 
produced and dominated in the mode of political economy, it was 
appropriated by the populace in an entirely different fashion. It has 
become an authentic place of representation with a distinctive hold 
on the imagination, even though as a space of material social prac-
tices it has all the character of a purely speculative and commodified 
spectacle. 
This triad needs to be borne in mind when we consider developments within 
the organization of the global economy, and will be returned to later in the 
chapter. 
The approach Lefebvre takes to the production of space highlights a number 
of crucial points. The first of these is that material practices cannot be under-
stood without due consideration being given to the way that the? are experienced 
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and imagined. Indeed this is a theme taken up by Arjun Appadurai (1990) ,,,ho 
queries any simplistic base/superstructure accounts of globalisation. Instead he 
argues that the emerging global cultural economy is one based upon ;disjuncture 
and difference' owing to the various 'scapes' or perspectives though which these 
processes are filtered (these include mediascapes, technoscapes, finacescapes and 
ideoscapes). Appadurai's approach highlights the tensions between homogeni-
sation and heterogenisation that are inherent to capital in our current epoch 
(expressed in the previous chapter with the notion of homogenous and fractured 
space). This view, which concurs with the one that has been outlined hitherto, is 
in stark contrast to how some scholars have interpreted the production of space 
under neoliberal globalization as simply being that of a proliferation of 'non-
places' (Auge, 1995). This term was coined as an intended critique of globalization 
(or what Auge calls 'supermodernity') owing to the lack of historical meaning and 
homogenisation that this entails. However, his argument only asserts a singular 
narrative and thus detaches the production of space and place from all identity 
and ideological contestation and resistance. Like Herbert ~ I a r c u s e ' s s (1964) One 
Dimensional Man, tendencies are therefore taken as a fait accompli. Coherence 
is taken for granted and no room is left for a counter-offensive (Lefebvre, 1976: 
115). By contrast, it follows from the argument that has been outlined hitherto, 
that space is never to be mistaken for the realm of closure. It is always open to 
contestation and struggle. Indeed it is therein that lie the politics of space and 
the reason for the continuance of geo-politics. To make a claim for the prolifera-
tion of non-places is to assume that space is simply a passive surface onto which 
capitalist social relations are produced: the very view that was so thoroughly 
rejected in the previous chapter (this point about the continuance of struggle is 
one we need to keep in mind when assessing the transnational thesis later). 
Following the elaboration made in Chapter 2, space was shown to be produced 
though the medium of class struggle (through the dialectic of efforts by capital to 
seek the maximum possible extraction of surplus value and subsequent resistance 
to this on the other hand). It should therefore be viewed as a product of societal 
interrelations, and not as something static but rather as a product constantly 
under construction (Massey, 2005: 9). As was outlined, class relations inscribed 
in space thus can be related to Antonio Gramsci's concept of h e g e m o n ~ ' ' - the 
57 
3.2 From embedded liberalism to neoliberalism 
means by which one class establishes its leadership over the rest of society. Hege-
mony for Gramsci was also theorised as a process rather than an accomplishment. 
It operates across the state and civil society though the formation of historical 
blocs (see also Chapter 5). The state is able to establish its hegemony through 
a combination of legal means such as coercion or legislation but it is the hege-
mony established through civil society that is the more important as it results in 
the 'spontaneous consent' being given "by the great masses of the population on 
the general direction imposed on general life by the dominant group" (Gramsci, 
1971: 12). It has been pointed out, however, that the concept of hegemony is 
applicable not only at the level of national social formations, but also leyel of 
world order. As Robert Cox (1983: 171) puts it: "Hegemony at the international 
level is thus not merely an order among states. It is an order within a world 
economy with a dominant mode of production which penetrates into all countries 
and links into subordinate modes of production." Let us now examine the change 
in hegemonic order by examining the shift from the Keynesian post-war system 
of 'embedded liberalism' (Ruggie, 1982) to that of neoliberalism. This analysis 
will help illuminate what is novel about neoliberal space and how new scales of 
accumulation have been produced though the contradictions of capitalist accu-
mulation and class struggles. This is integral to understanding the current spaces 
of capital. 
3.2 From embedded liberalism to neoliberalism 
The post-war economic system that dominated in the West from 1945 to the 
early 1970s is often referred to as the Pax Americana, 'embedded liberalism', or 
Fordism (after the production techniques popularised by Henry Ford). This epoch 
has come to be seen as the 'golden age' of capitalism due to the increasing levels 
of productivity and trade, coupled with a broad extension of welfare measures. 
Between 1950 and 1975 there was an unheralded age of prosperity with excep-
tionally high growth rates, which saw average income per person in developed 
countries rising 3% per annum (Glyn et al., 2000: 41). It was an economic order 
characterised by a multilateral international environment that ,yas committed to 
reducing the barriers to free trade \\'hilst hm"ing the priority of full employment 
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at the domestic level (Ruggie, 1982). The Bretton \Yoods financial order under-
pinning the system was based upon fixed exchanged rates with the dollar acting 
as the reserve currency and controls exerted on the movement of capital. As the 
name suggests, the order that emerged post-World War II owed a great deal to the 
hegemonic position of the United States, and the geopolitics of the Cold \Yar did 
much to influence the model of capitalism that was instituted as (Rupert, 1995: 
Glyn et ai., 2000: 56). Gramsci (1971: 279-80) viewed the rise of Fordism on a 
world scale as a potential process of 'passive revolution' that was analogous to 
the "successive small waves of reform" that were initiated from above in Europe 
following the French Revolution (Gramsci, 1971: 115). In other words Fordism 
was hypothesised as an instance of state-led reorganisation of production that. in 
making certain concessions to subaltern classes, facilitated the extension of class 
rule through the reorganization of social relations. In this instance, it was an 
increase in real wages that served to offset more radical demands for wholesale 
social transformation that had been inspired by the Soviet Union.4 This notion 
of passive revolution is an important class stratagem and will be returned to in 
the forthcoming chapters. 
Although the precise nature of states differed on a country-to-country basis. 
reflecting their various historical specificities, broadly speaking the post-war years 
were characterized by Fordist productive relations of mass production and mass 
consumption. Across Western Europe there was thus an analogous process of 
state formation (Brenner, 2004: 105). Piore and Sabel (1984) argue that from 
its inception Fordism has to be understood as a method for deepening capitalist 
social relations with standardized (proletarian) production replacing skilled craft 
production. Of course, this does not mean that everyone was involved in mass 
production, merely that under these particular 'accumulation regimes' mass pro-
duction provided the key source of the economy:s dynamism (Jessop. 1994: 253). 
The Fordist production system can be defined spatially by its vertical integra-
tion, large numbers of workers organized in mass assembly lines and by its fixed 
4Gramsci (1971: 310-12) highlights that higher wages were not borne out of capitalist class 
benevolence but, rather, as a result of increasing exploitation and less desirable work practices 
that people were being asked to engage in. Moreover, he argued that the period of higher wages 
associated with Americanism was historically contingent and therefore likely to be ephemeral, 
an analysis this chapter bears out. 
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and standardized production process (Robinson, 2004: 16). Due to the enormous 
amount of 'fixed capital' required to create this form of standardized production, 
state intervention was integral to the process of capital accumulation helping to 
redirect surpluses. Commenting upon this point, Tonkiss (2006: 90) remarks that 
the state acted "as a steward for such an industrial compact.:' The nation-state 
under the system of embedded liberalism thus was a key element in the production 
of capitalist space. Jessop (1994: 255) illustrates the point well. highlighting how 
the state in this period "invested in infrastructural projects, promoted economies 
of scale though nationalization policies, encouraged Fordist mass consumption 
through its housing and transport policies, and generalized norms of mass con-
sumption through intervention in labour markets and collective bargaining and 
through its provisions for collective consumption." Embedded liberalism thus can 
be characterized by distinctive 'state spatial processes' which in turn had particu-
lar spatial strategies as their adjunct e.g. housing policy, regional policy, economic 
development initiatives (Brenner, 2004: 76, 93). This period thus witnessed the 
emergence and consolidation of what Lefebvre (2009/1975: 105, 111) calls the 
'state mode of production' defined as an "ideology of growth controlled by the 
state" that was becoming worldwide in its application. 5 Surveying the process 
of state formation in this period, Lefebvre (1991: 23) argued that there was a 
change from states concerning themselves essentially with creating the conditions 
for growth, to one that manages the space of growth. The state thus comes to 
promote itself as the stable centre and instrumentalised space for particular ends, 
again exemplifying the conditions of passive revolution touched upon above. 
Although it needs to be made clear that the territorial state in this period 
"never fully contained capitalist social relations within its particularistic bound-
aries" (Lacher, 2006: 145) it is clear that the national scale did become the most 
significant scale for the flow of money, the means of production, consumer com-
modities and labour power (Lash and Urry, 1994: 2; Glyn et al., 2000: 48-51). 
The state in this period thus came to be valorized "as the basic spatial point 
of reference" (Lacher, 2006: 114). Jessop (1994: 252) concurs with this analysis 
5Indeed Lefebvre (1976: 109; 1991: 53) argues that this was also the case for the socialist 
countries ~ h o o he bitterly criticized for failing to produce their own space. Instead socialism 
became merely an alternative means of accelerating accumulation in underdeveloped countries 
rather than overcoming alienation (Lefebvre, 1947/2008: 5, 1961/2008: 316). 
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stating that "a given mode of socialization results from the dominance of an ac-
cumulation regime and its mode of regulation in conjunction with various social 
routines that successfully cope with the social conflict and perturbations." This is 
closely linked therefore to the process of hegemony or the perusal of a hegemonic 
project by the state, as the mechanisms for growth and institutional arrangements 
relied upon social acceptance and the forging of some basis of consensus (Glyn 
et al., 2000: 57; Gill, 2008: 61). There was, however, always a contradictory char-
acter to the spatiality of the post-war system. On the one hand, class conflict 
was mediated through state intervention in 'national circuits' of capital accumu-
lation, yet conversely, international institutions had arisen to ensure the openness 
of a world economy which involved the spreading of capitalist social relations and 
increasing exploitation of the periphery of the world system (Lacher, 1999: 34:4:. 
see also Wallerstein, 1984). In other words, the postwar Keynesian order was one 
built upon distinct spatial strategies that involved the production of geographical 
boundaries that defined who was, and who was not included in the benefits of 
capitalistic development. The Keynesian package of full employment and mass 
consumption were not perks to be extended to peripheral nations (SilveL 2003: 
21, 154). This theme will be taken up in greater detail in the following chapter, 
when the production of space in Latin America is considered. 
Owing to the contradiction between the commitment to full employment on 
the one hand with capitalism's expansionary logic on the other, there was a neces-
sity for immigration from peripheral countries to ensure continuing new supplies 
of labour power for capital (Dumenil and Levy, 2004: 44). Therefore, as Tonkiss 
writes with regard to this dual spatiality; "The reproduction of capitalism" has to 
be understood "not simply in terms of national systems of economic and political 
regulation, but of an international regime which both fostered and set the bound-
aries of inter-state exchanges." It was a system that served to revive and stabilize 
capitalist accumulation in the aftermath of the ravages of the Second World \VaL 
It did this by providing a model of growth that, as was previously mentioned, 
was grounded in mass production and mass consumption. This was facilitated by 
the wage settlement of the post-war years which saw workers having enough dis-
posable income to buy the very commodities that they manufactured. The huge 
development in productive power was thus offset by the concomitant growth of 
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mass consumption (Glyn et al., 2000: 49). Fordism also sought to redress un-
even development between regions within the national territory (Brenner, 2004: 
115). The period 1950-1970 was thus one of sustained economic growth, and is 
referred to by Lefebvre (1976: 112) as a 'euphoric period' owing to the fact that 
it appeared all opposition groups could be co-opted and integrated. Hegemony 
at this time therefore seemed relatively secure. 
However, this 'equilibrium' of production and consumption was not to last as it 
threatened the very social relations that capitalism is based upon (Harvey, 2006b: 
152). Indeed, cracks began to appear in the system of 'embedded liberalism' by 
the late 1960s and early 1970s. This was manifested in the form of stagflation 
in the core Fordist countries coupled with lower productivity and renewed class 
antagonism to the imposition of capitalist discipline (Jessop, 1994: 260; Han'ey, 
2005: 12-15). This class conflict was most visibly evident in the worldwide mo-
bilizations of 1968; referred to by Hardt and Negri (2000: 264) as ·the global 
confluence of struggles" against capitalism. According to Harvey (1990: 142) the 
problem of the Fordist accumulation strategy "could best be captured by one 
word: rigidity." The reason for this was the lack of profitable outlets for surplus 
capital leading to a declining rate of profit. While the enormous investment in 
fixed capital had led to greater productivity in the short term, it had also led to 
a saturation of the market for standardized goods and thus precipitated a crisis 
of over accumulation (defined in the previous chapter). This was intensified by 
the increasing competition from the newly industrializing countries (NICs) that 
added further pressure on national regulatory regimes (Jessop, 1994: 261). Class 
agency here becomes a vital component of understanding not only the crisis of 
the 1970s but also the response to it. This is because postwar, workers· struggles 
had led to increased social spending by the state in the form of higher wage rates 
and welfare extensions (thereby increasing the socially necessary labour time em-
bodied in production). This had, in turn, reduced the amount of surplus value 
that could be extracted in the form of profit for the bourgeoisie (Hardt and Negri, 
2000: 273). Drawing upon Bob Jessop (1990: 208) we can say that the various 
hegemonic projects of embedded liberalism - historical blocs of class forces tied 
to national-states - began to collapse as the accumulation strategies that under-
pinned them were in crisis. With states everywhere experiencing fiscal crises, 
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the material basis for the compromise between capital and labour came under 
question.6 The crisis of overaccumulation, however, provided capital the oppor-
tunity to break the link between itself and the state redistributive policies and 
instead re-establish "the unity of economic and social policy in the interests of 
renewed capital accumulation" (Jessop, 1994: 257). It was clear, therefore, that 
the integration of the working class had been conjunctural rather than structural 
(Lefebvre, 1976: 117). With declining rates of profit this class armistice was now 
considered expendable. Instead the influential sectors of the bourgeoisie sought 
to transform spatial and scalar arrangements in order to forge a new round of 
accumulation (on this point see Massey, 1994: 52). If the post-war system can 
be thought of as 'embedding capital' and serving somewhat to constrain its ex-
cesses7 then the move towards neoliberalism can be interpreted as a project .. to 
disembed capital from these constraints" (Harvey, 2005: 11). 
In analysing the postwar order, Hannes Lacher (1999: 344-5) illustrates bril-
liantly the latent class antagonisms it was built upon as, despite the label of 
'embedded liberalism', "such protectionism as prevailed... never amounted to a 
re-embedding of the economy, in which money, land and labour would have lost 
their character as 'factors of production'." Therefore "the reorganization of so-
cial purpose never challenged the ultimate basis of the market as a disembedded 
institution itself: the commodification of human labour. Precisely because pro-
tectionism of the welfare state was limited it could not last: it was undermined 
by the pressures of the market." Recalling the argument stressed in Chapter 2 
about capital constantly seeking profitable outlets for its surpluses and therefore 
constantly revolutionising spatio-temporal relations, this is exactly what hap-
pened with the shift from embedded liberalism to neoliberalism. This transition 
is another concrete example of aggregates that were built up during a previous 
6 A similar such process is currently underway following the credit crisis that originated in 
the US with the issuing of sub-prime mortages. This crisis is currently being used to further 
dismantle welfare provisions and extend commodification further into the public sector. 
7This was the argument classically put forward by Karl Polanyi (1957). Polanyi argued 
that the modern state could be understood as resulting from a 'double movement.' The first 
of these saw unbridled market forces unleashed upon society, whilst the second sought to deal 
with the imbalances caused by these forces by re-embedding the market within wider society. 
The genius of this argument was to turn orthodox economic theory on its head, highlighting 
that laissez-faire economics was a planned system whereas social protectionism ,vas in fact 
spontaneous. 
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period 'jumping tracks' to form a new assemblage (Sassen, 2006: 11). In this 
case, productive capacities had been developed in the context of postwar recon-
struction now found domestic opportunities for expansion of capital accumulation 
limited, and thus sought to construct a more integrated global market in the in-
terests of increased growth. Summarising this development, Dumenil and Leyy 
(2004: 9) trace the inherent class basis for transition, highlighting with empirical 
detail how that the move towards neoliberalism represented the "reassert ion of 
power by capital holders" who had seen their profit rates hit (see also Harvey. 
2005). Concurrent with McMichael (2001: 202, 205), the shift can be interpreted 
through the method of incorporated comparison (outlined in Chapter 1), in the 
sense it represents a counter-mobilisation by capital to previous spatial arrange-
ments (themselves the results of profound social struggles). The hallmarks of 
neo-liberalism as a spatial and scalar project can thus be understood only in 
relation to the crisis in which capitalism had found itself. This point highlights 
the need to place any theoretical conception of capital into the reality of social 
history. 
In order to better grasp the changes in spatiality associated with this shift to 
neoliberalism, let us now explore the most forceful exposition of these changes 
through a critical engagement with the so-called 'transnational thesis' associated 
with authors such as Leslie Sklair (2001), William Robinson (2003, 2004, 2005) 
and Hardt and Negri (2000, 2005). These authors have argued powerfully for 
the abandonment of a 'nation-state centric' analysis of capitalism. Instead, they 
seek to show that 'national space' associated with embedded liberalism has been 
displaced (or is in the process of being displaced) by the transnational space of 
neo-liberalism. In examining this thesis, particular attention will be placed upon 
the conception of class agency in constituting this transnational space. This goes 
to the heart of the key questions of this research as it critically examines the 
spatial scales through which neoliberal capitalism operates, and thus serves to 
signpost where movements seeking to resist and transform capitalism must also 
act. In other words, as a prelude to considering the spaces of resistance, this 
lets us understand more clearly the 'spaces of capital' which these movements 
must now contend with. Let us now then explore this theorisation of transna-
3.3 Towards a transnational space? 
tional space before the position is subjected to critical enquiry, and an alternatiye 
conceptualization of neoliberalism's spatial relations is ventured. 
3.3 Towards a transnational space? 
Leslie Sklair (2001: 2-3) defines the transnational as consisting of "forces. pro-
cesses and institutions that cross borders but do not derive their authority from 
the state." Indeed, a key contention of the transnational thesis is to argue that 
the nation-state has been superseded as the key organizing principle of capit alist 
life following globalisation in its most recent form (Robinson, 2004: 39, see also 
Sassen, 2007: 1). In contrast to the post-war Fordist regimes of accumulation 
in which the state was regarded as being central to the production of capitalist 
space, Robinson (2005: 561 emphasis added) believes that national states ':are 
being transcended by transnational social forces and institutions grounded in a 
global rather than the interstate system." Hardt and Negri (2000, 2005) writing 
in similar fashion, term this new order 'Empire'. "The concept of Empire" they 
write "is characterized by a lack of boundaries. Empire's rule has no limits. First 
and foremost, then, the concept of Empire posits a regime that effectively en-
compasses the spatial totality" (Hardt and Negri, 2000: xiv, emphasis added). 
Robinson highlights how globalization involves not only an extensive enlarge-
ment of capitalism (involving is geographical expansion) but also its intensive 
enlargement meaning that capitalism is deepened into areas previously held as 
'the commons'. Education and health are but two examples of this phenomenon 
(Robinson, 2004: 7). This analysis echoes the argument made by Kees van der 
Pijl (1998: 46-48) that commodification has been extended beyond material pro-
duction to include the social sphere of reproduction. Production therefore needs 
to be understood in the wider sense suggested by Robert Cox (1989: 39), includ-
ing not only the production of goods but also the production and reproduction 
of knowledge and social relations. 
As was mentioned above, a key element in transforming the spatial configu-
ration of the previous order was the transnationalization of finance. During the 
1960s, the growth in the various offshore financial markets (in particular the Eu-
rodollar market), as well as the costs of fighting the war in Vietnam, had put 
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the US economy under considerable strain as the w o r l d ~ s s leading creditor nation. 
l\Iore dollars were in circulation than could be backed up with gold reserves lead-
ing to rising inflation in the US. With an ascendant neoliberal ideology emerging, 
the United States decided to unilaterally abandon its capital controls in 1971 in 
with the so-called 'Nixon Shocks' (Helliener, 1994: 111). Britain, Japan and the 
other major capitalist countries soon followed due to competitive pressures so 
that by the early 1990s "the restrictive Bretton Woods financial order had been 
completely overturned and an almost fully liberal pattern of financial relations 
had emerged between advanced industrial s t a t e s ~ ~ ~ (Helliener, 1994: 146).8 The 
effect of lifting these capital controls was to liberate capital from its institutional 
pact between the state and labour by reducing its commitment to the domestic 
economy (Tonkiss, 2006: 95). As a result of its new mobility, capital assumed a 
far greater structural power in relation to labour. The class compromise under the 
Fordist system had clearly been predicated on finance and production remaining 
under national control (Bernard, 2000: 158). However this prerequisite now no 
longer held sway (the implications of these developments for Latin America will 
be considered in the next chapter). 
In terms of class struggle, (which was identified in Chapter 2 as being crucial 
to the production of space), Harvey (2005: 117) argues that capitalist class power 
is evidentially wielded through geographically mobile capital. With money losing 
its 'national character', factors such as high wages and welfare benefits - integral to 
the Keynesian class compromise - were instead now viewed as "costs of production 
rather than sources of home demand" (Jessop, 1994: 261). Furthermore, as 
states looked to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), they have altered in form 
from being interventionist states in a domestic economy to states concerned with 
promoting competitiveness in the global economy. The imperative to compete for 
FDI is then used as a justification to remove forms of welfare and social protection 
built up during the post-war period (Cox, 1999: 12). This does not necessarily 
mean that the state has retreated in the face of global pressures as in some 
analyses (e.g. Strange, 1996) but rather they have instead been reconfigured and 
reconstituted (Held and McGrew, 2002: 125). Summarising this development, 
8This again highlights the conditioning dynamics of uneven and combined development 
within the global economy. 
66 
3.3 Towards a transnational space? 
Robinson (2004: 75) claims that nation-states have "shifted from reproducing 
Keynesian social structures of accumulation to servicing the general needs of the 
new patterns of global accumulation." Commenting upon this, Noam Chomsky 
(2000: 137) refers to transnational capital as a 'virtual senate' able to yeto policies 
of governments by the threat of, or the carrying out of capital flight. However, 
whilst this might be true in certain cases, we also need to be aware of the fact that 
governments have often been actively involved in promoting globalization (as "'ill 
be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5). As Doreen ~ I a s s e ) ' ' (2005: 83-84) makes dear. 
governmental discourse about the inevitability of globalization and market forces 
is an 'heroic impotence' designed to obscure the search for alternatives. 
The transnationalization of finance does, however, have important implica-
tions for production. Indeed, the rise of transnational capital is central to the 
whole process of neoliberal globalization. As Bieler (2006: 50) argues '"the dereg-
ulation of national currency systems was a precondition for the free movement of 
capital, making an increased level of FDI possible." Robinson concurs but takes 
the argument even further stating that "transnational capital is the basis for eco-
nomic globalization. In turn, economic globalization brings with it the material 
basis for the emergence of a single global society marked by the transnational po-
litical and cultural processes and the global integration of s o c i a l l i f e ~ ' ' (Robinson, 
2004: 9, emphasis added). Robinson seeks to argue that we have moved from 
an internationalized world economy to a transnationalized global economy. The 
difference being that the former consists of separate domestic economies trading 
'national products' with one another at arms length, whereas the latter would in-
clude functional integration of internationally dispersed activities (GereffL 1995: 
113; Robinson, 2003: 13-20). Evidence for this transnationalization of production 
includes the aforementioned levels of FDI which have been rising rapidly since 
the early 1980s, the spread of transnational corporations (TNCs). cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions, strategic alliances and internationally interlocked di-
rectorates (Robinson, 2004: 55-67). Both Central America (Robinson, 2003) and 
South America (Robinson, 2008) are extensively examined to provide evidence 
of this new transnational productive structure. Robinson is prepared to concede 
that local and national circuits of capital do remain. However, he argues that 
it is the transnational fraction of capital that is now hegemonic and can thus 
67 
3.4 The transnational capitalist class 
exert structural power over these lesser scales forcing them to forge links "'ith 
this transnational sphere if they want to retain their competitiveness (Robinson. 
2003: 17; 2004: 21). The key point to note at this juncture is that (according to 
the transnational thesis) the multiple spaces of capitalism expressed though their 
territorial state forms are thought to be giving way to a single space of capitalism 
governed by a transnational logic. Evidence of a new productive structure can be 
cited in the fact that the gross product associated with international production 
and foreign affiliate sales worldwide (hallmarks of globalised production) have 
increased faster than both global GDP and global exports (UNCTAD, 2000: x\'). 
For Robinson (2005: 562), hegemony is therefore no longer established though 
nationally-oriented historical blocs (as was the case with embedded liberalism) 
but, instead, is founded through a transnational historical bloc that is constructed 
though global civil society and its emerging transnational institutions. Hardt and 
Negri's (2000: xii) characterization of Empire as a "decentred and deterritorial-
izing apparatus of rule" would support Robinson's thesis. A crucial role in the 
production of this new neoliberal space is assigned to the agency of the transna-
tional capitalist class (TCC) and the role of an emergent transnational state 
(TNS) through which they are said to act. Let us examine these two claims in 
turn. 
3.4 The transnational capitalist class 
According to Robinson, the transnationalization of capitalism, by definition, pro-
duces the transnationalization of class relations. This is because the social re-
lations of production upon which classes are constituted are now grounded in 
transnational rather than national circuits of accumulation. Apeldoorn (2002: 
2) concurs with this analysis and claims that social classes are both constituted 
by, and constitutive of, this new transnational capitalism. The examination of 
class formation requires a two level analysis in Robinson's account (following the 
formula set out by Marx (1847/1963)). This involves the material basis for class 
action (a class in itself) and also forms of consciousness (a class for itself) that 
result in collective agency. In R o b i n s o n ~ s s words; 
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"what distinguishes the TCC from national or local capitalists is that 
it is involved in globalized production, marketing and finance and man-
ages globalized circuits of accumulation that give it an objectiye class 
existence and identity spatially and politically in the global s ~ ' s t e m m
above local territories and p o l i t i c s ~ ' ' (Robinson. 2005: 564:. emphases 
added). 
The core of Robinson's argument is that neoliberal globalization provides 
the material basis for us to conceive of a TCC, and furthermore the Tee are 
increasingly acting as a class for themselves. In this respect Robinson can be seen 
to be building on earlier work that made similar claims regarding an emerging 
transnational class structure (e.g. Cox, 1981: 146-47; Gill. 1990, 2008: 93). 
The rigorous pursuit of capitalist globalization is evidence for the Tee acting as 
a 'class for themselves'. Examples of this include: the World Economic Forum 
(WEF) an annual meeting of private corporations that seek to influence "regional 
and industry agendas" (http://www.weforum.org/en/index.htm). the Trilateral 
Commission (see Gill, 1990), or the activities of the European Round Table of 
Industrialists (ERT) and Evian Group both of whom have been instrumental in 
furthering the project of global integration along neo-liberallines in Europe and 
Asia respectively. These groups are driven by the logic of global rather than 
national accumulation. This is backed up by Sklair's research on companies in 
the Global Fortune 500. 9 It was found that a majority of leading corporations 
no longer viewed themselves as national companies with units abroad but rather 
as global corporations (Sklair, 2001: 73). For Robinson (2003: 35-42; 2008: 1 1 6 ~ ~
166), as a result of the TCC vigorously pursing the project of capitalist economic 
integration, the old national structures of class antagonisms are giving way to 
ones based on transnational accumulation. This has been aided by the fall of 
communism and the overcoming of the "political-military bifurcation of global 
space" which has facilitated the increasing incorporation of these areas (Shaw, 
2003: 121). Likewise, Hardt and Negri (2000: 187-190, 325-329) argue that 
'modern' forms of sovereignty, defined in terms of a particular territory and its 
9The Global Fortune 500 is an annual ranking of the world top corporation based upon 
revenue for a fiscal year. 
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relation to an 'outside' is being overcome by imperial sovereignty: or the Empire 
of capital. 
3.5 The transnational state 
Concomitant with the rise of the TCC, the materialization of a global or transnan-
tional state (TNS) has also been postulated (Robinson, 2003, 2004, 2008; Shaw. 
2003). Likewise, Hardt and Negris (2000: xii) notion of 'Empire' characterized 
as "a series of national and supranational intuitions united under a single logic 
of rule" is comparable to this. According to Martin Shaw (2003: 122). although 
fragmentary and unstable, this state constitutes "a more or less coherent raft 
of state institutions which possess to some degree, global reach and legitimacy. 
and which function as a state in regulating economy, society and politics on a 
global scale." Taking up this debate, Lacher (2006: 104) argues that neoliberal 
globalization can be seen to represent capitalism's inherent logic of ·totalization', 
subsuming other political logics to its own. As was discussed in the previous 
chapter, capitalism came to exist in a territorial form that was in no way imma-
nent to capitalist social relations themselves. Therefore, although nation-states 
came to exert enormous influence upon capitalist modernity, they also imposed 
certain limits to capital accumulation which always had global tendencies. \\Tith 
finance and production becoming transnationalized, it is hypothesized that global 
political institutions will of necessity have to arise in order to sustain this process. 
Robinson (2004: 91) exhorts us to move away from a nation-state centric analysis 
by showing that the nation-state is but one form that a state can adopt and it 
is furthermore contingent upon social processes. If we understand the state in 
the Marxist manner of being "the institutionalization of class relations around 
a particular configuration of social production" then there is no reason to be-
lieve the state has to be territorially bounded (Robinson, 2004: 95). Indeed the 
proliferation of organizations such as the World Trade Organization (\VTO). In-
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) are cited as evidence of 
the supersession of the nation-state as the prime organizer of capitalism (Hardt 
and NegrL 2000: 336; Robinson, 2004: 85-144). Shaw (2003: 123-127) argues 
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that the key characteristics that we associate with the state such as 1) the em-
bodiment of a differentiated set of institutions: 2) having relations that flow to 
and from a centre; 3) covering a specific demarcated area; 4) having some au-
thoritative rule binding capacity; and 5) being inclusive and constitutive of other 
levels, are all empirically valid at the global level. This does not mean of course 
that national-state forms disappear. Indeed it is argued that they continue to 
provide a vital role for capital accumulation. They do this by ensuring propitious 
conditions favorable to capital reproduction. Examples of this type of activity 
include providing minimal infrastructure and education, a regime of authority 
and additionally quelling dissent to capitalist discipline. However, in Robinson's 
analysis, states are in effect passive recipients of transnational capital's dictates. 
In his terminology, states have become 'transmission belts' for neoliberal capital 
accumulation (Robinson, 2003: 62). In this manner some have begun to question 
the link between the nation and the state (Appadurai, 1990; Harvey, 2005: 84) as 
they are no longer thought to possess the same congruence as before. As Robin-
son (2008: 281) summarises, "there is a contraction between the class function of 
the neoliberal states and their legitimation function." 
To analyse how these developments have been said to affect the production 
of space let us recall the Lefebvrian triad of spatial practices, representations 
of space and representational spaces, to examine how we can identify the key 
changes in spatiality the transnational thesis postulates in the shift from em-
bedded liberalism to neoliberalism. It is clear that there have been changes in 
the realm of spatial practices facilitated by technological advances such as the 
use of information technology as well as the reduction in costs, and increasing 
speed, of air travel and the improvements in containerization, meaning products 
can enjoy a longer life and therefore travel further and for longer periods. These 
technological advances provided the conditions whereby fixed standardized pro-
duction could come to be replaced with the 'flexible accumulation' associated 
with neoliberalism (Harvey, 1990: 141-172). Additionally, vertical integration 
has been replaced by horizontal integration (although power remains rigidly hi-
erarchical). In Hardt and Negri's (2000: 295) terms, "the assembly line has been 
replaced by the network as the organizational model of production" under neolib-
eralism. This is exemplified in processes such as outsourcing and subcontracting. 
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Robinson (2004: 18) notes that although this trend began in low-skilled, labour 
intensive industries it has now spread into areas of advanced economic actiyity. 
It is important however once again that we do not confuse explanandum with the 
explanans (Rosenberg, 2000). Technological change it needs to be emphasized is 
only the explanandum. As Dicken (2007: 73-74) correctly points out: ··technol-
ogy is not autonomous; it does not have a life of its own ... Choices and uses of 
technologies are influenced by the drive for profit, capital accumulation and in-
vestment, increased market share and so on." Choices of technology furthermore 
can have direct political consequences. For example, the pursuit of complicated 
and potentially dangerous energy resources such as nuclear power preclude, or 
make unlikely certain organizational forms, and in turn make us ever more re-
liant upon the rule of experts (Harvey, 2010: 99). Class struggle and the search 
for increasing surplus value extraction are therefore essential elements in the pro-
duction of neoliberal space. As an empirical example of this one could point 
to contemporary models of production such as outsourcing, sub-contracting and 
just-in-time production that were copied from Japanese production techniques by 
rival firms, state elites and other such social forces seeking competitive advantage 
in the market place (Bernard, 2000: 158). The Japanese themselves had resorted 
to such techniques in the first place to overcome a crisis of over-accumulation 
during the era of embedded liberalism (Bernard, 2000: 155). The move to flexi-
ble accumulation can be seen as increasing the alienation of labour in the bid to 
strengthen the hand of capital. In other words there is an ever increasing removal 
from the conceptualization of work, and its carrying out, though the creation of 
new 'spatial divisions of labour', facilitated by the concentration and centraliza-
tion of capital (Massey, 1994: 56; 1995). This has involved a process of further 
deskilling as the productive process is further split into its constituent parts and 
workers are viewed as subcontracted and temporary, rather than an integral part 
of the production process itself (Robinson, 2004: 19). Summing up this develop-
ment, it can be claimed that not only is there alienation in production, but that 
furthermore we are producing spaces of alienation. 
In terms of 'representations of space', we can clearly witness Lefebvre's (1991: 
59) assertion that "class struggle is waged under the hegemony of the bour-
geoisie". This is evidenced from the agency of the TeC acting to plan the spatial 
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relations of the world in line with a strategy for global capital accumulation. Here 
we can draw on Gramsci's germane notion of 'organic intellectuals'. According to 
Gramsci (1971: 5-14) every social group produces its own intellectuals. These are 
defined by their social function rather than any intrinsic capability. These intel-
lectuals arise from the productive process and give the social group homogeneity 
and awareness, providing the conditions favorable to the expansion of their class. 
The TCC have thus clearly managed to produce their own organic intellectuals 
which correspond to their societal hegemony. Thus, ideas put together inside cor-
porate boardrooms, given additional impetus at meetings of the G8 or the WEF 
and projected as advertising campaigns and business strategies "provide the con-
text for neoliberal spatial practices across the globe" (Merrifield, 2006: 134). Neil 
Smith (1993: 112) has argued in relation to this point, that the ruling classes de-
fine what 'global' means in their own interests (for example the free movement of 
capital and commodities but not people). Adding to this argument, Gearoid 0 
Tuathail (1996: 18) points towards to the manner in which "governmentalising in-
tellectuals of statecraft" organise and help produce our common notions of 'global 
space' (see also 0 Tuathail and Agnew, 1992). Furthermore, exerting a hegemonic 
influence in the representation of space means neoliberalism exerts huge discur-
sive power by "constructing the 'rules' of interlocal competition by shaping the 
very metrics by which regional competitiveness, public policy or social produc-
tivity are measured" (Peck and Tickell, 2002: 387). Andrew Baker (2000: 364) 
concurs with this analysis highlighting how there arose "a dominant discourse or 
belief system often referred to as the 'Washington Consensus' emphasizing the 
value and benefits of open markets and sound money policies." The 'Washington 
Consensus' can best be explained by ten areas of policy agreement. These are 
fiscal discipline, public expenditure priorities, tax reform, financial liberalization: 
competitive exchange rates, trade liberalization, foreign direct investment, priva-
tization, deregulation and property rights (Williamson, 1990). These measures 
have underscored key policy frameworks in driving contemporary globalization 
(Scholte, 2000: 35). 
What then of representational spaces? Clearly the other two elements in the 
triad exert a powerful influence on this area. However, this is also the realm 
in which we can begin to develop an analysis of class forces resisting neoliberal 
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hegemony, as spaces are appropriated (or re-appropriated) and challenged. I d e a s ~ ~
therefore, formed in conjuncture with material practices can develop into what 
Antonio Gramsci referred to as 'organic ideologies'. These organic ideologies have 
the ability to '''organize' human masses, and create the terrain on which men 
move, acquire consciousness of their position, struggle etc" (Gramsci, 1971: 3(7). 
It is clear from any cursory glance at the world that, despite claims that we have 
reached the 'end of history' (Fukuyama, 1992), the social relations underpinning 
neoliberalism are in fact increasingly being contested. The issue here is thus 
whether the transnational capitalist class can create a stable historical bloc to 
ensure their continuing hegemony. Pellicani (1981: 32), interpreting Gramsci, 
states that "a class remains hegemonic as long as it is able to produce from within, 
or coopt a plurality of creative minorities... able to increase the material and 
spiritual patrimony of the collectivity and to obtain consent of the subordinate 
classes." Robinson, however, casts doubts on whether transnational capital can 
provide a broad enough material basis to sustain its hegemony in the long term. 
This is due to the inability or unwillingness of states to "attenuate the polarization 
tendencies inherent in capitalism" (Robinson, 2004: 162) due to their decreasing 
capacity to redirect surpluses. We can therefore expect to see a challenge to 
the idea of neoliberalism as 'common sense' (in the Gramscian sense of the word 
meaning uncritically thought out ideologies, see Gramsci, 1971: 323-26, 419-
25). This obviously leads us to the question of what kind of resistance and 
transformation is now appropriate. As was indicated in the introduction a central 
problem this research seeks to address is whether the changes in spatial relations 
associated with neoliberalism necessitate a re-thinking of site for political action, 
a matter that current debates within the historical sociology of international 
relations have been silent upon. 
3.6 What is to be done? 
Marx and Engels (Marx and Engels, 1848/1996: 833, emphasis added), when con-
sidering the issue of resistance to capitalist relations of exploitation put forward 
the classic proposition that "the struggle of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie is 
at first a national struggle. The proletariat of each country must. of course settle 
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matters with its own bourgeoisie." The key authors of the transnational thesis. 
however, argue that the changes in spatiality associated with neoliberal global-
ization warrant a re-examination of how resistance is articulated. According to 
Hardt and Negri (2000: 308, emphasis added) there is no longer "any independent 
space where revolution could emerge in the national political regime, or \"here 
social space could be transformed using the instruments of the state." This is due 
to the fact that the state, as we have seen, is perceived to have been surpassed as 
the prime organizer of social life under capitalism. Robinson (2003: 12) concurs 
with this analysis declaring that due to the pressures of transnational capital 
accumulation it is now "structurally impossible for individual nations to sus-
tain independent or even autonomous economies, politics and social structures." 
Following the distinction that Gramsci (1971: 235-239) made between a war of 
manoeuvre (characterized as a frontal attack on the state apparatus) and a war 
of position (conceived of more as a battle of ideas) it is clear to Robinson that it 
is the latter method that should be the focus for resistance movements. Just as 
the forces of exploitation are to be found in the transnational productive process, 
so therefore the task of resistance movements must be to organize collectively in 
this manner also. Hardt and Negri (2000: 206) put the issue in stark terms: 
We believe that towards the end of challenging and resisting Empire 
and its world market it is necessary to pose any alternative at an 
equally global level. Any proposition of a particular community in 
isolation, defined in racial, religious or regional terms, 'delinked' from 
Empire, shielded from its powers by fixed boundaries, is destined to 
end up as a kind of ghetto. 
Indeed resistance movements seeking to capture state power in their opinion 
only end up renewing the powers of territorial sovereignty (Hardt and Negri. 2000: 
97). Just as Marx theorized that capitalism had created its own gravediggers b ~ ' '
bringing into existence the proletariat, likewise Hardt and Negri argue neoliberal 
globalization has done the same by instituting a global economy that connects 
everyone to it, whilst relying on these same people to sustain this process of 
accumulation. The sovereignty of the global empire is thus "completely dependent 
on the productive social agents over which it rules" (Hardt and Negri, 2004: 335). 
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Although more favourable in relation to the question of state power, Robinson 
(2008: 350) likewise argues that national strategies of resistance are no longer 
applicable, as the source of exploitation is to be found in the transnational rather 
than national social relations of production. The global proletariat (or 'multitude' 
to use Hardt and Negri's terminology) must, like the TCC therefore become a class 
'for themselves' and begin what Robinson refers to as the 'long march through 
civil society' (Robinson, 2003: 319; 2004: 174). 
3.7 Evaluating the transnational thesis 
How successful, then, is this transnational thesis at describing the production 
of space under neoliberalism and what are we to make of the theory of resis-
tance it offers? In other words, how useful is this particular thesis in answering 
the core research questions concerning, 1) the current production of spaces of 
capital, and 2) where the spaces of resistance must emerge from. Although the 
transnational thesis does indeed have much to recommend it, it will be argued 
that three interrelated issues stand out as being particularly problematic. The 
first of these concerns the singular conceptualization of capitalist spatiality that 
this thesis advances. The second difficulty concerns the manner in which the 
constant dynamic of class struggle and the contradictions of capitalism in pro-
ducing space unevenly are neglected in favour of unified model. Lastly, because of 
these theoretical errors, the theory of resistance offered is also problematic when 
considering contemporary movements seeking to challenge neoliberalism. Lets us 
now address each of these in turn. 
With regard to their characterization of neoliberal space, transnational theo-
rists do capture brilliantly the importance of capitalist class agency in construct-
ing a globally integrated economy as well as the evolution of this class dynamic. 
The sustained attack on 'nation-state centrism', thus offers an importance cor-
rective to the study of international political economy (IPE). Their work illu-
minates the functional integration of economic activity and makes a persuasiYe 
case for this being qualitatively different from previous epochs of capitalism in 
its production of space. However, as Morton (2007b: 169) argues, many of the 
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claims with regard to the dominance of transnational space become over general-
ized without enough empirical attention paid to specific cases of neoliberalism's 
constitution within various state forms. Expressions like : E m p i r e ~ ~ or the 'transna-
tional' thereby become catch-all terms that, in Fred Block's (2001) words, leap 
over historical contingencies to justify a grand narrative of social theory' without 
being attentive to just how effective some states may be at resisting neoliberalism 
and why this might be. The work of Andreas Bieler (2006: 55-67), for example. 
highlights how the internalisation of neoliberalism in the context of fiye European 
Union countries differed vastly due to the varied models of capitalist development 
that they had adopted. The level of transnationalisation within these countries 
and the subsequent balance of social forces engendered are thus highly diYerse. 
Taking up this theme, Jessop (1994: 268-269) identifies three differing models of 
post-Fordist accumulation regimes. These are a single market strategy, a neo-
statist strategy and lastly a neo-corporatist strategy. All three elements are in 
evidence, he believes, within the EU, and also within various state forms to dif-
ferent degrees. Such attention to detail is missing from the transnational thesis 
and instead all countries are portrayed as following the same march of history. 
In relation to this point, Noel Castree (2010: 206) is at pains to point out that 
neoliberalism is not in fact a singular homogenous entity, but rather is "a varie-
gated and uneven global formation constituted differentially at a range of scales.:: 
'Transnational' can therefore imply very different things depending on the power-
geometry involved and we must therefore be attentive to the new spatial divisions 
of labour that are emerging within the globalised economy (this matter will be 
further highlighted in the next chapter). 
This is not captured well by the transnational thesis, as these authors fail 
to engage substantively with the idea that politics and economics operate across 
various spatial scales. Instead, their theorisation of spatial and scalar construc-
tion is viewed as something of a zero-sum game (Brenner, 2004: 56). The rise 
of 'Empire' or 'global space' in other words is thought to negate the importance 
of national or local space. However, this is patently not always the case. One 
may think of the former Eastern Bloc countries that in joining or seeking to join 
the EU and become further integrated into global capitalism are in fact redefin-
ing their idea of national space in relation to how it was previously configured. 
77 
3.7 Evaluating the transnational thesis 
Furthermore, specific local sites are also being constructed anew in tandem with 
the process of creating the global. A classic example of this would be the Pearl 
River Delta in coastal China (see Harvey, 2010: 33). The production of transna-
tional spatial practices furthermore, is often reliant upon 'common sense' 'spaces 
of representation' with regard to the national as a fixed scale. For example. the 
idea that issues such as debt, balance of payments and trade deficits are somehow 
'national' problems is frequently invoked and used as an impetus for restructur-
ing along neoliberal lines (Wainwright, 2008: 4, see also Chapters 4 and 5). In 
agreement with Sassen (2006: 21) therefore, we must recognise that various spa-
tial scales are not mutually exclusive but rather co-constitute one another. Once 
again, methodologically, this conforms to the notion of incorporated comparison 
set out in Chapter 1. Here, world order (the totality of capitalist social relations) 
cannot be postulated to have any existence without an analysis of how this is 
constructed at other spatial scales (McMichael, 1990: 396). 
Sarah Radcliffe (2001: 20) argues the type of thinking associated with the 
transnational thesis "tends to reinforce a geography in which there are only ei-
ther 'global' or 'local' actors. Such work can often flatten out the connections 
between specific state formations, inter-state bodies (official and social move-
ments) and political actors." The transnational thesis is therefore guilty of be-
coming rather totalising in its discourse, emphasising the coherence of Empire or 
the transnational regime of accumulation rather than its contradictions. Further-
more, the 'global' or 'transnational' in this thesis becomes slightly fetishized and 
portrayed as something of an exogenous power forcing states to adopt neoliberal 
measures. However, Peck and Tickell (2002: 383) caution against taking such an 
approach to neoliberalism that ascribes "extraterrestrial qualities to 'out there' 
forces, which are themselves typically linked towards homogenization, levelling 
out and convergence." This is what Doreen Massey (2005: 82) terms an aspatiaZ 
view of globalization whereby "spatial differences are convened under the sign of 
temporal sequence." This all too easily lends intellectual coherence to the very 
process one is seeking to combat. 
Therefore, whilst recognising the importance of the transnational as a scale 
at which capitalism now operates, we need equally to be aware that other spatial 
scales are vital to the constitution of these neoliberal spatial practices. Although 
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finance and capital may move rapidly around the world, this does not mean dif-
ference has been annihilated. As Harvey (1990: 293) counsels: ·the collapse in 
spatial barriers does not mean that the significance of space is decreasing." Rather 
class struggle is ever more intensively waged over just what particular spaces 
contain. It is these differences (at the local, or national scale) that transnational 
production and finance seek to exploit. Thus whist recognising the discursiye 
power of neoliberalism, or the so called meta-logic at work, we need to bear in 
mind Lefebvre's (1991: 308) famous phrase that "A space that homogenises has 
nothing homogenous about it." Indeed, as set out in Chapter 1, a key aspect 
informing resistance is the simultaneous equalisation of conditions of production 
combined with the difference of social relations inscribed in space (Smith, 2008: 
187). In other words those that are suffering from processes of uneven develop-
ment are increasingly aware of this fact due to the concomitant globalisation of 
informational flows (Lefebvre, 2008/1961: 316; Appadurai, 1990: 8). This brings 
us neatly to the related point about class struggle and uneven development. 
Although the transnational thesis is very strong on the development of class 
antagonisms on this new terrain of transnational space, it pushes out the lesser 
scales at which this also takes place. Lefebvre (1976: 18; 2003: 88) however, 
makes it clear that spatial and scalar hierarchies do exist. Differences therefore 
persist between a local order and the more distant order of society as a whole, and 
conflict frequently results when these intertwine (a theme that will be taken up 
in detail in Chapters 6 and 7 when the notion of uneven and combined hegemony 
will be introduced). Following this line of argument, David Harvey (2006a: 73) 
urges us to recognise the "unpredictable outcome of political and social struggles 
operating at a variety of scales. These powers can be organized as states or blocs 
of states, but struggles also occur between regions, cities, communities, local 
neighbourhoods, turfs etc." 
The transnational thesis, in taking what Robinson (2003: 2) describes as 
a macro-historical structural perspective, thus misses out on the micro politics 
that are constitutive of this larger picture. In this imagery. nation-states simply 
become overwhelmed by the pressures placed upon them by transnational capi-
tal" (Robinson, 2004: 62). A basic error of the transnational thesis is therefore 
to assume that neoliberal globalization is having unitary affects. In Robinson's 
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analysis "Globalization, in the process of creating a single and increasingly un-
differentiated field for world capitalism, integrates the various politics. cultures 
and institutions of national societies into an emergent transnational or global 
society" (Robinson, 2003: 12-13). Likewise, Hardt and Negri's (2000: 327) char-
acterisation of Empire as being that of 'smooth space' defined by ·tendential 
equalisation' would also indicate this lack of friction in the production of neolib-
eral space. However, as Morton (2007: 175) points out with regard to this, the 
error of the transnational thesis is to assume that "capitalism is having a unidirec-
tional impact on diverse and geographical state and class relations. The stress on 
gradual equalisation, furthermore, posits conditions of evened development rather 
than the contradictions of differential developmental c o n d i t i o n s . ~ · · The ontology 
of globalization that is constructed in the transnational thesis therefore misses 
out the dynamic of uneven development and persistent contradictions of capital-
ism in its spatial conception. Whilst transnationalism may indeed be a hallmark 
of modern capitalist production, does uneven and combined development within 
the global economy not ensure that some places are more transnational than oth-
ers, and thus problematise such universal assertions? As just one example, FDI 
is not evenly spread in it spatial effects. In 1999, developed countries received 
three quarters of global FDI, of which more than a third went to the US alone 
(UNCTAD, 2000: xvii). The transnational thesis is insensitive to these issues 
and is instead based on the assumption that the transnational, is transnational, 
is transnational! However, as was made clear in the previous chapter, the produc-
tion of differential space (within circumscribed limits) is vital for the continuance 
of capital accumulation. Whilst agreeing that that the totalization of capitalism 
also implies the totalization of its contradictions (Lacher, 2006: 108), one also 
needs to remember the contradiction outlined above in relation to the equalisation 
of the conditions of production taking place alongside the creation of differences 
in space. The transnational thesis seeks to find emergent tendencies that are all 
past residuals. However, as Chapter 2 stressed (and as Chapter 5, 6 and 7 will 
highlight in detail) it is these very residuals which inform future trajectories in 
the manner in which they are incorporated into new instantiations (J\Ic J\Iichael, 
2001: 202). Thus, as Lefebvre (1991: 86) rightly puts it, ;;the worldwide does not 
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abolish the local." When examining the production of neoliberal space we there-
fore need to recognize the new dimensions to capitalism·s spatiality such as the 
mobility of finance and the transnational integration of production without re-
ducing these changes to a simplistic explanation that posits a transition from the 
national to the transnational but instead is attentive to the various spatial scales 
though which capitalism now operates across (Lacher, 2006: 153-4). As Bruff 
(2010) correctly illustrates, the transnational thesis subsumes everything within 
this scale and ignores the continued importance of the 'international· within the 
global political economy.lO 
The transnational thesis does the exact opposite of what the previous chapter 
warned against in that it 'rigidifies' and turns into absolutes processes that are still 
highly tendential and contested. Lefebvre (1976: 54-55), however, warns us that 
the construction of models that are not extremely relative and that do not take 
into account the confrontation that emerges in everyday life and the potential 
for change that this brings with it, arguing, "the methodology of models thus 
tends to eliminate both radical critique and the contradictions (the dialectic) of 
the lived." (on this point, see also McMichael, 2001: 201-202). 
In terms of its normative implications for a politics of resistance, the transna-
tional thesis is quite possibly correct in assuming that a purely national spatial 
struggle is not feasible as a strategy for complete liberation from capital. This 
point however, is hardly novel. Indeed, this was the central thesis Leon Trotsky 
(1962/1930) advocated with his theory of permanent revolution. The difficulty 
with Hardt and Negri is their conflation of three issues: namely the need for a 
global strategy of resistance, and the lack of an independent space for which revo-
lution could emerge from, and the virtue (or not) of seeking control of the state.ll 
However, these are separate questions that need to be dealt with in turn. As the 
lORosenberg (2006: 308) defines the 'international' as the "dimension of social reality which 
arises specifically from the coexistence within it of more than one society." As noted above, the 
transnational thesis rejects this, claiming that there is now simply one single global society in 
a sociological sense. This is a highly dubious claim, especially when one considers Kees van der 
Pijl's (2007: vi) exhortation to in fact widen our notion of international relations to include 
"communities occupying separate spaces and dealing with each other as outsiders." 
11 Robinson (2008: 344) in this regard rather contradicts himself, as despite claiming the 
state is no longer site for backwards and forwards linkages, then advocates the taking of state 
power for these very reasons, thus displaying very little difference from the position of :'Iarx 
and Engels which he criticizes. 
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issue of state power will be considered in detail in Chapters 5. 6 and 7 ~ ~ little 
will be said on this matter here. However, far more problematic is the seeming 
contradiction between asserting the need for a global strategy of resistance whilst 
simultaneously denying that any independent space for political transformation 
exists. As Lefebvre (1976: 13) rightly argues, a resistance that aims at the trans-
formation of totality must begin somewhere. Hardt and Negri by contrast hm"e 
no geographical sense to their theory of resistance, relying instead on notions of 
'desertion' or 'exodus'.12 They write with regard to this; "Battles against the 
Empire must be won though subtraction and defection. This desertion does not 
have a place. It is the evacuation of the places of power" (Hardt and Negri. 2000: 
206, emphases added). However, this is to ignore that an essential dynamic of 
many resistance movements is precisely in the reclaiming of place in the face of 
attempted dispossessions (see Chapter 6 and 7). The transnational thesis there-
fore removes the 'staging post' for politics and leads to what Merrifield (2006: 
129) has labelled a 'big bang' thesis of revolution. However, resistance cannot 
be formed in a vacuum. It must begin from a certain point in time and space. 
Just as the abstract space of capitalism must be grounded in some absolute phys-
ical space, so too resistance must be located in the material reality of e v e r y d a ~ ' '
struggle (Lefebvre, 1976: 13). As Kees van der Pijl (2001: 499, emphasis added) 
notes, resistance to neoliberalism requires "a rolling back of the discipline of cap-
ital. This is turn will require that people resist that discipline in the specific 
circumstances that it is imposed on them." The words of author and activist 
Arundhati Roy (2001: 86) are prescient with regards to challenging neoliberalism 
at the purely transnational level. Instead of attempting the wholesale transfor-
mation of the system all at once she declares that; "attempts to define it, and 
fight it all at once is impossible. The only way to fight it is by fighting specific 
wars in specific places." 
This idea is similar to the strategy put forward by Holloway (2010) who calls 
for us to create cracks in capitalism and to recognize that interstitial spaces for 
political transformation can still be formed. This may well involve resistance 
12Jt should be noted that these themes of resistance were most cogently articulated by Deleuze 
and Guattari (1988) and it is from these authors that Hardt and Negri draw much of their 
inspiration. 
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being advanced at the transnational level. But it may equally involve a local 
and/or national dimension. Just as the error of the transnational thesis was to 
elide the various spatial scales upon which capitalism now operates, so too we 
need to be wary of their advocacy of a politics of resistance acted out at purely 
the transnational level. Rather, resistance, like capitalism must operate though 
a variety of spatial scales, with the degree to which it acts upon these depending 
on historically specific circumstances. The issue is not where resistance starts 
from. Rather it is about spreading and not remaining static (Harvey, 2010: 138). 
In other words, it is about not being confined to one spatial scale or another but 
being able to 'jump scales' (Smith, 1993: 97; Gibson, 2005). The transnational 
thesis does not concern itself with the continuing nuances of spatial differences 
preferring to instead emphasize the narrative of a monolithic capitalism against 
a monolithic resistance (whether it be called the transnational working class or 
'multitude') confronting one another in a millenarian manner (Holloway, 2002: 
137). However, Silver (2003: 9-10) has argued that research on world income 
inequality "is not easy to square with the image of an emergent homogenous 
global working class in-itself' as income inequality between countries remains 
more potent than inequality inside countries. Such simplistic assertions of the 
transnational thesis are therefore problematic. 
3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has engaged in a detailed discussed of the changing spatial and 
scalar configurations associated with neoliberalism. The theoretical framework 
established in Chapter 1 was hereby utilised to give concrete meaning to class 
struggle taking place through space. This was highlighted by considering the tran-
sition from embedded liberalism to neoliberalism - exemplified in the shift from 
Fordist accumulation regimes based upon national regulation to a more flexible 
accumulation strategy of neoliberalism characterised by the transnationalization 
of finance and production - in light of the decline in profit rates and low rates 
of growth that began to occur in the 1970s. The transnational thesis was then 
scrutinised to see how well it captured these changes. 
83 
3.8 Conclusion 
The agency of the TCC was highlighted as being key to the production of 
neoliberal space. However, it was noted that just as the system of 'embedded 
liberalism' could not be defined only with reference to national space, so too 
neoliberalism cannot be defined by a purely transnational space. Indeed, the rai-
son d'etre for transnational capital and production is to exploit the differences 
in what various spaces contain by way of their social relations. This implies a 
constant uneven geographical development inherent to neoliberal space that is 
missing from the analysis of the transnational thesis. The constant friction of 
class forces opposing the logic of capital is also missing from their thesis and 
instead a uniform picture of 'smooth' neoliberal space is postulated. Concurrent 
with Massey (2005), we thus need to recognize that space is the realm of mul-
tiplicity, yet this multiplicity must be linked to the causal dynamics of uneven 
and combined development (Rosenberg, 2006, 2010: 166). It is therefore argued 
that we need to conceive of neoliberal space as being made from the dialecti-
cal relationship between a variety of spatial scales. Drawing from the method 
of incorporated comparison, the whole can only be understood in relation to its 
constituent parts. It was also argued that we need to be attentive to questions of 
place and geographical specificity when considering the nature of resistance. In 
summary then, the transnational thesis advances our inquiry into the historical 
sociology of international relations by 1) focusing attention to current problems, 
and 2) giving consideration to questions of space and scale in addressing empirical 
problems. Nevertheless, it was argued that their spatial conceptions were found 
wanting, and not enough attention was paid to the problematic of uneven and 
combined development. Their mischaracterization of the spaces of capital means 
they fail to adequately theorise the spaces of resistance. These are key lessons 
that will help inform the chapter that follows, where the strengths of both the 
transnational thesis and the current historical sociology of international relations 
schools will be drawn upon, while seeking to avoid their shortcomings. 
8-1 
Chapter 4 
Latin America and the 
Production of the Global 
Economy 
Capitalism should be studied in 
the hope, not of finding how its 
history may repeat at a later date 
in the peripheral countries, but of 
learning how the relation between 
the peripheral and central was 
produced 
Cardoso and Faletto, 1979: 23 
This chapter seeks to show how neoliberal space has been forged within the 
Latin American context, replacing import-substitution industrialization (lSI) as 
the region's dominant developmental paradigm. The purpose of this chapter is to 
further the empirical analysis of the spatial, both as a terrain produced through 
capital accumulation, and as a site of resistance movements' struggle. It will help 
shed further light on the key research question regarding the 'spaces of capital: by 
providing a detailed examination of how geopolitical conflict takes place through 
the dynamics of capital accumulation leading to the establishment of new spatial 
divisions of labour. On the other hand, it will also provide the background in 
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which we can situate Inovements of resistance to neo-liberalism, and understand 
the necessity for these movements to challenge the logic of capital at multiple 
spatial scales. It thus helps point towards an alternative theorisation of what it 
means to engage in class struggle (a point to be taken up in detail in Chapters 6 
and 7). 
In exploring the production of spatial relations within the Latin American 
context, this chapter adopts a historical sociological perspective (outlined in the 
introduction), seeking to demonstrate the key role of class struggle as the driving 
force of this process as well as considering the role of the state, conceived as part 
of the totality of capitalist social relations (see Holloway and Picciotto, 1977). 
Following Morton (2007c: 599), it will be argued that the history of state for-
mation and developmentalism within national contexts must be situated within 
(although not predetermined by) the wider fundamental dynamics of the inter-
national political economy. Two related themes emerging from Chapters 2 and 3 
are thus drawn upon here and further elaborated. The first of these is the need to 
understand hegemony and class struggle as taking place across a variety of spatial 
scales. The second relates to the contradictory nature of capitalism as a mode 
of production, generating crises of over-accumulation which are then attempted 
to be resolved by means of spatial and scalar fixes. Both of these ideas can be 
witnessed in the history of Latin America's development trajectory, in particular 
during the transition from lSI to neoliberalism. David Ruccio (2010: 307-308) 
has argued that explanations for this transition have focused predominantly on 
either 1) the profit squeeze (a contradiction of the national mode of regulation), 
or 2) crises among advanced capitalist countries feeding into the international 
environment (a contradiction between national modes of regulations). "An al-
ternative" he argues, "would be to integrate the two accounts and investigate 
the connections between the internal and the external." This is exactly what this 
chapter sets out to accomplish by deploying the method of incorporated compar-
ison and focusing on the nature of uneven and combined development within the 
global economy. This will show how, contrary to the transnational thesis, the 
'international' retains a vital role in geopolitical explanation. 
A broad historical narrative is presented here, the details of which \vill be 
complimented when the specific instance of l'vlexico is examined in the following 
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chapter in relation to the key themes that will be developed. \Yhereas the pre\'ious 
chapter bridged the divide between the abstract and meso levels of a l l a l ~ ' s i s ~ ~ the 
purpose of this chapter is to serve as a point of arrival to the concrete level from 
the meso. An obvious objection to such an intellectual task is that the diYersity 
of countries' experiences within the region makes any generalization ultimately 
fruitless. What happens to be the case for relatively wealthy countries such as 
Brazil or Chile might not be the case for a country such as Bolivia. However. while 
due attention must be paid to historical specificities, we must also be aware of 
the key points of commonality. For example, all Latin American countries share 
a colonial history of incorporation into two Iberian empires that put a major 
fetter on economic development, and underwent an analogous process of liberal 
reforms post-independence, which involved an assault on peasant land tenure and 
the transfer of resources to politically connected landowners (Coatsworth. 1998). 
Furthermore, all countries in the region (with the exception of Cuba) have used 
capitalism as the engine of growth and development, and all have a dominant 
class that represents "a numerically insignificant proportion of the economically 
active population" (Portes, 1985: 34). Lastly, although these plate tectonics may 
be subject to change, all have hitherto occupied a subordinate position within 
the global economy (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979). 
The chapter will proceed in the following manner. First, the production of 
space in Latin America will be considered in relation to both the colonial and 
post-colonial integration into the world economy. Second, the rise of lSI will be 
discussed in relation to its class referents. Third, the spatial characteristic of lSI 
will be rendered before; fourth, these contradictions are explored. Fifth, the rise 
of neoliberalism as a new spatial and scalar project will be examined and finally a 
discussion of challenges to this in the form subaltern class resistances is discussed 
and conclusions drawn. 
Let us begin with a brief history of the production of spatial relations within 
Latin America in order to examine how they have been forged in dialectic relation 
to the international capitalist economy. This will highlight the need to understand 
state formation and developmentalism as a process of class struggle taking place 
across multiple spatial scales. This will contribute to understanding the role of 
87 
4.1 Incorporating Latin America 
the state in furthering capitalist development and help shed light on the anti-
statist nature of many contemporary resistance movements (to be considered in 
Chapters 6 and 7). 
4.1 Incorporating Latin America 
The production of space in Latin America has, for the past five centuries. been 
heavily mediated by external factors. With the advent of colonialism. the 'veins 
of Latin America' were forced open to facilitate the extraction of wealth and inte-
grate the space of the 'New World' with that of the West (Galeano, 1971/2008). 
Owing to high transportation costs, new settlements were constructed near riYers 
or coastal areas. However, with the advent of the railroad, space as an object 
of exchange value was invested in, and agricultural production for export shifted 
to the interior of the continent (Coatsworth, 1998: 28). Commenting upon the 
alteration in spatial practices that were affected by this, Phillip Oxhorn (1995: 
254) argues that, 
patterns of colonial trade and administration were highly centralizing 
influences, concentrating economic, political and social resources in a 
few major cities and ports throughout the region. After independence, 
these same cities came to dominate the national political, economic 
and social scenes in most countries. 
Latin America became integrated into the world economy post-independence 
through a strategy of export-led development fuelled by primary commodities. 
Politically this corresponded to the dominance of the rural oligarchy (Cardoso 
and Faletto, 1979: 14; Kaufman, 1990: 127). The very same cities that had 
served as colonial capitals, now (as national capitals) came to act as primary 
nodal points for Latin America's integration into the world economy serving as 
"a conduit for the export of primary products and the importation of manu-
factured goods and capital" (Oxhorn, 1995: 254). One can highlight the role 
of internal class forces in helping to produce this early state form, as a rural 
oligarchy and urban elite came to share similar interests. contributing to "a fur-
ther concentration of resources and power" (ibid). However, these internal class 
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forces were heavily mediated by the international capitalist economy. From the 
period 1870-1914 conditions within the 'international' influenced Latin American 
state formation and developmentalism in two key ways. First, Latin America:s 
insertion into the world trading system "and the corresponding ease of borrowing 
from abroad helped to stifle whatever potential for local production of technol-
ogy might have survived the Spanish crown's attempt at modernisation in the 
closing decades of the colonial era" (Glade, 1986: 2). During the latter part of 
the nineteenth century British investment was particularly decisive. By the end 
of 1880 British investment in Latin America totalled £179 million and b ~ ' ' 1890 
the figure was £425 million. Between 1890 and 1913. Latin America received 
one quarter of all British capital flows ( I D B ~ ~ 2007: 68). This was p r i m a r i l ~ ' ' for 
infrastructural development. This export of capital from the centre to periphery 
can be explained by what David Harvey (2006b: 427) refers to as the inner and 
outer dialectics of capitalist transformation. As we explored in Chapter 2. it is 
the inherent problem of overaccumulation that impels capitalists "to explore geo-
graphical frontiers or look to the production of use values that will payoff further 
and further into the future" (ibid: 410). Thus, owing to overaccumulation in one 
particular place (in this case the US and Western Europe), the 'inner dialectic' 
of capitalism causes it to expand beyond its current frontiers to forge new rela-
tions across space. Although the persistent problem of overaccumulation is not 
resolved it is displaced by means of a spatial fix e.g. a new round of accumulation 
or 'outer transformation' of the periphery. This process is of course imbibed with 
a particular power-geometry as Lenin (1917/1987a) recognised. Furthermore, as 
well as creating new sites for the recomposition of capital, it also creates new 
sites for class antagonisms to be generated (Silver, 2003: 64). 
The other key factor located within the 'international' was the fact that indus-
trial production in the core capitalist countries determined the level of demand 
for the region's primary products (Bulmer-Thomas, 1994: 57; Glade, 1986: 7). In 
this manner Latin American state formation and developmentalism were framed , 
in an "overarching structure of articulation provided by the world market s ~ ' s s
tern (Glade, 1986: 8). During this period, although pre-capitalist social relations 
persisted, "capitalism came to be installed as the hegemonic mode of production 
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among the several co-existing types" (ibid: 49). The expansion of the export sec-
tor had promoted urbanization and "contributed to the growth of a wage earning 
working class and a salaried middle class" (Bulmer-Thomas, 1994: 130). This 
would provide the stimulus for the emergence of a domestic manufacturing sector, 
although at this stage agriculture was still the dominant mode of employment. 
and thus oligarchic power still remained both economically and politically supe-
rior to that of the bourgeoisie (who remained very much a minority). However, 
the absorption by industry of a new class of workers in the cities demonstrates 
the key point made by Gramsci (1971: 59): namely that embryonic hegemonic 
activity needs to begin before the rise to power of a particular class. 
4.2 The rise of import-substitution industrial-
ization 
The outbreak of the First World War was an important milestone as the beginning 
of the end for both the export-led strategies of development and (as a corollary) 
oligarchic power. The war served to boost nationalism and increase acceptance 
of the necessity of state intervention in the economy (Thorp, 1986: 71). More 
importantly for its effect on Latin American developmentalism was the fact that 
the war destroyed the integrated markets for goods, capital and labour. Due to 
the re-imposition of capital controls that the European countries introduced to 
aid their financing of the war, they were no longer in a position to export surplus 
capital to developing countries (IDB, 2007: 74-75). The dominant developmental 
strategy that began to emerge in Latin America was that of import-substitution 
industrialization (lSI). As will be explained, this was linked to a highly differ-
ent set of spatial practices and ideological representation of space, themselves 
informed by the dynamics of uneven and combined development. 
To understand the rise of lSI it is imperative that we once again recognise how 
domestic class forces within national state forms reacted to conditions within the 
international economy in forging this new developmental paradigm. From the 
late nineteenth century to World War II capital exports by the US and Europe 
had mainly been focused in the primary sector and public utilities. However, 
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this was to create tension between governments and business over the amount of 
capital that was reinvested back into the domestic economy, contributing further 
to the rise of nationalism (Varas, 1995: 275). Moreover, there was growing class 
conflict in Latin America between the old elites tied to the agrarian export econ-
omy and those linked to the newly emerging industries. Due to levels of foreign 
investment, "a nascent group of industrialists developed under the auspices of 
the state. In trying to promote their own interests, these new industrialists had 
to challenge the traditional oligarchic rule, producing tension and clashes with 
the powerful landowning class" (ibid). Although numerically small, the fact that 
manufacturing growth began to lead the expansion of GDP for the first time can 
be cited as evidence for the growing importance of the bourgeoisie as an historical 
subject (Kaufman, 1990: 113). Adding to this atmosphere of class conflict was 
the fact that urban labour in the 1930s began to try to assert itself as a social 
force leading to tensions within the old development structure (Skidmore and 
Smith, 1992: 54). It is worth noting at this point the importance of the changing 
character of hegemony within the international sphere and the impact this had 
upon Latin American state formation and developmentalism. As previously men-
tioned, British hegemony (the so-called Pax Britanica is usually dated between 
1815-1914) in the international political economy helped reinforce the oligarchic 
export-led development strategy in its demand for Latin American primary prod-
ucts as the driver of its domestic industrialization. Furthermore, Latin America 
would then serve as a key destination for the exportation of British manufactured 
products. The emerging American hegemony after World War I, however, would 
presage the rise of worldwide industrial productive relations (Gramsci, 1971: 277-
216; Cardoso and Faletto, 1979: 24-26; Glyn et al., 2000: 56). These emerging 
economic ideas would be used to enhance the power of these nascent elites in 
Latin America l and provide an atmosphere convivial to their further expansion. 
Gramsci (1971: 116-117, emphasis added) was attentive to the manner in 
which geographical interlinkages such as these were formed, highlighting how, 
in many cases: "the impetus of progress is not tightly linked to a vast local 
economic development ... but is instead the reflection of international developments 
1 For a discussion on the role of ideas and their impact on economic development see Bier-
steker (1995). 
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which transmit their ideological currents to the periphery - currents born of the 
productive development of the advanced countries." In other words, the changing 
character of hegemony in the international political economy laid the foundations 
that were conducive for change in the character of hegemony at other spatial scales 
such as the regional and the national levels. This is not to say that the outcome of 
social struggle over the state form was pre-determined by the international sphere. 
merely that the terrain was created in which certain modes of development could 
be more favourably articulated. 
This was further reinforced with the onset of the Great Depression. In this 
period, demand for Latin America's primary products severely contracted as did 
the availability of capital to the region. Duncan Green (1995: 15) describes the 
situation of the region in the 1930s as one of "growing poverty, social unrest, 
repression, economic recession and defaults over foreign debt. Latin American 
export markets disappeared, and economies starved of hard currency had dras-
tically to curtail imports." This led to a climate of export pessimism in which 
lSI emerged, not so much as a coherent developmental paradigm, but rather as 
an emergency measure to "stave off the balance of payments crisis, maintain 
employment and to defend the interests of politically important constituencies" 
(Kaufman, 1990: 114). As will later be demonstrated, this would not be the 
last time the issue of debt was used to presage a restructuring of the state and 
the direction of development. World War II further contributed to the change in 
developmental policy. The scarcity of imports led to a stimulation of domestic 
manufacturing so that post-war industrial production expanded over 33% above 
pre-war levels (UN, 1949: 1). The ending of the Second World War furthermore 
was not a positive experience for the region as wartime co-operation with the 
US ceased. Moreover, with the new geopolitical dynamics of the Cold War. the 
reconstruction of Europe was prioritized over investment in Latin America thus 
limiting the exogenous capital available for development (Bulmer-Thomas. 1994: 
257). Post-war, the region had a reasonably healthy level of foreign reserves. 
However a combination of debt resettlement, nationalizations (and subsequent , 
compensation paid) and the massive rise of imports (an increase of 75% in three 
years) meant that these reserves were quickly diminished (ibid: 262). Thus, in this 
international climate of changing hegemonic structure, scarce capital flO\\'s and a 
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rising domestic bourgeoisie who sought to insulate themselves from foreign com-
petition and an increasingly aware working class, lSI emerged in Latin America as 
the dominant developmental paradigm. Drawing upon i'dorton (2007c: 612-13). 
it can be highlighted how transitions to capitalist modernity therefore unfolded 
"in a world-historical context of uneven and combined developmenC as it was the 
desire for economic development from all classes within Latin America coupled 
with particular conditions within the 'international' that led to the decline of the 
old model of accumulation and its replacement with lSI. 
By the 1960s every Republic had an lSI policy of sorts (Bulmer-Thomas, 
1994: 262). As Ricardo French Davis (1994: 188) summarises, although the 
specific policy content differed, "most Latin American countries from the 1950s 
to the 1980s have in common the basic features of relying upon the manufacturing 
sector as the main engine of growth. It is therefore possible to speak of a common 
Latin American experience of lSI." This was reinforced by institutions such as 
the Comision Economica Para America Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL, Economic 
Commission for Latin America) that helped lay the intellectual foundations for 
the model. Of particular importance were the economists Raul Prebisch and 
Hans Singer who acted as key 'organic intellectuals' providing homogeneity and 
awareness to the emerging bourgeois class and providing the theoretical terrain 
on which they could establish their hegemony (Gramsci, 1971: 5-23). Drawing 
upon the theoretical basis that was laid out in the previous two chapters, we 
can see once again how ideology (the manner in which space is represented) can 
intervene in spatial production. 
4.3 The state mode of production in Latin Amer-
• lca 
lSI sought to build on the prevailing Keynesian ideas (analysed in Chapter 3) 
with regard to the central role that the state had an important role to play in 
the direction of economic activity. The overarching purpose was to facilitate a 
development strategy for the countries of the region that had been denied to 
them due to the experience of colonialism (Kiely, 2007: 53). The adoption of lSI 
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thus represented a new epoch in state formation in Latin America. Previous h', 
the state had sought to promote the interests of the exporting sector whilst also 
acting as a conduit for foreign investment and thus had taken a subordinate role 
to the private sphere (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979: 129). As was explained earlier, 
this corresponded to the dominance of the domestic oligarchy and the particular 
mode of integration with the international political economy. With the newly 
emerging model, the state's function changed to providing the infrastructure nec-
essary to create the conditions propitious for industrialization. Domestically this 
entailed intervention to regulate prices and provide credit and subsidies, as well 
as controlling the labour market and establishing state-owned enterprises (SOEs). 
Concurrently, tariff barriers were erected and/or quotas installed to protect do-
mestic industry from competition. Lastly, in congruence with the received wis-
dom of the time, strict financial controls were imposed on capital movements 
(Stallings, 2005: 3-4). lSI thus came to be based around three key ideas: the 
promotion of the domestic industry that should produce goods for the domestic 
market, the reduction of dependence on both foreign manufactured imports and 
the exportation of primary products, and lastly on protection for these domestic 
industries (Kiely, 2007: 50). In terms of the spatial relations that were produced, 
lSI contrasted with the previous era of export-led growth. Instead of looking out-
wards and seeking to generate growth through integration with the world market, 
lSI can be thought of as an inward-looking development strategy in which the 
countries of the region based their economic dynamism on the growth of their 
own domestic industrial sector. This can be empirically witnessed by examining 
developments in world trade and Latin America's role in this. Between 1948 and 
1973 the value of international trade rose at an annual rate of 9.7%. However this 
was mainly concentrated in the developing countries. In this same period Latin 
America's share of world exports declined so that "by 1965 the region:s share 
of world exports had fallen below its share of population, perhaps for the first 
time since independence" (Bulmer-Thomas, 1994: 270). Imports also declined 
substantially as a percentage of GDP (Furtado, 1970: Ill). It is important to 
stress at this point that the institution of lSI was not an auto centric process but 
rather the confluence of national and international class dynamics. Due to the 
collapse of the export-led growth model, the economic hegemony of the oligarchs 
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receded and concomitantly there was a shift in power towards "foreign and do-
mestic industrial capitalists interested in preserving or gaining access to protected 
markets" (Kaufman, 1990: 121) One can demonstrate this point regarding the 
relative power of class forces in Latin America if one compares the respective 
roles of agriculture and manufacturing production to the contribution of GDP. 
During the 1950s, primary products fell from 17.2% of GDP to 8.9%. Conversely, 
manufactures rose from 18% of GDP to 21% (French-Davis, 1994: 172). Fol-
lowing the demise of agro-exportation as a model of development, the industrial 
bourgeoisie tied to the state were the only group capable of establishing a viable 
hegemonic project, defined as: "the mobilization of support behind a concrete. 
national-popular program of action which asserts a general interest in the pursuit 
of objectives that explicitly or implicitly advance the long term interests of the 
hegemonic class" (Jessop, 1990: 208). As mentioned above, since the 1930s (and 
continuing with the growth of industrialization) the working class had increasing 
been constituting themselves as an important political constituency. Migration 
from the countryside to the cities in search of employment threatened to create 
urban unrest and necessitated job creation. Thus, as Cardoso and Faletto (1979: 
26) explain, the industrial group were - despite their apparent marginal situation 
- the "only group in the new urban sector that possessed a real economic base. As 
the one group that could actually absorb urban popular sectors in a productive 
way (they were) strategically situated to establish terms of alliance or compro-
mise with the rest of the social system." This conforms to Gramsci's (1971: 116) 
view of how hegemony is established as what is important is not necessarily the 
numerical size of a class but its ability to represent (or potentially represent) the 
wider interests of society at a particular juncture. Jessop (1990: 99) elaborates 
upon this point, highlighting how economic hegemony is established "through 
general acceptance of an accumulation strategy. Such a strategy must advance 
the immediate interests of other fractions by integrating the circuit of capital in 
which they are implicated at the same time as it secures the long term interests 
of the hegemonic fraction." Thus, when examining the constitution of lSI's eco-
nomic hegemony it is imperative to note that the power of the landowners was not 
completely eroded. This was because, instead of a bloody revolution (the case of 
Mexico notwithstanding), there were "sufficiently elastic frameworks to allow the 
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bourgeoisie to gain power without dramatic upheavals" and whilst not eliminated , 
the old oligarchic classes were "demoted from their dominant position" (Gramsci, 
1971: 115). Instead, a new class alliance was formed under the new regime of ac-
cumulation. In order to industrialize, the region needed to purchase the necessary 
capital goods from abroad. This necessitated foreign exchange raised through the 
continuing exportation of primary products. lSI thus provided a "framework of 
tense interdependence between industrial and agro-exporting sectors; a growing 
power for state elites emerging within this framework; and an increasing use of 
the state's regulatory apparatus to protect organized interests" (Kaufman, 1990: 
112). In this manner the emergence of lSI can clearly be thought of as a Latin 
American variant of the 'state mode of the production' described in Chapter 3. 
In other words the 'space of growth' was one clearly managed and controlled by 
the state (Lefebvre, 1975/2009: 107-111). This state power was enhanced by 
their control of exports (Pearce, 2004: 493). The process of state formation in 
Latin American can also therefore be related to Gramsci's twin concepts of pas-
sive revolution and trasformismo. The former refers to a situation whereby the 
state plays the leading role in the process of transforming social relations, and 
its associated concept trasformismo describes the "establishment of an ever more 
extensive ruling class" within the framework of the established order (Gramsci, 
1971: 58). As Robert Cox (1983: 167) has noted, these concepts have particular 
purchase when applied to peripheral, industrialising countries. 
Once again recalling the triad of spatial practices, spaces of representation 
and representational spaces (the perceived, the conceived and the lived), we can 
see how lSI maps on to each level. With regard to spatial practices, the focus 
on the growth of internal market expansion clearly represented a break from the 
previous model of integration. In relation to 'spaces of representation' one can 
examine how nationalism and the representation of 'national space' came to be 
utilized as an elite class strategy for capital accumulation. There was however 
a limited degree of incorporation of the demands of the popular classes such 
as spending on social services, subsidized consumption, increasing employment 
opportunities and rising real wages (Robinson, 2004b: 137). This was achieved 
through the process of strong unionization often linked closely with the state in 
the method of corporatism. In terms of the 'representational spaces' of lSI, the 
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previous two elements were able to exert a powerful influence in creating a model 
for incorporation. In this manner, lSI as a hegemonic project can usefully be 
defined as one of 'controlled inclusion' (Oxhorn, 1995). In other words, it was 
very much a process of inclusion from above in which the electorate were viewed 
as clients rather than citizens (Pearce, 2004: 494-496). Co-optive democracy and 
populism were to become key traits of Latin American states during this era 
(Skidmore and Smith, 1992: 55). 
As a strategy for national development lSI had some degree of success. The 
period 1950-1981 saw a large increase in per capita growth, almost 5.5% per 
annum with output per capita concomitantly increasing by 2.8% (French-Davis. 
1994: 169). The region also made significant progress in industrializing. Be-
tween 1950 and 1978 manufacturing increased its contribution to GDP from 9.3 
to 57.9 billion dollars. However, it should be stressed that this impressive growth 
sat alongside the continuation of vast inequalities. Critically, despite the inward 
looking nature of the developmental model, Latin America never managed to 
create a development strategy that was not reliant upon both foreign technol-
ogy and capital to sustain its accumulation process. In what follows it will be 
highlighted how lSI as a hegemonic project collapsed not only as a result of the 
accumulation strategy underpinning it, exhausting its potentialities and thus cre-
ating the terrain for new social struggles, but also because worldwide there was 
a restructuring of capitalist social relations which the region was not immune to. 
After all, it should be remembered that "the history of central capitalism is, at 
the same time, the history of peripheral capitalism (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979: 
23). This contention will be explored in relation to the debt crisis that swept 
through Latin America in the 1980s. However, as will also be demonstrated with 
regard to this crisis, the history of peripheral capitalism is equally the history of 
central capitalism. This will serve to underscore the key points made in the pre-
vious chapter with regard to the mutual construction of various spatial scales for 
capital accumulation and the vital role that uneven and combined development 
plays within this process. It will also allow us to construct an analysis of the debt 
crisis in terms of geo-political competition that will be further substantiated in 
the next chapter. 
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Let us now explore the contradictions of lSI as a "distinct regime of accumulation" 
(Lipietz, 1987: 14). A key difficulty Latin America faced was trying to develop a 
self sustaining manufacturing sector. Other nations who had managed this. such 
as New Zealand, South Africa and Canada, had industrialized alongside their 
integration into the world economy (UN, 1949: 53). Latin America, by contrast, 
was inserted into the global trading system prior to this and thus came to rely on 
the transfer of resources generated from the sale of primary commodities to fuel 
the domestic industrial sector. As mentioned previously, this was essential to gen-
erate the exchange revenue necessary to buy the components needed for domestic 
industrialization as there were only limited indigenous capital goods industries 
in most Latin American countries. However, it is always difficult to increase the 
inputs necessary for industrialization whilst relying on primary products, as his-
torically they have a relatively low elasticity in terms of demand. Compounding 
this problem was the fact that the net barter terms of trade (NBTT) for primary 
products had declined significantly following the Korean War so that by 1967 
they were 30% below the level of 1950 (French-Davis, 1994: 180). Thus, despite 
the attempt to create endogenous growth conditions, lSI failed to move the region 
away from exogenous shocks. Although lSI did manage to reduce Latin American 
dependence on consumer goods, this was only achieved through a new relation of 
dependency on capital goods (Kiely, 2007: 54; Skidmore and Smith, 1992: 56). 
One must at this juncture take heed of Doreen Massey's (1994: 59) point, namely 
that in analysing space and spatial changes in one area, one must also remain 
mindful of the fact that the rest of the world does not remain static, and that 
furthermore the requirements of production are constantly evolving. Indeed, dur-
ing the period 1965-1973 the world economy began to move away from internal 
growth to growing internationalization of trade (Glyn et al. 2000: 87). The pre-
vailing climate of 'export pessimism' in Latin America however, meant that the 
region was slow to adopt to the openness of the international political economy, 
and unlike the NICs in East Asia, failed to see the potential of manufactured 
products as a strategy for growth. When this was realized in the 1960s, years of 
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high tariff barriers meant that the Latin American manufactured products \\'ere 
highly uncompetitive and often of a low standard. This, coupled with the over-
valuation of most Latin American currencies, meant manufactures struggled to 
break into world markets (Bulmer-Thomas, 1994: 283-84). 
The region also remained heavily dependent on foreign capital to expand the 
accumulation process. This led to attempts to encourage FDI in a bid to en-
courage technology transfer and provide much needed capital. An alliance thus 
developed between foreign capitalists and the domestic bourgeoisie connected to 
state power. For foreign companies, investment in Latin America provided a re-
gion with new fertile markets, cheap labour and a highly protected environment 
that they could invest inside (Twomey, 1998: 181; Varas, 1995: 276; UN, 1957: 
52-53). However, foreign firms often sought to repatriate profits, creating tension 
with an inward looking model of development that relied upon the reinvestment 
of this capital in order to expand domestic production. One therefore has to be 
cognisant of the place of Latin America within the emergence of a new spatial 
division of labour. As Massey (1994: 59) has argued, the production of spatial 
inequality is inherent to this very concept. In order to pay the dividends accruing 
to foreign investors whilst retaining their productive capital and expertise, new 
loans began to be sought (Martinez, 1993: 67). As we shall later see, this co-
incided with an international environment in which surplus capital was actively 
seeking new markets. This fact, however, makes any claim of lSI representing a 
purely 'nation-state' phase of capitalist development (e.g. Robinson, 2003, 2004a, 
2004b, 2008) somewhat nonsensical, as outside forces, as we have seen, were partly 
constitutive of this model from the outset. Full sovereignty over economic devel-
opment was never achieved, leading Alain Lipietz (1984: 76-77, emphasis added) 
to conclude that lSI as a model of accumulation was "immediately and durably 
international in character." Its portrayal as simply a "regional-specific version of 
Fordist-Keynesian national capitalism" (Robinson, 2008: 51) therefore becomes 
problematic as it elides the very different power geometries involved. Whereas 
Fordist-Keynesian regimes generated their own surpluses (and indeed suffered 
from a lack of avenues for profitable investment) Latin America was reliant upon 
the importation of this surplus capital, and therefore occupied a structurally 
subservient position within the global economy. 
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Another long term structural problem with lSI was its inherent class divide. 
As Oxhorn (1995: 258) powerfully argues; "The viability of the industrialization 
model required growing domestic markets. Ultimately this led to growing de-
mands by the working classes which Latin American economies strained to meet.:: 
Few workers could afford to buy the products they manufactured (Green, 1995: 
18), thus highlighting the alienating conditions under which capitalist produc-
tion was taking place and its internal contradictions as a regime of accumulation 
(Marx, 1844/2007: 69; Lebowitz, 2003: 12). Moreover, under lSI the income in 
real terms going to the poorest elements in society actually shrank (Portes, 1985: 
24). Unlike Fordism in the West, a consensus about the merits of large scale 
redistribution was not reached. Whilst those elites tied to the basic consumer 
goods industries favoured a more progressive income distribution to expand their 
sales base, this was opposed by those linked with consumer durables and interme-
diate goods (Varas, 1995: 277). Some attempts to overcome this limited scope for 
capital accumulation were attempted by means of a 'spatial fix' of regional inte-
gration in order to achieve economies of scale. However, despite some increases in 
inter-regional manufacturing exports, this new scalar arrangement did not fulfil 
expectations and the lack of domestic demand remained a key contradiction of 
the accumulation strategy. 
Adding to this difficulty was the fact that unemployment was an increasing 
problem in Latin America. Despite the success of lSI in stimulating economic 
growth it suffered from the fact that its model of industrialization was highly 
mimetic of patterns found in the developed countries, reflecting the nature of 
uneven and combined development. This meant that it tended to be technology 
intensive and thus had a limited potential for job creation as it failed to absorb 
workers into formal productive structures (again highlighting the importance of 
recognising Latin America's place within a global spatial division of labour). Un-
employment in this manner became a structural condition of lSI due to the fact 
that technology was imported in an effort to 'catch-up' with the West (Dumenil 
and Levy, 2004: 37-42). Therefore, as Alejandro Portes (1985: 29) illustrates. 
"despite accumulated industrial growth during the period following World 'Yar 
II, the relative size of the informal proletariat declined by only 4 percent be-
tween 1950 an 1980." This would lead to increasing social tension and conflict. 
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heightened by the fact that "the capacity of education to provide avenues for 
social mobility was nearing exhaustion as the creation of high paying employ-
ment failed to keep pace with the expansion of education levels in the workforce:: 
(Oxhorn, 1995: 258). The frustration of the popular classes led to increasing 
demands to maintain their limited political and economic inclusion. These mo-
bilizations from below were often met with highly authoritarian responses from 
above by elite classes in which 'coerced marginalization' emerged as a key state 
policy to replace the former model of 'controlled inclusion (ibid: 257-258).2 As 
Silver (2003: 165) explains, a key contradiction of the developmentalist state was 
that increased labour militancy led to a loss of legitimacy. However, to overcome 
this through increased social spending would threaten profit rates and therefore 
reduce the foreign investment that had become vital to the growth model. 
Ultimately lSI as a hegemonic project withered as the accumulation strategy 
that underpinned it came into crisis. Just as the oligarchs had sought foreign 
investment as a means of helping to secure their own power, so a similar strategy 
was now pursued by the bourgeoisie. Within all the Latin American states, lSI 
was consuming a vast amount of resources on things such as infrastructural devel-
opment, inefficient SOEs, and social welfare provisions. This helped precipitate a 
shifting basis of class power away from manufacturing and towards the financial 
sector. Indeed this has been identified as one of the hallmarks of neoliberal-
ism worldwide (Dumenil and Levy, 2004). Harvey (2006b: 303) synthesises the 
changing relationship as follows: "the capacity of industrial capitalists to finance 
their own investments and extend credit to each other is exhausted as they reach 
the limit of their cash reserves. They are forced to turn to the banks and the fi-
nanciers who strengthen their power vis--vis industrial capital as a consequence." 
This was exactly what occurred in Latin America, but crucially the financiers 
were external forces in the shape of international banks. Thus, contemporaneous 
with James Dietz (1989: 21), the rapid expansion of debt-led growth should thus 
be viewed as 
a concrete and costly manifestation of the continuing and deeply ret-
rograde nature of Latin America's class structure, a structure that 
2This can be particularly evidenced in the turn to military/authoritarian regimes in Brazil 
(1964) Argentina (1966) Chile (1973) and Uruguay (1973). 
101 
4.4 lSI: failed incorporation or successful class project? 
profoundly affects the nature and completeness of the region's pro-
ductive apparatus and its mode of development. Lacking the internal 
basis for expanded development, Latin American elites, very often via 
the state and state investment, turned outwards in the 1960s for loans 
to fuel capital accumulation and growth. 
Developments within the international political economy crucially helped to 
shape this trajectory, however, confirming the point that class strategies have 
to be understood in dialectic relation to multiple spatial scales and not viewed 
merely within a national context. The creation of the Eurodollar market and 
breakdown of the Bretton Woods financial system had, as Chapter 3 demon-
strated, led to the rise of transnational capital flows. The oil shocks of the 1970s 
not only generated vast excess liquidity in international markets, but also created 
a foreign exchange crisis for the oil-importing countries of Latin America, whilst 
oil-producing countries such as Venezuela, Ecuador and Mexico sought to borrow 
in order to expand their production capabilities.3 These 'petrodollars' thus not 
only presented an opportunity for Latin American elites to offset the contradic-
tions of lSI's weak domestic capital markets by borrowing abroad (whilst also 
providing resources for a degree of social redistribution to offset rising labour 
militancy), but at the same time provided a 'spatial fix' for over-accumulated 
capital in Western banks, as opportunities for investment there were limited due 
to the onset of stagflation (as discussed in the previous chapter). Capital after 
all "is defined as a process - as value 'in motion' undergoing a continuous ex-
pansion though the production of surplus value" (Harvey, 2006b: 83). Recycling 
'petrodollars' into Latin America thus became a way to productively put this 
capital to work and stave off domestic inflation and devalorisation (Lipietz, 1984: 
80). The accumulation of debt within Latin America thus needs to be firmly 
situated within the context of uneven and combined development and the very 
different socio-spatial relations contained within different geographical regions of 
the world, that were now brought into a new configuration. 
3The first oil price rise came in 1973, and was a response by the Organization of Arab 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) to the US support for Israel during the Yom Kippur 
War. The second shock in 1979 followed in the wake of the Iranian Revolution. 
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Debt helped to further the process of expanded capital accumulation through 
deficit spending based on 'fictitious capital', defined as, "a flow of money-capital 
not backed by any commodity transaction" and based upon "future labour as a 
counter-value" (Harvey, 2006b: 265-266). The assumption was that loans could 
be repaid though increased export earnings, the creation of profitable new markets 
and the further recycling of loans back to the centre to purchase capital goods, 
thus helping to stimulate western economies (Lipietz, 1984: 77). Latin America, 
in other words, has become a vital site for the reproduction and stabilisation of 
global capitalism This integration of spatial relations through over-accumulation 
is consistent with the inner logic of capital identified by Marx in 1863, when he 
wrote: 
Over-production, the credit system, etc ... are the means by which cap-
italist production seeks to break through its own barriers and to pro-
duce over and above its own limits. Capitalist production, on the 
one hand, has this driving force; on the other hand, it only tolerates 
production commensurate with the profitable employment of existing 
capital. Hence crises arise, which simultaneously drive it onward and 
beyond its own limits (Marx, 1863/1972: 122, original emphasis). 
Crisis then should be viewed as an essential moment in the dynamics of cap-
italist production, becoming a tool to restructure economies so as to extend and 
deepen the value form. This is vital to understanding the rise of neoliberalism in 
Latin America as it highlights that we cannot conceive of moments of capitalist 
production in isolation but rather always have to examine capitalism as an in-
tegrated whole (as the method of incorporated comparison stressed throughout 
has shown). Realising this allows us once again to empirically grasp the point 
made by Lefebvre (1991: 55) that class struggle is increasingly waged through 
the production of space. Let us explore then the specific class content of the debt 
crisis to demonstrate how this is the case. 
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In the post-war period, capital flows to Latin America had predominantly taken 
the form of bilateral or multilateral lending, with some FDI also proving crucial. 
However, with the emergence of the Eurodollar market the nature of capital 
flows was altered and syndicated bank loans emerged as the dominant form of 
investment (UNCTAD, 2003: 33). By 1980, 80% of the region's debt was held by 
private banks (French-Davis, 1994: 235). Financial capital thus came to displace 
productive capital (Martinez, 1993: 67). This put the region in a precarious 
situation, as integration into the world economy through this means was an even 
more unstable link than the previous one through commodities (French-Davis, 
1994: 185). One can witness the increasing vulnerability of the region to the 
influx of foreign capital if the debt ratios compared with the value of exports are 
examined. In 1950 foreign debt amounted to one third of the value of all exports. 
However, by 1960 the external debt was almost a third more than the region's 
total exports, and in 1973, prior to the first oil shock, it was almost twice as 
much. From this one can see that the structural conditions for the debt crisis 
were already firmly in place and that the oil shocks merely served to exacerbate 
the problem (Martinez, 1993: 65). In real terms, the average capital flow to 
Latin America increased four times from the period 1966-70 to 1974-81, so that 
by the beginning of the 1980s the region had accumulated the largest debt stock 
in the world (French-Davis, 1994: 226-227). The viability of debt-led growth in 
Latin America was conditional, though, upon the persistence of three factors: 1) 
the continuing availability of foreign capital, 2) the maintenance of low interest 
rates and 3) rising commodity prices to help service accrued debt. However, the 
election of Paul Volcker as Chairman of the Federal Reserve in 1979 precipitated 
a new monetarist policy in the United States in response to domestic fears of 
inflation. This cancelled out all of the above three premises. First, the unilateral 
raising of interest rates markedly increased the value of Latin American debt. 
Second, at the same time, the raising of interest rates caused a contraction in 
international liquidity, leading, third, to declining demands for primary products 
as recession became a feature of the central economies. Financial markets also 
became aware that Latin America could not repay its vast loans and thus foreign 
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capital began to dry up. All of these elements helped precipitate the debt crisis 
in Latin America that erupted in 1982. This provides empirical detail to Harvey's 
(2006b: 431) assertion that 
general crises arise out of the chaos and confusion of local, particular 
events. They build upwards on the basis of concrete individual labour 
processes and market exchanges into global crises in the qualities of 
abstract labour and in the value form ... crises build, therefore through 
uneven geographical development. 
The crisis of over-accumulation within Western economies was thus success-
fully switched to Latin America, which was to also bear the major costs of the 
restructuring process. The debt crisis marked a watershed in Latin American 
state formation and developmentalism. Gramsci remarks with regard to the po-
litical significance of economic crises: "(they) create a terrain more favourable to 
the dissemination of certain modes of thought, and certain ways of posing and 
resolving questions involving the entire subsequent development of national life" 
(Gramsci, 1971: 184). This was certainly the case in Latin America, where the 
debt crisis would be used to redefine the trajectory of development, with an out-
ward looking neo-liberal economic model emerging to replace the inward looking 
one of lSI. As Grindle (1996: 4) counsels, the debt crisis "opened up increased 
space for deliberative efforts to craft new relationships between state and econ-
omy and to redefine relationships of power and accountability with society." The 
role of international financial institutions (IFls) such as the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB) and Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB) were key levers of power in this regard. Although external forces had 
never ceased to influence Latin America's state formation and development, this 
tendency became ever more pronounced after the debt crisis. As countries in 
the region could no longer service their debts and sources of private lending had 
ceased, they had to look to IF Is as a means of obtaining much needed foreign 
exchange. However, these loans came with key conditionalities attached to them, 
including the reduction of public spending, exchange rate stability, import liber-
alization, privatization, deregulation and the opening of their economies to FDI 
(UNCTAD, 2006: 43-44). This was in line with the newly emerging '\Yashington 
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Country 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 
Argentina 5,809,759 7,722,484 27,156,990 50,945,920 62,232,660 98,482,300 
Bolivia 588,300 1,012,794 2,702,381 4,804,566 4,274,968 5,272,U7 
Brazil 5,734,466 27,331,380 71,526,930 103,611,700 119,964,200 160,515,300 
Chile 2,977,238 5,518,637 12,081,260 20,383,880 19,225,820 22,038,220 
Colombia 2,236,453 3,757,762 6,940,527 14,248,250 17,222,120 25,044,290 
Ecuador 364,311 908,754 5,997,483 8,702,830 12,107,260 13,993,570 
Mexico 6,968,569 18,230,540 57,377,670 96,867,300 104,442,000 165,378,600 
Nicaragua 6,968,569 800,688 2,192,851 5,772,308 10,744,680 10,389,700 
Peru 3,211,338 6,117,777 9,385,848 12,883,950 20,043,570 30,833,180 
Uruguay 363,012 904,235 1,659,824 3,919,448 20,043,570 30,833,180 
Venezuela 1,422,233 2,233,282 29,355,700 35,339,580 33,170,910 35,537,940 
Table 4.1: Total External Debt (in thousands of US dollars) of various Latin 
American Countries 1970-2000 (Source: World Bank: World Development Indi-
cators) 
Consensus' (discussed in the previous chapter) which sought to reduce (or in re-
ality alter) the role of governments in the economic affairs of developing countries 
and move them more generally to export-oriented models of growth (Williamson, 
1990: 1). Duncan Green (1995: 64) captures the essential policy dilemma that 
Latin American countries faced with no private loans being forthcoming. They 
could "either declare a moratorium on the debt and become an international 
pariah, or generate a trade surplus and use the excess hard currency to pay the 
banks. They chose trade." Commenting upon the new discourse of development, 
Thomas Biersteker (1995: 180) writes that, despite the unevenness of the shift to 
neo-liberalism "the change in development ideas has been profound." 
Table 4.1 highlights the huge impact and continuing problem of debt for Latin 
America. The levels of most countries' indebtedness continued to expand rapidly 
up to 1995 (and in some cases beyond this) due to both inflation on existing 
obligations and new debts accrued. Owing to this, Latin American governments' 
policies became directed towards "ensuring significant flows of external funding 
rather than encouraging domestic capital formation and productivity growth" 
(UNCTAD, 2003: 144). As we shall later see, this has had huge implications for 
the region's development path. 
The massive debt burden also meant that countries were forced to create 
the conditions necessary to service this debt. Practically this entailed increasing 
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exports whilst trying to reduce domestic demand. This quickly led to a disas-
trous recession whilst the rapid opening of their economies to foreign competi-
tion helped destroy local research and development (UNCTAD , 2003: 140). This 
meant that Latin American industries ' products would remain dependent upon 
a high import content, exacerbating the balance of payments crisis (UNCTAD. 
2006: 48). 
As a method for dealing with the debt crisis , economies were restructured 
(in line with World Bank recommendations) to become more 'investor friendly '. 
Tariffs on foreign trade for example dropped from 42% in 1985 to just 14% in 
1995 (Robinson, 2008: 54).This led to FDI replacing portfolio investment and 
commercial bank loans as the most important form of investment as Figure 4.1 
below demonstrates. This has important implications for control in the produc-
tion process and is evidence of a new spatial division of labour (Massey, 1995). 
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Figure 4.1: Total Resource Flows to Latin America and the Caribbean, by type 
of Flow, 1990-2003 (billions of dollars) (SouTce: UNCTAD, 2004: 8) 
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 highlight the massive expansion of FDI that has taken 
place in Latin America since the 1990s. A significant proportion of this has 
been in mergers and acquisitions, and the takeover of state enterprises that were 
privatized (UNCTAD , 2000: xvii). By 2005, FDI stock accounted for 32.7% of 
Latin America's gross fixed capital formation, expanding at a much faster rate 
than that of North America or the European Union. The t ransformation of the 
role of the state in economic development has had important ramifications for 
the region. The neo-liberal accumulation regime established in Latin America . on 
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Region/ economy 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Latin America and the 1599 3514 6483 6242 9748 29,610 97,803 75,541 
Caribbean 
Argentina 90 56 678 919 1836 5609 10,418 5008 
Brazil 392 1203 1910 1418 989 4405 32,779 15,066 
Chile 12 37 287 165 1315 3041 4860 6960 
Columbia 43 37 157 1023 500 968 2395 10,255 
Ecuador 89 95 70 62 126 452 720 1646 
Peru 
-14 81 27 1 41 2557 810 2579 
Costa Rica 26 69 53 70 162 337 409 861 
Mexico 312 458 2090 1984 2633 9526 17,789 19,736 
Venezuela 
-23 418 80 99 778 985 4701 2583 
Table 4.2: FDI Inflows to Latin America 1970-2005 (millions of US dollars) 
(Source: UNCTAD, 2001) 
Region/Economy 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
World 5.2 6.8 8.4 9.3 18.3 22.6 
European Union 6.1 9.1 10.5 12.6 26 33.1 
North America 4.5 5.5 8 8.3 13.9 14.2 
Latin America and the Caribbean 4.6 8.2 9.3 10 23.9 32.7 
Table 4.3: Inward FDI Stock as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product, by Host 
and Regional Economy 1980-2005 (Source: UNCTAD, 2001) 
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average, now only commits around 20% of national income to capital formation. 
"well below the level thought to be necessary to allow the region to catch up rates 
of economic growth" (UNCTAD, 2003: 65). Whereas under lSI, state banks 
were the key providers of credit (in keeping with the national spatial strategy 
of development), now, FDI is "to an increasing extent intended to serve global 
and regional markets often in the context of international production networks" 
(UNCTAD, 2006: 10). Thus, Latin America has further become integrated into 
what Gary Gereffi (1995) refers to as 'global commodity chain' production. Not 
only have exports increased, they have also become more diversified (Robinson, 
2008: 56). 
We need to be cautious, however, about viewing changes in Latin American 
developmentalism solely as an external imposition. As Alejandro Colas (2005: 70) 
powerfully argues, neoliberal globalization is a process "heavily mediated, when 
it is not actually authored by states." Whilst external factors were important 
influences in setting the terms of the debate and transmitting these new discourses 
of development, the furtherance of neo-liberalism in the region would not have 
been possible without the support of local elites, as well as the crisis of the 
existing model and the seeming lack of alternatives (Green, 1995: 23; Morton, 
2003). Michael Burawoy (1998: 20-21) has highlighted that blaming shifts in 
development trajectories solely on exogenous forces is often used as a strategy to 
mask the establishment of new domestic classes. Class struggles around the state 
form have thus proved to be essential, as its regulatory capacity has been used 
to craft these new relationships with external capital. An example of this would 
be the manner in which states seek to 'valorise' their cheap sources of labour 
to attract FDI (Lipietz, 1984: 74). It should be also noted how particular elite 
fractions in Latin America saw their positions augmented and enhanced by the 
transition to neoliberalism and the restructuring of the region's economies (Dietz. 
1989: 13-15). All in all, the transition to neo-liberalism has seen the consolidation, 
rather than the destruction, of a capitalist class within Latin America highlighting 
a new phase of trasformismo. Although lSI therefore can be viewed as a failure 
both in terms of a viable regime of accumulation and as a project to incorporate 
the subaltern classes, when viewed from a class-theoretical perspective it has 
been enormously successful in fostering the consolidation and dominance of the 
bourgeoisie. Therefore as David Ruccio (1991: 1329) explains, "\Vhat are often 
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seen as development failures may, in fact, be part of a more general process of 
the successful emergence and strengthening of capitalist class processes in Latin 
America and the rest of the world" . 
It is also important to not view the debt crisis simply as a crisis of Latin 
American capitalism but rather as a potential crisis of capitalism seen as a to-
tality. Following the Mexican default, thirteen American banks were owed $16.5 
billion. Had other countries followed suit in defaulting, the financial system of 
world capitalism could well have collapsed as it did in 1930 precipitating a global 
depression (Green, 1995: 61). As Dumenil and Levy (2004: 87) note, by 1983 23 
other countries had to reschedule debt repayments and the four most indebted 
nations in the world (Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela, and Argentina) owed 74% of 
debt held by developing countries. However, rather than becoming a crisis of 
capitalism and threatening the social relations upon which the system is based, 
the debt crisis simply became a crisis within capitalism, thus acting as a necessary 
precondition to drive the system forward and begin a new round of accumulation 
(Lebowitz, 2003: 165). This, however, involved a process of highly spatialised 
class struggle (or geopolitical conflict). As Harvey (2003: 151, emphasis added) 
counsels with regard to this, "regional crisis and highly localized place-based de-
valuations emerge as a primary means by which capitalism perpetually creates 
its other to feed on." As mentioned above, this was achieved through a massive 
privatization of Latin American public resources and SOEs, as well as large scale 
reductions in social welfare provisions. This is a classic example of what Har-
vey labels as 'accumulation by dispossession' as resources went from being state 
owned and geared towards national development to exclusive private property 
rights devoted solely to surplus value extraction (Harvey, 2003: 145). Survey-
ing the change in development discourse, Biersteker (1995: 178) highlights how 
development has come to be redefined solely in terms of growth of productive 
capacities whilst "concerns about the provisions of basic needs were shunted to 
the side." Latin America's transition to neo-liberalism thus seems to support the 
view expressed by Dumenil and Levy (2004) that it is a class project designed 
to reconstitute the wealth of the upper fractions of capital at the expense of the 
subaltern classes (see also Harvey, 2005). Evidence for this can be highlighted 
by the fact that average urban incomes in all Latin American countries (with 
the exception of Chile) have stagnated or declined since the onset of neoliberal 
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Region 1960- 1965- 1970- 1975- 1980- 1985- 1990- 1995- 2000-
65 70 75 80 85 90 95 2000 2005 
Latin America 4.6 5.8 6.6 5.1 0.5 1.8 3.6 2.8 1.5 
East Asia 5.0 7.5 6.8 7.6 7.1 8.2 8.8 -l.9 6.2 
Table 4.4: GDP Growth in Latin America and East Asia 1960-2005 (annual 
average percentage change) (Source: UNCTAD, 2006) 
Region 1960- 1965- 1970- 1975- 1980- 1985- 1990- 1995- 2000-
65 70 75 80 85 90 95 2000 2005 
Latin America 1.7 3.1 4.0 2.7 -1.6 -0.2 1.9 1.2 0.1 
East Asia 3.0 4.7 4.4 5.9 5.4 6.4 7.5 3.8 5.3 
Table 4.5: Per Capita Growth Rates in Latin America and East Asia 1960-2005 
(annual average percentage change) (Source: UNCTAD, 2006) 
reforms. This has been especially pronounced in Uruguay and Venezuela where 
income has declined by 30% and 50% respectively. The dominant classes mean-
while have increased their income faster than average (Portes and Hoffman: 2003: 
63-65). Business has also come to be highly privileged over labour (Phillips, 1999: 
85; Veltmeyer, 1997: 210). Jean Grugel (1998: 226) elucidates further on this 
matter, highlighting how businesses have become privileged due to "their orga-
nization capacity, their familial and social contacts with government elites, their 
external linkages, and their growing importance in terms of production and ex-
port performance." Evaluating the success or failures of neoliberalism is therefore 
essentially a class-loaded question. 
The shift to neo-liberalism has meant that as a region Latin America has 
undergone a dramatic deterioration in terms of its position within the world 
economy. This can be starkly observed if one looks at the difference in GDP 
growth and GDP growth per capita between Latin America and the NICs of East 
Asia expressed in Tables 4.4 and 4.5. 
Further social costs of the neo-liberal economic model in Latin America can 
also be witnessed from the huge increase in poverty. During the 1980s, the amount 
of people living in poverty increased by 60 million. Concomitantly there has been 
a massive growth in unemployment and under employment, with new jobs only 
being created in the informal sector (Veltmeyer, 1997: 220-223). The region"s in-
tegration into the new social geography of neo-liberalism has made its dependency 
on external finance and technology more acute than ever. This has meant that it 
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has become increasingly hard to generate a divergent trade profile. FDI remains 
concentrated in either low wage, low skilled industries serving as a cheap export 
platform for TNCs commodity production or in the extraction and exploitation of 
primary commodities with little labour employed. Neither of these create strong 
backwards linkages with the host societies (Gereffi, 1995: 134; UNCTAD. 2006: 
111). Surveying the period from the early 1980's to 1995, Duncan Green (1995: 
111) comments that "Although the rich have had a vintage decade, most of the 
region's people are poorer and more insecure; their homes, communities, schools 
and hospitals are collapsing around them, while their cities towns and villages 
are increasingly polluted." 
The neoliberalization of Latin America space has also involved a return to the 
Ricardian economic theories of 'comparative advantage'4, the very theories which 
proved so disastrous for the region in the past, and which Chapter 2 highlighted 
were erroneous for thinking about development in the modern world. With this 
transition the very term 'development' has also come to be redefined. Rather than 
being concerned with the transformation of the productive structure as it was in 
the past, 'development' is instead now focused on issues such as poverty reduction, 
the provision of minimal needs and individual advancement (see Chang, 2010 for 
a discussion of this point). Development on this basis can only be a palliative 
and not a cure for the alienation inherent in capitalist social relations (in other 
words it recognises the permanence of structural inequality). Dumenil and Levy 
(2004: 82, emphasis added) are therefore surely correct when they conclude: 
"That it was necessary to manage the (debt) crisis was an undeniable fact. That 
the neoliberal strategy was particularly harmful is another one." 
4.6 Resistance - a tale of two lefts? 
The above factors have meant that the viability of neoliberalism in Latin America 
as a new incorporation strategy was always inherently fragile, and there has been 
a growing tension with the social polarisation that the accumulation strategy has 
4This theory entails that countries focus economic activity in which they have a competitive 
edge over others. This is supposed to be a mutually advantageous arrangement for all countries 
as goods are produced more efficiently and therefore at a lower price. However, this ignores 
completely the class loaded nature of the term efficiency and ignores that historical manner in 
which this has been produced. 
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caused as well as a distrust of traditional political parties and elites (Luna and 
Filgueira, 2009: 371). Its long term viability is therefore reliant upon generating a 
wide base of political support beyond the privileged few that have benefited from 
privatisations, deregulation and the move to export-oriented growth (Cameron. 
2009: 338). In fact the opposite has occurred. Latin America has been at the 
epicentre of resistance to neoliberalism, prompting William Robinson (2008: 237) 
to proclaim that the neoliberal model is now moribund in the region. 
This obviously necessitates new thinking about how this resistance is best the-
orised and articulated. It is submitted here that to postulate resistance simply in 
terms of a self-aware transnational working class - as does Robinson (2003, 2004a, 
2008) - is highly problematic, not least because the transition to neoliberalism 
has actually seen a decline in the formal proletariat. This means that "the nu-
merically most important segment of the employed population in Latin America 
is that excluded from modern capitalist relations and which must survive through 
unregulated work and direct subsistence activities" (Portes and Hoffman, 2003: 
53). This evidence would seem to directly contradict the thesis put forward by 
Robinson (2004a: 7) that "capitalist productive relations are replacing what re-
mains of pre-capitalist relations around the globe." The rise of the informal sector 
therefore has important implications for how we view class struggle and resistance 
to neo liberalism. This is because "the interests around which informal workers 
coalesce have to do less with control over the means of production than with 
minimal access to the means of collective reproduction, such as transport, water 
and basic services" (Portes, 1985: 31). It was, in fact, the rise in bus fares that 
was to provoke the caracazo riots in Venezuela in 1989, which spelt the beginning 
of the end of the Punto Fijo regime there and the rise of Hugo Chavez. Similarly, 
struggles over access to land have been a prime factor motivating an array of 
social movements such as the Ejercito Zapatista de Liberaci6n Nacional (EZLN, 
Zapatista Army of National Liberation) in Mexico (to be analysed in Chapter 7), 
the Movimiento Bem Terra (MST, Landless Workers Movement) in Brazil, and 
the Confederaci6n de Nacionalidades Indigenas del Ecuador (CONAIE, Confed-
eration of Indigenous Nationalities) of Ecuador. Other recent examples of these 
everyday life struggles include protests in Bolivia in places such as Cochabamba 
and El Alto against the privatisation of water and gas, and the social tensions that 
have arisen from the implementation of the Transantiago public transportation 
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system in the Chilean capital, to mention just a few. What these examples make 
clear is that the notion of class struggle must be extended beyond the workplace 
to include notions of everyday life. This (as was theorised in Chapters 2 and 3) 
means that class struggles essentially revolve around the production of space and 
the social relations that spaces contain. 
As Lefebvre (1976: 85) summarises in relation to this point: "If space as a 
whole has become the place where the reproduction of the relations of production 
is located, it has also become the terrain for a vast confrontation which creates its 
centre now here, now there, and therefore which cannot be localised or diffused."' 
We can thus observe a key dialectic relation in class struggles inscribed in space. 
Neoliberal globalization seeks to de-territorialise space before re-territorialising it 
in order to forge new global spatial divisions of labour for the increasing accu-
mulation of capital. However, at the same time, subaltern movements are also 
seeking to re-territorialise space, making control over it a key aspect of social 
struggle. Spatial production is then attempted to be reoriented towards social 
needs. Rather than a simple normative statement of how theoretically class strug-
gles have to be transnationalized in order to challenge neoliberalism, the difficult 
task of integrating these place-based movements of resistance with national and 
transnational spatial scales must be therefore be undertaken. This will be dis-
cussed in detail in Chapters 6 and 7. 
A key question will be how an alternative political project that seeks to over-
come alienation and that aims at genuine inclusivity can be formed. Here the 
issue of state power looms large. Jorge Casteiieda (1994) acknowledges that the 
very things that give rise to the left such as poverty, discrimination, inequality 
etc have not disappeared and thus left-oriented governments are likely to remain 
a feature of the Latin American political landscape. However, he also argues that 
it is clear that that the left has historically failed to change any of these issues 
in a meaningful way, especially through armed revolution. He therefore advo-
cates an approach to political transformation that seeks to combine free market 
economic principles with social redistribution as the best means for taking the 
continent forward. Surveying recent political developments Casteiieda (2006) has 
sought to identify both a 'right' left and a 'wrong' left. The so-called 'right' left 
is defined by a market-oriented 'third way' approach and is associated with coun-
tries such as Brazil, Uruguay and Chile (under the Concertacion). The 'wrong' 
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left by contrast is characterized as 'nationalist, populist, and stirident' and is 
said to represent a threat to the region's future. This version of the left is as-
sociated with the model of change in Venezuela, Bolivia and the whole legacy 
of the Cuban Revolution. The problem with such an analysis however, is pre-
cisely the fact that it ignores the different conditions in which these movements 
emerge and grow. First, classifying as a 'right' left those that accept market-
oriented policies is precisely to ignore the lessons of why neoliberalism failed as 
a project of incorporation (Cameron, 2009: 336-37; Luna and Filgueira, 2009). 
Second, this analysis (shared but inverted by Robinson (2008: 293-94) actually 
closes the world, and fails to imagine that other institutional arrangements and 
political practices could exist beyond the nation-state. Chapter 2 highlighted the 
historical constitution of the nation-state and its intimate relation to class rule, 
yet in this analysis it becomes reified and defines both the goal, and the limit 
of political action (Luna and Filgueira, 2009: 275; Motta, 2006). It also ignores 
a hugely important feature of contemporary Latin American resistance. Rather 
than just 'two lefts' in Latin America, we must in fact postulate a 'third left' in 
the form of the anti-statist social movements who seek to affect change though 
the very processes of autogestion theorised in Chapter 2. It is these movements 
of resistance that have sought a fundamental remaking of space. 
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has contributed further to our understanding of the spaces of cap-
ital by offering a detailed historical sociology of spatial production and state 
formation in Latin America. It has explored the manner in which Latin America 
became inserted into the global economy noting the important developments in 
class relationships that followed. The rise of lSI was then connected to the dialec-
tic movements between domestic class formation and the global economy. The 
contradictions of lSI were then explored in relation to both the inward-looking 
spatial practices that this was built on as a regime of capital accumulation, and 
the manner in which it became produced as a site for a spatial fix for over-
accumulated capital in western countries. lSI, it was concluded, neither served as 
a long term viable accumulation strategy nor hegemonic project. Thus. while it 
may well have proved to be successful in other instances such as forging capitalist 
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class hegemony, it failed as a model of incorporation of the subaltern classes. 
Likewise, neoliberalism has proved incapable of offering any solution to this 
incorporation crisis. Instead, the region became the central battleground for 
a new politics of anti-capitalism as class struggles proliferated over attempted 
dispossessions that this model of development is based upon. In many countries 
this has led to the rise of left-oriented governments (although with significant 
differences between them in terms of their commitment to the market, social 
redistribution etc.). However, it has also seen the rise of social movements who 
have questioned the efficacy of taking state power as a means of effecting real 
change, and have instead sought to construct alternative geographical projects of 
their own. To understand these movements it is necessary once again to combine 
the theoretical with the lived. This will now be done through an examination 
of the specific case of Mexican development in the twentieth century through 
the concept of passive revolution alluded to above (see also Morton, 2011). This 
will sharpen our level of analysis and clear the way to understanding spaces of 
resistance in greater detail. 
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From 'Passive' Revolution to 
'Silent' Revolution: The politics 
of state, space and class 
formation in modern Mexico 
As the national becomes a more 
complex site for the global, the 
specific and deep histories of a 
country become more, rather than 
less significant 
Sassen, 2006: 229-30 
This chapter now seeks to move from the meso to the concrete level, using a 
case study of Mexico to demonstrate in a more empirically detailed fashion the 
generalizations made hitherto. Themes from the previous chapters such as passive 
revolution, the construction of hegemonic projects alongside accumulation strate-
gies, and the dialectic relationship between the national and global are examined 
to highlight the role of state and class formation as a process of social struggle 
that produced the space of modern Mexico. This chapter therefore helps us to 
understand how spatial configurations have been historically produced through 
the unfolding of capitalist social relations of production, offering an insight into 
the contradictory character of this accumulation process whilst emphasising the 
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role of the subaltern within this overall development trajectory (highlighting the 
dialectic of the spaces of capital and the spaces of resistance). In order to make 
this argument, evolving processes of state formation and particular state 'spa-
tialization strategies' linked to this are examined in detail. This chapter will 
also help us to situate and understand current resistance movements to the deep-
ening of the capital relation, which have implications not only for l\Iexico but 
also worldwide, as this case study is but a national manifestation of the global 
contradictions of capitalist accumulation. 
Drawing on Gramsci's key concepts of passive revolution and hegemony, this 
chapter seeks to provide an insight into how specific spatial configurations have 
been historically produced in Mexico within the conditions of worldwide capital-
ist development. It aims to offer an explanation into the contradictory character 
of this accumulation process, highlighting the class strategies involved, whilst 
giving due attention to the process of contestation and the potential for change. 
One should rightly be wary of using political theory indiscriminately across dis-
parate cases. However as Gramsci (1971: 108-9) argues, "since similar situations 
almost always arise in every historical development, one should see if it is not 
possible to draw from this some general principle of political science." In con-
trast to the position of Alex Callinicos (2010) it will be argued that the concept 
of passive revolution - understood as the reorganization and restoration of class 
power - has particular utility as a recurring theme of Mexican history in the 20th 
century. The reason for this lies within the very unresolved class contradictions 
inscribed in capitalist development which result in periodic crises and restruc-
turing of the social basis of the state. Passive revolution, although an important 
class stratagem for the maintenance of control, thus remains ultimately a strategy 
that does not overcome the fundamental contradictions within capitalist society. 
As Gramsci (1971: 114) puts it, "the concept remains a dialectical one - in other 
words, presupposes, indeed postulates as necessary, a vigorous anti-thesis which 
can present intransigently all its potentialities for development." The scope for 
the reappearance of passive revolution thus is implicit within the very conceptual 
framework. This is essential to understanding how current resistance movements 
have organized and also contributes to the debate on how we need to problematise 
and understand the role of the state in processes of transformation. 
The argument will be set out as follows. First, Mexico will be historically 
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situated within the world economy in order to understand the antecedents of the 
Revolution. Second, an understanding of the Mexican Revolution as an instance 
of passive revolution will be explicated and the importance of the bourgeois state-
form made clear. Third, Mexico's development trajectory will be outlined \yith 
reference to the particular scales and spaces which this was founded upon, before 
fourth, these contradictions are elaborated. Fifth, the rise of neoliberalism as 
a political and economic response to these contradictions will be explained as a 
second instance of passive revolution which came with its own spatial project. 
Finally, the unresolved antagonisms of this transition will briefly be discussed. 
This will provide the framework which we can then use to move our analytical 
lens to the regional level to consider the cases of Oaxaca and Chiapas in Chapters 
6 and 7. 
5.1 Situating Mexico within the world economy 
How should one approach the problematic of state, space and scalar development? 
Morton (2007c: 599) has argued that Gramscian theory offers us a "history of 
state formation and thus social development within the 'national' that are linked 
internally to the casual conditioning and wider geopolitical dynamics of 'the in-
ternational'." Womack (1978: 97) takes this argument further, claiming that 
explanations for Mexico's development trajectory need to be located within the 
world economy rather than in Mexico itself. However, one needs to be wary of 
reifying and dehistoricising the world system itself (Cox, 1981). A more fruitful 
approach is found in that of McMichael's (1990: 391) method of 'incorporated 
comparison' (set out in Chapter 1) within which 'totality' is viewed as "a concep-
tual procedure rather than an empirical premise. It is an imminent rather than 
prima facie property in which the whole is discovered through an analysis of the 
mutually conditioning parts" (see also Morton, 2010). 
Mexico, like the rest of Latin America, had its identity indelibly stamped by 
the experience of colonialism (see previous chapter). Spatial production was thus 
from the outset heavily conditioned by international forces. As Nora Hamilton 
(1982: 18) states: 
between the sixteenth and nineteenth century, through the world mar-
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ket, as well as through more direct means of colonisation and conquest, 
the core states succeeded in imposing on the rest of the world a divi-
sion of labour in which the latter functioned to provide certain types 
of commodities, as well as markets needed by the core. 
The social function of the space of Mexico is thus an important point and one 
that needs to be borne in mind when we consider the changing dynamics of capit al 
accumulation. Spatial production was inextricably linked to questions of class, 
refracted through racial categories. The indigenous population were dispossed of 
their lands, and social life was re-oriented to meet the interests of the colonisers 
(see Bonfil Batalla, 1996). 
As Mexico became unevenly inserted into the world economy, the model of 
'development' adopted was based on the intense exploitation of cheap labour and 
the extraction of natural resources. The growth of European capitalism hugely 
shaped the landscape of Mexico with the construction of railroads being neces-
sary to facilitate the exportation of mineral wealth, the growth of urban centres 
necessitated by the enclave economy, and the expansion of the export-oriented 
hacienda at the expense of the communal Indian village (Glade, 1963: 14; Hansen, 
1971: 17; Cockcroft, 1983: 30-31).1 Nascent capitalist relations began to be de-
veloped through European colonial expansion, and Mexico evolved to become a 
focal point for inter-imperialist rivalries during the latter part of the nineteenth 
and early twentieth century (for a general description of this process see Lenin, 
1917/1987). International forces were thus instrumental in informing the national 
conditions of class struggle. As Cockcroft (1983: 44) puts it, the colonial period 
"dialectically established in Mexico an embryonic dependent capitalism and the 
impoverishment and blocked opportunities that were to generate the repeated 
uprisings that ultimately broke out." Adolfo Gilly (1983: 30-36) contends that 
it was the construction of railroad infrastructure under Porfirio Diaz (1876-1880, 
1884-1911) that facilitated the expansion of capitalist social relations of produc-
tion, helping reshape space and the organisation of work. This, he argues, led 
to the 'proletarianisation' of the country and exposed the contradictions of the 
old political order by provoking new challenges that were to coalesce with the 
IThis is of course again a simplified picture which necessarily elides specific regional vari-
ations, where divergent trends can be observed (see for example Chassen-Lopez, 2004). Such 
disparities will be considered in Chapters 6 and 7. 
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Year Length of Railroad track (km) 
1880 1086 
1881 1661 
1882 3583 
1883 5308 
1890 9558 
1910 19,205 
Table 5.l: Growth of Railroads in Mexico - 1880-1910 (Source: Gilly, 1983: 29) 
revolutionary upheavals beginning in 1910. 
The growth of railways (see Table 5.1 above), as well as facilitating the ex-
traction of natural resources, also allowed for the beginnings of a domestic mar-
ket, with commodities beginning to circulate more freely as well as increasing 
the centralised power of the state (Hamilton, 1982: 43-44; Katz, 1986: 37). 
Mexico's transition to modernity therefore took place through the dialectic of 
national and international development. However, whilst there is undoubtedly 
some truth in the claim that productive forces were coming into contradiction 
with old forms of property relations, we should proceed with caution in claiming 
that pre-revolutionary Mexico was in fact a fully capitalist country. Although 
proletarianisation of the country had no doubt increased during this period (with 
the amount of industrial workers estimated at 803, 294 by 1900), it had done so 
in a highly uneven manner, with the north of the country overwhelmingly pre-
dominant (Katz, 1986: 59). Glade (1963: 53, emphasis added) thus concludes 
that: 
Despite incipient industrialisation and the spectacular achievements 
of various mineral enclaves, pre-revolutionary Mexico was basically an 
agrarian nation, not only in terms of the overwhelming preponderance 
of the population in agriculture and the share of the national product 
originating in the agricultural sector, but also in the tone of national 
life. 
In keeping with the pattern in Latin America sketched out in the Chapter 4, 
the agro-export oligarchy dominated both economic and political power, which 
was reinforced through patterns of global investment. Under Diaz, foreign influ-
ence had increased dramatically, providing resources that endogenous economic 
121 
5.1 Situating Mexico within the world economy 
activity could not. The growth of US capital was especially marked. with in-
vestment in Mexico greater than in any other area of the world. By 1911 this 
investment was exceeding that of the domestic bourgeoisie and was more than 
twice as much as other foreign investors (Cockcroft, 1998: 85). Furthermore. 
foreign capital was diversified, dominating not only mineral resources but also 
electrical and communications systems, furthering the growth of wage labour. 
By the end of the Porjiriato, over half the country's wealth was foreign owned 
(Glade, 1963: 52). 
Despite these developments, we should not conceive of pre-revolutionary 1Iex-
ico as being a country grounded in an advanced state of capitalist development. 
As Alan Knight (1985: 2) argues, the fallacy of this position is to confuse relations 
of exchange with relations of production. Thus, whilst Mexico was indeed produc-
ing goods for the world market and had high levels of foreign investment during 
this time, the relations of production that persisted were often pre-capitalist ones 
in which extra-economic coercion inhered. However, this is where we need to pay 
attention to conditions pertaining within the 'international'. Whilst it is true 
that pre-capitalist relations were probably more dominant than wage labour un-
der Diaz, "they were more subordinately articulated within the dynamic thrust of 
capitalist relations" (Gilly, 1983: 339). The form of capitalism that would come 
to be instituted in Mexico would thus come to represent not only the way in which 
international social forces had exerted their influence over the territory, but also 
in the way class forces tied to these processes enabled or reacted upon this field of 
force within the national setting whether that be in the form of comprador classes, 
epitomised by the Cientijicos who were to gain their political power through their 
role as intermediaries for foreign capital or resistance movements to this process. 
Cockcroft (1983: 57) neatly summarises this point, highlighting how the nature 
of capitalism in Mexico was: 
varied and complex, reflecting the socio-economic materials out of 
which it has grown - from Indian communal traditions to those of 
the Spanish mobility; from conquest to pillage, and 'original accu-
mulation' to the separation of labourers and artisans from the means 
of production for an external market and a growing home market. 
to labour recruitment through starvation and the 'tying' of labour 
through debt obligations. 
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Rather than the even spread of capitalist social relations then, it is more apt 
to draw from the approach of Eric Wolf (1997: 79) who shows how symbioses ,,,ere 
frequently formed within a world historical context between an expansive capital-
ist mode of production hungry for resources, and pre-capitalist means of mobilis-
ing social labour. This is of course the process theorised by Trotsky (1919/1962: 
175,1930/1962: 24-5) in his notion of uneven and combined development, and the 
contradictions that emerge from establishing advanced economic activity within 
a backwards social formation (as discussed in Chapter 2). It was exactly these 
conditions that pertained in Mexico under the Porfiriato. On the eve of the rev-
olutionary outbreak, this model of accumulation had led to the social fabric of 
the country unravelling. While the wealthy minority were still importing luxury 
goods and engaging in conspicuous consumption, there was a massive decline in 
real wages from 1898-1911, and by the time of the Revolution in 1910, never 
had so many Mexicans been landless (Hansen, 1971: 22, 27). The vast majority 
of cultivable land was dominated by just 835 families (INEGI, 1994: 364). As 
the country was only minimally industrialised, economic opportunities were not 
being generated which could serve to pacify the increasing demands of the pop-
ulation. It was in this atmosphere that revolutionary activity was to break out. 
Although beginning as an attempt to reform the country from above, the l'vIexi-
can Revolution quickly spread to the subaltern classes who gave it new direction 
and momentum. The mobilisation of the masses altered the terrain of struggle, 
transforming the original demands for reform into a wider struggle against dicta-
torship (Leal, 1986: 22). This, however, provides us with the beginnings of our 
central inquiry. As Nora Hamilton (1982: 3) succinctly puts it, "the problem of 
the Mexican state derives from the apparent contradiction between its historical 
origins in the Mexican Revolution and its contemporary function of maintaining 
peripheral capitalist development." 
5.2 The Mexican Revolution as passive revolu-
tion 
When analysing the Mexican Revolution it is imperative to view it as a process 
(or indeed set of processes) "rather than a discrete event" (Knight, 1985: 3). 
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When defining the Revolution's character, as well as stating what it was, it is 
just as important to examine what it was not. Moreover, it must be remembered 
that during the revolutionary upheavals there was not one struggle, but rather a 
number of diverse and at times overlapping struggles taking place: landed versus 
commercial power, subaltern versus bourgeoisie, nationalist against imperialist. 
constitutionalist versus federalist etc. As Guilllermo Bonfil Batalla (1996: 111) 
puts it, "A single fuse blew up very different powder kegs." The Revolution·s 
outcome was in many respects an uneven synthesis of these. If one thing is clear. 
it is that the Revolution did indeed precipitate the destruction of the old oligarchic 
state. However, it is vital to then analyse what forms of exploitation remained, 
where political power was concentrated, and where the impetus for the nation·s 
development strategy came from. In order to do this, a theory of the capitalist 
state, grounded in civil society relations (in both its national and international 
circumstances) needs to be adumbrated, with reference to Gramsci's concept of 
'passive revolution'. 
When any social order is challenged, forces of change and conservatism are 
naturally pitted against one another. "The problem", argues Gramsci (1971: 
219) "is to see in this dialectic 'revolution/restoration' whether it is revolution 
or restoration that predominates". It will now be argued that the Mexican Rev-
olution is a classic example of what Gramsci referred to as a 'passive revolution' 
(see also Morton, 2010). A passive revolution, or a '''revolution' without a 'rev-
olution'" (Gramsci, 1971: 59), occurs when social relations are fundamentally 
reorganised (revolution) but ultimately, popular initiatives are neutralised so as 
to continue class domination (restoration) (Jessop, 1990: 213). 
The revolutionary struggles in Mexico undoubtedly caused a crisis of author-
ity, destroying the social base of the Porfirian state, and leaving a power vacuum 
which the various contending factions sought to fill. However, as Gramsci (1971: 
210-11) notes with regards to periods of upheaval: 
the various strata of the population are not all capable of orienting 
themselves equally swiftly or of reorganising with the same rhythm. 
The traditional ruling class, which has numerous trained cadres, changes 
men and programmes and, with greater speed than is achieved by the 
subordinate classes, reabsorbs the control that was slipping from its 
grasp. Perhaps it may make sacrifices, and expose itself to an uncer-
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tain future by demagogic promises, but it retains power, reinforces it 
for the time being, and uses it to crush its adversary and disperse his 
leading cadres. 
The assassination of Emiliano Zapata in 1919, the refocusing of an accumula-
tion strategy based on industrialisation, and the commercialisation of agriculture, 
and the concomitant incorporation of a limited amount of worker and peasant 
demands into the constitution of 1917, coupled most importantly with large scale 
agrarian reform, give concrete historical witness to these claims. Thus, the Revo-
lution can be partly interpreted as the failure of the subaltern classes to develop 
their own hegemony, expressed as a national-popular collective will. While the 
oligarchic classes had lost their political power, the "mass of peasant farmers, 
undoubtedly the driving force of the Revolution showed itself, time and again 
to be incapable of forming a government" (Leal, 1986: 23). The nearest they 
came to doing so was through the Ayala Plan of the Zapatistas, which contained 
specifically anti-capitalist values, calling for the immediate expropriation of land 
and the nationalisation of all property of enemies of the Revolution, whilst also 
defending villages and an agrarian orientation (Bonfil Batalla, 1996: 64). How-
ever, this plan also had its limitations, intending to set up dual power alongside 
a bourgeois state, rather than actually displacing it. Commenting upon this, 
Gilly (1983: 79) reflects that "the peasants could not rise to a nation-wide per-
spective nor offer a revolutionary solution for the insurgent nation.:) This was 
due to the fact that fundamental existing structures of authority were not chal-
lenged. The eventual co-optation of the workers and peasants into the state's 
corporatist structures, would therefore be made easier due to the fact that they 
"lacked an ideology of their own and took up the ideological stand of the Mex-
ican Revolution, which is after all bourgeois" (Leal, 1986: 32). The labelling of 
the Revolution as a 'passive revolution', it should be made clear, does not imply 
that subaltern classes were not engaged in struggle (to deny such a fact would be 
absurd). Rather the key aspect in defining the Revolution as a passive revolution 
was the acceptance of the state as being 'above the classes', and thus as a neutral 
arbiter of conflict, capable of implementing the Revolution's goals. As Bob Jessop 
(1990: 213) writes in relation to this, "the crucial element in passive revolution is 
the statisation of reorganisation or restructuring, so that popular initiatives from 
below are contained or destroyed and the relationship of ruler-ruled is maintained 
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or reimposed" (cf. Gramsci, 1971: 105-6). 
However, the bourgeois character of the Revolution, so frequently asserted. 
requires some reflecting upon as there remains a great deal of debate as to "who 
were its leading agents. James Cockcroft (1998: 111) for example contends that 
it was led by segments of the industrial bourgeoisie. However, this is disputed b ~ " "
other scholars who claim conversely that no such class as a nationally-oriented 
bourgeoisie was in existence (Hamilton, 1982: 22; Hansen, 1971: 97; Knight, 
1985: 5; Morton, 2010). It is useful here to turn to Trotsky (1930/1962: 60) 
who asserts that a revolution's character can be defined by the historical tasks 
which it sets itself. In the Mexican case, this included the break-up of haciendas, 
the widening formation of private property and industry, and the fundamental 
transformation of social relations from extra-economic coercion to wage labour. 
The Mexican Revolution can thus be identified as bourgeois: 
Not because it was the conscious work of the bourgeoisie (still less 
the national bourgeoisie), nor because it instantly transmuted the base 
metal of feudalism into the pure gold of capitalism ... but rather because 
it gave a decisive impulse to the development of Mexican capitalism 
and of the Mexican bourgeoisie, an impulse that the preceding regime 
has been unable to give (Knight, 1985: 26). 
However, as Trotsky (1930/1962: 197) reminds us, "the general sociological 
term bourgeois revolution by no means solves the politico-tactical problems, con-
tradictions and difficulties which the mechanics of a given bourgeois throw up." 
In order to resolve these problems we need to turn to Gramsci's other key no-
tion of 'hegemony' and the associated concept of 'historical bloc'. After all, as 
Stephen Gill (2008: 58) has argued, the concepts of passive revolution and hege-
mony should be thought of as "end-points in a continuum of actual historical (and 
indeed possible) transformations". Turning now towards hegemony will therefore 
highlight further the role of the state in the process of class struggle. and the 
production of the spaces of capital. 
As was alluded to in the previous chapters, hegemony is not reducible to 
domination and is defined as the "intellectual and moral leadership" \yhich a 
certain class is able to exercise due to their "position and function in the ,,"orId 
of production" (Gramsci, 1971: 124). However, when looking at the type of 
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hegemony that was constructed in Mexico, we need to remain mindful that the 
state is "not suspended in mid air" (Marx, 1996/1852: 855). That is to say, it is 
responsive within certain form-determined limits to demands placed upon it by 
subaltern classes, as it still remains grounded in civil society relations as a site of 
ongoing conflict. Thus, as Gilly (1983: 40) argues, despite their failure to develop 
an alternative national popular programme, it was the struggle of the peasantry 
that "shifted the whole logic of capitalist development. It could not block it 
completely or substitute a different process, but it interrupted and altered its 
course and changed the relationship of force between its political representatives." 
The Revolution therefore needs to be interpreted as a rejection of the economic 
and political logic of Porfirian Mexico, and the corresponding narrow social rela-
tions it was built upon, for a new type of accumulation strategy that would create 
the conditions necessary for wider participation and redress of grievances. As Jes-
sop (1990: 198) explains, "an accumulation strategy defines a specific economic 
'growth model' complete with its various extra-economic pre-conditions and also 
outlines a general strategy appropriate to its realisation." This approach allows 
us to explain the development of capitalism in Mexico not as a process forced onto 
the masses, but rather as the construction of an overarching hegemonic project, 
the context of which the subaltern classes helped shape. Hegemonic projects in-
volve "the mobilisation of support behind a concrete, national-popular program 
of action which assert a general interest in the pursuit of objectives that explicitly 
or implicitly advance the long term interest of the hegemonic class" (Jessop, 1990: 
208). Hegemony should therefore not be thought of as synonymous with 'false 
consciousness' but rather as the outcome of the balance of class forces. As Gram-
sci (1971: 52) explains, subaltern groups can have "active or passive affiliation 
to the dominant political formations" and that furthermore they can attempt to 
"influence the programmes of these formations in order to press claims of their 
own." Article 27 of the 1917 Constitution, which enshrined the responsibility of 
the state to provide land for those without it, and Article 123 that established 
one of the most progressive labour laws in the world at the time, are examples 
of the successful shaping of the new hegemonic project by the subaltern classes. 2 
However, as will now be explained, the acceptance of the bourgeois state form 
2This law legislated for a maximum eight hour day, the right to form unions, the right to 
strike and the protection of foreign workers. 
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as an 'autonomous' entity, standing above the class struggle, that was capable of 
resolving disputes and serving the goals of the Revolution, meant that there were 
form-determined limits to how far subaltern classes could pursue their demands. 
Capitalist hegemony thus needs to be postulated as an elastic concept, capable of 
being stretched in response to particular forces, but unless pushed beyond these 
limits and snapped completely, always capable of contraction. This conforms to 
the point made by Gramsci (1971: 55) that, "subaltern groups are always subject 
to the activity of ruling groups, even when they rebel and rise up: only 'perma-
nent' victory breaks their subordination." For this reason the Revolution is best 
thought of not as an emancipation but "rather a new order of capitalist control" 
(Womack, 1978: 102). 
5.3 Mexico and the bourgeois state 
To examine why this is the case, a theory of the bourgeois state must be ren-
dered. This allows us to understand and historicise the key role of the state in the 
Mexican development process, while avoiding 'statolatory' (Gramsci, 1971: 268). 
The starting point for this investigation entails examining how surplus value in a 
society is to be appropriated and how this relates to the political form (Hirsch, 
1978: 58). The state is required by capitalism by virtue of the fact that there 
remain vital extra-economic preconditions that need to be realised in order for 
production and reproduction to proceed. These preconditions must be secured by 
an apparently autonomous entity standing outside of the market (Holloway and 
Picciotto, 1977: 79). As we have already seen, the Mexican Revolution helped 
sweep away the remnants of the pre-capitalist state built upon extra-economic 
coercion, and yet it did not do away with all class antagonisms, as was clear 
from the constitution of 1917 which enshrined that the system of private prop-
erty would remain vital to the overarching economic framework. The continued 
preponderance of foreign capital also remained a vital lever of power, limiting the 
state's room for manoeuvre and again highlighting how the struggle for hegemony 
has to be related to both national and international social forces and the country's 
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wider geopolitical position (Cox, 1983: 171).3 The Mexican state thus remained 
"directly dependent upon resources generated in the private sector" (Hamilton, 
1982: 213), whilst seeking to use these resources in order to pacify subaltern de-
mands. Class antagonism was thus to be mediated by the state, rather than done 
away with. However, as Holloway and Picciotto (1977: 80) make clear: 
seen through the prism of the state, the capital relation is concealed, 
class struggle is diffused, classes are atomised into a mass of individual 
citizens - 'the public', class consciousness is broken down into 'public 
opinion' to be expressed individually through opinion polls or ballot 
boxes. 
In other words, rather than seeing economic and political conflict as part of the 
same process resulting from capitalist exploitation, they are formally separated 
and channelled into fetishised forms. The 'imagined community' of the nation 
(Anderson, 1991), with its corollary of 'national interest' can thus be appealed 
to, in order to move issues away from class struggle and ensure the rule of capital 
(see Chapter 2). In this manner 'the revolution' was to become "the ideological 
banner legitimising bourgeois rule" (Cockcroft, 1998: 108). 
The process of state formation in Mexico did not occur in a vacuum, but rather 
within historically specific structural constraints. Among these were the lack of 
an economic base, the poor development of the productive forces, the remnants 
of the old oligarchic state, and the pressure exerted by foreign capital (Hamil-
ton, 1982: 63-71).4 The key issue confronting elites would be how to expand 
opportunities within a stratified class framework that would serve to alleviate 
pressure from below. In other words how to successfully incorporate some lim-
ited demands of the subaltern classes into an over-arching hegemonic framework. 
The answer to this, as it was in the rest of Latin America (documented in the 
previous chapter) came in the production of a nationally-oriented market. The 
social forces put into motion with the revolutionary struggle, therefore produced 
3In relation to this point Nicolas Higgins (2004: 128) notes that in comparison with other 
revolutionary regimes such as the Soviet Union or Cuba, Mexico enjoyed an overwhelming 
degree of international legitimacy. 
4 As example of the pressure bought to bear by foreign capital was the cessation of production 
in the oil industry, supported by the US State Department in response to the doubling of taxes 
on oil exports introduced by the Obregon administration (Hamilton, 1982: 71). 
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modern Mexico by forcing the creation of a new scale for capital accumulation. 
There was thus nothing 'natural' about this national scale. However, important 
consequences flow from this nonetheless. As Neil Smith (1993: 101) argues, the 
production of scale is "not simply a spatial solidification or materialization of 
contested social forces and processes; the corollary also holds. Scale is an active 
progenitor of specific social processes." In contrast to the previous development 
strategy in which foreign investment shaped the urban and rural environment, 
the government in the 1930s "moved to effect an equivalent domestication of the 
capital market" (Glade, 1963: 72). Although the process of a new conscious 
national orientation to the development of space can be traced to the Calles ad-
ministration in the 1920s, like the rest of Latin America, the Great Depression, 
and it's aftermath in the early 1930s, proved to be the key turning point for the 
evolution of the new development strategy, as it altered the field of force under 
which emergent bourgeois classes could pursue their objectives. Not only did it 
make export-oriented growth untenable due to the high tariffs that were erected 
in the core states, but furthermore it reduced somewhat the ability of foreign 
countries to intervene in the affairs of the peripheral ones (Hamilton, 1982: 23). 
Coupled with this was a generalised idea resulting from the Depression that it 
was a crisis of global capitalism, rather than a crisis of capital per se, the solution 
to which lay in constructing national markets that were less exposed to these 
world fluctuations. In the case of Mexico, where previously 50% of government 
revenues derived from foreign trade, new sources of productive capital were thus 
imperative (Cardenas, 2000: 199). Local manufacture of light consumer durables 
thus began in earnest (Gereffi and Evans, 1981: 35). 
What would emerge from this would be a Mexican version of the regional-
wide capitalist development paradigm of lSI. As Enrique Dussel-Peters (2000: 8) 
argues, lSI "was not only an accumulation strategy, it was also deeply embedded 
in the emergence of a new political and social consensus among the respective 
oligarchies, labour unions, agricultural workers, capitalists and state." In other 
words lSI was also a hegemonic project developed through the creation of an 
historical bloc of contending social forces. A 'historical bloc' should be thought of 
as more than simply an alliance of various social groups, as its creation reflects the 
dialectic interplay between structure and superstructure. Thus, as Gramsci (1971: 
377, emphases added) explains: "material forces are the content and ideologies 
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are the form." In other words, lSI can be postulated as an 'organic ideology' 
resulting as the synthesis from the material conditions under which social forces 
sought to press their claims. These material conditions included the breakdown 
of the traditional agro-export model, nationalist resentment of foreign ownership 
of key sectors of the economy, working class militancy and peasant unrest in the 
countryside. Concurrent with Hirsch (1978: 82, emphasis added), therefore, when 
investigating the function of the bourgeois state, it is imperative to "embrace 
the whole of the social, political and national conditions of the production of 
the social formation." As Robert Cox (1983: 168) points out, howeveL every 
historical bloc contains a hegemonic social class (in this case the bourgeoisie). 
Crucially, then, the system of lSI would take place through a capitalist framework 
where "the development and expansion of a particular group are conceived of, and 
presented, as being the motor force of a universal expansion, of a development 
of all the national energies" (Gramsci, 1971: 182). The hegemonic project would 
thus inscribe its own contradictions, when the limits imposed by its model of 
accumulation were reached and class forces began to stretch the elasticity of 
hegemony to breaking point. This, it will be argued, resulted in a second process 
of passive revolution with the transition to neoliberalism. 
5.4 Producing space and scale under import sub-
stitution industrialisation 
The historical bloc alluded to would be formally institutionalised through the 
creation of the Partido de la Revoluci6n Mexicana (PRM: Party of the Mexican 
Revolution, later renamed Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI: Institu-
tional Revolutionary Party), founded in 1929. As Serrano (1996) documents, 
since its creation, the party "has asserted a 'peculiar right to rule' liked to its 
emergence and rise to power in the aftermath of a 'historical crisis, the Mexi-
can Revolution." If the Mexican Revolution epitomised the conditions of passive 
revolution, the PRI came likewise to embody the state. Fearing the 'Hobbesian 
potential' of Mexican society, the subaltern classes were tied to the government's 
tutelage through emergent corporatist structures (ibid: 6). This was paradig-
matic of the model of 'controlled inclusion' discussed in the previous chapter. 
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The state, seeking to overcome the violence that had plagued Mexico since 1910. 
aimed to provide stability by trying to limit the demands placed upon the system, 
increasing the capacity of the state to meet what demands were made, stimulating 
cross-class support for the new growth model, and, vitally, retaining the support 
of key sectors of society that controlled enough resources to threaten the system 
(Hansen, 1971: 175). Key to the construction of this hegemonic project was the 
production of space. One integral aspect of this was land reform. A principle 
cause of the Revolution and a key source of continuing peasant unrest was the 
prevailing system of land tenure. Reform of the agricultural sector therefore be-
came a central pillar of the Cardenas administration (1934-40), and would come 
to serve a key historical social function in furthering the development of capital-
ism in Mexico. Under Cardenas the ejid05 was created which was to stabilise the 
Mexican countryside for almost thirty years (McCaughan, 1993: 20). The process 
of land reform profoundly altered the shape of the Mexican countryside. Whilst 
ejidalland only accounted for 13% of cropland in 1930, by 1940 this figure was 
47% (Hansen, 1971: 32). Through the breakup of large haciendas, not only were 
peasants pacified and the state's legitimacy enhanced, but, furthermore, the land 
reform process helped destroy a key barrier to capital accumulation, that of the 
status-based latifundia, with its associated idle means of production. This again 
vividly demonstrates the power of class struggle in shaping space, as well as the 
central role the state played in this reorganisation. 6 
The opening of the countryside to capitalisation also facilitated the rise of in-
dustrialisation, as labour was 'freed' from debt bondage. Mass migration from the 
countryside resulted, a process that was accelerated by the transfer of resources 
away from the agricultural sector due to the uncertainty of its profitability in 
the face of land reform (Cardenas, 2000: 204) Linked to these processes of land 
reform were state-led infrastructural projects intended to create a fully function-
ing 'national' market. This was to be achieved through irrigation works designed 
to increase the productivity of the land, and highway construction that would 
provide for the integration of formerly isolated areas, as well as linking indus-
trial and urban centres (Cardenas, 2000: 205-6; Kemper and Royce, 1979). The 
5 Ejidos were government created communal lands, reminiscent of the pre-Hispanic form of 
land tenure. 
6 As John Tutino (1986: 8) summarises, peasants fought for tierra y libertad, and got tierra 
y el estado. 
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Year 
1930 
1935 
1940 
1945 
1950 
1955 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1975 
5.4 Producing space and scale under import substitution 
industrialisation 
Total Dirt roads Surfaced Paved 
1426 629 256 541 
5237 1760 1918 1559 
9929 1643 3505 4781 
17404 2399 6842 8163 
21422 1865 5972 13585 
27431 3022 5881 18528 
44892 6710 11203 26970 
61252 8448 18373 34331 
71520 8494 21079 41947 
187660 75245 24434 57910 
Table 5.2: Kilometres of road in Mexico 1930-1975 (Source - Nacional Financiera, 
1977: 82-83) 
importance of this spatial integration was vital for capitalist development. As 
Harvey (2006b: 375) explains, "spatial integration - the linking of commodity 
production in different locations through exchange - is necessary if value is to 
become the social form of abstract labour." 
This point can be empirically highlighted through an examination of the road 
network and rail services in Mexico (Tables 5.2 and 5.3), key infrastructural 
developments that allowed for the circulation of commodities. 
Post-war Mexico saw the increasing production of what Lefebvre (1991: 49, 
53-57) calls 'abstract space' - that is a space whose primary purpose is the pro-
duction of surplus value under conditions of wage labour in which 'differential 
space' (spaces not devoted to commodity production) could be maintained only 
through class struggles. Whilst the dynamism for this was propelled by the strug-
gles of the subaltern classes and the necessity to expand opportunities for their 
participation, it was done so in a manner that retained support of the elites whose 
strategic control of resources allowed them to profit from this restructuring pro-
cess. This point is summarised by Glade (1963: 69) who neatly explains the 
recomposition of class dominance in Mexico: 
As the large public works program and urban expansion raised the 
returns on investment in construction industries, fortunes deriving 
from urban land ownership began to be invested in cement, glass, iron 
and steel and other construction industries. To a significant extent, 
then, the older landowning group abandoned its passive rentier role to 
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Year Freight - million ton kilometres 
carrieda 
1925 3219 
1930 4041 
1935 4596 
1940 5810 
1945 8024 
1950 8391 
1955 10,961 
1960 14,004 
1965 18,326 
1970 23,083 
1975 33,673 
a The number of ton-kilometres is the weight in tons 
of material transported multiplied by the number of 
kilometres driven. 
Table 5.3: Railroad Services in Mexico 1921-1975 
(Source - Nacional Financiera, 1977: 75) 
become actively involved in new financial and industrial undertakings, 
including those induced by domestic market growth. 
It should further be noted that commercial haciendas, producing for the ex-
port market, were largely protected from this process of land reform, leading 
to the development of a new agrarian bourgeoisie (Cockcroft, 1998: 118). The 
Cardenas government then, although making some key concessions to the subal-
tern classes, did so in a manner that ultimately was consistent with the further-
ance of capitalist development. Indeed, as Gerardo Otero (1999: 33, emphasis 
added) has argued "land redistribution in Mexico was the way chosen to entrench 
capitalism in Mexico." 
Due to the relatively poor development of the productive forces and weak 
endogenous capital base, state involvement was vital to the process of capitalist 
development in Mexico, in order to create the material pre-conditions for the 
production process which no individual capital either could, or would do. A 
key social function of the state under lSI was therefore as an investor creating 
conditions for expanded accumulation (Fitzgerald, 1978). As has already been 
argued however, this should not lead us to conclude that the state was 'above the 
classes'. Rather lSI as a policy should be thought of as resulting from the ensemble 
of class forces bought into the historical bloc, within the limits determined by the 
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value form (Hirsch, 1978). 
State regulation was also vital to developing the 'national scale' for capital ac-
cumulation. This was achieved through the creation of a favourable environment 
for investors, including protective tariffs, regressive taxation policies, subsidies to 
industry, and direct state ownership of key industries (King, 1970). The purpose 
was to create a stable environment whereby business would save and invest locally 
through the creation of profitable opportunities (Hansen, 1971: 71). This was 
another central pillar of PRI hegemony as it sought to gain the support of labour 
and the domestic bourgeoisie by insulating them from foreign competition. These 
policies were not without their successes. Indeed the post-war period has often 
been referred to as an 'economic miracle' due to the fact that social mobility in-
creased to a degree unprecedented in Mexican history (Hansen, 1971: 181). The 
gross national product leapt from 13,524 million pesos in 1910 to 98,200 million 
pesos in 1965 (Nacional Financiera, 1977: 23). Agricultural and industrial pro-
duction also increased exponentially during the years following the World War 
II, as Figures 5.1 and 5.2 illustrate. 
The government's industrialisation drive profoundly altered the spatial organ-
isation of Mexico. It went from being a predominantly agrarian society (in 1921 
close to 70% of the population was rural) to an overwhelmingly urban one with 
by these figures reversed by 1976 (Nacional Financiera, 1977: 5). This system 
proved to be relatively stable as not only did it provide increasing opportunities 
in terms of education, jobs and social mobility but furthermore, demonstrated the 
possibility for advancement for those who had not yet benefited (Hansen, 1971: 
193). Moreover, from a class-theoretical perspective it was enormously 'success-
ful' in instituting and developing the dominance of the bourgeoisie (Ruccio, 1991). 
Bianca Heredia (1996: 133) documents that from 1940-1970 there developed a 
strong state-business nexus based on tacit coordination and explicit cooperation. 
In exchange for saving and investing locally, the state gave its active support 
to private accumulation. However, as Jessop (1990: 210) argues, the long term 
success of a hegemonic project "will depend on a flow of material concessions to 
the subordinate social forces." Maintaining a flow of material concessions whilst 
seeking to restructure Mexican capital after the 'easy stage' of lSI came to an 
end was something that ultimately Mexico's accumulation strategy could not do 
without incurring massive debt. This would lead to the breakdown of the his-
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Figure 5.1: Index of the volume of manufacturing in Mexico 1900 - 1975 (Source: 
Nacional Financiera, 1977: 146) 
torical bloc and the recomposition of the state's social basis with the transition 
to neoliberalism. Giving more substantial detail to the analysis rendered in the 
previous chapter, it will now be argued that the reasons for this lie in the peculiar 
nature of the scalar and spatial project of lSI , relying as it did on an extremely 
narrow market for the consumption of its manufactured goods, whilst being de-
pendent on outside sources to provide the inputs for this production process. This 
led to an increasing current account deficit that was temporally displaced - but 
ultimately therefore compounded - by increased foreign borrowing. 
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5.5 The contradictions of import substitution 
ind ustrialisation 
One of the key contradictions of lSI in Mexico was that it never managed to 
reduce completely its reliance on an 'outside '. As Marx (1867/1974: 531-536) 
makes clear, capitalism is not merely a process of production, but also one of 
reproduction. That is to say, it must furnish the materials necessary to replace 
those used up in the course of a year in order for accumulation to continue. It 
is through this process that t he social relations of capitalism are also produced 
and reproduced. Taking this model of simple reproduction we can pick apart the 
idea that lSI represented a 'nation-state phase' of capitalism (Robinson. 2003. 
2004a, 2008). Whilst manufactured goods were indeed produced for the domestic 
market , key capital goods needed by the Mexican industrialization process were 
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generated in the core capitalist countries who in turn needed foreign markets 
for their over-accumulation of these Department 1 goods. Thus, whilst Mexican 
industrial capital did increase fivefold during the period 1940-1965, imports of 
capital goods and replacement parts increased over twelvefold over this period. 
Import-substitution, in other words was actually 'import-intensive' (Cockcroft, 
1983: 161-62, 179). Furthermore, the capital necessary to invest in the industri-
alization process was generated through the export of raw materials to the core. 
Although the Second World War is often highlighted as a key period for the coun-
try's turn inwards, in fact, during this period, Mexico's exports actually doubled 
(ibid: 151). The 'global' was thus inscribed in 'national' space from the outset 
(as the previous chapter also pointed out). This point can be further empirically 
demonstrated if we examine the process of irrigation, a key spatial development 
that was vital to transforming Mexican agriculture. Loans for this process were 
provided by the US based Rockefeller Foundation, and the irrigated land was 
then to become a key site for (cheap) agricultural exports to the US (Barkin and 
Esteva, 1986: 124). We can clearly see that through an examination of simple 
reproduction, the core and periphery remained thoroughly interlinked through 
transnational flows of goods and money (circulating capital in other words). Ex-
pressed another way, there was no period in which a purely national space was 
hegemonic, as the production of capitalist social relations always relied upon a 
space outside its territorial borders. The idea that nation-state based capital-
ism came to containerise social relations can thus be shown to be palpably false. 
The space of Mexico was always forged through transnational linkages therefore 
during the era of so-called 'national development' . It was nationally oriented 
capitalism with transnational characteristics. It is for this reason that lSI can 
more usefully be described as a 'dependent development' strategy (Gereffi and 
Evans, 1981: 31-32). This is superior to positing a Eurocentric history of nation-
state era capitalism, which elides the very differences in power relations between 
states as well as classes. In other words, it removes the very conditions of uneven 
and combined development, essential to understanding the spaces of capital. In-
deed, it was through these links with the global economy that new forms of class 
struggles began to manifest themselves that would precipitate a second phase of 
passive revolution in the form of state-led process of restructuring. Let us now 
examine this in more detail. 
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As mentioned previously, in the aftermath of the Revolution, foreign capi-
tal was still preponderant in Mexico. Although its dominance was challenged 
somewhat by Lazaro Cardenas - most notably with the expropriation of the oil 
industry in 1938 and, additionally, the nationalisation of railways - foreign own-
ership still constituted a major part of the manufacturing industry. Indeed, by 
1972 over half of Mexico's manufacturing firms were foreign-owned (Fitzgerald. 
1978: 266). Enrique Dussel-Peters (2000: 44) argues with regard to this point 
that: 
a seemingly 'peaceful coexistence' evolved: state owned enterprises 
and national private firms provided the infrastructure, producing con-
sumer and intermediate goods, whilst TNCs, with higher total factor 
productivity and profit rates, concentrated their activities in relatively 
more advanced manufacturing branches. 
The focus on the creation of a 'national' market actually drew in foreign 
investors as high profits could be made inside the protected environment that 
Mexico offered (Reynolds, 1978: 1006). As Cockcroft (1983: 151) documents, 
US investment "doubled in 1950, tripled in the 1960s and quadrupled in the 
1970s." Manufactured goods, despite this international composition, were pro-
duced largely for national consumption, and as we shall later see, this would 
be a key barrier to further accumulation. Increasingly during this period, Mex-
ico witnessed the concentration and centralisation of capital, as large enterprises 
took over small and medium ones. This can be directly related to the state's 
particular accumulation strategy as: "The concentration of personal income and 
the centralization of control over the productive apparatus was financed by the 
extraordinary high profits generated in an overtly protective environment care-
fully shaped by the state" (Barkin, 1990: 79). Despite the massive state support 
they received, domestic industry began to be outperformed by the more efficient 
transnational corporations (TNCs). Rather than complementing domestic pro-
duction with goods that they could not furnish, TNC growth in Mexico became 
increasingly due to acquisition rather than Greenfield investment (Gereffi and 
Evans, 1981: 45). The new global spatialisation strategy of these firms, how-
ever, needs to be dialectically related to developments within their own national 
setting. As was highlighted in Chapter 3, within Fordist core countries there 
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were fewer opportunities for productive investment in this period, meaning over-
accumulated resources sought a productive outlet elsewhere. Concomitantly, the 
protected environments offered by developmental nations such as Mexico offered 
incentives to shift production sites there. The uneven development of capitalism 
and the difference that nationally produced spaces contained in their social re-
lations can again be empirically witnessed here in explaining the rise of global 
capital accumulation. 
The spatial significance of Mexico under lSI can be demonstrated by exam-
ining the changing composition of post-war foreign investment. Whereas 477c 
of US private investment pre-World War II had been geared towards export-
oriented concerns, by 1959 manufacturing for the domestic market was the key 
focus (Glade, 1963: 8). Indeed by the early 1970s two thirds of US investment was 
in manufacturing (Gereffi and Evans, 1981: 40). This would not have happened 
were it not for the idea of a protected national scale in which capital accumulation 
could occur, thereby highlighting Saskia Sassen's (2006: 1) argument that the na-
tional can simultaneously be "one of the key enablers of the global scale." The 
embryonic formation of a transnational capitalist class therefore developed as "lo-
cal elites interested in development thus found common ground with many of the 
TNCs interested in global expansion" (Gereffi and Evans, 1981: 40). However, 
the growth of TNCs would ultimately have a corrosive effect on the viability of 
lSI as a hegemonic project. It accelerated Mexico's reliance on capital goods ex-
ogenously produced, adding strain to the country's balance of payments (Jenkins, 
1979: 104). lSI was funded largely through the transfer of resources gained from 
the exportation of agricultural products. This led to an effort to increase prof-
its in the agricultural sphere through capitalisation and mechanisation, speeding 
the dispossession of the peasantry and swelling the urban population. However, 
owing to the high organic composition of capital that was being imported, not 
enough employment opportunities were being generated to cope with this urban 
migration (Fitzgerald, 1978: 273; Hamilton, 1982: 32). 
Meanwhile, due to the reliance on foreign capital to finance industrialisation, 
the government favoured large commercial farms producing for export at the 
expense of ejidos (King, 1970: 29; Barkin, 1990: 22,34). Market relations rather 
than productiveness governed this decision, as ejidos were just as productive as 
private farms (Hansen, 1971: 61). This support expressed itself geographically. 
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with the government's main investments in irrigation and agricultural equipment 
being concentrated in the north and north-east of the country - areas that served 
as platforms for exportation to the United States (for a discussion of the way 
in which the South of Mexico has historically been neglected see Davila et al. 
2002).7 Uneven development was thus taking place both internationally and intra-
nationally (a point to be discussed in detail in the following chapters). As a means 
for depressing wages in the industrial sector, price support for basic grains had 
been frozen since 1962 (Barkin, 1990: 26). However, as a response to this, many 
peasants stopped producing for the market and instead reverted to subsistence 
farming. The result of the government's agricultural policy then was to move the 
country from a position of virtual self-sufficiency to one where the country had 
to import basic foods to fulfil the needs of the population. This would further 
serve to exacerbate Mexico's trade deficit, and thus cause additional balance of 
payment problems, an issue that has consistently plagued Mexican development 
(McCaughan, 1993: 12). Moreover, it would also lead to the fracturing of the 
PRI's hegemony among the peasantry with new independent unions being formed 
outside the government's corporatist structures (Harvey, 1998: 1; Cockcroft, 1983: 
249). In order to deal with the growing imbalances in the economy and the 
increasing demands that were placed upon it from workers, peasants and the 
nationally-oriented bourgeoisie, the Mexican state turned abroad for loans to oil 
the creaking wheels of lSI and offset discontent. 
As we can see, the conditions for creating an endogenously self-renewing pro-
cess of production were never realised in Mexico. This situation was compounded 
by the fact that the subaltern classes were largely excluded from entering into 
consumption of the goods they furnished. As the economic expansion associated 
with the 'easy stage' of lSI came to an end, the PRI found its hegemony unravel-
ling due to the fact that it was unable to make the concessions necessary to gain 
the support of key constituencies, both in terms of the domestic bourgeoisie who 
saw themselves being displaced by transnationally-oriented industrialists, and the 
subaltern classes who found their limited inclusion into the hegemonic project in-
creasingly precarious (Davis, 1993: 51). lSI thus entered a "structural crisis of 
accumulation" (McCaughan, 1993: 6). However, one can only understand the 
7Unlike Fordist countries in the West, in Mexico "the government's policy has never been 
so broadly conceived or applied to prevent seriously uneven development" (CMWP, 1953: 78). 
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meaning behind this structural crisis if due attention is paid to the class relations 
that the accumulation strategy was built upon, with limited scope for effectiYe 
demand leading to overproduction and stagnation (McCaughan, 1993: 11). Addi-
tionally, the term 'structural crisis' only has meaning to the extent that groups of 
human beings have frustrated needs, and make demands that cannot be met. As 
noted in Chapter 2, structure and agency are therefore tightly interlinked (Bieler 
and Morton, 2001). As Gramsci (1971: 113) argues in relation to this point: ··It 
seems obvious that the so-called subjective conditions can never be missing when 
the objective conditions exist, in as much as the distinction involved is one of 
didactic character." 
The starting point then for investigating capital restructuring comes from the 
falling rate of profit and the attempts by the Mexican state to mobilize counter-
tendencies to this. As Hirsch (1978: 74) writes in relation to this, "the mobili-
sation of counter-tendencies means in practice the reorganisation of an historical 
complex of general social conditions of production and relations of exploitation in 
a process that can only proceed in a crisis ridden manner." The state-led transi-
tion from lSI to neoliberalism perfectly exemplifies this point. The basis for this 
falling rate of profit was due to the narrow social relations on which capitalism 
was based, and the fact that production in Mexico had always been oriented to-
wards elite consumption. The production of national space - vital to fostering 
the conditions where capitalist class processes could be safely incubated - now 
became a barrier to further accumulation, as corporations sought integration into 
the world market in order to widen their profits. This crisis manifested itself in 
growing unrest and demands for reform, as well as more radical action in the 
growth of guerrilla movements in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The state re-
sponded to this pressure from the subaltern classes with increasing repression, 
most dramatically with the massacre of students and workers in the Tlatelolco 
Plaza in 1968, highlighting Gramsci's (1971: 263) point that along the path to 
hegemony the "the armour of coercion" is always latent. This act of repression, 
however, hugely undermined the legitimacy of the PRI. 
The administration of Luis Echeverria (1970-76) sought to deal with the con-
tradictory pressures placed on the state by labour and domestic capital by im-
plementing a new policy of 'shared development'. A central pillar of this was 
the so-called 'Mexicanisation laws' that sought to limit TNC activity and restore 
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the national basis of accumulation. This involved restricting foreign ownership in 
strategic sectors and legislating for majority Mexican ownership in others (\\'ein-
ert, 1981: 119). Concomitant with this, the state sought to restructure domestic 
capital in order to reduce its reliance on foreign inputs. Capital goods produc-
tion was thus focused upon. Lastly, the PRI sought to revive its legitimacy 
with the subaltern classes by taking on a greater investment burden in health 
and education (Fitzgerald, 1978: 27; Barkin, 1990: 83). However, this attempt 
to reconstitute the PRI's hegemony highlights dramatically the limits of state 
autonomy, with the nature of class forces able to influence state policy having 
shifted dramatically in favour of transnationally linked capital. Reflecting this 
was the manner in which transnationally-oriented fractions of capital successfully 
mobilised to block Echeverria's spending plans and modest tax reform proposals 
(Davis, 1993: 55). Capital export and production cutbacks were the manifesta-
tions of business opposition (Hamilton, 1982: 30). Reforming the basis of Mex-
ico's taxation system however was an urgent priority in order to counteract key 
fiscal imbalances. Although Latin America as a whole had a historically low rate 
of taxation as a proportion of GNP, with levels at around 20% compared with the 
30-40% taken in the developing world, Mexico stood out as particularly solicitous 
of business with an average tax rate between 5.7 and 7.7% (King, 1970: 53). 
Unable to mobilise sufficient domestic resources from inside its national space, 
the Mexican government was therefore forced to borrow on international mar-
kets. Maintaining lSI as a hegemonic project, which sought, at least nominally, 
to include all social classes in the development strategy, was thus commanding 
more resources than the accumulation strategy was able to generate. This pattern 
of temporally displacing crises, rather than addressing their fundamental cause 
became a familiar pattern in Mexico during the 1970s. Neil Brenner (1998: 472) 
has demonstrated that when spatial and scalar configurations fail to secure the 
conditions for capital accumulation, they are generally "reconfigured in signifi-
cant, if always highly contested ways." This indeed was precisely what occurred 
in Mexico. 
Thus, as Morton (2003: 637) notes, "while neoliberalism had not taken hold 
at this time, crucial cleavages within the organisation of the state were develop-
ing that would lead to shifts in capitalist accumulation." The context in which 
the 'shared development' strategy of Echeverria was articulated was qualitatively 
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different to previous attempts to shore up hegemony. The 'stabilizing develop-
ment' strategy pursued by the Diaz Ordaz administration (1964-1970). at least 
in its early phase was able to command the support of all fractions of labour 
and capital. However, the path dependent logic of capitalist development meant 
that by the time Echeverria came to power, a 'tipping point' had been reached 
where crucial class antagonisms had emerged that were becoming harder to recon-
cile.8 The struggle of particular factions of the bourgeoisie to accumulate further 
surplus value through increasing spatial integration with the global market. and 
attempts by the subaltern classes to resist their deepening exploitation, were the 
concrete class forces that created this 'tipping point'. As Diane Davis (1993: 52) 
explains with regard to the outcome of the 'stabilizing development' strategy: 
By strengthening a few large internationally linked firms to the detri-
ment of national industry and most other subordinate social groups, 
stabalising development had fundamentally altered the balance of po-
litical power both within the capitalist class and between labour and 
the state. 
It was becoming increasingly clear that the latest attempts to reinvent lSI as 
a viable accumulation strategy were untenable. Exports were failing to increase 
and imports were accelerating too fast, creating current account difficulties and 
leading to a dialectic of over accumulation and spiralling inflation in an effort 
to deal with this. In order to stabilise the system, further debt was contracted 
abroad, with this debt itself finally becoming the foundation of economic growth 
(Rosario Green, 1981: 106). In 1976 the cycle of foreign borrowing, capital 
flight and a deteriorating current account forced a massive devaluation of the 
peso. This devaluation was not, however, class neutral. As Barkin and Esteva 
(1986: 14) note, "the powerful national economic groups took advantage of the 
situation, centralising their control of strategic resources, reinforcing their links 
with transnational corporations, and expanding both their operations and their 
prospects for profits." Under the auspices of the IMF, an austerity program was 
agreed by the incoming Lopez Portillo administration (1976-1982). The program 
included reducing federal spending, the cutting of social welfare programs, the 
freeing of exchange rates and limiting wage increases (Cockcroft, 1983: 259). The 
8This notion of 'tipping points' is taken from Sassen (2006). 
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subaltern classes in other words were to bear the costs of devaluation, in order for 
the process of private capital accumulation to continue. This would prove to be 
a recurring motif of Mexican development for the next twenty-five years. Grow-
ing class resentment resulted, expressed through increasing labour militancy and 
peasants organising outside of traditional corporatist unions. Cockcroft (1998: 
256) documents how independent peasant organisations sought a broad alliance 
with urban squatters, teachers, labour militants and students. creating the po-
tential for progressive resistance. However, divisions over tactics and i d e o l o g ~ ' '
would come to split the movement. 
In the face of mounting social pressures, the discovery of vast oil deposits 
in 1976 was viewed by the government as 'black gold' that could again restore 
accumulation and shore up support through increased social spending. This oil 
discovery would have profound effects on the structure of the Mexican economy 
and class structure. By 1982, Mexico had become virtually a mono culture econ-
omy, with oil coming to account for almost 75% of export earnings (CEPAL, 
2007). Resources were diverted from agricultural production to increase pro-
ductive capacity, once more furthering the growth of proletarianisation. Again, 
however, Mexico found itself reliant on resources outside of its own national space. 
In order to increase the capacity for oil extraction a huge influx of machinery, for-
eign capital and technical know-how was needed (Cockcroft, 1983: 262-3). This 
dovetailed neatly with the internationalisation of US capital. Indeed as Rosario 
Green (1981: 112) argues, "only because of their international lending activities 
were American banks able to sustain the pace of profit growth". It was the accu-
mulation of vast reserves of 'petrol-dollars' in Western banks that provided this 
liquidity, as this would have caused inflationary pressures in core states were it 
not to find a productive outlet. This merry-go-round of finance capital and debt 
began to spiral out of control. As discussed in the previous chapter in relation 
to Latin America as a whole, Mexico in particular became a site for the creation 
of 'fictitious capital'. The rapid influx of finance capital was far in excess of 
Mexican productive capacity9, a matter that was compounded when oil prices 
began to fall in the late 1970s. However, by this time Mexico had the highest per 
capita debt in the third world (Cockcroft, 1983: 270). There was then a growing 
9 As Jessop (1990: 199) makes clear the rates of return on money capital are ahyays ultimatel,,· 
dependent upon the performance of productive or industrial capital. 
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realisation that it would not be possible to repay the debt, a fact confirmed by 
finance minister Jesus Silva-Herzog in August 1982, as Mexico entered into the 
so-called 'debt crisis'. 
5.6 The silent revolution as passive revolution 
This crisis, as it was for all of Latin America, would be taken as a chance to 
fundamentally restructure the Mexican economy along neoliberal lines, exempli-
fying the conditions of passive revolution whereby the state plays a leading role 
in the process of restructuring and renewing class power. The conditions were of 
course different to that of the Mexican Revolution, but as Gramsci (1971: 114:) 
makes clear, the concept of passive revolution should serve as a "category of in-
terpretation" rather than a specific programme (see also Morton, 2007b: 15-36). 
Just as the entry into the crisis came from the breakdown of a particular accu-
mulation strategy and hegemonic project, so the crisis would be used as the basis 
on which to begin constructing a new historical bloc with an alternative accu-
mulation strategy and hegemonic project. In this sense, the spiralling debt was 
utilised as a weapon to enforce market discipline. Unable to gain access to capi-
tal through private lending, Mexico was forced to adopt IMF austerity measures, 
which frequently involved a re-timetabling of the debt burden, but only at the 
cost of increasing its overall amount (see Figure 5.3). This further exposed the 
country to the pressure of transnational capital, enhancing those fractions of cap-
ital in Mexico oriented towards global accumulation. Barkin (1990: 7, emphasis 
added) astutely summarises the political implications of the debt crisis: "Mexico, 
like most other third world countries, can never be expected to payoff its debt. 
Rather, the debt and the crisis that sparked it have already done their service in 
the international economy. They have forced a reorganisation of production and 
of social classes." 
Bob Jessop (1990: 211) usefully distinguishes between 'one nation' and 'two 
nation' hegemonic projects. 'One nation' hegemonic projects offer an expansive 
form of hegemony, whereby rights and welfare are expanded (albeit unevenly) for 
the whole population. Sacrifices are required by the leading classes in the form of 
material concessions to provide stability. lSI can thus be interpreted in this light. 
'Two nation' projects by contrast seek only to mobilise strategically significant 
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sectors of the population and offer limited scope for material concessions to the 
subaltern classes. Neoliberalism in :rVlexico is in this sense a paradigmatic exam-
ple of a 'two-nation ' heg81llonic project. Green (1995) has labelled this process of 
restructuring (which also affected the whole of Latin America) as a 'silent revolu-
tion ' due to the manner in which the voices of the marginalised were sidelined and 
capitalist processes of exploitation deepened. It is argued here that a fo cus on 
the key role of the state as the facilitator of this process allows us to understand 
the rise of neoliberalism in 11exico as a second instance of passive revolution. 
The discussion hitherto has highlighted how the state has to be located within 
the historical form of exploitation engendered by capitalist social relations. How-
ever, as has been demonstrated through the evolving character of lSI. the precise 
nature of t hese relations are far from static, and as lSI progressed. class an-
tagonisms began to be constit uted more and more by transnat ional proce se 
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of accumulation, confirming the point made by Gramsci (1971: 117) that the 
state is to be understood as "the concrete form of the productive world." \Ye can 
see that, just as much as the period prior to Mexican Revolution, then so too 
with the turn to neoliberalism, the restructuring of state/civil society relations 
must be located in the dialectic between the 'national' and the 'international' 
and the conditioning of uneven and combined development. If it is to SUITiYe 
as an institution, an essential requirement of the bourgeois state is to ensure the 
conditions for continued capital accumulation. However, it was clear that \\'ith 
the declining profitability of lSI, the state's role as a creator of a 'national scale' 
for the accumulation of capital had reached its limits. Yet, this does not mean 
that the space of the 'national' has become unimportant. Induced by virtue of 
the historical relations pertaining there and thus the potential for the extensiye 
and intensive enlargement of capital, the space of Mexico has been reconfigured 
in order to serve as a site for the accumulation of capital on a global scale. 
The role of the state has been fundamental to the reorganisation of capital-
ism in Mexico. As a result of the changing balance of class forces, it has been 
transformed from being a key source of investment and the provider of goods for 
productive consumption (essentially an ideal collective capitalist) to one where 
its function was: 
to reshape social relations to create an attractive environment that 
would stimulate industrialists - domestic and foreign - to invest in new 
competitive ventures which would in turn allow the country to become 
a responsible participant in the international economy (Barkin, 1990: 
94, emphasis added). 
Making space an attractive destination for foreign capital therefore became 
a vital policy priority. To this end, the state once more became an agent of 
'primitive accumulation' in Mexico. The 1987 Pacto de Solidaridad Economica 
(PSE) was the first key piece of legislation signalling the state's new policy ori-
entation, eliminating subsidies and dramatically reducing tariff barriers (Dussel-
Peters, 2000: 65-66; Heredia, 1996: 138). The mounting debt burden meant 
resources were forced to be transferred from social expenditure to debt repay-
ment. This had massive social repercussions with a 40% decline in real wages 
(Walton and Shefner, 1994: 123). Factors such as ejido land or parastatals - es-
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sential to the stability of lSI - now became the spaces through which the capital 
relation could be extended. Article 27 of the constitution - the cornerstone of the 
Mexican state's covenant with the peasantry in the aftermath of the Revolution 
- was repealed by Carlos Salinas in 1992 demonstrating the new policy priorities 
of the state. This reform allowed for the privatisation of ejido land and also 
formally ended the petitioning for land reform, signalling the end of the l\Iexican 
Revolution while auguring the rise of a new passive revolution. The southern 
states of Mexico (where the largest proportion of communal land is held) have 
become what Neil Brenner (1997: 280) refers to as 'spatial targets' for a new 
round of capitalist expansion. Just as the uneven and combined development of 
space within the global political economy was the means by which the crisis built. 
so too would it be utilised as a means to attempt to resolve it by producing its 
relation anew in a different articulation. 
As Figure 5.4 demonstrates, taking the declared objective of attracting FDI 
on its own terms, Mexico has been highly successful. The beginning of the rapid 
increase of FDI in 1990 coincided with the massive privatisation of parastatals and 
reforms designed to pave the way for entry into N AFTA, such as the reduction 
of price supports and subsidies to peasants. Mexico has thus gone from being a 
country that based its accumulation strategy on domestic industrialisation and 
the growth of an internal market, to one which seeks further integration into 
global production networks. This is demonstrably shown in Figure 5.5 which 
highlights the rise of manufacturing as a percentage of the total value of Mexican 
exports (from 1992 onwards this includes maquila goods). 
The state has reshaped the space of Mexico so that it now serves a vital new 
social function in the global division of labour. With Mexico's entry into NAFTA 
in 1994, its space has now become essential to the profitability of US capital. Some 
62% of FDI in Mexico is US based, with 86.6% being located in the maquila sec-
tor, where wages are notably lower than in the US (Dussel-Peters, 2000: 124). 
Maquilas, as Gereffi (1995: 134) notes, provide a poor basis for meaningful devel-
opment, as they offer limited scope for skills upgrades, technology transfers, and 
create few backwards linkages with local society. Drawing on the discussion from 
the previous chapter, Mexico may experience economic growth, but is unlikely to 
see 'development' based on the continuation of this trajectory. 
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The move from lSI to neoliberalism in ]Vlexico , thus again provides concrete mean-
ing to Lefebvre's (199 1: 55) claim t hat ; "Today, more t han ever the class struggle 
is inscribed in space". The debt crisis in Mexico must not be understood only as 
a national crisis of capital accumulation, but also a global capitalist crisis. It was 
through geopolit ical competition t hat t he costs of devaluation were exported to 
Mexico (Harvey, 2006b: 438). Devaluation, however , is always a two sided pro-
cess that provides opportunity for some and increased exploitation for others. lO 
Marx (1867/ 1974: 567) captures t his essential class dynamic when he declares 
lOCarlos Slim, one of the world 's r ichest people, made his for tune during this period for 
example in the privatization of state-owned industries , and a number of other tycoons also 
emerged. 
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that the "development of productive power is accompanied by a partial depreci-
ation of functioning capital. So far as this depreciation makes itself acutely felt 
in competition, the burden falls on the labourer , in the increased exploitation 
of whom the capitalist looks for his indemnification." This can be witnessed in 
the move to create 'flexible ' labour markets in IV[exico as a concomitant to the 
new export-oriented strategy. In practice this has meant an intensification of the 
labour process, in which employment status is more precarious and government 
or union protection limited (McCaughan, 1993: 18). Large internationally-linked 
business on the other hand, saw their power augmented and their political cen-
trality increased (Heredia, 1996: 142). Other geographical manifestations that 
resulted from this include increased migration to the US in search of jobs. as \\'ell 
as the growth of urban slums (Barkin, 1990: 10). A conservative UN estimate 
puts the percentage of urban Mexicans now living in slums at 19.1o/c . although. 
151 
5.7 iLa lucha sigue! 
using a less restrictive definition, the number rises to almost two thirds of the 
population (Davis, 2006: 23). These slums contribute to the growth of the infor-
mal economy (discussed in the previous chapter), helping to mask unemployment 
figures whilst also providing a super-exploitable workforce, adding further down-
ward pressure to wages in the formal sector. The point was clearly recognised by 
Marx (1867/1974: 435) who saw that the spatial dispersion of work led to the de-
creasing power of collective resistance, something capital attempts to build upon 
with piece work and subcontracting. Concurrent with Cockcroft (1998: 236) the 
growth of slums and the informal economy should not be viewed as pre-capitalist 
forms of social relations but rather as a "product and tool of modern capitalist 
accumulation. " 
The state has played a key role not only in affecting this transition but also 
in attempting to deal with the resulting class resentments, through a number of 
social programs such as the Programa Nacional de Solidaridad ( P R O ~ A S O L : : Na-
tional Solidarity Program) and the Programa de Educacion, Salud y Alimentacion 
(PROGRESA: Program for Education, Health and Nutrition) as well as widen-
ing the sphere of democratic participation. However, these social programs must 
clearly be interpreted in light of an attempt at the recomposition of PRI hegemony 
(Morton, 2003: 643; Veltmeyer, 1997: 234). Whilst not overlooking the impor-
tance of widening democratic participation in Mexico, and the notable ending 
of the PRJ's 71 year dominance of Mexican politics with the election of Vicente 
Fox in 2000, this must again be interpreted as a state-led solution to the political 
crisis provoked by the Zapatista uprising in 1994, as it aimed at pacifying subal-
tern demands and channelling them onto a more manageable terrain that stays 
within the limits of acceptable discontent. As Morton (2005: 190) argues, the 
democratic reforms were: 
designed to frame and condition the institutional context of opposition 
movements. The reform constituted the construction of a specific 
legal and institutional terrain that was capable of containing popular 
demands by defining terms and fixing the boundaries of the rules of 
the game of representation and social struggle. 
This attempt at the statisation of discontent has not been w h o l l ~ ' ' success-
ful. The Zapatistas, since 1994 have steadfastly continued to resist incorporation 
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into 'official' political discourse, and have instead created autonomous spaces 
for horizontal, democratic political practices beyond the purview of the state. 
Their example has served as an inspiration to other social movements around the 
country, who have found themselves forcibly disenfranchised from the state's new 
hegemonic project. In 2006 the Zapatistas began their Otra Campana, ,,"hich 
ran parallel to the Presidential elections. This was intended to begin the pro-
cess of creating civil society alliances to transform Mexico from the bottom up. 
2006 also witnessed the explosion of popular anger at the corrupt and repressiYe 
governorship of Ulises Ruiz Ortiz, crystallising in the formation of the Asamblea 
Popular de los Pueblos de Oaxaca (APPO: Popular Assembly of the Peoples of 
Oaxaca). This movement, coming in the wake of the repression of the teachers 
union (Section 22) must be placed in the context of the increasing inability of the 
state to attend to wider societal demands, demonstrating the failure of hegemony 
(Martinez Vasquez, 2007: 79). 
5.8 Conclusion 
It has been argued that through an examination of Mexican development in the 
twentieth-century we can identify two particular instances of passive revolution 
whereby the state has acted as the leading agent of transformation, restructur-
ing social relations and maintaining/furthering class power. These instances of 
passive revolution must be thought of as protracted processes rather than sin-
gle, sudden events, the import of which has been to affect "molecular changes 
which ... progressively modify the pre-existing composition of forces, and hence the 
matrix of new changes" (Gramsci, 1971: 109). Associated with each phase was 
a particular state spatial project that served a distinct historical social purpose. 
While the first instance of passive revolution managed to offset the revolution-
ary impulses of the time and draw subaltern classes into an expansive hegemonic 
project through its production of space, it is becoming increasingly clear that 
the neoliberal passive revolution is failing to do this, as rather than opening new 
possibilities for the subaltern, the new spatial strategy is threatening long-held 
revolutionary desires for a different way of life. As the Mexican state has sought 
to open new spaces for capital, so too there have emerged a proliferation of l1e'Y 
spaces of resistance. It is to these spaces of resistance that we now turn, with 
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detailed case studies of the Southern states of Oaxaca and Chiapas. 
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Chapter 6 
The Changing State of 
Resistance: Defending Place and 
Producing Space in Oaxaca 
While over the centuries, the 
Valley of Oaxaca's population has 
retained many indigenous cultural 
features, these now seem in 
opposition to capitalist 
development 
Cook and Diskin, 1976: 13 
In the summer of 2006, the historic capital of Oaxaca State - known for its 
quaint charm and tranquil ambiance - resembled something more akin to a war 
zone. Thousands of barricades were erected throughout the city around key public 
offices, and a state of 'ingovernability' was declared. For five months no official 
government functioned. Instead, informal neighbourhood organisations sprang 
up with popular 'people's councils' replacing official political parties as the local 
centres of power. Out of this cacophony of voices and searing anger, directed at 
one of the most corrupt and repressive governors in recent history, a disparate 
collective of social movements, trade unions and civil society organizations came 
together under the banner of the Asamblea Popular de los Pueblos de Oaxaca 
(APPO). Some immediately drew the analogy between events taking place in 
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Oaxaca and those of the Paris Commune (Esteva, 2009: personal interview, Oax-
aca). Since this time, the sharpened social tensions have not receded. Whilst the 
Mexican state and transnational capital continue to attempt to reconfigure it into 
a new pole of accumulation, so too has Oaxaca been at the forefront of experi-
mentation and creative alternatives to neoliberal governance in Mexico, moving 
from long held traditions of resistance to active transformation of the political 
terrain. Whereas Chapters 1 and 2 elaborated the dialectical method in the ab-
stract, this chapter now seeks to utilise this at the concrete level to excavate 
where this process of resistance came from, in order to understand all the more 
clearly where it is going and what its potentialities are. An argument will thus 
be presented that seeks to situate Oaxaca within the changing global, regional 
and national dynamics of accumulation. 
In exploring the spaces of capital and the spaces of resistance, we have so 
far outlined an abstract theoretical analysis of the production of space and the 
role of class struggle in this process (Chapter 2), before moving on to consider 
the macro-structural changes that have taken place within the global economy 
(Chapter 3). A discussion of key themes emerging from these chapters, such as the 
role of the state within capitalist development, the geopolitics of devaluation and 
the antimonies surrounding the production of spatial scales was then discussed 
in relation to both regional and national developments (Chapters 4 and 5 and 
respectively). It is therefore time to extend the concrete level of analysis further 
through detailed local case studies of the southern Mexican states of Oaxaca and 
Chiapas, beginning here with Oaxaca. This exploration of the sub-national scale 
should complete our picture of the production of space and provide us with the 
tools to understand the dynamics and contradictions inherent in the latest phase 
of capitalist expansion, as well as offering insights into the alternative geographies 
that are currently being produced in opposition to this. A focus on specific 
regional history is also an essential element in the dialectic method as it allows 
us to explore not only how particular places are incorporated and transformed 
by an over-arching structure of articulation, but also how these places themselves 
produce this structure, and furthermore how they seek to contest or resist it 
(Chassen Lopez, 2004: 17; Wolf, 1955: 455). Drawing from, but also deepening 
Phillip McMichael's (1990,2000) notion of incorporated comparison, this chapter 
extends one of the key claims that has been highlighted hitherto, namely the 
156 
mutual imbrication of a variety of spatial scales through which capital is currently 
seeking to produce its spatiality through. Another claim that will be advanced in 
this chapter and the following one is that, as capital becomes ever more dependent 
upon creating the new, and extending its logic into space, so too does it become 
more vulnerable to alternative spaces of resistance. 
Through an exploration of spatial production in Oaxaca, this chapter high-
lights that not only does the process of capitalist expansion unfold in a highly 
uneven manner, but moreover (as was stressed in Chapter 2) it is this unevenness 
itself that induces the particular manner of (attempted) transformation. Thus, as 
Patricia Martin (2005) has submitted, one needs to be attentive to the differing 
topographies of social relations at localised spatial scales if one is to understand 
the particular trajectories of capitalist development in a wider setting. The same 
is equally true of resistance to this process. Gerardo Otero (1999: 22) argues suc-
cinctly with regard to this: "Peasants in different parts of the world or in different 
regions within a country ... may have diverse structural capacities depending on 
their distinctive histories and cultures, or the villages or regions where they de-
velop" (on this point see Stephen, 1998). This makes it necessary therefore to 
examine in detail the composition of social forces at the sub-national level and 
explain how they relate to wider spatial scales. In doing so we are forced to ex-
plicitly spatialise Gramsci's concept of hegemony and explore how it is articulated 
through a variety of strategies (for a further discussion of this point see Jessop, 
2005). By conducting an analysis of the historical sociology of the production 
of space in Oaxaca, it will be argued we need to develop the concept of 'uneven 
and combined hegemony' (bringing together the insights of Trotsky, Gramsci and 
Lefebvre). Consequently, rather than postulating a monolithic 'global' or 'na-
tional' hegemonic project (Jessop, 1990: 201-211; Robinson, 2004a, 2008; Hardt 
and Negri, 2000), this chapter demonstrates how these projects are struggled over 
and re-negotiated at the local scale. An over-arching project with a particular 
social logic can thus manifest itself differently in particular contexts, which are 
dependent upon the social forces within a given place. Thus, in congruence with 
the approach of David Harvey (1996: 6-9), it will be argued that a consideration 
of localized conditions can be highly disruptive of social theory. Furthermore it 
is only through an appreciation of this scale that we can arrive at grounded no-
tions of justice. In contrast to the prevailing aspatial (and thus highly abstract) 
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approaches to uneven and combined development within the historical sociology 
of international relations (laid out in Chapter 1), the contribution of this chapter 
is to give the concept a thorough geographical grounding, that highlights its con-
temporary relevance, as well as its past significance for both the spaces of capital 
and the spaces of resistance. 
This chapter also forces us to reconsider the agency of political transforma-
tion. Through an exploration of struggles to defend place and produce alternative 
spaces, this chapter challenges the traditional Marxist notion of class struggle 
whereby developments among the peasantry are subordinated to the struggles of 
the working class, who necessarily occupy a vanguardist position (Gramsci, 1971: 
15; Trotsky, 1930/1962: 61). This exploration of peasant agency also stands in 
stark contrast to the approach of some recent Marxist-inspired analyses of trans-
formation in Latin America that have put forward the view that developments 
in the world economy are leading to the disappearance of the peasantry as the 
forces of global capitalism wrenches them from the land and forces them into pro-
letarianisation (Robinson, 2008).1 However, as will be highlighted here, this is to 
take a rather large leap over historical contingency (Block, 2001). This chapter 
therefore seeks to take a more nuanced approach that recognises this is a process 
that is far from complete or uncontested. Instead, concurring with Eric Wolf 
(1955: 462, emphasis added) it is argued that it is extreme folly to "visualise the 
development of the world market in terms of continuous and even expansion, and 
to suppose therefore that the line of development of particular peasantries always 
leads from lesser involvement in the market to more involvement." 
The chapter is set out as follows. First, the historical space of Oaxaca will be 
explored in relation to the impact of Spanish colonialism. Following this, the lib-
eral era from Independence to the outbreak of revolution will be examined. Third, 
the changing space of Oaxaca in the twentieth century will be scrutinised, with 
a particular focus on how this fits into the Mexican state's hegemonic project 
of nation-building along the capitalist lines of lSI (analysed separately in the 
previous chapter). The final section will explore the increasing clash of opposing 
spatial projects in Oaxaca following Mexico's neoliberal turn, as global capitalism 
increasingly seeks to expand and transform it in an area for surplus value creation 
on the one hand, whilst in opposition, subaltern social forces seek to extend the 
1 For a rebuttal of this point see inter alia Morton (2007a), Otero (1999). 
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spaces of autonomous, democratic participation, based in the state's indigenous 
traditions and histories of struggle. Understanding how space and place have 
been created is vital if we are to understand the roots of modern conflict in Oax-
aca. In relation to this point Lefebvre (2003: 89) argues: "Synchronic analysis 
(of the present) does not prohibit a diachronic analysis (a history of space). On 
the contrary, the latter leads to the former. Morphological analysis presupposes 
genetic analysis." Examining Oaxaca from the perspective of the longue duree 
therefore allows us to develop in more empirical detail a number of key points. 
First, drawing upon the arguments laid out in Chapter 2, it will show how shift-
ing modes of production have altered the spatial terrain of Oaxaca. Second, it 
will highlight the changing interactions of the state with different spatial scales 
that have altered in their respective levels of influence, conditioning in turn the 
development of space and place within the region. Lastly, it will underline how 
processes of resistance have been, and continue to be, hugely significant in shaping 
the space of Oaxaca. 
6.1 Situating the state of Oaxaca 
Located in the southwest of Mexico, Oaxaca is a state that encompasses a rich va-
riety of contradictions: It is rugged and geographically isolated, and over the last 
century has had minimal influence on the national political agenda. It has there-
fore been aptly described as being both literally and metaphorically peripheral 
to national life (Clarke, 1992: 153). However, historically with Porfirio Diaz and 
Benito Juarez, it has produced two statesmen that have profoundly influenced 
Mexico's transition to modernity. It furthermore remains a tourist 'hot-spot', 
with thousands flocking each year to see the colonial city of Oaxaca de Juarez, 
enjoy the indigenous markets and relax on its spectacular beaches. Indeed as will 
be highlighted, the national state has actively sought to produce Oaxaca precisely 
in this image. Oaxaca is often portrayed as a traditional state, as well as being a 
bastion of PRI support (owing to the fact it has never elected a state governor not 
from this party).2 However, the municipality of Juchitan was the first place in 
which the PRI experienced a dent in their electoral hegemony with a defeat from 
a radical leftist-oriented social movement in 1981 (see Campbell et al., 1993). In 
2This was finally changed in July 2010 and will be discussed in Chapter 8. 
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many respects this movement was an important precursor of the formation of the 
APPO (a position that will be developed as this chapter progresses). 
Figure 6.1: Location of Oaxaca in Mexico 
According to the Programa de las Naciones Unidad para el Desarollo (PNUD , 
United Nations Development Programme) Oaxaca ranks 31st out of Mexico 's 32 
states for its Human Development Index (PNUD , 2009: 6). Despite having only 
3.4 % of the national population however , it contains over a fifth of all the na-
tions ' 2438 municipalities , numbering 570 in total. Of these , 412 since 1995 have 
governed themselves according to their own ' usos y costumbres' (practices and 
customs). 3 For these reasons the state has often been portrayed as a backwater, 
untouched by the hand of modernity (Chassen-Lopez, 2004: 4). However , this 
is to understand modernity from a highly Eurocentric perspective , as it fails to 
grasp how so-called traditional and modern societies have mutually conditioned 
one another (see also Chapter 2 for a discussion of this point) and how these 
traditions and customs have evolved over time. 
3This involves a grounding of politics in the community assembly, from which members are 
elected to serve cargos (burdens) of a period usually up to three years. These are seen less as 
positions of prestige and more of a community service that people have an obligation to take 
part in. 
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As one should be able to infer, the high number of municipalities in Oaxaca 
did not fall from the sky, nor were they created by chance. Rather they are 
the result of a long process of struggle for autonomy (Esteva, 2001: Corbett and 
Whiteford, 1983: 16). The largely indigenous campesinos have not simply been 
victims who have had a new way of life imposed on them, but rather have actively 
contested and negotiated various hegemonic projects to refine them towards their 
own needs. As the title of this chapter suggests, although Oaxaca has had a 
long history of resistance stretching back half a millennium, this should not be 
taken to imply that this resistance has remained unchanged during this period. 
To do so would romanticise peasant culture and hold the communities static. 
As Francie Chassen-L'opez (2004: 343) has argued, this position serves to deny 
peasants their role as "potential makers of history.') Forms of struggle, as we shall 
see, have been constantly reinvented. As Kiado Cruz (2009: personal interview 1 
Oaxaca), a member of a Zapotec community in the Sierra Norte elaborated with 
regard to this: "If we did not constantly reinvent forms of life and other things 
it would not be possible to be a community." We need to therefore examine the 
context in which these movements of resistance emerged to contest projects that 
sought to incorporate them into new spatial relations. Let us now then explore 
the changing historical sociology of space beginning with the colonial era. The 
purpose of this is to call attention to the way in which property relations evolved 
in the state, as this not only informs the manner in which capital is seeking 
to expand there, but also provides the basis for spaces of resistance to forms 
alternative geographical projects. 
6.2 Caciques, cabildo, and community: produc-
ing the spaces of colonial Oaxaca 
How then do we go about explaining spatial developments in this politically 
volatile state? Oaxaca has a long history of exceptionalism in terms of its prop-
erty relations in comparison with other regions of Mexico. The Spanish arrived 
in the Valley of Oaxaca in 1521 and immediately began altering the spatial prac-
tices they found. Recalling the point made in Chapter 2 with regard to colonial 
representations of space, it was from this gaze that the space of Mexico was 
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viewed as an unknown territory to be discovered, and the perspective of the In-
dian was ignored (Bonfil Batalla, 1996: 8-9). The conquistadors' arrival resulted 
in the indigenous people losing their freedom to the land. Instead, this freedom 
was converted into a 'right', something that was to be fought for and granted 
(Cruz, 2009: personal interview, Oaxaca). However, scholars have noted that 
the Spanish take-over in Oaxaca was far less violent than in other areas of the 
country. Indeed the conquest that took place has been described as 'spiritual' 
and 'exploitative' rather than military. In contrast to the destruction and level-
ling of 'place', and the remaking of space that occurred with the Aztec capital of 
Tenochtitlan in the Valley of Mexico4 , in Oaxaca pre-existing communal spaces 
of power were reconfigured by the Spanish crown to serve their primary interest 
- which was of course the extraction of tribute (Cook and Diskin, 1976: 9; Tay-
lor, 1972: 198). The development of land tenure in Oaxaca, however, stood in 
contrast to the northern and central states which have often been assumed to be 
paradigmatic of colonial social property relations. Instead of the hacienda de-
veloping to displace communal land, as happened widely elsewhere (as discussed 
in Chapter 5), "late colonial Oaxaca did not experience a dramatic expansion 
of Spanish landholdings" (Taylor, 1972: 7-8). This is partly explained by the 
physical geographical features of the state. As Colin Clarke (1992: 152) explains, 
the largely mountainous topography of Oaxaca was "inimical to agricultural de-
velopment of a hacienda or plantation type." The fierceness of native resistance 
and their determination to hold on to their communal land however was also 
fundamental to the evolution of this property regime (Murphy and Stepick, 1991: 
18, Taylor, 1972: 197). Spanish colonialism thus developed alongside the sur-
vival of the native nobility in the form of cacicazgo landholdings (noble estates). 
These local caciques in fact were to play a crucial mediating role for the Spanish 
crown, and would help facilitate the extraction of tribute (Taylor, 1972: 35-7; 
Knight, 2002: 14). Recognising what existed already in native practice there-
fore became a method for transforming it (Wainwright, 2008: 53). This is not 
to say however, that the experience of colonialism did not affect in any manner 
4As Henri Lefebvre (1991: 220-221) notes, monuments or places of symbolic importance are 
often destroyed by invaders as they offer societies' images of membership or collective memory. 
This also took place in Oaxaca with regard to religious centres, for example at Mitla where 
the indigenous site of worship was raised and a Catholic church was built in the areas former 
ceremonial centre (Murphy and Stepick, 1991: 83). 
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the pre-existing forms of space. Rather that the spatial terrain was shaped by 
asymmetrical relations of force with a particular social purpose in mind, that 
nevertheless was forced to recognise the power of already existing social relations 
at the community level. Commenting upon this, Bonfil Batalla (1996: 9) argues: 
"geographical transformations did not take place on an empty landscape. Rather, 
the changes Europeans introduced affected groups of people with a cultural her-
itage elaborated over many centuries in the same places, where local adoptions 
allowed different sorts of responses." 
As well as being decimated by diseases brought by the Europeans, some in-
digenous communities found themselves physically transferred to new locations 
in what were known as 'civil congregations' (Cline, 1949). The spatial practices 
of village life were also modified as the Spanish sought to introduce the Cabildo 
(town government) as was used in their own domestic municipalities (Chassen-
Lopez, 2004: 286). This conformed to their preference of a "nucleated grid com-
munity with a concentrated civil-commercial and religious precinct (the plaza)" 
(Whitecotton, 1977: 180). This reorganization of space is a classic example of 
what James Scott (1998: 2) describes as 'seeing like a state', where concentrated 
power is used to attempt to resettle and render people more legible for a partic-
ular social purpose (in this case, easier social control and mobilization of labour 
and resources). As we shall see throughout this chapter, these efforts to render 
certain spaces more legible and to make them conform to the demands of a par-
ticular mode of production have been a pervasive (albeit differentiated) theme in 
Oaxacan history, and one which is at the core of modern conflicts. These so called 
pueblos de indios were intended to serve three functions for the Spanish crown; 
1) the curtailment of power of the new colonial landholding class, 2) the simpler 
identification of group units to mobile and extract resources from 3) the creation 
or enhancement of communal obligations to which labour should be dedicated 
- this was important due to the loss of labour due to flight and disease (Wolf, 
1955: 457). Their creation can thus be thought of as a spatial strategy for the 
mobilization of social labour under historically specific class conditions. However, 
owing to the intensity of struggle in Oaxaca a far greater amount of municipalities 
were created here than in other parts of Mexico in an effort to divide and rule 
the population more efficiently (Esteva, 2008: personal interview, Oaxaca). By 
the end of the colonial period the Cabildo was a spatial reflection of the clash 
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of social forces and the contested nature of the regime of power. Although the 
crown had managed to introduce the civil-religious 'cargo: system, this has been 
intended as a means of control that was to aid in preserving social peace and the 
extraction of tribute. This was supposed to be secured through the comprador 
classes in the form of indigenous caciques, who were the only ones entitled to 
hold positions of authority, as well as being the only ones able to participate in 
the electing of community representatives. However, the power of the caciques 
was gradually eroded by the resistance from the commoners to the abuses that 
took place. Far from simply being an instrument of control, the Cabildo was 
contested and renegotiated through indigenous class agency to protect and serve 
community needs (Whitecotton, 1977: 180-191; Frye, 1994: 326). We can see 
here therefore, the very real dynamics of class strategies for the production of 
space. As James Scott (1998: 49) elucidates with regard to this issue: "We must 
keep in mind not only the capacity of state simplifications to transform the world 
but also the capacity of the society to modify, subvert, block and overturn the 
categories imposed upon it." Recalling the triad of spatial production (discussed 
in Chapter 3) it can be seen that there was a clash between spatial practices, 
spaces of representation and representational spaces. Despite the modifications 
of spatial practices and the representations of space linked to the particular ideol-
ogy of the colonial power, this would be subverted by the everyday practices and 
resistance from the indigenous people who would serve to transform it (Lefebvre, 
1991: 33). 
From the beginnings of the colonial epoch, the indigenous population was 
forced to pay tribute through the encomienda system whereby the crown granted 
rights to a particular individual from which they could then claim an amount 
of particular goods from specified places. Labour could also be demanded from 
these places in what was known as the repartamiento. Tribute in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth century was collected primarily in-kind rather than in specie 
(Taylor, 1972: 71). This arrangement led to particular tracts of land being put 
aside by communities to work collectively in order to fulfil their obligations to the 
conquistador. Recalling the discussion from Chapter 2 with regard to the manner 
in which social labour is mobilized, we can see that under Spanish colonialism 
the mode of exploitation was not one that divorced the primary producers from 
their means of production, but rather sought to requisition both their products 
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and their labour power (often through the use, or threat, of force). As \Vaterbury 
(1975: 420-1) explains in relation to this: "removal of the Indians from their land 
would have been contrary to the economic interests of the most powerful class in 
the province: the Spanish merchants". What then were the principal drivers of 
socio-political relationships? 
6.3 Merchants and miners: towards the forma-
tion of the Vallistocracia 
Murphy and Stepick (1991: 22) argue that up until Mexican independence, Oax-
aca had been one of the country's most important economic regions. This fact 
derived largely from the state's production of cochineal. It was through cochineal 
- a red dye made from crushed insects that live parasitically on cacti - that Oaxaca 
would become integrated into the world economy through trade (Knight, 2002: 
225). It is claimed that by the early eighteenth century over half of the state's 
agricultural labourers were devoted to its production (Clarke, 2000). This was 
undertaken for the most part as a supplement to subsistence production for house-
hold or community needs. Owing to this trade, the state became one of Mexico's 
principal export centres during the second half of the eighteenth century. Com-
mercial development began to take place in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec where 
both cochineal and cotton were exported in response to the rising demands gener-
ated from European textile production that followed in the wake of the industrial 
development (Tutino, 1993: 51; Waterbury, 1975: 419). These new spatial links 
led to particular geographical transformations such as the establishment of a more 
sophisticated port at Santa Cruz, Huatulco, as well as an increase in the number 
of weaving houses (Murphy and Stepick, 1991: 216). 
It is clear that class relationships that were developed or maintained in Oaxaca 
and in Western Europe were not independent of one another. Cook and Diskin 
(1976: 10,12) conclude nevertheless, that despite Oaxaca's incorporation into the 
emerging European capitalist system, this "did not deprive it of its own structure 
and dynamic embedded in a pre-capitalist mode of production" as "Within the 
colonized indigenous formation, land and labour remained substantially within 
the non-commodity or simple-commodity sphere of circulation.;' However, this 
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analysis is to ignore not only how these relations were perpetuated by links with 
the world economy but also how ruling classes came to be formed in the ;new 
world'. For exarnple the increasing involvement in cash crop production did cre-
ate increasing internal differentiation within the indigenous communities, whilst 
creating a powerful merchant elite that numbered around 5% of the population 
(L6pez Monjardin, 1993: 68; Stepick and Murphy, 1991: 23). This concurs with 
the findings of previous chapters that have explored the manner in which the 
development of capitalism - although resonating in various parts of the world 
- did not lead to universal and evenly felt transformations of property relations 
but rather instead formed symbioses with diverse already existing relations (Wolf, 
1997: 79). This is in fact the hallmark of uneven and combined development. 
As discussed above, Oaxaca did not experience the proliferation of powerful 
haciendas like in central and northern Mexico. Evidence indicates the absence 
of a strong landholding class, and that conversely large landholdings in the form 
of estates were often highly mortgaged. In fact the most important landowner 
in the Valley of Oaxaca was the Catholic Church which was estimated to control 
a quarter of the valley's productive rural property. The firm control of land by 
the indigenous people, as well as the litigious perusing of their claims in court, 
were factors that prevented a stable landed class developing (Taylor, 1972: 160-
193; Murphy and Stepick, 1991: 18). In fact, whilst tribute was demanded in-
kind and the indigenous population retained the primary means of production, 
they found themselves in a relatively strong bargaining position. Lacking the 
material compulsion to enter debt-peonage on what haciendas did exist in Oaxaca, 
they could therefore command large advances from the hacendado due to relative 
labour shortages (Whitecotton, 1977: 209). The elite class formation that took 
place was instead built upon merchant and mining wealth rather than the power 
of hacendados. 
The change in the Spanish demand for tribute in form of specie however, be-
gan to alter the social and economic foundations of community space as people 
were increasingly drawn into more commercial activities to meet their quotas. 
The 'cash-nexus' gradually began to function more as a moderator of social rela-
tionships, and communal lands were fractured somewhat as peasants were often 
forced to sell or rent land, as well as trade goods outside of the traditional commu-
nity setting (Murphy and Stepick, 1991: 22; Whitecotton, 1977: 205). Appraising 
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the colonial period, Cook and Diskin (1976: 11-12) identify eight key features to 
the socio-economic formation during this epoch; 1) a system of cargos (politi-
cal posts) dominated by a civil-religious hierarchy 2) often obligatory ceremonial 
cycle of saints days (mayordomia) 3) tequio (communal labour service) in each 
village 4) institutionalized mechanisms for reciprocal exchange (guelaguetza) 5) a 
division of labour manifested in inter-village specialization 6) market places orga-
nized cyclically to facilitate trade between communities 7) exploitation of Indian 
labour in the form of debt peonage and some wage labour 8) a clear division 
between producers and non-producers. 
A perennial problem with the reliance on communal spaces as the basis of 
wealth extraction however was the same basic problem inherent in all absolutist 
and feudal societies. There was a lack of any incentive for increased production. 
Whatever extra was produced by the peasant would be taxed away in tribute. 
Therefore the social relations of colonial domination reinforced largely subsistence 
production rather than one based on reinvestment. Communities were governed 
by the logic of simple reproduction rather than the expanded reproduction char-
acteristic of capitalist accumulation (Wolf, 1955: 454). 
6.4 From liberal to revolutionary Oaxaca 
Space in Oaxaca, as throughout Mexico, began to be profoundly altered during 
the liberal era. The advent of independence witnessed a collapse in the export 
economy of the state. This collapse was intimately linked to the production, or 
lack of production of space, as the region's poor transportation infrastructure 
meant that it was susceptible to competition on a world scale if other places 
could ensure a faster turnover time for products. Competition from Guatemala in 
cochineal production during the 1820s, and the exploitation by colonial powers of 
their territories for both cochineal and indigo - India in the British case, Indonesia 
in the Dutch - would lead to the spatial devaluation of Oaxaca (Tutino, 1993: 53; 
Clarke, 1996: 268). This again highlights the point raised in the previous chapter 
with regard to the production of new spatial relations leading to geopolitical 
competition and the gaining of particular places at the expense of others (Harvey, 
2006b: 285). Following this devaluation, Oaxaca reverted back to becoming a 
regional peasant economy with trade being centred in the capital city ( ~ l u r p h y y
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and Stepick, 1991: 27). 
The two foremost spatial projects of the liberal era throughout the whole 
of Mexico were to be the creation of infrastructure (regarded at the time b ~ ' '
elite classes as synonymous with civilization) and the increasing privatization of 
property rights (Chassen-Lopez, 2004: 47). It was thought that only through 
these developments would Mexico be attractive to foreign investors who were 
needed to transform the country into a modern state. Both the ideology and 
necessary capital for the liberal project were thus imported and set to work in 
local conditions. Benito Juarez and Porfirio Diaz can be seen to epitomise the 
maxim that Henri Lefebvre (1991: 190) would later stress: to change life, it is 
necessary to change space. 
As we saw in Chapter 5, the beginnings of state formation in Mexico took 
place during this period in the shadow of Western capitalist expansion. Whereas 
in parts of Europe, liberalism was an 'organic ideology' that developed in conjunc-
tion with the rise of capitalism, in Mexico it was an imported ideology that was 
wielded by elite classes in the attempt to mimic the European road to modernity 
and impose change (Chassen-Lopez, 2004: 4). Led by Juarez (1858-1872), the 
liberals came to power determined to transform Mexico from its colonial heritage. 
This strategy involved breaking up landed estates held by the church and commu-
nal property held by indigenous communities which were viewed as impediments 
to the spread of individual property holdings. Just as the process of privatiza-
tion and individualization of landholdings was spurred by the Reformation in 
England during the time of the Stuarts (see Marx, 1867/1974: 675), so too the 
passage of the Ley Lerdo in 1856 which sanctioned the privatization of corporate 
property, was to provide the instrument "for the theft of the people's land" in 
much of Mexico (Marx, 1867/1974: 678; Tutino, 1986: 259-262). Although often 
presented as a merely ideological struggle, the anti-ecclesiastical stance of the 
liberals should in fact be framed in class-theoretical terms. Post-independence, 
throughout Mexico there was a battle between conservative forces who supported 
church power and liberals who wished to reduce it. This must be understood 
as a class stratagem to control labour and taxes (Benjamin, 1996: 14; Kemper 
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and Royce, 1979: 271).5 In this battle for power, private property was thought 
to be harder to usurp than communal property (Whitecotton, 1977: 221). The 
destruction of the church's realm of authority was thus a vital antecedent to 
modern state formation in Mexico. As John Tutino (1993: 53-54) makes clear. 
"Independence brought a new orientation to state power in Mexico. The national 
state, including its provisional substances such as Oaxaca increasingly functioned 
as the agent of aspiring economic elites." The Spanish merchant class "were re-
placed by a clique of European newcomers, including French, Milanese, British 
and German entrepreneurs." Aided by state power which acted as a nodal point 
through which European and American interests were wielded, laws were passed 
in Oaxaca in favour of privatization. This spurred these new class actors to target 
areas rich in natural resources (such as the Isthmus of Tehuantepec) as new sites 
of wealth accumulation. An intriguing case in this regard relates to the state 
granting a monopoly in the Isthmus over salt beds. Previously these salt beds 
had been part of the commons. They formed an essential part of the indige-
nous Zapotec way of life, including their trade with Guatemala. However, while 
they remained communal, they were 'fiscally illegible' to the state for taxation 
purposes. Granting a monopoly was thus an attempt to classify and render 'the 
opaque' transparent (Scott, 1998: 37-39). This granting of a state monopoly 
aroused fierce resistance from the peasantry who fought to defend their historical 
access to them (Tutino, 1993: 56-9). Furthermore, it should be noted that this 
was not an isolated act of resistance. In response to the efforts at privatization of 
communal lands, rebellions took place in "most of the seven districts of Porfirian 
Oaxaca" (Chassen-Lopez, 2004: 80). 
6.5 Porfirian Oaxaca 
As we saw in Chapter 5, foreign capital poured into Mexico during the Porfiri-
ato, in line with the cientifico ideology of the time. Oaxaca was not immune to 
these changes. Indeed it had its very own cientifico governor in Emilio Pimentel 
(1902-1911). Porfirio Diaz thus, in both a direct and indirect manner did much 
5In his celebrated text Open Veins of Latin America Eduardo Galeano (1971/2008: 12) has 
noted the link between the process of colonial expansion and religious power. However, as Marx 
(1844/2007: 78) wryly points out, "the gods on their own were never the lords of labour." 
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to influence the development of his patria chica (Overmyer-Valazquez, 2006: 23, 
55). The decline of cochineal prices on the world market as well as the aforemen-
tioned competition from other regions had led to Oaxaca becoming transformed 
into a centre for light industry and handicrafts (Kemper and Royce, 1979: 279). 
Additionally, since 1863 coffee cultivation had replaced cochineal as the most im-
portant cash crop of the state. As links grew with foreign businesses anxious to 
market the product, the increasing emphasis on coffee cultivation acted as a spur 
to the privatization of land (Chassen-Lopez, 2004: 138, 143). Following national 
trends, the largest amount of land privatization took place between 1880 and 
1910 (Stephen, 1998: 12). During this period, some indigenous communities also 
privatized their landholdings, although this was generally the result of a strat-
egy for survival rather than an ideological shift towards individualism. However, 
perhaps the most salient feature to note from this period is that in comparison 
with other parts of Mexico where the peasants were totally displaced and ren-
dered landless, the peasantry in Oaxaca were able to retain a large proportion of 
their land. Nevertheless, the process of capital expansion was beginning to make 
inroads (quite literally) into the region. 
Foreign capital was attracted to the state and was utilized both to construct 
infrastructure and to extract natural resources in the shape of mining indus-
tries. In 1876 when Porfirio Diaz assumed power, Oaxaca had no railroads at 
all. By 1910, it had 1,829 kilometres (Chassen-Lopez, 2004: 48). Railroad con-
struction, as was argued in the previous chapter, cannot be separated from the 
export-orientation of the Porfiriato, or the uneven and combined development 
of the world capitalist economy. This expansion of infrastructure highlights the 
clashing of distinct spatial projects. In the liberal outlook there was little regard 
for the distinct places of indigenous communities. They would survive therefore 
only through their stubborn defence. The growth of infrastructure induced spa-
tial development and land speculation in sites of close proximity that saw their 
value transformed. 6 The Puebla-Oaxaca railway line, completed in 1892 also her-
alded the beginning of the mining boom in the state, demonstrating again how 
spaces are produced in tandem with the socio-economic imperative of a particular 
models of production. The railway line was thought to be the physical symbol of 
60ne can see the concept of 'exchange-value' is thus set into motion alongside notions of 
'use-value' . 
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Oaxaca's integration into the national state-building project and circuits of global 
capital. Although insignificant if taken as a percentage of the country's overall 
mining exports, this 'national gaze' does not tell the whole story, as from a local 
perspective the mining industry was to rapidly increase the state's linkages with 
the global economy, Indeed over one hundred companies set up offices in Oaxaca 
City (Overmyer-Vala,squez, 2006: 13), Mining and commerce were to flourish in 
the state until the outbreak of revolution, heralding the high point of Oaxaca's 
uneven insertion into the global capitalist system, Importantly, whilst contribut-
ing to elite class formation in the state, the proliferation of mining interests did 
not threaten village lands during this time, but rather was utilized by peasants 
as a source of wage labour to supplement their subsistence income (Waterbury, 
1975: 421-4). 
During this time the Isthmus of Tehuantepec was viewed as a key strategic site 
(over a hundred years later, little has changed as will be discussed later). A long-
held dream had existed to build an overland link between the Gulf of Mexico and 
the Gulf of Tehuantepec, therefore connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. 
This would have the potential to dramatically reduce the turnover time for goods 
travelling between the US and Asia. 
After numerous setbacks, this dream was finally achieved in 1907, when En-
glish capital in partnership with a Mexican firm completed the Trans-Isthmus 
Railway line. For a short period, goods from all over the world were transported 
through this corridor. Ports such as the one at Salina Cruz quickly became 
centres of commerce, with foreign merchants and representatives flocking to the 
area, leading to a rapid population increase (Chassen-Lopez, 2004: 229). How-
ever, the completion of the Panama Canal in 1914 and the outbreak of revolution 
in 1910 effectively eroded the value embedded in the physical environment here, 
and dramatically curtailed the state's geopolitical importance (Martin, 2005: 204; 
Waterbury, 1975: 424). 
Oaxaca City, as the epicentre of trade and thus of ruling class power in the 
state - was also fundamentally transformed during the Porfiriato. This was done 
through urban planners' redesign of neighbourhoods, the inculcation of public 
space (for example street names or public parks) with symbolic importance, and 
through increased disciplinary techniques to remove socially undesirable people 
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Figure 6.2 : The Trans-Isthmus Railway Proposal (Map courtesy of FelT) 
(Overmyer-VaLisquez, 2006: 40-69). The Vallistocracia7 , who saw their position 
augmented by the arrival of foreign capitalists with whom they intermarried: 
reflected their domination though the creation of exclusive private spaces such as 
country clubs, tennis clubs and theatres in the state capital (Smith, 2009: 29). 
7The term Vallistocracia has been coined to describe the ruling elite of Oaxaca . It refers 
to an elite of owners, political classes and organic intellectuals that come largely, although not 
exclusively from the central valleys (Martinez Vasquez 2007: 27). 
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Scholars generally are in agreement that liberal privatization and infrastruc-
tural developmental projects did not leave land tenure in Oaxaca unaffected. 
Unquestionably land speculations linked to mining and agrarian capitalism were 
beginning to make their mark on the state's social relations (Chassen Lopez: 
2004: 92; Waterbury, 1975). Despite these changes however, Colin Clarke (2000) 
concludes that "Oaxaca's peasantries, though undoubtedly dominated socially 
and politically and exploited economically during the Porfiriato, retained much 
of their land and maintained their spatial distribution more or less intact." The 
hegemonic project of the liberals was thus not articulated evenly throughout Mex-
ico, or the state of Oaxaca. This is an important point to note, as it means the 
process of state formation took place on highly differentiated terrain that did not 
simply become subsumed by the directives of the centre (see Joseph and Nugent, 
1994). Indeed, specific regions of Oaxaca such as Juchitan have been described as 
centres of "adamant resistance to state power" (Tutino, 1993: 42). This concurs 
with the critique elaborated in Chapter 1 in relation to those who see the world 
merely created in capital's image. An exploration of concrete cases such as this 
one instead reveal the push and pull dynamics involved in capitalist expansion, 
and the class struggles this provoked. 'Spaces of resistance' have thus been an 
ongoing feature of the physical and political landscape of Oaxaca. 
However, despite the fact that the peasantry of Oaxaca managed to retain a 
large amount of their lands, it should also be noted that the increasing produc-
tion of capitalist space would change the environment in which they operated, 
creating new class relations which they were not immune from. The expansion of 
infrastructure had in the form of roads, railways and ports led to an increase in 
the capitalisation of agriculture and the cultivation of new crops (Smith, 2009: 25, 
298). As Colin Clarke (1992: 147) summarises, the peasantry became "increas-
ingly differentiated internally because the economic value of what they control 
is changed by capitalist investment." This issue serves to highlight that whilst 
'everyday forms of resistance' may be important for the protection and retention 
of place (Scott, 1985), it is ultimately a defensive strategy, in which subaltern 
classes remain susceptible to the activities of the hegemonic groups in wider soci-
ety who may seek to manipulate the spaces which they occupy for their own ends 
(Gramsci, 1971: 55). Taking our understanding of capital (as was set out in the 
preceding chapters) as an expansive mode of production that seeks to subordinate 
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and transform space in line with its logic of surplus value creation, this implies 
that at some point, a purely defensive strategy may no longer be adequate. and 
one must begin to build instead an offensive strategy whereby the "expropriators 
are expropriated" (Marx, 1867/1974: 715). 
Summarising Oaxaca on the eve of revolution, Francie Chassen-Lopez (2004: 
178) identifies four types of labour relations in the state; 1) survival of com-
muneros 2) the beginning of wage labour alongside the retention of the means 
of production by the direct producer 3) informal slavery in Thxtepec and 4) the 
limited use of debt peonage as compared to central and northern Mexico. 
6.6 Post-revolutionary Oaxaca: between local 
practice and national project 
As scholars have noted, owing to the fact the state's peasantry had not experi-
enced the dramatic dispossession that others had, Oaxaca was not a state that 
was at the forefront of the revolutionary struggles (Waterbury, 1975).8 However, 
the outbreak of revolution would nonetheless alter the spatial terrain of Oaxaca. 
It shattered Oaxaca's links with the wider forces of the global economy (Murphy 
and Stepick (1991: 27). Mining and coffee industries collapsed, and although 
coffee would recover to again become the main export commodity of the state, 
mining has (until recently) remained dormant. These developments however did 
not fundamentally alter the class structure of Oaxaca. As Benjamin Smith (2009: 
32-33) argues: 
The vallisiocracia may have been trimmed of its exotic imports, its 
mining and commercial agriculture enterprises left to the malicious 
militant masses, and its national power delimited, but the Oaxaca 
City elite maintained extensive commercial, industrial, real estate, 
and agricultural interests, especially around the state capital. 
As has been discussed hitherto, Oaxaca's resources including its labour power 
had been mobilized for various political projects and under various class con-
8This does not of course mean that there were not parts of the state that didn't engage 
in revolutionary activity. Communities in the Sierra Norte for example allied with Zapatista 
struggle against the Carrancistas (Kiado Cruz, 2009: personal interview, Oaxaca). 
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ditions, of which wage labour was still relatively minor. The region had shifted 
from being a space that was colonized directly by a foreign power, to one that was 
colonized by an emergent nation-state on behalf of foreign interests. As we saw. 
during the Porfiriato, Oaxaca served as a destination that could attract foreign 
capital due to its natural resources, whilst also serving as an important export 
centre and tourist destination. The state was thus partially produced as a 'space' 
of international capital formation. However, it must also not be forgotten that a 
strong tradition of resistance had remained in the state, resulting the retention 
of vast tracts of communal land. 
Let us now explore how space was transformed with the changing hegemonic 
project of lSI as was analysed in the previous chapter. The following analysis 
seeks to show the contradictions described by Henri Lefebvre with regard to state 
formation under conditions of capitalist development. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
Lefebvre (1991: 23,11) argued that the twentieth century witnessed a worldwide 
process of modern state formation in which the state sought to promote itself as 
the stable centre of a political regime. A particular logic concomitantly came to 
be imposed as states sought to project their authority across the territory they 
claimed as their own. However, in order to do this increasing violence was/is 
necessary to suppress differences and absorb various groups in an over arching 
project. This, according to Lefebvre leads class struggle to continue in myriad 
forms (see also, Gramsci, 1971: 57; Harvey, 2003: 145). In complete contrast 
to the social contract theory of Thomas Hobbes (1985), political society thus 
existed far in advance of the state form, and the state therefore had to re-imagine 
community on a different scale (see Anderson, 1991) and seek to absorb these 
differential spaces to its own logic. 
Under the accumulation regime that emerged in Mexico following the revolu-
tion, Oaxaca - and the southern Mexican states in general - were not considered 
vital areas for industrial development. Indeed the lack of industrial development 
in Oaxaca can be explained usefully in the notion of 'uneven and combined hege-
mony' alluded to in the introduction. The purpose of this concept is to show how 
hegemonic projects designed at a particular scale, play out differently at other 
levels where they are contested and re-articulated within local conditions. 
Following the protracted conflict, the newly formed Mexican state was forced 
to seek ways to secure its legitimacy (e.g. promoting itself as a stable centre), 
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especially with regard to the recalcitrant elements of the population. As was 
discussed in the previous chapter, lSI was a classic example of a one-nation hege-
monic project in that it sought to mobilise all sectors of society (Jessop, 1990: 
211). Land redistribution and industrial development were the key drivers that 
were to engender wider opportunity within the overall framework of capitalist 
development. However, as has been illuminated hitherto, Oaxaca possessed a 
population that was overwhelmingly rural and where indigenous campesino lands 
had not been usurped to the degree they had elsewhere. There was not therefore 
the same imperative for the national state to create a new spatial terrain in order 
to win support. Consequently, government spending on industrial development 
was concentrated largely in the central and northern states where the majority of 
the more contumacious population were located. Oaxaca's geographical location 
and hostile topography also partially explain the government's lack of efforts to 
expand industry there. Due to its mountainous terrain, the cost of installing 
roads and power lines is twice the national average (Corbett and Whiteford, 
1983: 16). Furthermore, indigenismo began to be promoted within the state to 
increase its attractiveness as part of the tourist trade (Smith, 2009: 50). The 
regime of hegemony constructed in Oaxaca, although definitively part of a wider 
national project was therefore founded in particularly localized conditions. Con-
current with Chassen-Lopez (2004: 427) it can therefore be demonstrated that, 
"The process of state formation demanded constant negotiations on the local, 
regional, state and national levels, each in their own particular context but also 
interconnected. " 
In the years following the Revolution, Oaxaca was both drawn into, and served 
to shape, the national state's hegemonic project. Efforts were made to extend 
the emergent corporatist model of control to Oaxaca. This was done through the 
creation of the Confederaci6n de Partidos Socialistas de Oaxaca (CPSO, Confed-
eration of Socialist Parties of Oaxaca), an umbrella organisation created under 
Governor Vasquez in 1926, comprising a union of 26 regional parties. No party 
eventually existed outside of this umbrella and by 1934, it had been subordinated 
to the national PNR (Smith, 2009: 47). As we saw in the previous chapter, fol-
lowing the Great Depression Mexican leaders sought to create a fully fledged 
national market, based on industrial production, with a stable landholding peas-
antry in the countryside. Essential to this process of modern state formation \yas 
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the break-up of haciendas, described by Eric Wolf (1959: 245) as "ramparts of 
power in the countryside." Although attracting little industrial development, be-
tween 1917 and 1964 almost all areas of Oaxaca experienced land reform of some 
kind. The only places that didn't were those areas that had managed to hold on 
to their communal land during the colonial period, the so called' communidades 
agrarias' (although at times the state played an important role in confirming their 
title).9 However, the manner in which agrarian reform was carried out reflected 
the politics of state development combined with struggles for local autonomy. For 
example, land was predominantly redistributed in places which the government 
sought to increase its tax base such as Tuxtepec and Pochutla. Areas nearest to 
the state capital were also given priority (so as to maintain control over them) 
whereas more peripheral areas were left to cacique control. Lastly. protection 
was offered to landowners in particularly productive zones (Smith, 2009: 58-63, 
132). Passive revolution, analysed in the previous chapter with reference to the 
national level, can also be shown to have had a local articulation in Oaxaca as it 
was through state-led processes of restructuring that recalcitrant elements were 
subordinated, subdued or silenced. 
Post-revolution, three distinct patterns of land tenure had evolved throughout 
Mexico; private property, ejidal property and communal property. The develop-
ment of agrarian property in Oaxaca during this time has been a contradictory 
process. Despite the efforts of reform, one third of the land remained in private 
hands. Nevertheless, only Durango and Chihuahua, received more land in the 
form of redistribution in the period 1900-1992. Furthermore, this process of re-
distribution created more beneficiaries than in any other state (INEGI, 1994).10 
For reasons such as these Lynn Stephen ((1997: 78), 1998: 23) has claimed that 
many campesinos in Oaxaca came to have a positive view of the Mexican state, 
and whilst not acquiescent to it, viewed it as an ally in the struggle against 
9These were not, however, an insignificant part of the make-up of property relations in the 
state. As Lynn Stephen (1998: 13) notes, of the 1200 communidades agrarias that exist in 
Mexico, 674 are located in Oaxaca. 
l0From 1900 to 1992 Oaxaca received 6,305,324 hectares of land that created 263,396 bene-
ficiaries. Whilst the corresponding figures for Chihuahua are 10,356,642 hectares with 107,115 
beneficiaries and for Durango there were 8,593,499 hectares distributed with 121, 635 benefi-
ciaries (INEGI, 1994: 379-380). 
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elite classes. ll Again, this shows the interlinking of passive revolution and the 
production of space. 
However, the redistribution of land was far from the only spatial development 
in Oaxaca during this time. Throughout the period of lSI, resources were increas-
ingly mobilized to serve the new project of building a nationally-oriented market. 
Under this arrangement parts of Oaxaca came to be utilized as a domestic colony. 
This confirms the point made in Chapter 2 with regard to the changing nature 
of statecraft resulting from the imperatives of a different mode of production. 
Whereas the pre-modern state sought only to bring together dispersed economic 
activities, the modern capitalist state seeks to use space instrumentally (Lefeb-
vre, 1991: 378). Surveying modern developments, Colin Clarke (1992: 159) 
highlights that "the role of the federal state, as a modernizing/urbanizing and 
land redistributing agent, has not only reconstructed Oaxaca's space directly: but 
facilitated or accelerated peasant differentiation in rural areas, and encouraged 
capital accumulation in the cities and towns." 
More important than the break-up of haciendas for the reconfiguration of 
space in Oaxaca has been the investment in large-scale infrastructural projects 
that have acted as key forces propelling capitalization and urbanization. The 
state was markedly opened up from 1940 onwards by the construction of the 
Pan-American Highway (Clarke, 1992: 148, 157). Stepick and Murphy (1991: 78) 
submit that the completion of the highway "literally paved the way for Oaxaca's 
reintegration with the national economy." Commerce rapidly increased as a result 
of this (Smith, 2009: 271). As well as providing for the circulation of goods to 
and from the state it, was also hugely influential in facilitating the rise of tourism 
in Oaxaca (Kemper and Royce, 1979: 280). 
Other large infrastructural projects included the construction of huge dams to 
provide hydroelectricity and water for irrigation projects, for example the Aleman 
Dam in Tuxtepec or the Benito Juarez Dam in the Isthmus region, as well the 
creation of a large oil refinery at Salina Cruz. These projects had important con-
sequences for the class composition of particular places. As during the Porfiriato, 
these projects could only proceed through the dispossession of people from the 
llThere is reason to suggest that Stephen's thesis is a over generalised, and is in f a ~ t t f ~ r r m?re 
applicable to those areas immediately surrounding the Valley of Oaxaca where redlstnbutlOn 
was strongest. In contrast, Cook (1984: 76) argued that "a very small p r o ~ o r t i o n n of r u r , ~ l l
Oaxacans, regardless of their class position, accept the ideology of the bourgeOIS democracy. 
178 
6.6 Post-revolutionary Oaxaca: between local practice and national 
project 
land, with the additional result being an increase in land speculation in the sur-
rounding areas. Furthermore, in an effort to recuperate the costs of the projects 
the government sought to reorient agricultural production to more commercial 
ends (Lopez Monjardin, 1993: 69-70; Rubin, 1993: 160). Binford and Campbell 
(1993: 16) explain how class relations were altered by these spatial developments: 
"Agrarian capitalism, followed by modern industrial capitalism, penetrated the 
hitherto merchant dominated economy as the government sought to convert the 
Isthmus into a full-blown development pole." 
As will be discussed shortly, this reorganization of space was to produce the 
'militantly particularist' social movement Coalicion Obrera Campesina Estudantil 
del Istmo (COCEI - Worker-Peasant-Student Coalition of the Isthmus), that in 
many ways was an important intellectual precursor of the APPO (see Renique, 
2007). 
Following national trends, Oaxaca has not escaped from the process of urban-
ization. However, this process is not one that has been driven by industrialization, 
as elsewhere in Mexico. Indeed, the state still lacks a real industrial base with only 
textile production, mines, power plants and sugar refineries providing what indus-
trial production there is (Smith, 2009: 52) .12 Rather, state services, commerce, 
and importantly tourism have engendered this transformation. This is reflected 
in employment statistics among the urban population with 40% being employed 
in the services sector, 19% in the commercial sector, and just 7% in the construc-
tion sector. Oaxaca however, remains a largely agrarian economy, with 51 % of 
the state's inhabitants employed in the primary sector, 14% in the secondary and 
a further 34% in the tertiary. The population also remains overwhlemingly im-
poverished with almost 50% either receiving no salary or less than one minimum 
salary. One can see the narrow basis of wealth monopolisation and elite class priv-
ilege in the fact that just 3.4% of the state's population earn over five minimum 
salaries (INEGI, 1998: 279-285). Just 57 families are said to dominate business in 
Oaxaca, owing to their monopoly in consumer durables (Clarke, 2000: 132). The 
state contributes to just roughly 1% of Mexico's overall industrial manufacturing 
value. Furthermore, 53% of the population remain rurally based in comparison 
with the national average of just 24% (http://cuentame.inegi.org.mx). 
12 According to a World Bank commissioned paper just 13% of Oaxaca's economy is based 
on manufacturing (Hall and Humphrey, 2003: 17). 
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The twentieth century witnessed a dramatic population increase in the state. 
as Figure 6.3 demonstrates. 
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Figure 6.3: Population increase in Oaxaca 1900-1990 (Source: INEGI, 1994) 
Scott Cook (1984: 62) outlines that generally speaking to possess land in 
Oaxaca has always meant to be a minifundista, with the land base too small 
to provide support to the whole of a family's labour power or provide for all of 
their subsistence needs. Unlike in Chiapas however this does not mean the large 
estates were the corollary of this (as will be argued in the following chapter it was 
the presence of large estates that would influence the mode of resistance there). 
Maize cultivation in Oaxaca for example can only provide enough subsistence for 
around half of the year (Cohen, 2010: 154). The dramatic population increase 
has placed furthered pressure on peasant communities (as will be seen in the 
following chapter, the campesinos of highland Chiapas have suffered a similar 
problem). Lacking the endogenous capacities to satisfy their needs, members of 
the community have increasingly had to look outside of their communities for 
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opportunities (Clarke, 2000: 109, 139).13 This demographic change has led to 
what Jeffrey Cohen (2004: 5) calls a 'culture of migration' in Oaxaca, defined by 
the author as a pervasive phenomenon grounded in everyday experience. in which 
migration is seen as a viable strategy for socio-economic advancement. Whilst 
this migration at the beginning of the twentieth century was largely internal. this 
shifted to include specific industrial centres under lSI. J\;Iigration must also be 
understood as a response to government policies, as the increased capitalization 
of agriculture favoured large well-irrigated farms over small family ones that were 
often denied access to credit and irrigation. With only a miniscule amount of 
industry to be found in Oaxaca State, Mexico City became a destination to 
which many sought employment opportunities. Whilst Oaxaca sent workers to 
the United States during the 'bracero' program, migration to the US has increased 
sharply since the implementation of the structural adjustment programs and the 
ending of government protection to domestic industry, with the Mexican economy 
no longer having the capacity to absorb urban migration as it did in the past 
(Cohen, 2004: 56-63). This highlights the crucial linkages between hegemonic 
projects articulated at local, national and global levels, and the contradictions 
that these spatial scales produce in formulating policy. Paradigmatic in this 
regard are the contradictions involved in the US government's political response 
to an increased wave of Latin (mainly Mexican) immigration. On the one hand 
it must seek to secure the border so as to keep labour firmly in place (and thus 
spatially differentiated though a reinforcement of a spatial division of labour). 
This is a precondition for a greater extraction of surplus value and the continuing 
profitability of the capitalist system. Unlike free trade treaties such as the one 
negotiated within the EU, the provisions of NAFTA granted free movements 
across borders only to capital and commodities, not people (Watt, 2010). In this 
manner illegal immigrant labour comes to serves an important function within 
other domestic sectors of the US economy. As Robinson (2008: 313-317) notes. it 
is here the spatial categorisation of citizen/non citizen is used to enforce relations 
of exploitation, as minimal wages can be paid, with precarious employment status 
and no legal protection. However, erecting spatial barriers leaves nowhere for 
13Following Michael Lebowitz (2003: 35-49) it must be stressed that 'need' is not a s t a t ~ c c
term but rather something that is socially conditioned. Thus the growing needs of Oaxaca s 
population and the concomitant inability to meet these needs must be situated in the context 
of capitalist development. 
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this discontent to escape and raises the spectre of social unrest braking out with 
unpredictable consequences. The heightened militarization of Mexico under the 
pretext of the 'war on drugs' is perhaps the logical outcome of such a process 
(Watt, 2010). 
Like much of Mexico, Oaxaca went through a politically tumultuous period 
during the 1970s and 1980s as lSI, both as an accumulation strategy and hege-
monic project, began to stutter. During this time class conflict was manifested 
in a number of social movements seeking social justice. Land invasions increased 
markedly as did student activism. The expansion of police powers, intervention 
of the army and the co-optation of independent organizations were the concomi-
tant responses from the federal state (Martinez Vasquez, 1990; Martin, 2006: 63). 
Following the 1968 student massacre, a radical student organization known as the 
Federacion Estudiantil Oaxaqueiia (FEO, Oaxacan Student Federation) emerged 
in Oaxaca. As well as involving themselves in a high profile campaign to reduce 
bus fares, they would also ally with the ultimately unsuccessful struggle of the 
indigenous vendors to resist the relocation of their market from the centre of the 
city to the periphery - a movement insisted upon by merchants for reasons of 'hy-
giene' (Clarke, 1996: 273). Other popular movements such as the Coalicion de 
Obreros, Campesinos y Estudiantes de Oaxaca (COCEO, Coalition of Workers, 
Peasants and Students of Oaxaca) also emerged during this period and played 
a key role in co-ordinating disparate social groups. However, without doubt the 
most important social movement to emerge in Oaxaca was the COCEI that was 
founded in 1973. As was mentioned earlier, the COCEI emerged as a political 
response to the changing class relations in the Isthmus. In particular, the move-
ment was a reaction to transformations in space, specifically the capitalization of 
agriculture. Land, and access to it and its products were thus at the heart of this 
conflict. As previously explained, the infrastructural projects in the area such as 
the dam and irrigation projects had developed in tandem with the needs of the 
national hegemonic project of seeking to increase the productivity of the land 
(Lees, 1976: 202-3). It was thought that capital-intensive agriculture would pro-
vide cheap food for domestic consumption as well as produce for export (Binford, 
1993: 89). This process of commercialization, however, was an assault on "the 
most elemental conditions of reproduction" of the largely indigenous peasantry 
(Lopez Monjardin, 1993: 69). COCEI emerged in this atmosphere to defend 
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place and local identity. They took part in land invasions, blocked roads, and in-
volved themselves in union organization whilst articulating demands for increased 
autonomy (Binford and Campell, 1993: 3; Rubin, 1999: 189). The highly local-
ized forms of authoritarianism that had been developed in Juchitan, reliant as it 
was upon indigenous cacique rule, had resulted in corporate institutions affiliated 
to the PRl being weak or absent. COCEl thus developed an important social 
function as a social movement capable of raising class-consciousness in the region 
(Rubin, 1993: 160-162). They were able to win widespread support from workers 
and campesinos culminating in their electoral defeat of the PRl in 1981. The 
national state's response to this was a mixture of reform to outright repression 
(Rubin, 1999: 182), confirming Gramsci's (1971: 263) definition of the state as 
"hegemony protected by the armour of coercion." 
The struggle led by COCEl in many ways was a direct precursor of the strug-
gles that are now taking place in Oaxaca in that what took place was a distinct 
clash of spatial projects (in contrast to the clash of civilizations thesis outlined 
in Chapter 2, the analysis laid out here and in the following chapter will demon-
strate how geopolitical conflict can instead be better thought of as a 'clash of 
spatializations'). On the one hand capital sought to expand into Oaxaca trans-
forming it into space into which accumulation of surplus value could proceed. 
However, the corollary of this spatial transformation was also the transformation 
of people and their dispossession from their cultural patrimony (Harvey, 2003: 
137-182; Castro-Soto, 2005). This has not been a process that the population of 
Oaxaca have been willing to uniformly accept. An important factor to note is 
that radical action has generally arisen in Oaxaca from either those connected 
to capitalised agricultural production, or from issues related to land use and as-
sociated conditions of use (for example the provision of credit, equipment etc). 
Equally important is the manner in which these movements have gained support 
of urban-based groups (Cook, 1984: 72). The interlinking of the rural and urban 
can be explained through the central role of Oaxaca City both as an economic 
hub and political centre of the state (Smith, 2009: 272). Unlike neighbouring 
Chiapas, Oaxaca (as was earlier explained) did not experience the proliferation 
of haciendas, and the few estates that did exist were largely dismantled following 
the Revolution. This left the capital city as the main symbolic centre of power. 
For this reason, since the 1940s it has been the symbolic heartland of protest 
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movements. As Murphy and Stepick (1991: 61) argue, "It is the symbolic locus 
of Oaxaca's social tensions, the place where groups congregate to confront the 
government with their underlying discontent with the state's economy and social 
structure." This will be an important point to bear in mind when we come to 
consider the APPO, and the nature of social protest in the state from 2006 on-
wards. It is worth re-emphasising that movements such as these underline the 
well of experience Oaxaca can draw upon in social struggles against capitalisation 
in the shadows of authoritarian governance. 
The following section seeks to explore how Oaxaca has been affected b:v the 
national turn to neoliberalism. Following on from the arguments presented in 
Chapter 5, it will be demonstrated how Oaxaca has become what Neil Bren-
ner (1997: 280) calls a 'spatial target' for a renewed round of accumulation. If 
spatial transformation is the intended plan for Oaxaca, this will, following the ar-
guments set out in Chapter 3, be linked to a particular representation of space. As 
Lefebvre (1991: 105) makes clear, ideologies intervene in space in the form of de-
velopment strategies (see also Chapter 4). It is therefore pertinent to examine the 
ideologies of groups that seek to influence the area's development. The World 
Bank's 'Southern States Development Strategy' (Hall and Humphrey, 2003) is 
perhaps paradigmatic in this regard. Its overarching concern is with the opening 
of Oaxaca to the vicissitudes of the world market. The report makes it clear that 
infrastructure must be improved in order to encourage investment. The poor 
spatial integration of the state's regions leads to higher logistical costs for com-
panies seeking to operate in the area. Limited infrastructure is also highlighted 
as a problem retarding the potential of tourism in the region. One prominent 
example in the case of Oaxaca relates to the inability to exploit its beach resorts 
such as Huatulco in comparison to other places in Mexico like Cancun, due to 
184 
6.7 Indigenous place versus neoliberal space 
the difficulties involved in getting there. 14 Unclear property rights are also said 
to hinder investment and promote social conflict. The report recommends the 
reorientation of the economy towards export-based agriculture and production, 
the latter of which is to be aided by valorising the low wage base of the area. It 
is clear from this that the history of social/spatial relations in the state are of 
vital importance in dictating the strategy for accumulation there in that it seeks 
to draw on Oaxaca's lack of developed capitalist social relations in order to insert 
it all the more beneficially into the global system (Massey, 1994: 56-57). This 
is of course nothing other than the logic of uneven and combined development, 
though which new spatial divisions of labour are attempted to be constructed. 
However, this local history is equally salient to informing the alternative spaces 
of resistance. It will be shown that in contrast to the omnipotent, homogenizing 
force that neoliberalism is often presented as being: a concrete analysis of Oaxaca 
reveals its limitations in the face of oppositional subaltern forces. Oaxaca has thus 
become the site of struggle for survival between two very different spatial projects, 
both of which seem inimical to each other. On the one hand capital must expand 
into new areas such as this if it is not to perish (owing to the inherent dynamics 
as a mode of production, discussed in Chapter 2). However, the conditions of 
this expansion would consign an alternative way of life to history. It is through 
this examination of the refusal of capitalist domination that we can also identify 
a different theorisation of what it means to engage in class struggle. 
6.7 Indigenous place versus neoliberal space 
It is often assumed that the onset of the debt crisis and the fiscal austerity that 
followed this was felt evenly both spatially and temporally throughout Mexico. 
I4Huatulco was one of the five 'integrally planned resorts' created by the Fondo Nacional 
de Formento Al Turismo (FONATUR, Nacional Find for Development Tourism), a l o n ~ ~ with 
Cancun, Ixtapa, Los Cabos and Loreto. Founded in 1986, Huatu1co has thus f ~ r r f a I l ~ d d to 
meet governmental expectations. However, there are plans to re-launch the areas m a b ~ d d to 
attract over 170000 additional international tourists a year by 2012. This is to be achIeved 
through greater ~ p a t i a l l integration including plans to widen current highways as well as poten-
tially building a new super highway to draw it in into a 'tourist circuit' that includes O ~ a c a a
City. There are also plans to expand the airport and port facilitates, as well as the c ~ e a t m g g a 
number of exclusive golf clubs, villas, condos, five star and boutique hotels and shoppmg malls 
(http://www.fonatur.gob.mx/en/Des.Buatu1co/des-huatu1co.asp). 
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However, whilst as a national trend the country slashed public spending, the state 
budget for Oaxaca actually increased in a populist effort to relieve social tensions 
and stop them from spilling over into the 'national agenda'. As Richard Snyder 
(1999: 314) points out, in 1989, during the governorship of Helaio Ramirez Lopez 
(1986-1992) the Oaxaca state government actually received more money than 
it could spend, and was forced to return 3 of the 21 billion pesos it had been 
given. This highlights again how national concerns can translate into different 
strategies for maintaining hegemony in accordance with the struggle of social 
forces in a particular locale (once again giving meaning to the notion of uneven 
and combined hegemony stressed in the introduction). One cannot assume so-
called national order changes are experienced equally throughout the country. 
A classic example of this is the process of democratization in Mexico, analysed 
by one scholar as the "quintessence of hegemonic practice designed to frame 
and condition the institutional context of opposition movements (Morton, 2005: 
190). Whilst this may hold true from a perspective that examines solely the 
'national scale' we must also be mindful that the process of democratization at 
the national level that has accompanied the neoliberal reforms has been a far from 
even process (Gibson, 2005). At the same time as being aware of the importance 
of wider spatial scales, we must also therefore be wary of adopting a 'centre-
centred approach' that ignores the continuation of 'illiberal peripheries' (Snyder, 
2001: 101). As Oaxacan sociologist Victor Raul Martinez Vasquez (2007: 16) has 
argued "it is evident that in some places, like Oaxaca, in recent years not only 
have the changes seen at the national level not occurred but the characteristics 
of the old authoritarian regime have been deepened." This was exemplified in the 
governorships of Jose Murat (1988-2004) and the present one of Ulises Ruiz Ortiz 
(2004-2010).15 It is against the background both of localized authoritarianism 
and the attempted neoliberalization of the nation that we must understand the 
formation of the APPO, as shall now be explained. 
Snyder (1999: 310) identifies three types of subnational authoritarianism. 
15 As an example of these authoritarian practices, during his five years in office Murat sus-
pended 140 (25%) of Oaxaca's municipalities. This intervention took place largely in urban 
areas of opposition control (Gibson, 2005: 116). Ulises Ruiz Ortiz has gained even wider in-
famy for the widespread use of repression and practices of crony capitalism. One high profile 
target of repression was left leaning Oaxacan daily newspaper N oticias that was openly critical 
of him. 
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These are populist, traditional and modernizing. Under lSI, although there were 
modernizing tendencies, the subnational state would - when it feared losing sup-
port - revert back to populism. This however, was a form of populism with 
distinctly local characteristics. Demographically, Oaxaca is Mexico:s most in-
digenous state with over a third of the population identifying as such. It is also 
indigenously diverse with 16 separate groups. This fact meant that the local 
hegemony of the national PRI could be secured in Oaxaca only in compromise 
with this tradition throughout the lSI period. As Gustavo Esteva (2008: personal 
interview, Oaxaca) explains, it was realized that governing could only take place 
in Oaxaca "with the indigenous people not to them." One can extrapolate from 
this that the very process of state formation in Mexico took place under condi-
tions of competing visions of citizenship, nation and sovereignty (Chassen-Lopez, 
2004: 314). A compromise existed whereby certain demands for autonomous de-
cision making processes were accepted in the communities in exchange for their 
loyalty to the PRI. As Eisenstadt (2007: 62) explains, under this settlement 
"votes were harvested by local caciques or chieftains invariably affiliated with the 
PRI and acting as the communities' interlocutor with the party and the state 
government (which were fused together as one)." Municipalities in Oaxaca are 
governed by the ayuntamiento constitucional. This contains three branches; the 
executive, legislative and judiciary, with the main executive power being based 
in the position of the Municipal President. Under the indigenous practice of usos 
y costumbres (practices and customs), these positions were decided by cargos, 
a communal responsibility that is inherently rank-based, and seen less as some-
thing prestige based and more of a communitarian obligation. Under this system 
of semi-autonomous governance other indigenous practices such as the commu-
nity assembly (a forum for discussing all pertinent issues as well as a basis to 
which all cargo holders must submit themselves to) and tequios (collective work 
projects for community needs) were maintained. PRI hegemony within wider 
society could be continued only so long as the social conditions of peasant repro-
duction could be assured. However, this has been increasingly threatened with 
the inroads of capitalist development. As one indigenous community member ex-
plained, migration and money have affected the horizontality of the community 
structure and created hierarchies, which have often formed into centres of power. 
Returning migrants are at the same time time more reluctant to participate in 
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tequios or cargos or pay for the upkeep of the community (Cruz, 2009: personal 
interview, Oaxaca). 
This threat to community reproduction must be placed within a national 
context in which peasant agriculture has come under attack. This was further 
increased after 1992 with the ending of agrarian reform and moves towards ne-
oliberal policies nationally, meaning the already highly marginalized conditions 
of existence for Oaxacan campesinos have been made even worse. 
As has been highlighted hitherto, Oaxaca had experienced heightened social 
conflict in the 1960s and 1970s. This was to culminate with the declaration 
of martial law in response to the power of the COCEO in 1977 (Cook, 1984: 
73). Munoz (2005: 594-7) argues that this proliferation of independent popular 
organizations highlights the PRI's declining legitimacy. At the same time the 
First International Forum on the Human Rights of Indigenous People held in 
the state in 1989 is cited as evidence of growing political mobilisation by indige-
nous actors. The PRI furthermore began to lose municipal elections in the state. 
An indication of the declining ability of the PRI to maintain their control over 
the Oaxacan countryside came in 1995 when the state officially recognised the 
right of the municipalities to choose their authorities based on their own usos y 
costumbres Although as we have seen this had often been the reality for many 
communities before this time, the significance here was that communities could 
now elect their own representatives without the mediation of political parties. As 
was mentioned in the introduction, of Oaxaca's 570 municipalities, 412 opted to 
use this traditional system which allowed political decisions to be expressed in 
their own cultural framework. As Luis Hernandez Navarro (1999: 159) cogently 
argues, this was only recognising what existed in practice anyway and moreover 
was the lesser of two evils for the PRI, as it prevented indigenous communities 
from uniting electorally under an oppositional party banner. Furthermore, Eisen-
stadt (2007: 55) points out this legalization followed rapidly on the heels of the 
Zapatista rebellion (discussed in the next chapter), and thus can be interpreted 
as a defensive strategy of the Mexican state to prevent a wider escalation of in-
digenous rebellion and prevent a so-called contagion effect of Zapatismo (Munoz, 
2005: 596). However, in tandem with these reforms was a systematic process 
of repression. In its efforts to counter the rise of Oaxacan guerrilla movements. 
particularly the Ejercito Popular Revolucionario (EPR, Popular Revolutionary 
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Army) who announced their presence in 1996, the Oaxacan state government, 
rather than seeking to address the material causes of anger, began a campaign 
of low intensity warfare against the local population where suspected members 
were thought to dwell such as Loxicha. 16 As Kristin Norget (2005: 116) astutely 
observes, the situation of repression there "is just one of the contradictions of 
the present political and social climate in Mexico, a nation showing the severe 
contradictions and pains of an unprecedented period of rapid expansion." These 
examples highlight the point that we need to be mindful of the manner in which 
local state-level struggles, as well as responses to them, cannot be divorced from 
developments at wider spatial scales. 
Lynn Stephen (1998: 23) has claimed that the national state, for historically 
specific reasons was viewed in a more positive light in Oaxaca than in neigh-
bouring Chiapas. While reservations were earlier stated as to the validly of this 
thesis, whatever basis it had in fact, appears now to be seriously waning as the 
social conditions of the two states have begun to converge, reflecting in many re-
spects the attempted equalisation of the conditions of production (Smith, 2008: 
187). This needs to be put into the context of the changing national hegemonic 
project into which Oaxaca is now increasingly attempted to be drawn into. One 
particularly salient feature of the new neoliberal turn in Mexico has been that 
of land reform (or more accurately counter revolution). As described at the end 
of the previous chapter, the revisions to Article 27 formally ended petitions for 
land redistribution. However, land reform under Salinas (1988-1994) went even 
further in decimating the social contract that had been built with the peasants, 
further evidencing the reorientation of the government's projects and the recom-
position of the state's social base (Jessop, 1990: 207; Stanford, 1994: 98; Richard, 
2008: 401).17 As well as ending the government's responsibility to redistribute 
land, reform also made provision for formerly inalienable ejido land to be rented 
or sold. Furthermore, although maintaining limits on the maximum amount of 
16Following state repression, when soldiers were sent into the community, 500 local residents 
were arrested after being accused of links with the EPR. 12 men remained imprisoned until 
2009, despite widespread irregularities and abuses including well documented allegations of 
torture. 4 of the 12 were released on July 18th 2009, but 8 political prisoners remain to this 
day. 
17This changing emphasis is perfectly summed up by an government official who remarked: 
"agrarian struggle is over. We are now in a struggle to develop production" (quoted in Stephen. 
1998: 27). 
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land an individual could hold (100 hectares), corporations could now own up to 
2500 hectares as long as 25 individuals were associate members in the new yen-
ture (Otero, 1999: 47). Despite the rhetoric of support for autonomous ejidal 
organizations, these communities lacked the resources to compete successfully in 
the transition to a fully capitalist market. The new discourse of individual rights 
was thus insensitive to the highly differentiated capacities to enjoy these rights. 
Recalling the dialectic method where we not only read history backwards but 
also seek to extrapolate the inherent logic of a system into the future, we can see 
that full commodification of land in Mexico paves the way for the concentration 
and centralization of agricultural capital as large capital will always be at an 
advantage (Marx, 1844/2007: 42-3).18 The prime motivation for this change in 
policy was to encourage foreign investment in the agricultural sector, and thus 
increase productivity in a bid to reorient production in the nation to exportation. 
As Ita (2006: 158) argues, the agrarian reforms seek to transform the status of 
land from a social right to a commodity. The ejidal sector was also felt to be 
an unproductive albatross around the neck of government that was no longer 
sustainable in the new economic climate. Part of this problem came from the 
state ownership of the land, meaning ejidatarios had only usufruct rights. This 
legal status prevented them from using the land as collateral to obtain credit 
(Hansen, 1971: 82; Stanford, 1994: 100). However, this does not mean ejidos 
were unproductive, rather than the institutional complex in which they operated 
was hugely unfavourable, as it favoured large farms (as was discussed in the pre-
vious chapter). Thus it must be stressed the decision to attempt to end peasant 
agriculture does not relate to its 'natural' decline as a mode of production "but 
rather is a clear case of a planned obsolescence" (Richard, 2008: 396). 
Organizations like the World Bank have argued, the illegibility of property 
rights in the southern states is an impediment to investment and increased pros-
perity (Hall and Humphrey, 2003). The Mexican government has sought to rectify 
this through the Programa de Certificaci6n de Derecho Ejidales y Titulaci6n de 
Solares Urban os (PROCEDE, Program for the Certification of Agrarian Rights). 
This a supposedly voluntary program into which communities could enter to offi-
18Gerardo Otero (1999: 47) argues that, "The new agricultural policies can thus be expected 
to promote a new wave of bankruptcies that will forces peasants to sell their land and will 
expand the reserve army of unemployed workers in the cities." 
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cially have their lands demarcated and a title granted. 19 Certification of the ejidal 
land is a pre-condition for the decision to then privatise or rent out the land. Ad-
ditionally, as in the case of the salt beds discussed earlier, the unclear boundaries 
of many of the ejidos has made them extremely difficult to levy tax upon. Pisa 
(1994: 267, 287) sagely interprets revisions to agrarian property rights as an ef-
fort to reclaim territory for taxation purposes. This policy need to be therefore 
placed in the context of evolving state formation. 
In contrast to the school of thought that postulates neoliberalism as leading 
to a decline of the state (Strange, 1996; Radcliffe, 2001: 22), it must be stressed 
that the introduction of the PROCEDE had the opposite effect, increasing the 
state's regulation and bureaucratisation of the countryside, involving as it did 
the creation of three new institutions including; the agrarian attorney general, 
the national agrarian registry as well as agrarian tribunals (Pisa, 1994: 267, 
273). Again then we see the process of 'seeing like a state', only this time with 
a distinctly capitalist social purpose in mind. As Scott (1998: 51) writes with 
regard to this, 
Where the premodern state was content with a level of intelligence 
sufficient to allow it to keep order, extract taxes, and raise armies, the 
modern state increasingly aspired to 'take in charge' the physical and 
human resources of a nation and make them more productive. These 
more positive ends of statecraft required a much greater knowledge of 
the society. 
As a state that has an large rural population, Oaxaca has not been unaffected 
by these developments, although due to the nature of the different land tenure 
patterns the affects have been experienced differently here than they were in the 
highlands of Chiapas (as will be discussed in the next chapter). It is also clear 
from the argument that has been laid out hitherto that efforts to transform space 
190ne may question however just how 'voluntary' this project was. Ita (2006: 152) highlights 
how certificates of entry into PROCEDE were often illegally demanded by local and regional 
authorities for receiving subsidies and credit. One government program, PROCAMPO, was in 
fact made dependent on entry into the PRO CEDE (Pisa, 1994: 290). Community representa-
tives interviewed by the author also spoke about being tricked into agreement. They also spoke 
of their ignorance of PROCEDE's ramifications (personal interview with indigenous community 
members, Oaxaca 2009). 
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unfold in both a spatially and temporally uneven fashion. However. there is now 
a consensus among policy planners that the space of Oaxaca must be reshaped 
in line with those areas in which the state enjoys 'comparative advantage' so as 
to help increase revenues within the reconfigured national accumulation strategy 
(discussed in the previous chapter). Practically this translates into the exploita-
tion of the state's low wage base, natural resources and cultural patrimony. 
Efforts to reshape the space of Oaxaca are perhaps best encapsulated in Plan 
Puebla Panama (PPP, now renamed Plan Mesoamerica).For international finan-
cial institutions, TN Cs and state planners the resource rich area of the Isthmus 
of Tehuantepec is central to this project. As one APPO advisor from the region 
clarified, although there are development projects throughout Oaxaca affiliated 
to this plan, the Isthmus is the area in which the majority of projects are con-
centrated, due its natural resources including wind energy, hydroelectric dams, 
and petro-chemicals (Valencia Nunez, 2009: personal interview, Oaxaca). PPP 
seeks to transform the space of Oaxaca into part of the southern tourist corridor 
necessitating the creation of high speed autopistas (highways) alongside a new 
maquiladora industry. There remain ambitions to resurrect the Trans Isthmus 
Railway as an alternative to the increasingly over-capacitated Panama Canal, 
meaning huge infrastructural development would have to take place in order to 
facilitate the necessary increased flow of goods particularly in relation to port 
capacity (Harvey, 2006c: 209-10). It has been noted by planners that this would 
remove 2500 miles from the present shipment of goods from the US east to West 
Coast, and would remove 1000 miles of travel from the US east coast to Asia. 
In order for this to come to fruition the current spatial configuration of Oaxacan 
communities would have to be fundamentally altered, as the population is far too 
fragmented for this to be feasible (Mexicon, 2002: 67). Removing the population 
from their historical lands will thus be a vital step in this process. 
Engendered by the PROCEDE one town in the Isthmus, La Venta is already 
reaping the whirlwind of capital investment in wind energy (whose main purpose 
is to provide Wal Mart with renewable electricity to meet their targets on carbon 
reduction). Lead by Spanish TNC Iberdrola20 , associations have been entered into 
20 A UN World Investment Report (2000: 59) notes that the surge in Spanish TNC acquisition 
of private companies has been a noted feature of Latin American development since the 1990s. 
Seven TNCs (including Iberdrola) dominate this process, accounting for the majority of Spanish 
investment. 
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with ejidatarios, who have rented out their lands to have wind farms erected on 
them. The consultation process was heavily criticised as lacking in transparency. 
as of the 36 ejidatarios who agreed to rent the land only a handful were literate 
(Davies, 2007; Rojas, 2005). Many have since claimed they were completely 
unaware of the environmental implications this would bring. Nevertheless, the 
project has expanded installing thousands of generators on formerly inalienable 
peasant land. There remains resistance in the area with efforts to annul the 
contracts. However, even if, as appears likely, they will be unsuccessful in this 
regard, the conflict this has generated, and the links that have been established 
with transnational networks such as Red Latinoamericana contra Represas y par 
los Rios sus Comunidades y el Agua (REDLAR), will be important in informing 
future struggle in the region. Concurrent with Holloway (2002: 159) then, even 
in moments of temporary defeat, the very act of insubordination can be expected 
to leave a residue. 
However, whilst this case illustrates the changes the PROCEDE can facilitate, 
Oaxaca has been far from universally acquiescent. In fact it is the state with the 
least adoption of the program with only 20.5% of the surface area being certified 
(Ita, 2006: 155). It is becoming clearer that the historical defence of place and 
the long struggle against exploitation have provided the collective form of social 
organization through which capitalism can be resisted. Indeed, it is by virtue of 
the democratic control of their own communities, that the indigenous population 
are able to deny capital the right to expand. As Esteva (2009: personal inter-
view, Oaxaca) puts it, the spatial structure of the assembly is both an end and a 
political tool. One example of this is the opposition to Libramiento Sur, a super-
highway project costing 548 million pesos, announced officially by the Secretaria 
de Obras Publicas (SOP, Sectretary of Public Works) and Caminos y Aeropistas 
de Oaxaca (CAO, Roads and Airstrips of Oaxaca) in October 2009 (Noticias. 
2010a). This highway intends to dramatically reduce the time it takes to get to 
the coastal beach resorts of the state (such as Puerto Escondido or Huatulco, 
discussed earlier). As should be obvious, a development like this can only take 
place through the production of space and the transformation of places (indeed 
this is the raison d'etre). The PROCEDE lays the conditions where this can 
be made possible through the alienation or renting of lands. However, Zaachila, 
one community that is threatened to be directly affected by this highway. has 
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already begun the process of organizing against the development. A large sec-
tion of this municipality has allied themselves with the APPO in a bid to Kiden 
their struggle and articulate it within a more state wide atmosphere of resistance 
(again highlighting the point made in Chapter 2 with regard to the importance 
of movements being able to 'jump scales' and connect to wider issues beyond 
their immediate locale). Previously a PRI stronghold) a 'failure of power' was 
acknowledged in the community in 2006 and mayor Jose Coronel was removed 
from his post, as the people decided to revert back to using their own usos y 
costumbres, declaring themselves to be an autonomous municipality. In August 
2007, the PRI re-took power amidst wide allegation of fraud, yet the community 
has maintained its fierce resistance to the state, with governor Ulises Ruiz Or-
tiz (URO) being prevented from entering the municipality after barricades were 
erected and a violent confrontation took place between PRIistas and APPO sup-
porters. Meanwhile, the authority of the community assembly has been invoked 
to challenge any potential threats to their lands. The ejidatarios of Zaachila 
claimed the community assembly has no knowledge of the project, nor does it 
have the approval of the municipal president (Noticias, 2009). Representatives 
from the community were highly visible at the Planton of 2009 and have managed 
to put their struggle at the forefront of social movement activism in the state as 
increasing connections are being made to different localised patterns of exploita-
tion. A mantra often heard around the historic Zocolo during the Planton of 
2009 was, "Ruiz entiende, la tierra no se vende" (Ruiz understand, the land is 
not for sale). At the same time as the project was finally announced officially, 
the community assembly voted unanimously to reject it, arguing that not only 
would it cause irreparable damage to agriculture, ecology and water systems of 
the areas but also that it would provoke the community to stop producing things 
that have cultural value (Noticias, 2010b). As one ejidatario argued: "It is some-
thing more than just a field, it is a feeling we carry inside of us. It is a love of our 
land" (N oticias, 2010b). This view of land is widely shared among the indigenous 
population of Oaxaca, and indeed throughout Mexico. This process of resistance 
can be thought of as an example of what Benjamin l\laldonado (2009: personal 
interview, Oaxaca) calls the "recuperation of the power of the assembly and the 
fortification of community life." In other words communities are able to draw 
upon traditions of resistance and collective power that have been developed over 
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centuries of struggle, which are now used to inform present ones. An indigenous 
community member from the Sierra Norte (Cruz, 2009: personal interyie,Y. Oax-
aca) claims that these conflicts are intensifying as laws are closing down ways to 
officially gain land and little is left to redistribute. He argues therefore that in the 
context of an expansionary capitalist system, communities defending their land 
and territory have the potential to form powerful social movements. Indeed, it 
is this commonality of experience that gives highly place specific movements the 
ability to 'jump scales' and link to other groups suffering similar experiences. In 
this case not only was the community of Zaachila able to link with other groups 
in the state of Oaxaca facing dispossesion, but an alliance was formed with the 
Frente del Pueblo en Defensa de La Tierra (FPDT, People's Front in Defense of 
the Land) in Atenco. Atenco has been an adherent to the Zapatistas 'Other Cam-
paign (to be discussed in the following chapter), and came to national attention 
when residents successfully blocked Vicente Fox's plan to construct an airport on 
their lands, and subsequently announced themselves to be an autonomous munic-
ipality. The defence of place therefore does not preclude wider links being forged, 
rather movements can be Janus-faced being simultaneously both introverted and 
extroverted (Castree, 2004: 150). 
As mentioned earlier, neo-liberal modernizing developments have taken place 
in Oaxaca under the auspices of highly authoritarian governors. The apogee 
of this authoritarianism was reached under the governorship of Ulises Ruiz Or-
tiz (commonly referred to as URO). From the outset of his dubious election 
(widespread fraud was alleged), his time in office has been characterised by the 
systematic violation of human rights and heavy use of repression against social 
protest. Epitomising this was the fact that the state came in last place nation-
ally for both transparency and access to information (Martinez Vasquez, 2007: 
19). Adding to this anger was the remodelling of the historical symbols of the 
city, described as the systematic destruction of the state's natural and histori-
cal patrimony that benefited associated cronies (Esteva, 2007: 84). Significantly 
this included moving a key site of authority - the Palacio de Gobierno (Govern-
ment Palace) - from the Zocolo (the historic centre of social protest). Deborah 
Poole (2007a: 10-11) highlights the manner in which cultural diversity came to 
be promoted in Oaxaca as a commodity, and packaged within a framework of 
individualised rights in a bid to promote the image of the state as a ·traditional' 
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Figure 6.4: Protestors reveal their opposition to planned super-highway (Photo 
by Chris Hesketh, 2009) 
indigenous tourist mecca. Furthermore, in 2004 URO introduced the 'Pact of 
Oaxaca' which sought to prohibit public protests which were thought to repre-
sent a danger to foreign investment (on these points , see also Norget , 2008). 
This clash between Oaxaca's deepening authoritarianism with neoliberal fea-
tures and increased societal demands was most visibly manifested with the for-
mation of the APPO in 2006. On May 22nd for the 26th year in a row, the 
teachers ' union (Section 22) began their annual strike demanding better terms 
for teachers, as well as students and teaching related issues such as improvement 
to class room infrastructure. Spatial concerns in fact were prime motives for 
their struggle in 2006. As they had done the year before, the teachers demanded 
the re-classification of various part of the state. Citing the pressure of tourism 
as leading to rising prices, the teachers argued that specific places should be 
rezoned and higher wages be paid in those areas. 21 In line with this , a series 
of megamarches were also co-ordinated to protest against the repression endured 
21 An identical claim had been successfully perused in previous months in neighbouring Chi-
apas. 
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under URO. However, in the atmosphere where social protest had effectively been 
criminalised, rather than listening to the demands of the teachers the government 
extraordinarily tried to violently dislodge the plant6n on June 14. The act of pub-
lic repression has been described by one observer as signifying "not only a crisis 
of the government but of the political regime" in Oaxaca (Martinez Vasquez, 
2007: 9). Following these events (and seeking to galvanise a wider movement) 
the teacher convened an assembly on June 20th to which they invited various 
official groups which they hoped to utilise to support their struggle. However, 
rather than the twenty or so organizations that had been invited to attend, over 
300 civil society organizations arrived armed with a plethora of social grievances 
(Esteva, 2008: personal interview, Oaxaca). What had begun as a trade union 
struggle was thus converted into a wider movement of discontent (Esteva, 2007: 
80). The authoritarian governorship of URO acted as a centripetal force for all 
of the state's oppositional social forces. Organized political groups that had been 
repressed under Murat and URO all came together under the APPO banner in-
cluding; el Frente Amplio de Lucha Popular (FALP), el Consejo Indigena Popular 
de Oaxaca (CIPO), el Frente Popular Revoluncionario (FPR), la Organizaci6n 
Indigena de Derechos Humanos de Oaxaca (OIDHO), el Comite Democnitico 
Ciudadano (CODECI), el Consejo de Defensa del Pueblo (CODEP), la Organi-
zaci6n de Pueblos Indigenas Zapoteca (OPIZ), el Ayuntamiento Popular de San 
Blas Atempa and Nueva Izquierda de Oaxaca, as well as an even longer list of 
civil society organizations (Martinez Vasquez, 2007: 70). 
As Stout (2010: 37) argues, "the APPO became a symbol of popular cohe-
sion and a trigger for political change." Thousands of barricades were erected 
throughout the city in a spontaneous rejection of governmental authority. All 
official government activities were suspended for five months, as a state of 'in-
governability' was declared. From simply having the plant6n taking over public 
space, new encampments were set up around the headquarters of the legislative 
power, the municipal palace, the judicial buildings as well as the official house to 
which the governor has been despatched to in Santa Maria Coyotepec (Martinez 
Vasquez, 2007: 80, 89). Human circles were formed around all of the symbols 
of state power, and public space became forcefully reclaimed in an assertion of 
what Lefebvre (1986) refers to as the 'right to the city'. Recalling these events. 
one participant of the barricades describes them as "the moment when the people 
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from below took their lives in their own hands" (Venegas, 2009: personal inter-
view, Oaxaca). These barricades to defend public space also became the places 
where for many, political conscious and practical collective action began to be 
developed. Radio and TV stations were also captured to aid in the propaganda 
war which the government quickly launched. These became autonomous spaces 
through which a genuine 'people's news' was broadcast (Norget, 2008; Stout. 
2010: 32). This radio station became the most listened to in the city and the 
central valleys (Martinez Vasquez, 2007: 93). 
Whilst not only being about the demands of the teachers, it is clear that 
the mobilization would not have come about were it not for the struggle of Sec-
tion 22, a militant wing of the CNTE, itself part of the wider national teachers 
union SNTE. Historically the teachers have been at the forefront of politicizations 
and popular mobilization in Oaxaca. Owing to the lack of industry in Oaxaca. 
the teachers union with 70,000 members approximates the nearest thing Oaxaca 
has to a class based opposition to the government (Davies, 2009: personal in-
terview, Oaxaca). As Martinez Vasquez (2007: 59) puts it, over the years the 
teacher's movement has been converted into "a catalyst for inconformity and 
social protest." 
Owing to its spontaneous creation there remained a great deal of confusion as 
to what the APPO actually was. Esteva (2007: 74) makes it clear however, that 
rather than an organization the APPO must be thought of as a movement, or 
movement of movements. Picking up on this theme of plurality, Kristin Norget 
(2010) argues, despites its amorphous nature it was often presented as a coherent 
movement. This view is confirmed by those who participated in the mobilisations, 
who have agreed that "it was not born with clear objectives" (Venegas, 2009: per-
sonal interview, Oaxaca). One clear demand was of course that exit of URO. As 
Esteva (2008: personal interview) says, "this was perhaps the only thing we all 
had in common." Following a National Forum more general tendencies began to 
be formed and demands broadened. These included things such as minimum stan-
dard of wellbeing, respect for cultural diversity, equality, non-violent resolution 
to conflicts a social administration of natural resources, municipal autonomy. , 
multicultural education, the real participation of citizens in political life and sus-
tainable development (Martinez Vasquez, 2007: 98). However; perhaps the most 
interesting thing about the mobilization has been the unity that was expressed 
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in spite of its diverse base. The popular chant from the street (still in force as of 
2009) was: "Hombro con hombro, co do con codo, la APPO, la APPO, la APPO 
somos todos" (shoulder to shoulder, side by side, we are all the APPO). The 
movement in other words was a popular explosion of the disenfranchised. l\Iany 
of the demands that began to be formulated were ones with a long history in 
Oaxaca, such as teacher's and women's struggles, indigenous rights and demands 
for increased autonomy. As Poole (2007b) notes: "Although the APPO is in 
many respects a new type of organisation, its novel form is made possible by 
its grounding in a familiar language of popular democracy, dissent and rebe ldia. " 
The emergence of the APPO points us towards the failure of social inclusion in 
Oaxaca, and the breakdown of representative democracy. The widespread sup-
port the teachers received and the anti-authoritarian response it provoked thus 
has to be placed in the context of the increasing inability of the local government 
to attend to the demands of the society. The rise of the APPO movement can be 
interpreted as the absence of hegemony and the increasing turn towards repres-
sion (Martinez Vasquez, 2007: 79, for an analysis of this as a trend throughout 
Latin America see Robinson, 2008: 37).22 
Analysing the movement, Kristin Norget (2010: 119) makes the argument 
that whilst Oaxaca has had a long history of rural radicalism, "what made the 
APPO unique was its urban, very heterogeneous profile." Whilst this is true in 
relation to the place specific location of the protests, to label the movement as 
merely an 'urban phenomenon' is to ignore a vital component of the historical 
sociology of Oaxaca, in terms of both indigenous migration to urban areas and 
Oaxaca City's role as a central hub for economic activity (as discussed earlier). 
Gareth Jones (2000: 201) has argued that for reasons such as this it does not 
makes sense to analyse urban and rural Mexico in distinction from one another. 
The period of lSI witnessed the 'ruralization' of cities as peasants migrated in 
search of work during the 1970s, and many Oaxacan peasants continue to seeks 
part time wage work for periods of the year (Cohen, 2010). 1\lore than 40 of 
the colonias populares (popular neighbourhoods) that formed barricades in 2006 
came from indigenous communities (Valanica Nuiiez, 2009: personal interview. 
Oaxaca). Furthermore, in relation to Section 22 which was at the forefront of 
22 As evidence of this point, 2006 represented the first time in which the PRI suffered an 
overwhelming historical defeat in Oaxaca, losing 9 of 11 electoral districts. 
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the struggle, Martinez Vasquez (2007: 53, 54) points out that although teach-
ers are often characterized as urban and middle class, "We cannot leaye out of 
recognition that a large number of teachers come from peasant families and in-
digenous communities." Indigenous community members he argues have not just 
been important to the composition of section 22 but more fundamentally "in the 
definition of the organizational strategies, their tactics and their direction." The 
distinction between rural and urban is thus far from clear in the context of Oax-
aca. Furthermore, Norget's analysis is also one that is rather 'frozen in time' as it 
ignores the manner in which the APPO quickly developed. Since its inception in 
2006, there have been efforts to ground it even more firmly in the distinct histories 
of the state's regional cultural traditions, making it closer to the population and 
more responsive. At the Constitutive Congress of APPO for example, there were 
separate APPO representation from the Canada, Costa, Isthmo, Mixteca, Sierra 
Norte, Sierra Sur, Tuxtepec, Valle Centrales regions, as well as separate sectors 
such as traders, artisans, juridicial, students, women, ecclesiastical organizations, 
trade unions, barricades, prisoners etc. 
Since 2006, the struggle of the APPO has broadened and evolved. It is no 
longer merely about the exit of a governor, but for wider changes to the po-
litical system. Moreover, the struggle is specifically transformative rather than 
defensive, seeking to recuperate public spaces. As one interviewee recounted: "In 
almost all of the City there are alternative projects of the people. People are 
looking for options that they didn't look for before 2006" (Valencia Nunez, 2009: 
personal interview, Oaxaca). The APPO also has retained a presence among var-
ious colonias that have sought to recuperate urban spaces. In some cases former 
PRI dominated urban areas have been taken over by autonomous committees. 
These committees collectively decide on what public resources they need and 
try to organise in a manner to provide public service for the community in the 
manner of the indigenous tradition (ibid). Additionally there has been the de-
velopment of various civil society groups who have been inspired by the struggle 
of the APPO. One such group is Voces Oaxaqueiias Construyendo Autonomia y 
Libertad (VOCAL - Oaxacan Voices Constructing Autonomy and Liberty). This 
group has been influential in involving itself with campaigns for food sovereignty 
and alternative energy production. It has also been actively engaged in key strug-
gles within the state, such as the fate of the autonomous community of San Juan 
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Copola. This community which declared itself autonomous in 2007, has since the 
beginning of the year been under a paramilitary blockade with tacit government 
support (see Esteva, 2010). Overall then the APPO has become the inspiration 
for the formation of anti-authoritarian, socially inclusive and collective model of 
social movements organisation (Martinez Vasquez, 2007: 72). 
Many Oaxacan activists and intellectuals have noted the change in discourse 
of the teachers union away from their old authoritarian and corrupt practices to-
wards a more inclusive democratic practice that includes efforts to ground popular 
education in community structures (Davies, Esteva, 2009: personal interviews, 
Oaxaca). As was documented earlier, there are historic links between urban and 
rural movements within Oaxaca. These links however are growing ever stronger 
according one activist (Lopez, 2009: personal interview, Oaxaca). A prominent 
example of this is the struggle against mining interests. Mexico has, in recent 
years become a prime site for transnational capital investment in extractive in-
dustries. This trend has rekindled mining activity in Oaxaca, as it is an area 
rich in carbon, silver and gold. There are currently over 22 large mining projects 
in the state, and as one CODEP activist outlined, each month more and more 
concessions are being granted by the government (Lopez, 2009: personal inter-
view, Oaxaca). We can thus note clearly the connections between the arrival of 
transnational capital and agrarian reform (as private companies were previously 
banned from such associations). One such spatial target for resource extrac-
tion has been the municipality of San Jose del Progreso. This municaplity lies 
next to the town of Ocotlan in the Central Valleys roughly 20 miles outside of 
Oaxaca City. As Scott Cook (1984: 73-754) notes, Ocotlan was one of the few 
places in Oaxaca that proved to be an exception to Waterbury's (1975) thesis 
of Oaxacan peasants as 'non-revolutionary'. Indeed, due to agrarian struggles 
against a large hacienda, it has a strong history of activism and independent 
peasant organisation. The recent experiences of this community perhaps rep-
resent what some in Oaxaca are calling the attempted 'economic re-conquest'. 
Here the government in conjuncture with the municipal president and 10 indi-
viduals from the ejido sold thousands of hectares of concessions to a company 
Minerales de Oaxaca, who in turn sold the land to Cuzcatlan, a local affiliate of 
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Canadian TNC Fortuna Silver.23 According to an official Fortuna Silver Report 
(http://www.fortunasilver.com/i/pdf/SanJose-Report.pdf). they have 23 mineral 
concessions totalling 43, 520 hectares in the region. 24 This has aroused fierce op-
position from the community who have protested that the mining project will 
contaminate water sources and threaten the agricultural basis of community life. 
As one resident (2009: personal interview, Oaxaca) said, "We can live without 
gold and silver in our community. We cannot live without land." The community 
took the decision to blockade the mine and have declared that they will never 
consent to it reopening. In response to this, the state sent in 1500 troops to smash 
the blockade. Currently the entrance to the mine is under armed guard, and at 
the time of writing violent struggle continues. Recently two pro-mine commu-
nity members were killed, and the local Priest Padre MartIn who has supported 
oppositional struggles, was ambushed and badly beaten. 
The residents of the community are under no illusions as to the root of the con-
flict, declaring it to be "about the ambition of capitalism" (community member 1, 
2009: personal interview, Oaxaca). The community are refusing to recognise the 
authority of the president and are forming alliances with the teachers' movement 
in order to defend their land. Both the APPO and Section 22 have thus far been 
highly active in defending the community, and have promised to come to their 
aid should the government seek to re-open the mine. 
This strategy of defending place therefore represents an important aspect of 
class struggle, in that it is the refusal of the extension of commodification. This 
does not always entail the articulation of a specifically anti-capitalist discourse. 
Rather it is about protecting a form of life whose values are in contrast to those of 
capital, often involving a conscious decision to retain an un-alienated relation with 
nature. 25 APPO advisor David Venegas (2009: personal interview, Oaxaca) notes 
that "for some this would be considered petty-bourgeois", but argues conversely 
that "it must be understood as a radical anti-capitalist act as it undermines the 
ability of capitalism to expand and extract the earth's natural resources." This 
23Fellow Canadian TNC Continuum Resources Ltd previously owned a 16% stake in the mine 
but have recently been bought out by Fortuna Silver. . . 
24 A La Jornada report estimates that state-wide there are roughly 600,000 hecatres of mmmg 
concessions (Rios, 2009). ., . 
250ne example in this regard is the indigenous tradition of living in harmony WIthin ~ ~ wI.der 
ecosystem of which they view themselves part of. This conflicts to the ideology of capItalIsm 
which sees this nature merely as 'natural resources' to be exploited. 
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Figure 6.5: Community of San Jose del Progreso (Photo by Chris Hesketh) 2009) 
Figure 6.6: The disputed mine , currently being guarded by the Federal Preventive 
Police (PFP) (Photo by Chris Hesketh) 2009) 
stands in stark contrast to the view of recent theorists of global resistance such 
as Hardt and Negri (2004: 106) who, although seeking to expand the notion of 
class struggle have still insisted that the 'multitude ' can be defined as those "who 
work under the rule of capital" and therefore "can refuse its rule. " Their view 
is endorsed by William Robinson (2008) , who postulates revolutionary agency as 
coming from a transnational working class. However , one can see that this notion 
is still far to reductionist as it does not deal v,Tith those who are ·not-yet" prole-
tarianised. In other words it seeks to reduce one 's capacity for resist ance to one 
particular historical narrative and membership of a particular sociological cate-
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Figure 6.7: Residents make clear their feeling with regard to the mine. The photo 
on the right reads 'URO is selling the country ' (Photo s by Chris Hesketh. 2009) 
gory. By contrast , class struggle on the basis discussed hitherto can be related 
to anyone who refuses to submit to capital 's discipline. It is in other words not 
about an empirical category, or identitarian terminology, but the refusal of ex-
ploitation (Holloway, 2008: personal interview). Class struggle should be thought 
of as a relational concept that becomes defined in terms of political commitment 
and concrete action. Chapter 3 argued that production had to be understood in 
a wider sense, beyond simply referring to the production of physical goods, but 
also concerned with knowledge and social relations. Equally, therefore, we need 
to understand class struggle in a similarly broader context . As David Harvey 
(1996: 401) has submitted, struggles become class projects when they entail "a 
direct challenge to the circulation and accumulation of capital which current ly 
dictates what environmental transformations occur." This conforms to the view 
of class struggles expressed by Henri Lefebvre (1976: 38-40) who argued that the 
idea of a homogenous unified social category was false , and instead it was about 
a question of forming alliances with kindred groups. Class struggle on this basis 
is a rejection of a productivist ideology, and is instead concerned wit h reorient ing 
development towards social needs. Local notions of 'place' furthermore are cen-
tral to these struggles. As was discussed in Chapter 3 this stands in cont rast to 
the view that resistance is defined in terms of an evacuation of place. Having a 
radical history based on different social relations to those of capitalism provides 
a basis for the possibility of constructing alternative projects. As Kiado Cruz 
(2009: personal interview, Oaxaca) put it: "In Oaxaca we have thousands of 
hectares of communal land ... This implies thousands of hectares of resist ance .·· 
Communities in Oaxaca are now trying to consolidate and extend these type 
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of social relations to re-take control of the production of space. The place of the 
community is increasingly seen as a method of defence, as the social fabric that 
has been maintained over the years provides a collective form of power over their 
territory. As Esteva (2008: personal interview, Oaxaca) puts it. ';,\,e are resisting 
by affirming ourselves in place, but at the same time, opening ourselves to others 
like us, meaning opening, hearts, minds and arms to create wide coalitions of all 
those others who share the same predicament. 
Historically, and continuing to this day, Oaxacan communities remain frag-
mented, and conflict has been pervasive among them owing to territorial bound-
ary disputes and the control of resources such as water as well as fierce mono ethnic 
identity formation (Stephen, 1997: 77, 84-85). This resulted in individual com-
munities fiercely defending what they perceive as their own land and territory 
However, with the increasing threat of displacement, communities are more and 
more learning to build alliances and share their experiences with one another 
(as numerous interviews in Oaxaca confirmed). This has been aided with the 
development of the APPO which has helped provided a forum to bring these 
movements together. Unlike the Zapatistas (to be analysed in following chapter) 
the APPO contains a far more diverse array of members and ideas. Furthermore. 
it is still a movement very much in formation, which contains numerous divisions 
and splits over ideology and future direction. Some have argued that the failure 
to oust URO in 2006 and the fundamental split between vertical organisation of 
Section 22, in contrast to the more horizontal organisation of social movements, 
left the movement weakened as teachers returned to work and social movements 
drifted apart (Waterbury, 2007). However, Stout (2010: 37) notes that the elec-
tion of Azael Santiago Chepi as Secretary General of Section 22 has helped to 
reinvigorate the APPO struggle. Indeed, the teachers are at present heavily in-
volved in the state's various social struggles. According to Narco News reporter 
and resident of Oaxaca, Nancy Davies (2009: personal interview, Oaxaca) the 
new direction of the teachers movement will be crucial to the struggles for social 
justice, as owing to their large organized presence, they are the only force capable 
of acting as a counter-weight to the government. 
Understanding the manner in which property relations evolved in l\Iexico with 
the state acting as the arbiter of agrarian conflict and the agent of redistribution 
is crucial to understanding the nature of modern resistance movements, as it is 
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now the state that is acting as the intermediary to grant concessions to TNCs. 
Whilst the state may have been an ally of some communities, it is now more 
and more identified as the principal enemy of indigenous communities in Oax-
aca (Cruz, 2009: personal interview, Oaxaca). As Scott Cook (1984: 76) has 
argued, centuries of perceived illegitimate rule has built up in Oaxaca an anti-
statist, "deep home-grown anarchism that cross cuts the rural class structure and 
pervades rural social consciousness." 
Oaxaca is clearly an example of a highly global struggle inserted into partic-
ularly local conditions. As we saw earlier, autonomy, although a long articulated 
demand among the peoples of Oaxaca is able to resonate with greater force at 
particular junctures. It would appear that this is one such juncture. As Martin 
(2005: 217) argues: "the language of autonomy represents a clear stance both 
against the strengthened role of the local state and against the large scale devel-
opment projects promised by national and international neo-liberal agendas." 
6.8 Conclusion 
Beginning in 2006, there has been a visible break with government authority in 
Oaxaca. At the forefront of political struggles has been the teachers movement, 
and the APPO - to which a diverse array of social organizations have expressed 
an affiliation with or solidarity towards. However, according to Gustavo Esteva 
(2009: personal interview, Oaxaca) there is a growing split within the movement 
into two rival factions; those who wish to take part in electoral politics and aspire 
towards state power on the one hand, and those who base political transformation 
in grassroots politics on the other. The movement is thus not one that has con-
cretised into a definitive structure. Indeed this remains both its primary strength 
and its weakness. While it remains horizontal and open it becomes a space into 
which a variety of struggles are projected. However, it also risks the danger of 
political impotence if it does not develop further organizational capacities to co-
ordinate the many diverse movements that are emerging in the state. As one 
resident of San Jose del Progeso stated (2009 person interview, Oaxaca): "we 
can only fix these problems together." APPO is still not a coherent organized 
movement. There remains the question of whether it needs to be, or whether it 
can still remain a mobilising symbol of struggle. There also remains a great deal 
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of debate over the meaning and scope of the struggle. Oaxacan historian and 
long time observer of social movements, Benjamin Maldonado (2009: personal 
interview, Oaxaca) argues that at present, the various conflicts taking place in 
the state are still not strong enough to generate a coherent unified movement. 
It must be remembered however, that the APPO as a political grouping is 
a relatively new movement (or coming together of a movement of movements). 
Political conscious and social movements need time to mature, especially ones 
formed in the background of divided, isolated communities that have had to con-
tend with 70 years of state corporatism. In light of this. Oaxacan intellectual 
Gustavo Esteva (2009: personal interview, Oaxaca) has submitted that: "APPO 
has never existed. It is a possibility. It is something being constructed today." 
Much will depend on the ability of disparate groups to maintain solidarity. Of 
particular importance is the issue of whether Section 22 will continue to democra-
tise and provide support for the movements without seeking to dominate them, 
and just how far it is prepared to go in this support. It is clear that the APPO 
would not have materialized without the strength of the teachers movements. 
However, many in Oaxaca remain suspicious of the union as they have acted in a 
vertical manner for many years, and have a history of clientelistic practices. At 
present however the trend appears to be in the opposite direction. The strength 
of grassroots organizations seems to be forcing the union into uncharted waters). 
With the world economy entering a protracted financial crisis, the search for 
new spaces of capital can be expected to sharpen, along with the state's social 
conflicts. 
One issue of vital importance for the future will relate to the wider alliances 
the Oaxacan movements will be able to form and sustain. As Gustavo Esteva 
(2008: personal interview, Oaxaca) recounts, one of the biggest problems with 
the movement in 2006 was the lack of alliances developed at the national level 
and beyond. How the Oaxacan struggles engage with the social maelstrom that 
is emerging in Mexico will therefore be vital to future success. In other words, 
movements here must seek to 'scale up' their activism, fighting not only place-
specific battles but also forging wider spatial links to other centres of resistance. 
The future of Oaxaca thus remains open ended. it is clear is that there is a 
growing level of political consciousness in the state that is increasingly hostile to 
Oaxaca becoming an increasing 'space of capital', and instead are pursing efforts 
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to form alternative spaces of resistance. This is being aided by a combination 
of political graffiti, public speeches, and numerous videographic displays of gov-
ernment repression all of which playa role in the oppositional 'war of position'. 
There remains the possibility that the age old tactics of divide and rule could be 
employed by the state, and a new passive revolution could ensue (a theme to be 
returned to in Chapter 8). However, a more likely scenario at present would seem 
to be increased militarization and criminalization of social protest, as occurred 
vividly with the killing of two international peace activists recently who sought 
to break the paramilitary blockade of San Juan Copola. Whether this sharpens 
the vertical elements of the movements or strengthens the resolve of grassroots 
activism, it is too early to tell. 
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Chapter 7 
The Clash of Spatializations: 
Class Po-wer and the Production 
of Chiapas 
That comes from afar. When the 
river rises, it means a flood has 
been building in the mountains 
for a long, long time 
Zepeda, 1995: 203 
These words, spoken by a Chiapaneco poet, serve as a metaphor for the Zap-
atista uprising of 1994. Giving testimony to the protracted process of oppression 
which the indigenous Mayan people of Chiapas have suffered, the Zapatistas 
described themselves in the 'First Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle' as "the 
product of 500 years of struggle" (EZLN, 1994: 13). This chapter seeks to explore 
this struggle, extending the 'concrete' level of analysis with a second detailed case 
study that investigates how the spaces of capital have sought to be extended into 
Chiapas and moreover how spaces of resistance have emerged in response to this. 
In terms of their influence on both political theory and the tactics of resis-
tance movements, the Zapatistas have, since their emergence, offered arguably 
the most important and comprehensive alternative geographical counter-project 
to neoliberal capitalism. Just as the previous chapter sought to excavate where 
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resistance movements had come from in Oaxaca, what historical experiences they 
appealed to that aided or hindered this process, and what was novel about their 
proposals, so this chapter seeks to do the same with a historical-geographical 
sociology of Chiapas. Once again, in defence of the long-term perspective that is 
adopted here, it is worth remembering that the indigenous conception of time in 
Mexico is circular rather than linear. The past, in other words is not something 
dead, but rather something that can be returned to, and is appealed to in order 
to re-imagine the present (Bonfil Batalla 1996: 38).1 Furthermore, through a 
detailed historical analysis of exploitation, we are better able to understand its 
continuation in new forms today (see Marx 1867/1974: 533). 
This chapter seeks to explore the manner in which Chiapas was 'produced' 
in relation to social forces linked to both national and global scales of accumu-
lation. Drawing upon McMichael's (1990, 2000) model of 'incorporated compari-
son' stressed in the previous chapters, Chiapas should be viewed as a site through 
which the contradictions of modern capitalist development are manifested (rather 
than viewing struggles here as simply peripheral, both geographically and theo-
retically to wider concerns). 
Indeed, Chiapas embodies many of the key issues that humanity is forced to 
confront at the beginning of the 21st century, including race, gender and migra-
tion, as well as environmental degradation caused by natural resource extraction. 
Linking all of these issues is the manner in which the productive system impacts 
upon them. Questions arise therefore, whether current dominant processes are 
sustainable politically, socially or ecologically. In this manner we are able to 
understand concretely the statement of the Zapatistas, made to the 'First In-
ternational Encueniro for Humanity and Against Neoliberalism' (Marcos, 2001: 
103, emphasis added): 
Behind our Black Ski Mask 
Behind our armed voice 
Behind our unnameable name 
Behind us, who you see 
Behind us, we are you 
IThis was confirmed by a member of La Realidad's Junta de Buen Gobierno (2009: personal 
interview) who stated: "We look to our past to create our future." 
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The importance of the Zapatistas comes not only from their actions and dis-
course, it also stems in part from their timing. The uprising and subsequent 
political project of seeking to build autonomous, democratic, and moreover anti-
capitalist spaces of decision making, confronted, and rendered problematic, three 
important theses about transformative politics. The first of these was put forward 
by Francis Fukuyama (1992) and was concerned with politics on a global scale. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, Fukuyama argued that with the fall of the Berlin 
Wall and the collapse of communism, we (meaning humanity), had reached the 
'end of history'. This is not to say time had somehow come to an end, but rather 
that alternatives to liberal-democratic capitalism had been tried - and were shown 
to have failed. Liberal-capitalist development was the only feasible alternative. 
No doubt influenced by these political and intellectual developments, the second 
important thesis, put forward by Jorge Castaneda (1994) sought to draw out its 
implications for Latin America. Castaneda claimed that 'leftist utopians' in Latin 
America were now 'unarmed' and that change would only come about through 
acting in a reformist manner with the state. 
The very much armed uprising of 1994, coinciding as it did with the day 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came into affect, radically 
challenged both of these theses. As John Holloway and Eloina Pelaez (1998: 1) 
put it, the Zapatista's revolt "opens a world that appeared to be closed, gives life 
to a hope that seemed dead." The rebellion was, of course, informed by the local 
conditions that pertained in Chiapas (as shall later be demonstrated). However, 
drawing upon the understanding of uneven and combined development expressed 
through the multi-scalar analysis of capitalism as set out in the previous chapters, 
we can also understand Chiapas as a 'produced space' that expresses concomi-
tantly the contradictions of both the Mexican national development project as 
well as the global capitalist economy (Cecena and Barreda, 1998: 39; Morton, 
2002: 37). Through their questioning of the legitimacy of the Mexican state 
and its neoliberal project to 'modernise' the nation, the Zapatistas also put into 
question the social relations upon which capitalism is based. This allowed the 
rebellion to have a resonance way beyond the boundaries of Chiapas, and Mexico. 
Drawing upon Neil Smith (1993: 97), the Zapatista's struggle is not, therefore, 
just about the production of space but also a struggle over the production of 
scale, and what level this struggle is to operate at. As has been pointed out. it 
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has been the Zapatistas ability "to transforrn what is in effect a local struggle 
with a particular set of issues onto a completely different scale of analytics and 
politics that has made the uprising so visible and so politically interesting" (Har-
vey, 2000: 80). Naomi Klein (2002: 217) thus argues the Zapatistas have been 
"both specific and universal." 
The final thesis that the Zapatistas have challenged is the centrality of the 
state as the primary locus of political contestation (Holloway, 2002b). As Gus-
tavo Esteva (2008: personal interview, Oaxaca) argues, for much of modernity, 
the nation-state has been "a specific structure that defines political horizons .. .In 
the modern mind the state is the political horizon." However, over the last two 
decades, it has become clear that globalization has undermined the foundations of 
liberal-democratic politics, as economic forces have moved increasingly through 
the global scale (as well as the national and local scales). This has rendered 
problematic the idea of consent and deliberation at a purely national level (see 
inter alia Held, 1993; Tormey, 2004: 41; Robinson, 2003). In the face of this, 
the Zapatistas have provided the clearest example of how it can be possible to 
construct an alternative political praxis that 'reinvents revolution' (Holloway and 
Pelaez, 1998). It is for these reasons that the Zapatistas are so central to the 
key themes of this research, as they not only show how alternative 'spaces of 
resistance' have been formed in the concrete, they also demonstrate the impor-
tance of constructing an alternative politics on a variety of spatial scales. It is 
from the Zapatistas therefore that we can arrive at what Lefebvre (1991: 4-11) 
refers to as connaissance (knowledge informed by action against power) rather 
than savoir (abstract knowledge concerned with facts and figures). 2 It is vital 
that theory and action are combined in this manner to produce what Gramsci 
(1971: 330) would later call 'the philosophy of praxis'. This is at the heart of 
historical-materialist thinking. As the young Marx (1844/2007: 124) recognised. 
to defeat the idea of capitalism, all that was needed was the idea of something 
else. However, to defeat actual capitalism, actual action is required. 
The history of Chiapas has been aptly described by one set of scholars as 
"a chain of multiple yet discrete instances of resource capture and ecological 
2 A similar difference can be found between the Spanish verbs' saber' and' conocer'. Although 
both meaning 'to know', conocer means to know people and place and thus is linked to reflexive 
and grounded knowledge. 
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marginalization" (Howard and Homer-Dixon, 1996: 14). By demonstrating hO\\" 
space has historically been transformed from the time of colonialism right the 
way up to the modern era, we can therefore provide further empirical evidence 
for the claim (made in theoretical terms in Chapter 2), that spaces are produced 
and transformed as 'moments' of differing modes of production, transformations 
which themselves create the shifting terrain upon which spaces of resistance are 
formed. As the title of the chapter suggests, Chiapas is not posited as haying a 
fixed ontological status (Wainwright, 2008: 5). As has been highlighted through-
out the previous chapters, the capitalist mode of production has the specificity of 
constantly having to transform the space in order to respond to the tendency for 
the rate of profit to fall. Therefore, what we can see in Chiapas is what Bonefeld 
(2001) has referred to as a permanent process of primitive accumulation (see also 
Amin, 1974: 3). As is obvious, this implies that primitive accumulation remains a 
constant feature of capitalist development, rather than a historical footnote to its 
genesis. In a recent restatement of this idea, David Harvey (2003: 145-6, 153) has 
termed this "accumulation by dispossession". In Harvey's analysis this "entails 
appropriation and co-optation of pre-existing cultural and social achievements 
as well as confrontation and supersession." It occurs to "any social formation or 
territory that is brought or inserts itself into the logic of capitalist development." 
In other words, through the savoir of state planners and intellectuals, capital-
ism comes to rely on the negation or co-optation of the connaissance of existing 
cultural patterns. However, as Chapter 6 highlighted, this is a far from uncon-
tested process. This chapter is thus equally concerned to look at how this has 
been resisted and how alternative emancipatory geographies have been formed 
within the over-arching articulation of capitalist dominance, that have begun to 
act as a counter-tendency to this phenomenon. The chapter therefore addresses 
a number of key questions of the overall thesis: namely 1) how does capital seek 
to transform space and for what end? 2) What is problematic about this? 3) 
How has this been resisted? 4) What alternative geographies are being formed? 
and 5) how viable are these as alternatives? 
This chapter continues the argument for the relevance of uneven and com-
bined development at a multi-scalar level. It is submitted that \ye have to look. 
therefore, not only at the uneven insertion of Mexico into the global economy, 
but also at the uneven insertion of Chiapas into both the national and global 
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economy as well. In this manner, places like Chiapas are both the spatial prod-
uct of uneven and combined development, and also the site where this relation is 
continually re-produced through new spatial divisions of labour. This reinforces 
what Neil Smith (2008: 159) refers to as the contradiction between the creation 
of increasing differentiation of space on the one hand with the equalization of the 
conditions of production on the other. 
This chapter will also lay stress on the notion of uneven and combined hege-
mony (introduced in the previous chapter). The purpose of this concept is to 
help explain processes of class and state formation that are differentiated geo-
graphically, but formed in symbiosis with an over-arching hegemonic structure 
(see Wolf 1997; Joseph and Nugent, 1994). This helps to clarify that hegemony 
should not be thought of as a monolithic process, but rather one in which politi-
cal formation occurs through negotiation, contestation and complex articulation, 
but at the same time stays within the boundaries of a specific social logic. 
The chapter will be structured around four distinct 'clashes of spatializations', 
which, whilst dialectically related and overflowing into one another (conforming 
to the method of incorporated comparison), serve as a useful periodization for the 
production of space in Chiapas. First, it will examine the 'original' clash between 
the space of the indigenous communities and that of the Spanish colonisers, as 
a new matrix of power relations was introduced to Chiapas. Second, the clash 
that occurred during Mexico's liberal period when labour relations began to be 
transformed and the national state began to make its presence felt will be de-
tailed. This was to widen into a distinctive clash in the post-revolutionary period 
of state building, most notably with the process of agrarian reform introduced 
by Cardenas and the absorption of Chiapas into the national hegemonic project 
of lSI, and will be detailed in the third section. The fourth section will analyse 
the final clash grew out of the contradictions of this regime of accumulation and 
the attempted means of resolving it via the opening of new spaces of accumula-
tion (discussed in Chapter 5). This clash has taken place principally between the 
Ejercito Zapatista de Liberaci6n Nacional (EZLN, Zapatista National Liberation 
Army) and the Mexican state. This has involved the reclaiming of territory from 
the state on which alternative, autonomous governing structures have been con-
structed (spaces of resistance). These clashes, as will now be shown, have entailed 
long processes of class struggles against dispossession of indigenous people from 
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their land and cultural patrimony, as well as the alienation of their labour. 
7.1 A clash of civilisations or a class of spatial-
isations? 
In one of the most famed books on Mexican history, Guillermo Bonfil Batalla 
(1996) sought to argue that the last 500 years of Mexican history can best be 
understood as a 'clash of civilizations' between a native Mesoamerican culture 
(Mexico profundo, or deep Mexico) on the one hand, and a exogenous West-
ern culture on the other ( Mexico imaginario, imaginary Mexico). 3 According to 
Bonfil Batalla (1996: xvi), from the time of colonialisation onwards, Mexico has 
been organised on "the norms, aspirations, and goals of western civilization." 
As we saw in the previous chapter, for the indigenous people of Mexico this fre-
quently led to a violation of their connaissance (or conocimiento) as space was 
re-oriented to confirm to the savoir of the colonisers. However, whilst not seeking 
to deny the huge importance of cultural negation that colonialism implied (and 
continues to imply), it will be argued here, that if we do not want to essentialise 
location and culture, and are serious about examining the possibilities for eman-
cipatory transformation that extend beyond the borders of Mexico (thus avoiding 
parochialism), this clash is better understood as a clash between evolving class 
projects that were, by their nature culturally loaded.4 This involves a dialectic 
process of de-fetishising fixed categories, leading to further fundamental ques-
tions about the constitution of social reality (see OIlman, 2003). For example, 
once we come to investigate the spatial transformations that have occurred, we 
are also forced to explore questions of territorial control as well as the resources 
within that territory, including the population's labour. This leads us then to 
inquire into the motivations driving this. Here an appeal only to culture becomes 
3It is worth noting that the original publication in 1987 of this text preceded the famous 
statement of a clash of civilizations as applied to world politics more generally by Samuel 
Huntingdon (1993). 
4We should be potentially wary of portraying Spanish colonialism as a synonym for 'western 
civilization. As Higgins (2004: 35) points out, 500 years of conflict with the ~ I o o r s s gave an 
idiosyncratic history to Spain in comparison with other parts of Western Europe t ~ a t t has led 
to a much more intense sense of religious and ethnic superiority which was reflected III the ,,"ay 
in which they administered their colonial possessions. 
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something of a misnomer, as it is doubtful one could identify anything inherent 
to 'western civilization' that made it seek to conquer other areas and peoples of 
the world. Once it is admitted, therefore, that these processes are contingent 
rather than necessary, we must explore what social processes are animating and 
transforming these cultures. It is here that a relational category like class has far 
more utility. This is in fact tacitly admitted by Bonfil Batalla (1996: xvi) when 
he writes: "The confrontation does not happen between cultural elements but 
between social groups that bear them, use them, and develop them." Many of 
the attributes assigned by Bonfil Batalla to Mesoamerican civilization, in contra 
distinction to western civilization, can in fact be related to important changes 
taking place within the mode of production within in these countries (see Chap-
ter 2 for details). Lastly, as Slavoj Zizek (1997) has pointed out, the recognition 
of cultural pluralism has in fact become a key means for the furtherance of capi-
talism on a global scale. As will be highlighted later, this has increasingly been 
the case in Mexico in recent years. We must therefore be wary of appealing to 
cultural categories without a further questioning of fundamental structural in-
equalities. This leads us back to the issues raised in Chapters 1 and 2. Namely, 
as Eric Wolf (1997: 17) has outlined, to examine the processes through which 
inter-linkages and spatial transformations occur. With these points in mind, let 
us now consider the historical production of Chiapas, beginning with the colonial 
period. This will highlight how modern struggles for land and territory have to 
be rooted within the colonial policy economy (Wainwright, 2008: 51). 
7.2 The clash begins: Chiapas in the colonial 
era 
The Spanish began to definitively colonise Chiapas in 1528, led by Diego de 
Mazariegos. An attempt had been made to subdue the region four years earlier, 
but this had been repelled by the fierceness of native resistance. Even now, the 
control the Spaniards were able to establish was "partial and contested" (Knight, 
2002: 4). Prior to this intervention, Chiapas existed in a multiplicity of 'ethnic 
states' with their own territorial boundaries and distinct environments. governed 
by the local nobility. It was thereafter incorporated into the colonial administra-
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tion of Guatemala, and divided into encomiendas, the most desirable of which 
were located in the more densely populated central Highlands (Markman, 1984: 
47). Although Chiapas did not possess important mineral wealth or gems compa-
rable with other states, it did possess other important primary commodities such 
as cacao, cotton, wood and dye-stuffs, as well as being a region of fertile land. It 
was from these materials that the colonists sought to enrich themselves through 
the insertion of the area into the circuits of the global economy, as well as the 
setting up of unequal relations of exchange within a local mercantile economy 
(Wasserstrom, 1983: 9-11; Viqueria, 1994; Cecelia and Barreda, 1998: 40). It is 
clear that there existed a system of domination that entailed the compulsion of 
labour in order to provide tribute before the Spanish arrived. However. this trib-
ute neither involved a wholesale transformation of productive systems or a process 
of cultural negation based upon racial superiority (Bonfil Batalla 1996: 71-74). 
Originally in fact, the productive systems of Chiapas were not radically altered 
to begin with; they were simply re-oriented to serve new beneficiaries. How-
ever, it was soon found that the traditional markets did not offer large enough 
scope for enrichment, and thus they were modified, with new crops being put 
into cultivation and new industries developed, which brought with it a change in 
productive techniques and spatial practices (Wasserstrom 1983: 12-13, Markman 
1984: 46). The experience of colonialism absolutely devastated the indigenous 
population causing a 50% decline in their numbers by 1570 (Harvey 1998: 38). 
As the region's cheap labour was one of its most important commodities, this 
led to population re-settlements into areas where they could be the most pro-
ductive for the system. This necessitated a reorganization of space, as sparsely 
populated villages were drawn into urban centres. Soconusco, for example be-
came the location of much of the state's plantation, export-oriented agriculture 
in products such as indigo, cacao and sugar. However, it was thinly populated 
and thus required inducements such as the reduction of tribute payments in or-
der to move the labour force there (Markman 1984: 47; Collier and Quaratiello, 
1994: 19). The early experience of Spanish colonialism in Chiapas however, was 
not entirely successful in terms of profit maximisation with settlers experiencing 
difficulty with credit, high transportation costs and a precarious labour supply. 
as well as the continuation of indigenous resistance (Wasserstrom 1983: 38). 
Viqueria (1994: 239) argues that it was between 1670 and 1690 that the 
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original mechanisms were established to ensure tribute payment. As frequently 
inhered with colonial powers, to guarantee a subservient population it was felt 
necessary to destroy their cultural fabric. This involved interfering with local 
marriage patterns, with noble lineages forced to intermarry with 'inferior' lin-
eages thus discrediting their prestige. Caciques (local political bosses) \yere also 
installed and removed as colonial interest dictated (\Yasserstrom 1983: 19). As 
these examples highlight, issues of cultural negation cannot be understood with-
out due consideration of the social purpose of such actions, which in turn cannot 
be divorced from class projects to control labour and resources. 
As was the case with almost all areas colonised by the Spanish, the encomienda 
and repartimiento served as the dominant institutions of economic exploitation. 
Unlike Oaxaca which managed to retain much of its traditional political au-
thority (see Chapter 6), in Chiapas. it was decimated. From 1680-1720 there 
,'"as an increased period of productive development in the region, eyidenced 
by spatial transformations including a direct opening between Campeche and 
Guatemala which intended to break down the isolation of distinct regions and 
increase commercial activity between them (Viquiera 1994: 240). Between the 
mid-seventeenth and eighteenth century, Indian townships were set up with a 
particular division of labour and speciality in mind that the Spanish sought to 
exploit in order to obtain the maximum amount of tribute. The production of 
space through the specialization of place helped create identity formation (Collier 
1994: 20). This clearly was a class strategy that not only intended to mobilize 
indigenous labour as efficiently as possible, but also sought to create networks of 
dependency and prevent a more collective consciousness from forming in fayour 
of a fragmented localized one (in other words it was an attempt to scale down 
resistance) . 
Elite class conflict took place during this time between those who took part 
in overseeing royal offices (alcades mayores) , and thus could profit from their 
position, and landowners and merchants on the other hand who only held minor 
offices but acted as suppliers and agents in economic transactions (\Yasserstrom 
1983: 46). Church power also competed for wealth in the region, as religious au-
thorities regarded ostentation as a sign of devotion (Wassterstrom 1983: 27). As 
well as elite conflict there was continued resistance by the indigenous population 
who fought against their subjection by escaping from the towns they had been 
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forced to congregate in. As Markman (1984: 47-48), explains a tension existed 
between the forces of concentration and the forces of dispersion, that was not 
simply based upon a desire to escape the harsh labour conditions, but \\"as more 
fundamentally linked to indigenous cosmology about their relation with land. 
This has to be read therefore as the clash between the negations of indigenous 
connaissance and the imposition of the colonizers savoir. The Spanish believed 
that the concentration of populations around a fixed, stable centre was the only 
rational and efficient way to organise a productive system. However, this \yas 
totally at odds with the indigenous connaissance, which based production on the 
Milpa system of shifting agricultural production from place to place along with 
the residence of the farmer in a nomadic fashion, in order to maintain harmony 
with the environment. 
Chiapas also witnessed numerous large scale rebellions, most notably in 1712 
and 1848. On each occasion the rebellions were precipitated by the increasing 
levels of exploitation and inability of indigenous communities to ensure their 
own social reproduction. During the rebellion of 1712 the indigenous population 
sought to contest colonial relations of power by inverting them. The attestation 
of miracles led to symbols of Christianity being appropriated and combined with 
older indigenous beliefs to justify political practices that sought to rid themselves 
of colonial dominance (Viqueria 1994: 256). This rebellion, which included 32 
communities, was said to be one of the most serious to shake the colony as "it 
included a thorough rejection of the colonial order, not least the church" (Knight, 
2002: 148). However, the rebellion failed to lessen economic exploitation and 
social injustice, which in fact became even more intense (Wassterstrom 1983: 
87). Although indigenous people often retained land in Chiapas, extractions 
in the forms of tribute, forced labour and other feudal conditions had become 
increasingly onerous. This had necessitated the gradual changing of work patterns 
with migratory labour on haciendas, plantations and religious properties being 
necessary in certain cases to meet the demands of tribute that was demanded 
in cash from certain geographical areas (Viqueria 1994: 246). With a rapidly 
declining population owing to disease and famine, the same demands were placed 
upon a smaller number of people. "A dwindling population thus had to sen"e 
a growing parasitic elite" (Knight, 2002: 147). One spatial response to these 
developments was that many indigenous people abandoned their tmyns and sought 
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to colonise new areas such as the Selva Lacondona (flight) rather than petition 
the crown for their rights (fight) (Wasserstrom 1983: 89). 
7.3 Between local autonomy and national poli-
tics: the formation of La Familia Chiapaneca 
By the early nineteenth century the economic order had evolved. Although the 
indigenous population had not necessarily been disposed of their lands, the wider 
socio-economic matrix which they engaged with had led to the transformations of 
communities, with traditional economic activities being abandoned. While direct 
coercion did remain (and would do for some time), it inhered less frequently, 
with social labour being mobilized through both tenancy agreements and wages 
(Wasserstrom 1983: 64-66, 104). Payment, however, was frequently made in-kind 
with goods from landowners stores ( Tiendas de Raya) which were over-supplied so 
as to ensure a continuing debt obligation (Higgins, 2004: 83). Chiapas had been 
the subject of a long struggle between Guatemala (who officially administered 
it) and Mexico (who it was formally subject to). Following independence from 
Spain, Chiapas became incorporated into Mexico in 1824. As Benjamin (1996: 
6-7) notes, independence from Spain should not necessarily be interpreted as 
a radical moment. In fact, within Mexico it was something of a conservative 
reaction to the liberal changes that were taking place in Spain (for example the 
restriction of the privilege of the Catholic church). Independence was, in the first 
instance, inspired by the desire to protect Mexico from these 'radical' tendencies. 
Furthermore, following independence the colonial structure of economic ex-
ploitation was not fundamentally altered, simply re-oriented to serve new masters 
(Bonfil Batalla 1996: xvi). The native elites of Chiapas favoured incorporation 
into Mexico for a variety of reasons linked to their class position. Not only were 
commercial links more important with Mexico than with Guatemala, but it was 
felt that royalist tendencies were stronger in Mexico and thus their interests would 
be better defended. Lastly, being on the periphery of the Mexican state meant a 
large degree of regional autonomy could be preserved, something that was highly 
prized among the local ruling elite (Benjamin 1996: 7-8: Harvey 1998: 43). 
Indeed due to the weakness of the national state, as well as the region's , 
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geographical location, Chiapas enjoyed a large degree of autonomy during the 
nineteenth century prior to the rule of Porfirio Diaz. However, this is not to sa:" 
important changes did not occur. During the liberal period the old encomienda 
was reformed until it morphed into the hacienda of the 18th century ( H i g g i n s ~ ~
2004: 42). Owing to the bankruptcy of the national state, after 1826 a new round 
of primitive accumulation took place in earnest in Chiapas as the government 
encouraged landowners to denounce and entitle communal property, in a bid 
to increase productive commercial activity and therefore boost state revenues 
(Wassterstom 1983: 110). Those Indians in the highlands that remained on 
their traditional lands were often transformed into tenants and forced to give up 
labour services (baldiaje) for a certain period of time each week if they wanted 
to remain there (Rus, 2003: 262). This tight control of territory by landlords 
had resulted in one third of highland Indians becoming baldios. In many cases 
this prompted migration to lowland ranches by indigenous peasants to work as 
either a sharecropper or peon (mozo) which was viewed as a preferable form of 
exploitation. The eventual outcome of these developments was an increase in 
landlessness and a tightly prescribed social structure with limited capacity for 
innovation and development (Wasserstrom 1983: 119). 
There was also a reciprocal interaction between the increasing power of the 
old landlord class and caciques in the highlands, who through their control of 
lands became labour recruiters for the expansion of agricultural plantations in 
the lowlands (Rus, 1995: 73). The importance of space and territoriality was 
reflected in the development of patrilineages as kinship increased in significance 
owing to the need to show a connection with the title holder of land (Wasserstrom 
1983: 141). The dispossession of the indigenous population from their lands in 
Chiapas did not, however, lead to the development of 'free labour' as recounted in 
the classic model of primitive accumulation (Marx 1867/1974: 667-670). Rather 
it had led to the creation of an indigenous migratory workforce in plantations like 
Soconusco or lumber camps in the Selva Lacondona under conditions of debt pe-
onage (Harvey 1998: 49). Pre-capitalist relations thus persisted in Chiapas, with 
things largely being produced in space rather than continuous spatial production 
becoming an essential component of the political economy. Once again we can 
highlight the point made by Eric Wolf (1997: 79) with regard to the abilit:' of 
the capitalist mode of production to "enter into working arrangements with other 
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modes; siphoning off wealth and people and turning them into capital and labour 
power" and furthermore its ability to form "temporary and shifting symbiosis and 
competition with other modes." Uneven and combined development was clearly 
taking place through Chiapas. Like elsewhere, it was geo-political competition 
expressed through both the national state and at a local level that would provide 
the impetus for the further transformation of social relations. 
The liberal period saw the growth of an entrepreneurial class of landowners in 
the lowlands of Chiapas. This led to a furtherance of elite class conflict in the state 
between lowland liberals and highland conservatives. Agricultural production had 
expanded rapidly in Chiapas after 1832, especially in the areas of cattle ranching 
and sugar production. However, by far the most important commercial products 
were cotton and coffee (Wasserstrom 1983: 111-2). It was thus international 
demand for these commodities that began to transform Chiapas. Summarising 
the labour relations that took place during this period Thomas Benjamin (1996: 
5) writes that "The wealth of Chiapas was squeezed from the native population 
in the form of tribute, tithes, forced labour and forced sales of merchandise for 
the benefit of a small circle of royal officials, prominent settlers and enterprising 
friars." 
The battle between conservatives and liberals that took place in Mexico during 
the 19th century was mirrored in Chiapas between the oligarchy of the central 
highlands (who were generally conservative) and the landowners of the central 
valley (who were generally liberals). This was essentially a divide between old 
and emerging power (Higgins, 2004: 84-85). Whilst new centres of economic 
power were growing, these had not yet translated into political power, which 
was still dominated by a handful of caciques who served as intermediaries of the 
Porfirian state (Harvey 1998: 44). The control of space was a central component 
of state formation during this time. However, this was very much formed in 
tandem with the demands of western capital that was attracted to Chiapas for 
its cheap labour costs, but remained anxious about the supply of this labour. 
In a bid to reassure them, a vagrancy law was passed in 1880. This required 
that the indigenous population remain active during specific parts of the year. 
In addition increased head taxes were levied on households (Wasserstrom 1983: 
115). These measures were designed to exert compulsion over Indian labour. 
The spaces of indigenous community thus became a method for controlling the 
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population (on the issue of spatial production for social control see Lefebvre 1991: 
26). The Ayuntamiento (town council) became responsible for tax collection, and 
jefaturas politicas appointed ladino agents to every village to oversee this process. 
Furthermore, both workers and their debt obligations were registered with the 
government in order to tie labourers to a particular locale and prevent them 
from fleeing. In cases where workers did take up new residence, the jefatura 
politica had to be informed by the landowners and records kept of this (Rus. 
2003: 265). This again highlights the point made in the previous chapter with 
regard to efforts by the state to simplify and render legible populations it seeks 
to control (Scott, 1998). This is another example therefore of what Joseph and 
Nugent (1994) refer to as processes of 'everyday state formation', but it would not 
be until after the Revolution that one would see an everyday formation of what 
Lefebvre (1975/2009: 106-120, 129-30) refers to as the 'state mode of production' 
(see Chapters 3 and 4). 
As was the case with Oaxaca, the experience of Porfirian state building was 
to have important effects on Chiapas. During this time, an informal system of 
patronage brought the periphery under control of the centre (Benjamin 1996: 21). 
During the Porfiriato, Chiapas experienced profound uneven development with 
the central lowlands and the coastal zones experiencing the most pronounced 
investment and infrastructural change, due to the fact they were the most pro-
ductive agricultural zones (Higgins, 2004: 116). During the 1870s and 1880s 
Chiapas began to be divided into zones of influence (Benjamin 1996: 22). Sur-
veying the situation, Wasserstrom (1983: 116) writes that, "expanding national 
and international markets had divided the state into a series of economic zones in 
which one or two commercial crops set the pace of life for hacienda workers and 
Indian villagers alike." One key region of exploitation was the Selva Lacondona. 
Here European firms set up logging businesses, transforming Chiapan nature into 
'natural resources' which could be commodified and sold on the world market. 
As Collier (1994: 24-25) notes, this process was controlled by Europeans for the 
benefit of (some) Europeans. It contributed little to either Chiapas or 1Iexico as 
a nation in terms of investment, infrastructure, or skills upgrades. 
One can see the difference in the type of economy and varying success of in-
digenous resistance if the number of municipalities in Oaxaca and Chiapas are 
compared. Whereas the fierceness of Oaxacan resistance led to the diyision of the 
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state into 570 municipalities in order to better divide and rule the population, 
in Chiapas the corresponding figure was just 118, which includes Ocosingo, the 
largest municipality in Mexico. This spatial organization demonstrates the far 
greater power of landowners in Chiapas, as well as highlighting how the regional 
economies evolved on a different basis with plantation agriculture and enclave 
economies being far more prominent in Chiapas, whereas mining interests domi-
nated in Oaxaca. Both however were produced in relation to the demands of the 
international economy. 
The lack of roads in Chiapas presented a major impediment to further eco-
nomic expansion. However, new road building projects began to take place un-
der the governorship of Emilio Rabasa (1891-95), including the first highway 
that connected Chiapas with Oaxaca. This would serve to increase the links be-
tween Chiapas and the rest of the Mexican economy and helped propel a boom 
in commercial agriculture (Benjamin 1996: 48). Prior to this development of 
road building projects, indigenous labourers, known as cargadores, had carried 
products across trails or paths. However, these developments were deeply re-
sented by highland elites who saw spatial integration as a means of undermining 
their privileged domain of power, which was predicated on their control of in-
digenous labour as well as their investment in land and loans which they feared 
becoming worthless should Indian labour be 'freed' (Rus, 2003: 274-7).5 One can 
see therefore an emerging clash of spatializations, as one group sought to retain 
their traditional territorial control, whilst an emerging group saw the necessity of 
transforming space to increase their profits This was thus a form of geo-political 
conflict, understood in the wider sense of the term, as elaborated in Chapter 2. 
Road building did have the effect of massively increasing foreign investment in 
areas such as hardwoods, rubber, sugar cane, cacao and notably coffee. Whereas 
European capital (particularly German) had dominated foreign investment in 
Chiapas previously, the second wave in the 1890s and 1900s was dominated by 
the US and focused on the enclave economies of Soconusco (1.2 million pesos) 
and Palenque (1.6 million pesos). It is important to point out that although 
foreign investment increased and spurred the commercialization of agriculture, 
this did not take place through capitalist social relations whereby social labour 
5 As Bobrow-Strain (2007: 65) notes, the state governor in 1898 was offered a 30,000 peso 
bribe to cancel the planned road that would connect fincas with remote markets and ports. 
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was mobilized without extra-economic coercion (Benjamin 1996: 33, 85, 25). 
Spatial transformations in Chiapas were also induced through geo-political 
competition, understood in the more traditional sense, between Mexico and 
Guatemala. The Guatemalan government had, in this time, constructed a rail-
way from the west coast to the Atlantic Ocean. Fearing succession of the region's 
plantations, the Mexican state sought to integrate them more firmly into the na-
tional economy through their own railway network which connected western and 
central Chiapas to the heart of the nation. The construction of the Panamerican 
railway facilitated the transportation of coffee to ports in the Gulf of Mexico, 
reducing turnover time for the products and thereby increasing the commodity's 
production as well as the profits derived from it. Aided by these infrastructural 
developments, from 1890 to 1910 the value of agriculture increased by five times 
in Chiapas (Benjamin 1996: 85). It is worth noting however that Eastern Chiapas 
was to remain remote and outside of this modernization process (Collier 1994: 
27). The significance of this will become clear later when we consider the fact 
that Eastern Chiapas has been the base of the Zapatista movement. For now 
it is sufficient to point out that processes of uneven and combined development, 
linked to the national and global economy were taking place within Chiapas. This 
highlights the long-term nature of uneven and combined development as result-
ing from a social logic in contrast to recent scholarship that claims this is a new 
process (e.g. Robinson, 2008: 45). 
In the two decades preceding the Mexican Revolution, foreign investment 
would also come to fundamentally restructure labour relations in Chiapas and 
affect profound changes in the scalar organization of the economy, the space of 
Chiapas and the spatial practices of everyday life. The 1890s had seen a cri-
sis in the coffee industry. As Rus (2003) documents, both foreign and national 
investment in the coffee fincas had been encouraged in the lowlands. This in-
vestment had been premised on the assumption that highland labour was simply 
a transferable resource. However, the labour of indigenous communities was al-
ready accounted for, as they were used essentially as a 'reserve labour force' by 
the highland elites, in effect continuing colonial policies of repartimiento. This 
arrangement was acquiesced to by the indigenous communities in exchange for 
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some kind of internal autonomy for their community (Rus, 2003: 261).6 
During the Por£lriato, haciendas and ranches vastly expanded in order to 
produce commodities for export as Chiapas was increasingly integrated into na-
tional and global economic imperatives. This integration meant indigenous peo-
ple were further dispossessed of their land by foreign businesses and state officials 
(Wassterstrom 1983: 108; Bobrow-Strain, 2005: 748). Entire villages became 
tied to expanding £lncas, and migratory labour to work on coffee plantations 
increased (Benjamin 1996: 89). Soconusco was the central target for capital in-
vestment spurred by this coffee economy. Foreign owned farms came to occupy 
25% of rural property. These investments led to large fortunes being derived 
that then acted as a further incentive towards the growth of large estates within 
Chiapas (Alvarez, 1988: 280-1). 
Between 1895-1910 a huge transformation oflabour relations took place within 
the state. The amount of coffee workers more than quadrupled in this period 
from 5000, to 21,000, with over half of these migrant workers coming from the 
central highlands as highland landowners now became labour contractors (Rus, 
2003: 258). Export commodities that would circulate in European and North 
American capitalist markets were thus being produced in Chiapas, but the labour 
mobilized to produce these commodities was done so in a largely pre-capitalist 
manner (e.g. through debt obligations mediated by monetary relations as well as 
direct coercion and dispossession). This symbiosis of modes of production had 
completely altered the spatial and scalar organization of economic activity in the 
state. As Rus (2003: 283) describes, "If Chiapas had been a state of largely self 
contained regions, each almost sovereign in its isolation as late as the 1980s, by 
the early 1900's, all had been subordinated to the state and federal government 
and reorganized to suit the interests of export agriculture." However, a profound 
new clash of spatializations would occur in the wake of the Revolution, between 
6 As should be clear we cannot discuss the project of autonomy without an examination of the 
social purpose for which it is desired (in other words, its class content). Although 'autonomy' 
has a long been a political goal among various groups in Chiapas, two very different meanings 
can be discerned. The first of these is an elite-based understanding of autonomy, which takes 
it to mean a lack of outside intervention in their positions of political and economic authority. 
This is a highly narrow understanding of the term. The other struggle for autonomy, also seeks 
an end to outside interference, but additionally seeks to widen the sphere of political decision 
making in order to ground it within the community (for a discussion of the contested notions 
of autonomy see Esteva, 2001). 
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those who sought to transform space for their own political ends, and those that 
sought to keep arrangements as they were. 
The 'national state', although penetrating Chiapas in terms of its accumula-
tion strategy, did not really have what could be described as a 'hegemonic project" 
in the Gramscian sense of the term. Rather, its policies were carried out through 
the mediations of the landowning class. It is little exaggeration to say that during 
the Porfiriato, the landowners were the State. This was related to their monopo-
lization of territorial control (e.g their ability to control both space and things in 
space such as the labour force) (Bobrow-Strain, 2005: 748, 2007: 77). By 1910 
half the labour force of the state was made up of indebted servants (mozos). As 
Neil Harvey (1998: 50) argues, "It was this extensive and intimate control of In-
dian workers that regional landowners were to defend in their counter-revolution 
against Carranza and the constitutionalists." 
7.4 (Passive) revolutionary Chiapas: transfor-
mation of space/transformism of social re-
lations 
Like Oaxaca, Chiapas was not one of the Mexican states that played a prominent 
role in the Revolution. However, whereas in Oaxaca the peasantry's limited in-
volvement was due to a position of relative strength (see Chapter 6), in Chiapas 
it was due to their weakness. Here the peasantry were too divided, weak and spa-
tially isolated to construct an organized challenge to the established order (Ben-
jamin 1996: 92). The Revolution in Chiapas, instead of being one that was given 
impetus from subaltern classes, in fact was really a struggle between elite classes 
to control land and Indian labour - the state's most precious commodity (Harvey 
1998: 52) This conflict was essentially between those who integrated themselves 
into the Carrancista movement, and those that rejected further integration in a 
national political agenda (Benjamin 1996: 134). During the revolutionary pe-
riod (1910-1920), the indigenous population were mistreated by both sides, who 
sought to requisition their food and labour as well as handing out punishments 
to suspected collaborators with the other side (Rus, 1994: 265). This is not to 
say that there were not some progressive initiatives during the revolutionary pe-
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riod. Rather that these initiatives often came from above (and often from those 
that had taken federal power) rather than from local social pressure from below 
(Reyes Ramos, 1992: 41-42). Perhaps the most significant of these progressive 
initiatives was the 1914 Ley de Obreros (Workers Law). This law, passed by Gen-
eral Castro, abolished debt servitude7 , and company stores (Tiendas de Raya) , 
as well as establishing a minimum wage and free education (Wasserstrom 1983: 
158). However, due to the weakness of subaltern class organization, the revolu-
tionary struggle was initially defeated in Chiapas by the Mapache forces, who, 
led by Fernandez Ruiz, sought a restoration of their class power that had been 
curtailed with recent developments such as the shift of the state capital from 
San Cristobal to Tuxtla Gutierrez (Benjamin, 1996: 48, 99). One reason for the 
Mapache's success lay in their appeal to protecting regional autonomy against 
outside interference. 
In 1921 Ruiz signed into effect a law that allowed the retention of fincas up to 
8000 hectares for personal use. Furthermore, no limit was placed on the number 
of family members who could hold properties. In this manner large estates could 
be retained through their formal (if not actual) division (Wasserstrom 1983: 159-
60). In the proceeding decades landowners managed to secure seats of power in 
every government that followed, confirming their continued importance as a social 
force within the region's political and economic affairs (Bobrow-Strain, 2005: 744; 
Reyes-Ramos 1992: 22). 
If the initial fire of the Mexican Revolution had failed to spread to Chiapas, 
the Revolution's 'institutional' phase led by Lazaro Cardenas (1934-1940) did 
begin the process of transforming socio-spatial relations in the state. Cardenismo 
however, was a double edged sword for the indigenous people, as, whilst giving 
them limited land redistribution, it also tied them further to the state's corpo-
ratist control and reduced their autonomy (Rus, 2004: 214). Let us now examine 
exactly how these changes came about and what their effect was. 
The activities of political parties, in particular the Partido 80cialista del 80-
conusco (Socialist Party of Soconusco) had begun to help develop political con-
sciousness among the subaltern classes of Chiapas, increasing the militancy of the 
plantation workers and presenting a danger to the state and federal government. 
7 Of course debt servitude was only abolished in law. In reality in would persist for many 
decades in Chiapas. 
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According to Benjamin (1996: 139), Chiapas really began to be politicised from 
below around 1920 and political polarisation began to appear: "Indios against 
ladinos, landless against landed, poor against rich, and workers against capital-
ists. The politics of class was beginning in Chiapas." 
Indian activism, rather than straightforward benevolence on behalf of the 
state must, therefore, be seen as a key component in bringing labour and agrar-
ian reform to Chiapas (Collier 1994: 30). However, equally important was the 
new political realities the Mexican state faced. With the onset of the Great De-
pression and the collapse of international trade, the government had sought a new 
political direction and social compact in the form of a historical bloc that had 
to be constructed (as analysed in Chapter 5). The Mexican state's new orien-
tation to domestic industrialization necessitated the geographical transformation 
of the hitherto agrarian nation into an urban one. This required the concomi-
tant production of cheap foodstuffs in the countryside however, if it was to be 
a viable accumulation strategy. In order to achieve this end, land redistribution 
was necessary in order to make use of the productive resources of the nation that 
were often idle in prestige-based haciendas. Politically, this entailed co-opting the 
peasants into the hegemonic project of the state as allies through the granting of 
ejidos, in order to defeat the forces of conservatism. However, it was the manner 
in which this land reform process was carried out within the class conditions of 
Chiapas that would provide the setting for an explosive clash of spatializations 
that provides the background to the Zapatista rebellion. 
Van der Haar (2005) notes that following the Zapatista uprising it became 
common place to argue (incorrectly) that the Mexican Revolution never came to 
Chiapas. However, this is to completely elide important spatial transformations 
that profoundly altered the terrain of class relations in the state. The significance 
of these transformations is aptly described by Aaron Bobrow-Strain ((2005: 245); 
emphasis added) who argues that: 
During the critical moment of socio-spatial reconfiguration that fol-
lowed the Mexican Revolution, landowners did not maintain autonomous 
domains of despotism - 'colonial reserves' amidst quickly thickening 
post-Revolutionary rule. Rather the contours of landed property were 
made and remade through the complex interactions of landowners, the 
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state, and indigenous peasants struggling over the forms and meaning 
of post-Revolutionary rule 
It will now be argued that Chiapas can be seen as a regional articulation of 
the process of 'passive revolution' and trasformismo that was analysed in Chap-
ter 5 as occurring at the national scale. Furthermore, it will be demonstrated 
how Chiapas, became integrated into the accumulation strategy and hegemonic 
project of lSI, but with local characteristics and peculiarities that informed future 
struggles. It was this deepening insertion into national and global economic ac-
tivity that would alter class relations in the state and provide the catalyst for the 
Zapatista movement. It is through this understanding of Chiapas, as part of the 
incorporated comparison method (set out in Chapter 1) as both a produced space 
and as a space in turn that produces capitalism that we can understand the sig-
nificance of the Zapatista rebellion as expressing a moment in the contradictions 
of the totality of capitalist social relations. 
7.5 Ejidos: spaces of passive revolution 
Key to this passive revolution and process of trasformismo in Chiapas was the 
production of particular spaces. Land reform was conducted in a manner that 
did not adversely affect large land holdings, but did provide land for some com-
munities. 8 By 1950, 47% of land, formerly held fincas had been transformed into 
ejidal property (van der Haar, 2005: 486). However, as was frequently the case 
nationally, this was done so in a manner in which landowners retained power. As 
Reyes Ramos (1992: 22) argues, agrarian reform in Chiapas led to the coexistence 
of landowners with new social sectors. Far from leading to a modernization of 
the state, it confirmed their existence as an important rural class, whilst leading 
to extensive capital investment in things like cattle ranching, the incipient de-
velopment of the industrial sector and the continuation of the export economy, 
most notably in coffee. In this manner, despite the efforts at agrarian reform, the 
landowning class still retained their economic dominance as the finca remained 
8The actual amount of land redistributed and the number of beneficiaries created however 
was extremely small compared with other states. Only the Federal District and Southern Baja 
California had less land redistributed (INEGI, 1994: 379) 
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the most important unit of production in Chiapas, although now with a modified 
form of mobilizing labour. 
The clash of spatializations between a landlord dominated region and a new 
state space eager to extend its domain of power did not result in either triumphing 
fully. Instead what occurred was an extension and reorientation of class power 
in Chiapas and the development of a new form of 'entrepreneurial caciquismo· 
(Lewis, 2005). This was very much a state-led process however, conforming to 
the conditions of passive revolution as described in Chapter 5. The manner in 
which land reform took place allowed the landowners to retain the best parcels 
of land and also all the key economic levers of power such as processing plants, 
buildings and storage facilities (Wasserstrom 1983: 164). The ejidos created on 
the peripheries of these estates were often then 'dependent spaces' that continued 
to serve the interests of the old masters in their new clothing. In many cases 
however, agrarian reform led to an even more profound change in the spatial 
form of social control and thus the means of mobilizing labour. As has been 
previously mentioned, prior to the Revolution, it was through the landlords' 
territorial control of estates, and the tying of peons to the land that ensured their 
political dominance. However, an important discourse (or in Henri Lefebvre's 
(1991: 42) terms, a different representation of space) arose from the revolutionary 
ideal of land belonging to those who worked it (La tierra es para quien la trabaja). 
This had material consequences, as it gave rise to petitioning for re-distribution 
from campesinos and state intervention on their behalf. Landowners, therefore, 
found it less and less desirable to have occupants who had permanent residence on 
their land as this carried with it the future threat of petition and expropriation. 
Instead, they sought to hire sharecroppers, day-labourers and seasonal workers 
who would be employed through wage work (Rus, 2004: 215). However, when 
examining social relations, Otero (1999: 23) reminds us that we have to look 
not only at relations of production but also re-production. This flow of migratory 
labour was ensured due to the fact that land which the indigenous population were 
granted was generally not sufficient on its own for the communities' reproduction. 
Wage labour in the lowlands was thus essential to their cultural survival (Rus 
1995: 74-78; Rus and Collier, 2003: 37). Summing up the effects of labour and 
agrarian reform in the state, Benjamin (1996: 216) concludes that despite the 
temporary setbacks it involved for the landowners, it also "served to provide 
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the state with a large pool of agricultural workers tied to their communities 
but forced by economic necessity into poorly compensated labour.'· Lm\" ,,"ages 
could be paid as the reproduction of the worker took place within the sphere 
of the community. In terms of labour relations a peculiar hybrid, somewhere 
between capitalist wage work and peasant production therefore was formed in 
which agricultural producers were in semi-proletarian positions ··torn between 
wage-labour and peasant production" (Otero 1999: 9). 
Thus, whilst the indigenous were excluded from the benefits of capitalist de-
velopment in terms of social spending and infrastructural development, they were 
also part of its economic foundation (Cecelia and Barreda 1998: 50). Like the 
capitalist transitions in Europe analysed by Gramsci (1971: 115) what occurred 
in Chiapas was not the liquidation or removal of the landowners as a class. but 
their demotion from their dominant position, to one which they had to share 
the spoils of political power with new social actors, the most important of which 
was the national state which sought to extend its power into Chiapas. In order 
to achieve this end, new spaces were created outside of the territorial control of 
landowning estates. In this manner the government was able to co-opt peasants 
and ensure "their primary loyalty would be to the state and not their class" (Col-
lier 1994: 32). The hegemony of the PRI (at that time named the PNR), was 
secured through corporatist institutions such as the CNC and the INI, as well 
as organizations such as Program a de Desarrollo Economico y Social de los Altos 
de Chiapas (Program for Social and Economic Development in the Highlands of 
Chiapas, PRODESCH) and the ejidal bank. These latter two acted as patronage 
networks that helped to create chains of dependency and thus extend state disci-
pline (Harvey 1998: 55-56, Benjamin 1996: 212). The future hope of land reform 
also served to act as a means of social control and keep the indigenous largely 
quiescent (Rus, 2004: 215). This was an unstable equilibrium however, and could 
not be maintained in perpetuity. This arrangement, moreover, involved a tension 
in the sense that the spaces granted to the indigenous in which they sought to 
construct their own political projects, was also space that represented the power 
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of the national state in Chiapas.9 A shift in the balance of power for either. thus 
represented a threat to the other. 
However, in its early phase one could argue that subaltern groups had rel-
atively active affiliation to the dominant political formation in its construction 
of hegemony in this period (cf Gramsci 1971: 52). Nevertheless, as explained 
in Chapter 5, even when programmes are relatively favourable to the subaltern 
classes, if the initiative comes from the state there remains the ever present danger 
of co-optation and integration into a purely bourgeois form of political contes-
tation (Otero 1999: 4). Surveying the 'institutional phase' of the Revolution 
(from the mid 1930s to the late 1940s), Benjamin (1996: 195) documents the 
consolidation of the revolutionary family as: "the government of Chiapas com-
pleted the political mobilization of workers and campesinos, fully integrated the 
regional 'revolutionary' party into the national party of the state, and carried 
agrarian reform to the indigenous Central Highlands and the coffee plantations 
of Soconusco." In terms of trasformismo, this was to be achieved in three main 
forms. The first involved selective land reform designed to quell unrest. Wasser-
strom (1983: 160) notes that up until 1937, the ejidos that received definitive 
titles were located in areas such as Cinalapa, Yajal6n, Pinchucalco and Soconusco 
where plantation workers had been the most militant (on this point, see also Chap-
ter 6). This was aided with the factionalism that developed in the struggles for 
land, which resulted in alliances being formed directly with the state in a vertical 
manner rather than with other communities in a horizontal fashion. In conjunc-
tion with measures such as these, labour and peasant leaders were converted into 
politicians, resulting in their loyalty being directed towards the state or particular 
governments to whom their position owed its existence, rather than their class 
constituents (Benjamin 1996: 198). As Gramsci (1971: 59) presciently notes, 
trasformismo of this kind necessitates an important Machiavellian role for politi-
cal leadership in the process of domination, leading to the absorption of enemies. 
9Bonfil Batalla (1996: 112) captures the two very different interpretations of land reform, 
arguing that for the indigenous people it not only involved the recovery of territory but also 
represented "a social space full of symbolic and emotional meaning. It meant the possibility 
of survival, but also for continuity. For the revolutionary planners and leaders of r-.Iexico, the 
agrarian reform had another meaning; it was indeed a way of carrying out social justice b ~ t t
a way of making the earth produce, through the new projects of national development. ThIS 
plan did not support the continuity of Mexico profunda, but, rather, its incorporation - and 
negation - in what was to be a new society." 
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The result is their "decapitation, and annihilation often for a very long time." 
The important thing to note is that this reform was mediated by the state ,yho 
replaced social classes in the processes of struggle and renewal, the classic traits 
of passive revolution. When these co-optation measures failed, repression ,,"as 
also used. This included the assassination of prominent socialist party members. 
However, as was previously mentioned, the manner in which land reform was 
carried out was partial and insufficient as a resource base for indigenous people 
to fulfil their needs of social reproduction. Whilst the discussion so far has fo-
cused on the tactics from above, it must not be forgotten we are dealing with 
the constant process of class struggle over these meanings. We must also recog-
nise therefore, that concomitantly, the process of land reform also provided the 
"physical and social base for development and institutionalisation of indigenous 
territorial claims" (Bobrow-Strain, 2005: 752). Thus, whilst indigenous peasants 
and the state could be allies at this specific juncture, their spatial projects would 
grow to be irreconcilably hostile as both developed, as this chapter shall demon-
strate. A new clash of spatializations thus emerged in which the Mexican state 
has sought to extend the space of capital whilst the indigenous communities have 
sought to expand their collectively held territory. 
7.6 State space/spaces of indigenous territory 
Following land reform in Chiapas, the municipio was the site through which gov-
ernment funding was channelled. In this manner the state produced particular 
dependent spaces of political control (Collier 1994: 35). This is documented 
by Jan Rus (1994) who labels these new spaces as 'Institutional Revolutionary 
Communities'. Indigenous communal space has long been a site of political con-
testation as we have seen with regard to the manner in which labour resources 
were mobilized and sent to the lowland ranches. Caciquismo had predominated 
in the period prior to the Revolution. During this time, bilingual men had dom-
inated political affairs. In order to prevent future abuses, communities in the 
post-revolutionary period had drawn inwards and decided to only appoint mono-
lingual principales (elders), so they couldn't go behind the back of the community 
and sell them out to the ladinos. Whilst corruption was perhaps lessened with 
this tactic it also limited the communities' ability to engage with the ne,y na-, 
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tional agenda (Rus, 2005: 172). Indicative of the new power relations that were 
being formed in Chiapas was the establishment of agrarian reform committees 
as well as organizations such as the Oficina de Contrataciones (Hiring Office). 
and the Sindicato de Trabajadores Indigenas (Union of Indigenous Workers, STI) 
following the victory of the PNR candidate in state election in 1936. Not only 
were some fincas expropriated and turned over to workers and communities, but 
furthermore the plantation owners had to go to the STI before hiring workers, 
who were obliged to join the Union (Rus, 2005: 173). There was thus a trade 
off between better working conditions for the indigenous people, and increased 
government control over their lives. The key point to note is that it was now the 
state that was mediating social relations and therefore playing a hegemonic role 
within Chiapas, seeking to instrumentalise space for its own ends and over-coding 
it to conform to its hegemonic national project. The activities of the INI sought 
to increase processes of capital accumulation within the communities thereby 
helping to assimilate the indigenous population into the nation (Rus 1994: 289). 
This conformed to the state ideology of 'acculturation' whereby Mexico was con-
structed as a purely mestizo nation (see Bonfil Batalla, 1996). The victory of 
the PNR in 1936, although therefore key to introducing agrarian reform, also ef-
fectively ended independent activity among workers and peasants (Wasserstrom 
1983: 162). 
Erasto Urbina, who ran the government's successful election campaign in 1936 
(for the governorship won by Efrain Gutierez) in the highlands was a key fig-
ure in transforming state-societal relations in Chiapas (Lewis, 2005:156). He 
rose to become the director of Indigenous Affairs, and through this office was 
able to consolidate the party's hold over native labour by training a new group 
of young bilingual men who acted as intermediaries between state institutions 
and indigenous communities. Communities were forced to accept these bilingual 
scribes, alongside traditional monolingual elders, as a condition of agrarian re-
form (Wasserstrom 1983: 173). In this way, the spaces of native communities 
were essentially subverted, and new positions of authority created to mediate re-
lations with the state. As Rus (1994: 267) has vividly described, the state ,yas 
able to utilise the inward looking, egalitarian structures of native communities, 
governed by strict civil and religious norms, to create 'institutional revolutionary 
communities', governed and controlled by these young scribes, who secured the 
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PRI's vote. Through the wages they were paid by the state, these scribes \yere 
also able to become caciques themselves, replacing landowners and ladinos as 
power brokers in the community through their monopolisation of alcohol sales 
(essential to many religious fiestas), lending activities, and ownership of key pro-
ductive assets such as trucks and improved seeds (Rus, 2005: 175: \Yasserstrom 
1983: 177). 
As noted earlier, the production of these communities helped to absorb pres-
sures from the exploitative relations of labour that pertained in the state. The 
space of the community was thus one that capital accumulation was able to utilise 
(Cecena and Barreda 1998: 41-42). Community was necessary for the reproduc-
tion of labour power but precarious enough to necessitate seeking work outside of 
its boundaries. It was in other words, a produced space that capital was able to 
take advantage of by getting egalitarian community structures to provide a social 
wage (Rus 1995: 74). However, Neil Harvey (1998: 59, 66) quite correctly points 
out that whilst the creation of 'la communidad revolucionaria institutional' was 
part of the apparatus of hegemony in Chiapas, this hegemony was far from even 
in its spatial penetration. In other places such as Venustiano Carranza, in the 
North East of Chiapas, land disputes were far more prominent and scribes princi-
pales could only retain their legitimacy by regaining land for their communities. 
Harvey concludes that the further one moved from the highland communities, 
the less state presence was felt. This is important, as it was in this atmosphere 
of weak state presence that the Zapatista movement grew (van der Haar, 2005: 
496) . This brings us back to the question of uneven and combined hegemony, 
introduced in the previous chapter. Some scholars who have analysed the Za-
patista movement have usefully cited the breakdown of PRI hegemony within 
Chiapas during the period of economic restructuring that took place from the 
mid 1970s onwards (Morton, 2002: 40). Whilst not seeking to deny the utility of 
such an analysis, one must take it further and also recognise that this hegemony 
was never evenly exercised across territory. Within Chiapas therefore, there were 
some areas in which this hegemony was weak or absent. In other words, there 
were particular places in which the PRI were never hegemonic in the sense of 
having "intellectual and moral leadership." It was therefore possible to construct 
a new form of socio-spatial relations here in which social movements, rather than 
the state led the process of renewal. However, despite recognising that the PRI"s 
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hegemony was unevenly exercised, we have to also understand that the political 
formations that took place inside areas where hegemony was not present were of-
ten intrinsically linked to the breakdown and recomposition of hegemonic practice 
in other parts of the state. This can best be observed through an examination of 
the Eastern part of Chiapas, specifically the Selva Lacondona and its surrounding 
areas which has served as the base of the Zapatista movement. The Selva Lacon-
dona essentially served as the state's form of 'spatial fix' to the contradictions of 
land tenure in Chiapas. Colonization was encouraged to ease political tensions 
and diminish class struggles over existing land distribution. According to Neil 
Harvey (1998: 62) over 100,000 colonists settled in the Selva between the 1930s 
and 1970. This is a process that obviously has its limits in terms of physical 
space and environmental balance. lo One should be able to infer from this that 
ecological questions are not separable from questions of property rights as shall 
be discussed later. 
As was outlined in Chapter 2 and 3, space and scale are not fixed and eternal 
but contingent upon social processes. Marx's method was to show how change 
is in fact the natural order of things and what should interest us are moments 
of 'permanence' that become inscribed within a logic of accumulation (Harvey 
1996: 82). The 'permanence' of politico-economic arrangements in Chiapas \vas 
clearly broken by the Zapatistas armed rebellion and land takeovers from 1994 
onwards. The question that therefore must be asked is what changed in conditions 
to precipitate a rebellion in this time and place? These are naturally material 
questions. As Jan Rus (1995: 72-73) argues, "of course, economy and political 
conditions are at the root of the rebellion ... after a period of improvement from 
the 1950s through the early 1970s, these conditions have deteriorated noticeably 
since the 1970s, most especially since the 1980s." This should not be taken to 
mean simple economic reductionism, but rather to examine the manner in which 
the cultural norms and aspirations of people were also threatened. \Vhat then 
were the important economic developments in Chiapas that led to this clash of 
spatializations? 
lOSettling in the jungle also required an intensive process of clearing l a n ~ s s a ~ d d often.brought 
with it environmental degradation as the traditional practice of Milpa cultIvatlOn v;as mappro-
priate to the soil of the jungle and thus the biodiversity was threatened. 
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7.7 Chiapas under lSI: the state mode of pro-
duction 
Following the Revolution, links with the national and global economy had been 
increased (Harvey 1998: 48) Most of the productive activities of Chiapas are 
based at the primary level (agriculture, fisheries, forestry). Therefore, following 
the Great Depression, the export economy of Chiapas severely contracted, with 
certain products such as cotton never fully recovering on international markets. 
Instead, under lSI, the production of grains for the local food market was en-
couraged. During World War II, when Northern states began producing food 
for export, Chiapas became further integrated into national circuits of produc-
tion (Cecelia and Barreda 1998: 40; Wasserstrom 1983: 181). From the 1940s 
onwards and continuing for the next two decades, the state saw a boom in com-
mercial agriculture due to the rapid rising of commodity prices. During this 
period Chiapas became Mexico's principle producer of coffee, corn and beans, in 
addition to other commodities such as sugar, rice, cacao and cotton (Rus 1994: 
285). 
This situation was only made possible however, due to the production of space 
by the state, most notably in road building that was to connect isolated fincas 
to centres of commercial activity. From having just 1,400 kilometres of road in 
1940, by 1970 the state had over 6 million kilometres (Benjamin 1996: 224). Of 
particular importance was the Pan-American Highway, completed in 1950 which 
provided links with the national economy (Cancian, 1992: 101). Furthermore, in 
a bid to ensure the security of production, the state made many fincas exempt 
from expropriation and gave them price support (Rus 1994: 285). This :state 
mode of production' continued with the further construction of roads, connecting 
the lowland commercial fincas with highland municipios which was necessary in 
order to facilitate the vital labour supplies that were needed there. Migratory 
labour was thus redirected from its hitherto destination at coffee plantations in 
Soconusco. This was aided by allowing undocumented Guatelaman workers (who 
would work for lower wages) to enter Chiapas (Rus 1994: 286), highlighting again 
a particular spatial strategy of the state, and the role of classification based on 
scalar boundaries. It must be stressed that this process of modernization \,'as not 
one that bought benefits to the masses, but rather to dominant elites (Benjamin 
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1996: 226). This helped sharpen class antagonisms within the state as ethnic 
differences became "submerged beneath more fundamental differences of wealth. 
property and power" after 1936 (Wasserstrom 1983: 215). George Collier (199--1: 
16-17) describes Chiapas under lSI as an 'internal colony': pointing out that most 
of the developmental money poured into the state has been used to extract re-
sources. Thus, with just 3% of the national population Chiapas produces 13% 
of the nation's corn, 54% of its hydroelectric power, 13% of its gas, 4% of its 
oil, 5% of its timber and 4% of its beans. Meanwhile almost half of the state·s 
population do not have electricity, running water or other basic resources. Sub-
comandante Marcos (2001: 23), spokesperson of the EZLN would later declare, 
"The tribute that capitalism demands from Chiapas has no historical parallel.:' 
Capital accumulation thus served to increase social stratification in the state. 
By the 1960s there began to emerge increasing struggles within indigenous 
communities against the scribes principales control of both political and economic 
opportunities. A new entrepreneurial class, as well as newly qualified teachers 
within communities sought increased opportunities that were denied to them by 
this rigid organizational arrangement (Rus 1994: 298,2005: 178). Chiapas there-
fore, despite the difference in the manner of articulation, was like a microcosm of 
the country at large, whereby the authoritarianism of the state and the decreasing 
avenues for advancement were causing increasing friction, and violent repression 
was often used to put down these claims. The crisis of lSI thus occurred upon 
multiple spatial scales. The proliferation of road building in Chiapas (especially 
in the highlands) also led to increasing class struggles and shifting political al-
liances. As Frank Cancian (1992: 127, 150) argues, these are best viewed as 
struggles to control transportation routes, and therefore access to markets and 
community resources. Neil Smith (2008) refers to the contradictions that arise 
from uneven and combined development as taking place inter-spatially, with dif-
ferentiation of geographical spaces being produced alongside the equalization of 
the conditions of production, leading to geopolitical competition between certain 
areas. However, as we noted in Chapter 2, such an analysis is largely concerned 
with capital as its subject. Once the focus is shifted to examine subaltern classes 
as our subject, the picture is altered and we can see intra-spatial conflict as a 
form of class struggle that also results from the conflicting demands of differen-
tiation and equalization. As conditions of production became equalized during 
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this period, conflict thus took place over access to differential geographical space 
that had been monopolized by the scribes (Alvarez 1988: 288).11 All merchandise 
entering the communities was coming through the cabecera (head town) which 
was controlled by them. The emerging entrepreneurs sought to have new roads 
built directly connecting their towns with the Pan-American Highway. This at-
tempt to spatially open the community was met with fierce repression however. 
with those petitioning for the new roads murdered (Rus, 2005: 180). Conflict 
was thus emerging between capital accumulation and authoritarian control of 
indigenous territory. 
This increased during the 1970s, which saw a period of hegemonic crisis in 
Chiapas, with an explosion of popular mobilizations against the governing party 
(as was also occurring nationally). The period witnessed a return to radical agrar-
ian demands outside of the state's traditional corporatist institutions ( ~ l o r t o n , ,
2002: 36-40). This can be interpreted as the heightening of the clash of spatial-
izations alluded to earlier. Chiapas witnessed something of a crisis in agriculture, 
as guaranteed prices for corn began to fall. At the same time the state witnessed 
what Marx (1867/1974: 598) would refer to as the rising 'organic composition of 
capital', the replacement of living labour by machines (dead labour). Responding 
to market prices, cropland began to be replaced by cattle ranching which dou-
bled in this period. These cattle ranches often expanded at the expense of ejidos, 
further aggravating land conflicts in the state (Benjamin 1996: 231). The effect 
of this agricultural crisis on jobs can be witnessed by the fact that in the early 
1970s 80% of the indigenous population could derive their living from this sector 
but just a decade later this had dropped to less that 50% (Rus 1995: 78-79, 2004: 
224). 
However, although a large proportion of jobs were lost in his manner, the situa-
tion was ameliorated by public works programs both in Chiapas and neighbouring 
Tabasco. The oil boom provided the liquidity for infrastructural improvements 
in things such as dams, roads, oil refineries, urban improvement etc. As we saw 
in Chapter 5 energy development in Mexico was to have important social and 
political consequences for the nation. Nowhere were the impacts of energy de-
velopment more keenly felt that in Chiapas. As a result of this boom. oil had 
llThese conflicts are important because they led to a great many expulsions from highland 
municipalities like Chamula to areas of the Selva Lacondona. 
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massively increased its importance in terms of its contribution to national CDP. 
In the same period, agriculture fell from 14% to just 77c (Collier and Collier. 
2005: 95). This is hugely important when one considers the fact that almost 
60% of the Chiapaneco workforce was based in the agricultural sector (Katzen-
berger, 1995: 131). Public spending under the Echerverria (1970-76) and Portillo 
(1976-82) administrations profoundly altered the pattern of economic life in the 
highlands. Utilising money from the oil boom, important energy infrastructural 
developments took place. Notably among these were oil refineries in the northern 
part of the state as well as hydro-electric dams in the Grijalva River \"alley. By 
the end of the 1970s Chiapas had been transformed "from a technological backwa-
ter into the producer of about half the country's hydroelectric energy (one fifth 
of all electric energy) generated in Mexico, and major producer of petroleum" 
(Cancian, 1992: 48) .12 These developments as well as school, road and hous-
ing construction re-oriented labour away from traditional corn farming (Cancian 
1992: 27). However, with the onset of the debt crisis these work programs \\'ere 
withdrawn, forcing a growing population onto an insufficient resource base. The 
misery was compounded by the fact that the move way from maize cultivation 
led to a massive increase in the costs of basic staple foods (Alvarez 1988: 287), 
whilst the population of the state has also expanded. The graph below indicates 
the explosive population growth in the state. As can be seen from Figure 7.1, 
from 1950 to 1990 the population tripled. 
Following David Harvey (1996: 117-119), it is useful to explore the issues hith-
erto discussed in terms of environmental politics, with the term 'environment" 
widened beyond the sense of its common usage to refer to resources, ecology and 
situated human need. As Noel Castree (2000: 27) elaborates this ontology does 
not separate nature from society. Howard and Homer-Dixon (1996) usefullyex-
plain the contradictions of the economy of Chiapas as resulting from three types 
of environmental scarcity (which necessarily inter-relate to one another). These 
are 1) demand-induced (e.g. caused by demands of an increasing population or 
increase in per capita consumption) 2) supply-induced (caused by degradation 
and depletion of resources) and 3) structurally-induced (caused by distribution 
of resources that favours elites and impinges on the subaltern classes). They 
12The construction of hydroelectric dams did, however, flood a great deal of peasant farmland 
causing further migratory pressure in and around the Selva Lacondona and lowlands. 
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Figure 7.1: Population increase in Chiapas 1900-1990 (Source: INECr 1994: 17) 
conclude that demand induced and structural scarcities are the most important 
problems in Chiapas. In the face of these difficulties, the immediate response of 
the indigenous communities was to intensify the resources under their control. 
However, these activities led to corrosive effects on community s o l i d a r i t y ~ ~ lead-
ing to "social stratification and polarization within communities that formerly 
thought of themselves as egalitarian" (Rus 1995: 82). 
Collier (1994: 120) argues that this deeper immersion into wage labour led 
to a move away from rank-based forms of hierarchy to class-based ones. As has 
been previously discussed, the PRI's hegemony prior to this had been secured 
through the corporatist structures of the CN C and the IN!. However. as the 
economic situation worsened, radical independent groups sprang up, such as the 
Central Independiente de Obreros Agricolas y Campesinos (CIOAC. Confedera-
tion of Agricultural workers and Indians), Organizacion Campesina Emiliano Za-
pata (OCEZ, Emiliano Zapata Peasant Organization) and Politica Popular (PP. 
Popular Politics) as well as the formation of the Union de Uniones (UU. Cnion 
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of Unions), the biggest of all the independent unions (Collier 1994: II. Han'eY 
1998: 84). The proliferation of these movements in the 1980s. "highlights th'e 
erosion of corporatist and clientelistic forms of political control" (Han'ey 1998: 
1). It must be stressed here, that it was the effects of capital restructuring that 
engendered these independent peasant organizations. It was also during this time 
that a number of guerrillas, radicalized by the events of 1968, and seeing fertile 
ground for mobilizing discontent in Chiapas, began to organize clandestinely in 
the mountains of Eastern Chiapas. They would integrate into the indigenous 
communities to form what we now know as the EZLN. One can again appreciate 
that the construction of hegemony in Mexico was always an unstable process that 
was reliant upon class alliances, whose political projects were inimical. Subaltern 
class struggles could only be recuperated to the extent that a material flow of 
concessions could be maintained (these material concessions not just relating to 
money but also land), However, from the period of the 1970s onwards, with the 
increasing turn to repressive measures, due to the declining ability to maintain 
patronage networks, "political identities took shape in which the state came to 
be seen as part of the problem, rather than part of the solution" (van der Haar, 
2005: 501). 
During the Presidency of Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988) agricultural subsi-
dies fell by 13% annually (Harvey 1998: 179). The decline of 1Iexican agriculture 
was further accelerated by the signing of the PSE (discussed in Chapter 5) which 
sought to reduce wages and price supports. These measures, which hit the peas-
ants hardest, were compounded by the devaluation of the Peso, which led to 
a flood of cheap imports. Although neoliberal reforms had been introduced by 
de la Madrid, they became rapidly accelerated under Carlos Salinas de Gortari 
(1988-1994). As Collier (1994: 88) notes, whilst under de la Madrid they have 
been introduced in the face of the debt crisis, under the Salinas administration 
they "reflected a change of will." Neoliberalism, in Gramscian terms had become 
a new 'common sense' among policy makers. These austerity cuts hit indigenous 
areas particularly hard, especially in areas such as public health, as even token 
salaries were deemed unaffordable (Collier and Collier, 2005: 452-3). Further-
more, the two most important cash crops, coffee and maize were devastated by 
the fluctuating commodity prices. The provision of government credit in this 
period overwhelmingly went to beef producers which fm'oured large landhold-
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ers. By 1990, 87% of small farmers could not get access to credit (Howard and 
Homer-Dixon 1996: 12). 
The most radical departure was of course the reform to Article 27 of the 
constitution which ended the state's historic covenant with the peasantry. by 
abolishing the petitioning for land reform, as well as allowing for the pri\"3tiz3-
tion and commodification of the ejido. In explaining the origins of Zapatismo 
it is worth highlighting that the state of Chiapas had the most unresolved land 
disputes in the country (van der Haar, 2005: 504). One can obviously appreci-
ate the historical continuities of neo-liberalism in Mexico, with its earlier liberal 
version. Both held suspicions of communal property, believing that it was an 
obstacle to investment and therefore progress. However, a whole section of the 
nation was left out of this narrative, their hopes and aspirations not deemed 
worthy of importance. It was a triumph of what Bonfil Batalla (1996:158- 161) 
refers to as Mexico imaginario (imaginary Mexico) over Mexico profunda (deep 
Mexico). The indigenous and the peasantry in this discourse were felt to be an 
anachronism preventing the nation from modernising and becoming competitiye 
in the global market. 
For state planners, the future of Mexico lay in tying the economy ever more 
closely to their Northern neighbours. This was to be institutionalised through 
the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Representing Mexico's full 
insertion into global circuits of capital, the conditions of NAFTA required Mexico 
to phase out price support and import restrictions over a fifteen year period. As 
Harvey (1998: 181) explains: "The rationale for NAFTA was that each country 
and region should produce goods and services in which they have comparative 
advantages. The argument implied that over 2 million small producers could not 
continue to survive as maize producers." Journalist and long time chronicler of 
the Zapatistas, John Ross (2008: personal interview, Mexico City) argues that 
NAFTA is "indicative of what globalization does. It makes who the Zapatistas 
are go-away, because it threatens their ability to survive". The Zapatistas them-
selves called NAFTA a 'death sentence for the indigenous people' and Marcos 
declared that the Mexican peasantry were to be "the sacrificial lambs of NAFTA:' 
(Benjamin 1995: 67). Their uprising, timed to coincide with the day that this 
agreement was due to come into effect, thus "highlighted globalization as a set 
of contested social relations" (Morton, 2002: 28). Their actions can therefore be 
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interpreted as a refusal of the model of 'accumulation by dispossession'. Rather 
the Zapatista rebellion puts into questions the extension of commodification. Im-
portantly, their rebellion demonstrated a clear rejection of the peaceful. legalistic 
negotiations with the state, that other peasant movements in the Chiapas had 
pursued. These groups had either found themselves co-opted through the process 
of trasformismo (discussed earlier) or were repressed by the state. In contrast to 
economic modernization theory that suggests the development of infrastructure 
will lead to declining levels of poverty, Chiapas witnessed the opposite since 1952, 
where modernization accelerated the difference between rich and poor, leading to 
class stratification and a decline in living standards (Wasserstrom 1983: 212). As 
Alvarez (1988: 288) therefore summarises, social disintegration and the rise of 
peasant activism, must be linked to "the enormous, sudden and unbalanced de-
velopment of capitalist investment in the Chiapas agricultural sector." \Videning 
our lens of analysis, Chiapas has become a space produced through conditions of 
uneven and combined development within the global political economy. The re-
form to article 27 was the final straw as it foreclosed the possibility of legal paths 
to land reform. It should be noted that Article 4 of the Mexican Constitution had 
been amended prior to this recognising Mexico as a multicultural nation. This 
revision to Article 27 rendered this meaningless however as the material capabil-
ities needed to put this into practice a different cultural way of being were now 
under threat (Castillo and Aida, 2001: 188-9). This does not mean that we need 
to reject the idea of multiculturalism altogether as does Zizek (1997). Rather it 
means that we must remain attentive to the class content of any such proposals. 
Within the context of Chiapas the state had thus created a situation akin to 
a pressure cooker, but with safety values no longer able to function. This build 
up of pressure resulted in explosion on January 1st 1994, as the EZLN emerged 
to declare' jYa Basta!' to neoliberal reforms. 13 
13 jYa Basta! translates roughly into 'enough is enough' 
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7.8 Beyond state space: Zapatismo and the geopo-
litical 
Beginning on this day, the Zapatistas began a territorial response to the .\Iex-
ican state's policy of dispossession. In an audacious military manOeU\Te t h e ~ ' '
took over key towns and cities within Chiapas including Las l\Iargaritas. Alta-
marino, Rancho Nuevo, Ocosingo, San Cristobal de las Casas, and Comitan. As 
John Ross (2009: personal interview, Mexico City) notes, these were important 
symbolic cabeceras (head towns within municipalities), and the military uprising 
was thus an attack on the geographical power structures within the state. 14 The 
Zapatistas have put into practice the maxim of Henri Lefebvre (1991: 190) who 
stressed that to change life "we must first change space." Following this uprising, 
they have managed to recuperate 250,000 hectares of land from private hands 
(Villafuerte Solis, 2005: 467). As Jorge Santiago (2008: personal interview, San 
Cristobal) argues, the Zapatistas established the priority not only of the defence 
of territory, but also a territory considered the property of the people rather than 
individuals. In the wake of the Zapatista rebellion, land invasions multiplied, as 
peasants from a whole spectrum of political positions took over private p r o p e r t ~ · , ,
As Bobrow-Strain (2007: 3) illuminates, "contrary to both the plans of the ne-
oliberal policy makers and the fears of critics on the left, land tenure in Chiapas 
underwent a rapid repeasantisation and reindiginisation rather than privatisation 
and concentration" . 
The space of the community has long been a refuge or defensive bulwark of 
resistance for indigenous communities. However, as has been highlighted hitherto, 
it was also a space that was manipulated and used as a means of control by the 
state in order to benefit capital accumulation. The significance of the Zapatista 
uprising has been to move from using the space of the community as a purely 
defensive means to one which it is also used for transformative purposes. As Neil , 
Harvey (2006c: 215) succinctly puts it: "Against the effect of economic, ecological 
and political crisis, the community has been converted into a strategic resource for 
the reconstruction of the bonds of solidarity and the defence of natural resources," 
14Unlike in Oaxaca which used the state capital as the symbolic centre of social protest owing 
to the large development of Haciendas and £incas, the presence of these large estates in Chiapas 
meant various symbolic centres of power were targeted (see also Stephen, 1997). 
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This reclaiming of space has also been developed into a new territorial form of 
politics. In December of 1995, 38 'autonomous municipalities' were declared. 
These were to be governed by the peoples own political will, beyond the purview 
of the state. These autonomous municipalities thus represent a rejection of the 
statization of discontent and instead impose a new territorial framework on the old 
geographical patterns recognised by the state. In doing so, they simultaneously 
assert what can be called the 'constituent power' of the subaltern ·to name' and 
shape space (Castillo and Aida, 2001: 216; Negri, 1999) .15 
The Zapatistas draw on specific indigenous traditions, built up in Chiapas 
and other areas of Mexico. The community assembly for example is utilised as a 
tool to discuss through problems until consensus is reached. Furthermore. various 
principles that began to be developed by the Union de Uniones during the 1970s 
in dialogue with liberation theology such as mandar obedeciendo (to command 
obeying) have been carried on and converted into part of the guiding philosophy 
underpinning the Zapatista movement (Leyva Solano, 2001: 23-26). T h e ~ ' ' draw 
upon and develop further the pluri-ethnic conceptions of autonomy that \\'ere 
developed in the Eastern parts of the state owing to its history of migratory com-
munities (Castillo, 2003: 74-77). This is in contrast to the practices of communal 
autonomy practised in Oaxaca, which are far more ethnically homogenous. 
However, there is also something qualitatively new to the political project 
that the Zapatistas offer. As John Holloway (2008: personal interview, Cholula) 
argues, Zapatismo has led to a fundamental rethinking of politics. which has its 
roots in 1968 and the fall of the Berlin Wall, but also the failure of revolutionary 
movements in Central America. The Zapatistas thus exemplify the "rejection 
of monological politics, or politics as monologue and insist on the process of 
dialogue and the politics of listening" (on this point, see also, Holloway 1998: 
164). This is most clearly expressed in their principle of preguntando caminamos 
(asking we walk). Zapatismo is therefore a political praxis that rejects politics 
as 'savoir' and instead bases itself in the connaissance of those that are its , 
150pposing the idea of a fixed 'constituted power' Negri (1999: 10) argues that a h a l l ~ a r k k
of democracy is constituent power of people to alter their form of governance: ·'the .paradigm 
of constituent power is that of a force that bursts apart, breaks, i n t : r r ~ p t s , , u n h m g e ~ ~ any 
preexisting equilibrium and any possible continuity. Constituent power IS t I e ~ ~ to the n o t l O ~ ~ of 
democracy as absolute power. Thus, as a violent and expansiv: force,. C o ~ s t i t u e n t t power IS a 
concept connected to the social preconstitution of the democratIc totalIty. 
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subjects. La Jornada journalist Gaspar Morquecho (2008 · pe . 1 . ° 
. rsona mterYle,,· . 
San Cristobal) argues the importance of their autonomous pOll·tO C 1 . 1° 1 a project Ie 
in the indigenous becoming historical subjects in the worst conditions. and gi\"in o' 
voice to an identity and way of life that didn 't appear in previous T\lexican h h s t o n ~ ~
Through their struggle, the rights of the indigenous people have become far mo:.e 
visible. 
Figure 7.2: Zapatista mural , La Realidad (Photo by Chris Hesketh. 2009) 
The Zapatista uprising has also illuminated important dynamics of contempo-
rary class struggles. The rebellion can be interpreted as a refusal of the model of 
'accumulation by dispossession ' that capitalism is increasingly reliant upon (Har-
vey, 2003: 137-169). It does this by the reclaiming of social space in which the 
logic of capital does not operate. Thus, in concurrence with the model of class 
struggle set out in the previous chapter , it entails a direct challenge to the abi lity 
of the state and capital to produce spaces through which new rounds of accumu-
lation can then occur. As Robinson (2008: 302-3) argues in relation to this point: 
"The fundamental indigenous notion of 'mother earth·. as something that cannot 
be 'owned ' much less privatized , and which must be respected and sustained. 
is diametrically opposed to global capitalism·s drive to commodify and plunder 
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nature." In this manner, struggles for full cultural recognition are transformed 
into class struggles. The Zapatista project is also one that is based on collecti\'e 
action for collective need (expressed in the guiding maxim Para todos todo. nada 
para nosotros - for everyone everything, nothing for ourselves). As Lorenzano 
(1998: 133) argues, "Zapatismo cannot be understood except as an experience 
of communal/popular power." This point is important as it recognises the con-
temporary spatiality of class struggles that have been increasingly prominent in 
Latin America during recent decades in efforts to retain access to basic sen'ices 
(Portes 1985: 31, see also Chapter 4). As was also highlighted in the previous 
chapter, this spatializaing of class struggles also moves us away from a dogmatic 
and exclusionary conception of class that views only workplace struggles at the 
point of production as being relevant. Instead, once we open up class struggle 
to the terrain of the lived space of the community it also encompasses concerns 
such as culture, gender and environmental issues (Harvey, 2003: 170-71) .16 
As was outlined in Chapter 6, class struggle is better thought of. not in terms 
of an empirical category or fixed sociological group, but rather as a relational 
concept. In other words it is not a conflict between two pre-constituted external 
agents, but rather a conflict about the constitution of social practice. bet\w'Pll 
creative work and its negation (Holloway 1998: 182, 2002a: 50, 78-90). Through 
their actions of re-claiming the social, the Zapatistas thus challenge the logic of 
capital accumulation by their refusal to be proletarianised. I\Iarx (1894/1977: 
814) pointed out that "capital was not a thing, but rather a definite social pro-
duction relation". It is representative of past labour that transmogrified, feeds 
vampire-like upon living labour (Marx 1867/1974: 224). Therefore, as Holloway 
(2002a: 40) illustrates, its 'power-over' is predicated on the expropriation of 
power-to. However, the Zapatistas overcoming of this separation between the do-
ing (the process of labour), and the done (the product of labour), and the refusal 
of these relations of domination, presents a challenge to the abilit:y' of power-over 
to continue. As Marcos (2001: 92) declared with regard to this point, the current 
system "is based upon our weakness. To our lack of alternative proposals, they 
16 As the young Marx (1844/2007: 29) argued, the problem with bourgeois political economy 
was precisely the fact that they failed to look at workers beyond the workplace. !n other words 
it failed to view them a human beings. Once this point is recognises a whole senes of e w r y ~ a y y
life issues must also be theorised into one's notion of class struggle (on this point, see LebOWItz. 
2003) 
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offer the continuation of the nightmare. We must go beyond lamentations and 
propose new possibilities." It is therefore a politics that takes a proactiYe stance 
by seeking the self-valorisation of labour (Lorenzano 1998: 149). 
7.9 Producing spaces of resistance 
The Zapatista struggle is an example of overcoming of alien determination and 
points towards a liberation of 'species being' (Marx 1844/2007: 67-80). In rela-
tion to this overcoming of alienation, Gustavo Esteva (2008: personal interyie,,·. 
Oaxaca) draws a useful distinction between autonomy, ontonomy and hetronomy. 
Hetronomy is essentially the situation we live in under state governed societies. 
whereby norms are imposed by others. Ontonomy, on the other hand, refers to 
the ability to be ruled by one's own cultural being that relates to shared norms 
and inter-subjective meanings. These norms however, can be, and are, altered by 
the community by virtue of their autonomous decisions (they are thus not fixed 
but require constant self-reflexivity). The Zapatistas seek to construct a politics 
that is both ontonomous and autonomous. One example of this changing onton-
omy has been the involvement of women in the movement. As Mercedes Olivera 
(2005: 617) argues, "one of the most important achievements of the EZLN has 
been the legitimization of female participation in politics, hitherto a reserve of 
males." Traditionally it was only men, in their role as heads of households that 
participated in the community assembly and dominated political life. Although 
receiving far less attention in the media, on the same day that the Zapatistas 
announced themselves to the world with the 'First Declaration of the Lacandon 
Jungle', they also proclaimed the 'Revolutionary Women's Law'. This asserted 
that women were to have full control over their own fertility: the right not to be 
forced into marriage and also the right to be free from domestic violence (1 Iillan, 
1998: 74-75). One can only appreciate the significance of these measures when 
it is considered that there currently exists a World Bank sponsored program 
in Chiapas to forcibly sterilise women who exceed a three child limit (OliYera, 
2009: personal interview, San Cristobal). F u r t h e r m o r e ~ ~ women have also had to 
bear the burden of the recent wave of immigration as men have left communities 
in search of work as opportunities declined in Chiapas (Villafuerte Solis. 2005: 
469). As well as having responsibility for the household, this has concomitantly 
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led to a process of feminization of peasant production (Olivera, 2009: personal 
interview, San Cristobal). PROCEDE, the government program to regularise 
land titles (discussed in the previous chapter), has furthermore s y s t e m a t i c a l l ~ ' '
excluded women from the process of land reform by making certification status 
only in relation to (male) heads of households (Olivera, 2005: 615). Women's 
participation in the EZLN can be related to resistance against this attempted 
dispossession. Gender struggles therefore cannot be divorced from wider class is-
sues related to the manner in which capitalism operates in Chiapas. According to 
Neil Harvey (1998: 224), "there has been a general re-appraisal of gender relations 
in the wake of the rebellion." Women are estimated to constitute a third of the 
EZLN's membership and make up half of the Comite Clandestino Revolucionario 
Indigena-Comandancia General (CCRI-CG Clandestine Indigenous Revolution 
Committee - General Command), the EZLN's military command. \\'omen have 
also been at the heart of key symbolic acts of the Zapatistas including :\Iajor 
Ana Maria leading the military occupation of San Cristobal and Commandata 
Ramona leading the Zapatista delegation in peace talks with the government. 
Women's mobilization was also decisive in the fight to evict federal forces from 
the autonomous municipalities. The Junta de Buen Gobierno (JBG) of La Reali-
dad (2009: personal interview) identified the participation of women as being one 
of the key aspects of change they had witnessed in the community since 1994, and 
(especially since the inception of the Juntas in 2003). The revival of traditional 
Mayan medicine in daily life within the autonomous communities has also proved 
to be empowering as women's connaissance has become increasingly valued (Har-
vey, 2006c: 229). This is not to claim that a situation of perfect equality now 
exists within Zapatista communities.17 Indeed, a 2004 communique from i\larcos 
entitled 'Two Flaws of the Zapatista Movement', recognised the participation of 
women was not increasing as much as it should have done, and although the 'Sixth 
Declaration of the Lacondon Jungle' (CCRI-CG, 2005) recognised the position 
of women had improved, further progress was still demanded. The Zapatistas, 
therefore, are not simply trying to restore past conditions, but rather to create 
an alternative future. This involves conscious work as many aspects of Zapatismo 
17 According to Jutta Meier-Wiedenbach of Global Exchange (2008: personal i n t e r v . i e ~ v , , ~ a n n
Crist6bal) it is clear that some communities have gone further than others in the partICIpatIOn 
. . d b t' th . ns there is a far more e,'en of women. Some remam largely male dommate u m 0 er regIO 
split in the participation at the community assembly. 
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are not found within traditional communities (Lorenzano 1998: 129, 1:3-l). 
As should be clear, the rejection of alien determination implies the rejection of 
the state as an organization that places itself above society (Lefebvre 1966/2009: 
147-150). After all, the state is not just a form of social relations, but a process 
of forming social relations (Holloway, 2002a: 94). This has been a conscious 
decision that relates to the experience of betrayal by the state that culminated 
with the revisions to Article 27 of the constitution. As van der Haar (2005: -l89) 
argues, the EZLN "sought to displace the state and deny the Mexican government 
legitimacy because the latter had betrayed the revolutionary project. The EZL:\ 
revived Zapata, whereas the Mexican state had declared him d e a d . ~ ' ' Indeed, the 
invoking of Zapata was an important discursive move, due to his symbolic referent 
in Mexico as the emblematic defender of the peasantry. It therefore provided a 
means of claiming historical legitimacy for their struggle that reached out to 
wider sectors of Mexican society (Rajchenberg and Heau-Lambert, 1998: 23-3-l). 
This highlights the point raised in the introduction with regard to the fact the 
Zapatistas struggle is not merely to be confined to the local production of space. 
but is also a struggle to insert itself onto wider scalar dynamics. However. whilst 
the discourse of the Zapatistas has been hugely important in terms of mobilizing 
support, this must not be separated from the concrete nature of their struggle, 
as without a material political project their discourse would be little more than 
posturing and wishful thinking. 
Instead of trying to capture state power and use it instrumentally to achieve 
their objectives, the Zapatista model of organization is pre-figurative, organically 
constructing a new type of social relations as a lived experience of experimenta-
tion, rather than waiting for some future moment of decisive action. I8 As Marx 
(1844/2007: 124) points out, the value of pre-figurative action results in the cre-
ation of new needs, namely the need for society. Thus, "what appears as a means 
becomes an end." As one Zapatista (2009: personal interview, La Realidad) put 
it, they are not looking for power, but seeking to return it to the p u e b l o ' ~ . . It is 
in other words a geographical redistribution of power. Rather than 'a politics of 
180ne Zapatista (2009: personal interview, La Realidad) explained that the importance of 
the movement was that they were making plans new a new life: "when it rains one ~ r e p a : e s s
by getting an umbrella and wearing adequate clothing ... The world economic system IS gomg 
. ft Wh u want to change the world down the toilet. We are preparmg for what comes a er... en yo 
you need to prepare for it." 
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Figure 7.3: "You are in Zapatista Rebel territory. Here the people command and 
the government obeys" (Photo by Chris Hesketh, 2009) 
demand ' - whereby state power is reinforced as the supreme arbiter of decision 
making, the Zapatistas have moved to a 'politics of the act ' whereby they them-
selves assume the responsibility for the social (Day, 2005: 88-89). The impetus 
for this came when the government refused to ratify the original San Andres Ac-
cords agreed at peace talks in 1996, and instead finally passed in 2001 a watered 
down version of the bill , which failed to recognise the Zapatistas fundamental de-
mands for cultural rights to autonomy and the use and benefit of their territory 
(Mora, 2007: 71 ; for further details see People 's Global Action, 2007). This led 
the Zapatistas to a process of internal reflection and the further development of 
their autonomous project , through the creation of the Juntas de Buen Gobierno 
(JBG) in 2003, which put the San Andres accords into effect unilaterally. Rather 
than the state leading the process of renewal and absorbing discontent in the 
form of passive revolution (discussed in Chapter 5) the Zapatistas as a subaltern 
force managed to keep the initiative. Their rights were claimed and put into 
practice, not simply granted by an external power. As one member of the JBG 
of La Realidad (2009: personal interview) stated with regard to this: ··\\·it h or 
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without laws, we will construct our own autonomy." The Zapatistas ha\"e learnt 
from the failures of previous social movements in Chiapas who were co-opted and 
rendered powerless through their involvement with the state. In contrast they are 
extremely aware of the dangers of trasformismo and passive revolution. They are 
therefore insistent their struggle will take place without the mediation of political 
parties "who find new ways to win, new clothes to wear new words to say. and 
new gifts to offer" (Zapatista 1, 2009: personal interview, La Realidad). Instead, 
the Zapatistas have built a form of collective class power that is grounded in their 
own needs and aspirations. 
What then have been the Zapatistas key proposals? Politically, one can iden-
tify the production of three spatial scales at which the Zapatista politics now 
function within their territorial zone of influence. These are the community level. 
the municipal level, and the level of the caracoles which operate on a regional 
scale. These spatial scales are linked together as networks of resistance (Gonza-
lez Cassanova, 2005). The caracoles are an example of urban experimentation 
the Zapatistas have been involved with, housing as they do key economic foun-
dations of Zapatismo, as well as schools, health clinics, and meeting centres. The 
premise of creating this level of government was to co-ordinate better the efforts 
of the autonomous municipalities, to counter the uneven development that had 
taken place between areas under Zapatista influence19 , and provide a focal point 
for people wishing to engage with the movement. Meaning snail or shell in Span-
ish, the idea of the caracoles was for knowledge to spiral outwards among their 
communities. 
Drawing on the indigenous tradition of the cargo (discussed in the previous 
chapter), members of the community assembly are elected to the municipal gov-
ernment where they generally serve a term of around 2-3 years. The municipal 
government contains the general command, the agrarian council and the honour 
and justice commissions. Members work for 1-2 days a week and then return to 
their communities. Members of the Municipal government are further divided in 
three teams of 7-8 people to occupy positions on the JBG. These teams rotate 
19For example a 10% tax is made on all solidarity contributions from NGOs working in 
Zapatista territory. 10% is also levied on any government project that wants to pass t h ~ o u g ~ ~
their zone of influence (JBG, 2009: personal interview, La Realidad; Stahler-Sholk et ai., 200 I. 
57). 
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every 10 days or S020 (JBG La Garrucha, 2009: personal intervie,Y). The princi-
ple of rotation is important for a number of reasons, both economic and political. 
Economically it is vital to allow members to return to their communities to be 
able to plant and tend crops (as work on the Junta is an unpaid r e s p o n s i b i l i t ~ · ·
rather than a position of prestige). However, in rotating in this manner an im-
portant political mechanism also operates as it ensures that representati,'es are 
constantly in contact with their social base. As Marcos (2004) explained. it is 
a new way of doing politics "so that the task of governing is not exclusiye to 
one group, so that there are no 'professional' leaders, so that learning is for the 
greatest number of people, and so that the idea that government can only be 
carried out by 'special people' is rejected." A member of the JBG at La Realidad 
(2009: personal interview) described the Juntas as a space in which they learned 
to construct autonomy. Therefore, "the Junta is like a school ,,,here we learn to 
govern." This model of governance thus conforms to the theory of autogestion 
described in Chapter 2. The principle of rotation also overcomes one of the po-
tential problems inherent to this concept, namely the formation of a bureaucracy 
(Lefebvre 1966/2009: 147). Some have sought to argue that autogestion dovetails 
with neoliberal ideologies of self-help (Higgins, 2004: 140). However. this is to ig-
nore the key differences of social purpose. As Lefebvre (1979/2009: 128-9) makes 
clear, the latter consists in "transferring the problems, but not the priyileges of 
the central power to grassroots organization." 
Education itself is perhaps the most advanced aspect of Zapatismo, not only 
in the sense that it is the most active and pervasive, with each community now 
having a school, but also in the sense that it is seeking to ground education 
within the peoples own reality, in terms of history, and social environment (Ross, 
2008: personal interview, Mexico City). Education promoters are nm" sent to 
each village where maths, history and language tuition are taught in whatever 
the language the children speak (education promoter, 2009: personal interview, 
La Realidad). A system has been created whereby those who gain literacy can 
then serve the community either through working on the Juntas or themseh'es 
. 1 .. th munity becoming education promoters and thus collectIVe y rmsmg e com .. 
20In La Garrucha the Junta is staffed by an 8 member team with two members f r ~ m m e ~ c ~ ~ of 
d 211 'ties In La Reahdad It IS a the four municipalities, that in turn represent aroun commUlll. .. 
~ ~ . 4 .. l't' d around 150 commurntles. I member team, also representmg mUlllClpa lIes an 
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Figure 7.4: Primary school in Oventik (Photo by Chris Hesketh, 2009) 
Another important aspect of the Zapatista's autonomous project is their pro-
vision of ontonomous justice and law, based on the indigenous tradition. This is 
based on the principle of reparations rather than the western system of punish-
ment . Someone found committing a crime is sentenced to work in the community, 
and the appropriate sentences are decided by village assemblies (JGB , La Reali-
dad; JGB, La Garrucha, 2009: personal interviews). Indeed, non-Zapatista com-
munities have been known to ask the Juntas to adjudicate in particular disputes 
helping to soften traditional int ra-community tensions (Hansen , 2008 : personal 
interview, Tlaxcala) . One prominent example on their justice provision is the 
prohibition on alcohol within the communit ies. One must understand this in 
terms of the history of exploitation in Chiapas, whereby alcohol was forced onto 
the communities as payment in lieu of money. It was t he key means by which 
caciques enriched themselves and caused further problems in the community with 
alcoholism and domestic violence (see Lewis, 2005: 161-3; Bobrow-Strain . 2007: 
71). A collective decision was therefore made in t he assemblies to ban it (JBG . 
La Realidad, 2009: personal interview). 
Overcoming alienation has also been important in the realm of production. as 
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well as the social reproduction, of the community. The Junta de Buen Gobiemo 
at La Garrucha (2009: personal interview) stressed their elders had lived through 
suffering and had bosses to answer to, but they had never known bosses. In a 
misinformed analysis of the movement, Tom Brass (2005: 665) labels the Zapatis-
tas 'petty small holders' primarily interested in protecting their private property. 
However, this is to ignore the fact that, from their inception the Zapatistas hm'e 
promoted collective ownership rights, an example of which was the R e v o l u t i o n a r ~ ' '
Agrarian Law declared in 1994 (Lorenzano 1998: 139). Production is largely or-
ganized in cooperatives and is taking place more and more in a collective manner 
as one Zapatista confirmed (2009: personal interview, La Realidad). Production 
is undertaken first and foremost for the subsistence needs of the community, al-
though some products are exchanged on the market. In La Realidad there is a 
bank that provides loans at a rate of just 2% interest for those who need money. 
Interest is charged so that extra funds can be generated for the community if 
needed. Jorge Santiago (2008: personal interview, San Cristobal) the former 
Director of Desarrollo Econ6mico y Social de los Mexicanos Indigenas (DESMI, 
Indigenous Mexican Social and Economic Development), a San Cristobal based 
NGO that has worked for over thirty years in Chiapas with indigenous groups, 
argues that the Zapatista communities have been involved in a profound process 
of change. Although collective work has a long history in Chiapas, the idea of 
collective ownership of property, in terms of the means of production, has been 
something new that the Zapatistas have contributed to. One example of this 
is the women's collective from Oventik 'Mujeres por la Dignidad' (Women for 
Dignity). They formed in 1997, and now have over 700 members from over 4 mu-
nicipalities. Products from Zapatista communities, including clothing, artwork, 
coffee and other such things, as sold within TierrAdentro, a Zapatista solidarity 
cafe in San Cristobal. It has been pointed out that in global commodity chain 
production, the largest benefits rarely accrue to the direct producers (Radcliffe 
and Laurie, 2006: 88). This strategy of the Zapatistas however ensures it is 
the primary producers, who receive the full benefit of their labour, not coyotes. 
Having seen the success of the collective marketing of the Zapatistas, some non-
Zapatista communities have requested to sell products jointly with them. Some 
products are also sold through the solidarity economy, most notably in the US. 
Canada and Western Europe. The solidarity economy provides 'breathing room' 
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to some communities on occasions, but according to Tom Hansen (2009. personal 
interview, San Cristobal) "the substance of Zapatismo does not depend on it ," It 
is worth noting that the reindigenisation of production has a particular geography 
to it that is frequently not understood by ladinos. In Nettie Wild's documentan' 
A Place Called Chiapas, Jorge Kanter, one of the most (in)famous landowners of 
Chiapas (whose family lost three of their four ranches to the Zapatistas) argues 
that despite inheriting the land and infrastructure, nothing has been done \\'ith 
it, and the fields are overgrown and unkempt. However, this view is based on a 
totally different understanding of what it means to produce. In Kanter's case, 
production relates to capital accumulation and doing as much as possible with 
the resources. For indigenous peasant communities, production relates the abil-
ity to live in harmony with the land and wider environment (Castillo and Aida, 
2001: 218-9). This includes leaving certain tracts of the land fallow, explaining 
why certain areas appear as idle and overgrown to those not familiar with this 
method of farming (see also Bobrow-Strain, 2007: 159-160 for a discussion of this 
issue). 
Lastly the Zapatista have developed their own autonomous health service. 
Each autonomous municipality now has its own health clinic, with prominent 
hospitals such as the Clinic 'Commandata Ramona' located in La Garrucha and 
the clinic 'Guadalupana' at Oventik. These clinics conduct health consultations 
and minor surgeries within Zapatista territory and are free for Zapatista mem-
bers, whilst those from non-Zapatista communities are only asked to pay a small 
fee. These developments highlight the revolutionary politics of the Zapatistas. 
and shows concrete evidence for spatial transformation that have been induced 
through collective power, transforming conditions of everyday life. 
7.10 The scale of the Zapatistas 
However, it is not just within Chiapas that the Zapatistas have had an influence. 
As was mentioned in the introduction, the Zapatista politics has operated on a 
variety of spatial scales that includes a local, regional, national and transnational 
component. 
With regard to the national scale, they have undoubtedly been the most influ-
ential social movement that the country has seen since the Revolution. As John 
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Figure 7.5: Zapatista autonomous health Clinic, La Garrucha (Photo by Chris 
Hesketh) 2009) 
Ross (2008: personal interview, Mexico City) puts it: "In a country that was de-
pendent on one party for 7 decades to provide everything for them from the cradle 
to the grave, doing things for yourself was not encouraged. The message of the 
Zapatistas was therefore radical and has inspired others." The Zapatista rebel-
lion has been hailed as "the most powerful force for democratization in r..!lexico" 
(Collier and Collier, 2005: 450). Not only did the emergence of the Zapatistas 
coincide with the ending of the PRI's 71 year rule in 200021 , but additionally. 
the Zapatistas have opened the political terrain for a plethora of civil society 
groups to flourish (Gilbreth and Otero , 2001: 8-9). This was further enhanced 
with the Otra Campana (Other Campaign) which took place in 2006 alongside 
the national presidential elections. This was designed to build networks with 
other social movements across Mexico who were 'below and to the left". The 
Otra has sought to put into practice ideas about autonomy on a wider scale. 
and seeks to construct a national political force that , at the same time. is not a 
21 With the election of Vicente Fox as leader of the Partido Acci6n N aci6nal (Party of 1\ a tiona! 
Action, PAN). 
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party that aspires to office (Mora, 2007: 65-67). This is precisely a strategy that 
struggles against the dangers of passive revolution that came from the process 
of national democratisation trying, as it did, to absorb opposition movements 
into an acceptable sphere of discontent (Morton, 2005: 190).22 The Zapatistas 
have rejected representative democracy as an irrelevance that fails to deal with 
fundamental structural inequalities (Villafuerte Solis, 2005: 479; H a r y e y ~ ~ 1999: 
246), and thus seek to widen the meaning of democratic participation. It is also 
part of the inside/outside dialectic of the movement, that is proactive at the local 
level but also recognises the importance of political solidarities outside of it. As 
one Zapatista in La Realidad (Zapatista 2, 2009: personal interview), put it: "it 
is important that people do not forget we are still here struggling. ,. 
Although not covered by the mainstream news, the Zapatistas have formed 
and fortified alliances with various social movements across Mexico for example 
the Frente de Pueblos en Defensa de La Tierra (FPDT, Peoples Front in Defence 
of the Land), in Atenco, the Consejo Nacional Urbano Campesino (CNUC, Na-
tional Urban Peasant Council) in Tlaxcala and the Frente Popular Francisco Villa 
Independiente (FPFV-I, Independent Francisco Villa Popular Front) in Mexico 
City. Tom Hansen, whose organization Mexico Solidarity Network works in close 
association with many of these movements, refutes claims that this has not been 
a success, and instead agues that it cannot be viewed in terms of 2-3 years, but 
rather must be seen as a 30-40 year project. This is because "the ideological 
foundations of autonomy is not something that can take root overnight. It takes 
a lot of education and practical experience to internalise something that isn't 
corporatist organizing." The Zapatistas therefore have helped inspire a new con-
ception of thinking about political organization that explicitly rejects the Leninist 
model of vanguardism, whereby social struggles are subordinated to the interests 
of the party.23 Whilst autonomy has a long tradition in Oaxaca, the Zapatistas 
certainly helped to reignite social struggles there, showing what could be made 
possible. Inspired by the Zapatistas, a number of 'autonomous municipalities' 
have sprung up throughout Mexico including Zirahuen, San Salvador Atenco and 
San Juan Copola. If the Zapatistas resistance does indeed offer an example of 
22For an in depth analysis of this trend see Robinson (1996). . . , 
23Marcos (2003) made his position on this matter abundantly clear WIth a commumque 
entitled 'I shit on the Revolutionary Vanguards of this planet' 
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a counter-hegemonic struggle (see Morton, 2002), it is arguable that it is one in 
which the term counter-hegemony requires a double reading, as not only are they 
countering a current regime of hegemony, they are also countering the logic ~ f f
hegemony itself a singular emancipatory project. 
As Marcos declared in relation to traditional political organization: 
It always tries to impose a hegemony of sorts; a hegemony of class, 
or of a vision of the world, or a political position over the rest of 
society .. .In the case of a new politics that does not propose the tak-
ing of power, and when confronted with the search for hegemony, the 
first task is to recognise that there are differences between all of us , 
and that in light of this we aspire to a politics of tolerance and inclu-
sion. You cannot aspire to eliminate the other, that which is different 
(Huerta, 1999: 270). 
The Zapatistas have also been involved in the politics of resistance at the 
transnational scale. Their example has proved to be hugely inspirational in the 
alter-globalization movement (Collier and Collier, 2005: 451; Morton, 2002: 28). 
Through their skilful use of the internet to disseminate communiques, the Zap-
atistas have generated what Cleaver (1998: 81) refers to as the 'electronic fabric 
of struggle'. The numerous encuentros (encounters) organized in Zapatista terri-
tory have attracted participation from a wide transnational network of support. 
This has not only proved key in providing material support for the struggle, it has 
also protected the communities from military attacks that had been encouraged 
by private capital. 24 The internet was key therefore to scaling up their politi-
cal project. As Olesen (2004: 225) highlights, however, the Zapatista resistance 
project is one that it has a developed a relationship with transnational solidarity 
activists based upon mutuality, that is to say, it does not depend on a one way 
flow of resources but activists also come to Zapatista territory to learn and share 
experiences. 
The Zapatistas have also helped to redefine strategies of resistance in an age 
of global capital. This stems from their consolidation of local power, but with 
24 A memo from the Chase-Manhattan Bank in 1995 called for the Mexican government 
to 'eliminate' the Zapatistas in order "to demonstrate their effective control of the national 
territory and security policy" in order to reassure stock markets. 
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a supranational projection that critiques neoliberal capitalism. This has proved 
hugely influential to resistance to megaprojects such as Plan Puebla Panama. 
where over 100 social movements have created a network of resistance that base 
themselves within their everyday social reality but also look for alternative means 
of integration (Coronado and Mora, 2006: 36; Harvey, 2006c: 214-5). 
7.11 ,Zapata vive! 
The Zapatista project has, of course, been taking place concomitantly with in-
creased activities of the state to re-absorb this social struggle into its hegemonic 
structure. The Zapatistas after all offer a clear challenge to the logic of the state. 
usurping its monopoly on territorial control, as well as taking over key functions 
usually associated with the state such as the provision of education and health as 
well as the administration of justice. The response by the Mexican state has gone 
through various phases. The first of these was a direct military response. Accord-
ing to Ernesto Ledesma (personal interview, San Cristobal, June 2009) director 
of CAPISE, an NGO that monitors militarization and human rights violations in 
Chiapas, there still remain 59 military bases within indigenous territory. many of 
which encircle the caracoles, the political nerve centres of Zapatismo. 
However, generally speaking, the direct military response has been replaced 
by more subtle means of economic coercion and political pressure, in conjunction 
with the use of state backed paramilitary violence against the Zapatista communi-
ties. 25 Tom Hansen (2009: personal interview, San Cristobal) director of Mexico 
Solidarity Network, a US-based organization that has worked closely with the 
communities since the uprising, defines the situation in terms of a state strategy 
of low intensity warfare. In Chiapas government aid programs have been offered 
to communities who were formerly aligned with the Zapatistas such as CIOAC 
and ARIC. Various inducements have also been offered to these communities 
who also took over land in the wake of the rebellion to normalise their titles un-
der PROCEDE. This has had to increasing claims for land being extended into 
Zapatista territory (Olivera, 2009: personal interview, San Cristobal). The i\Iex-
ican state has thus not ceased searching for ways to marginalise the Zapatist a 
25For updated information of these violation against the communities see the websites of Fray 
Bartolome or CAPISE. 
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project and reclaim their recuperated land. This has escalated tensions inter 
and intra-communally, as the Zapatistas do not allow their members to accept 
government aid programs. Many of these government programs such as Plan 
Caiiadas, Program a Integral para el Desarrollo Sustentable de la Selva (PIDDS. 
Integral Program for the sustainable development of the Jungle) and Proyecto 
de Desarrollo Social Integrado y Sostenible (PRODESIS, Socially Integrated So-
cial and Development project for Sustainable Development), have targeted the 
Selva Lacandona area, the base of the Zapatista movement. They are interpreted 
by some as counter-insurgency tactics, that dovetail with the new accumulation 
strategy of the Mexican state in Chiapas (Olivera, 2009: personal interview, San 
Crist6bal).26 The Mexican state has also offered numerous spatial responses to 
the Zapatista challenge. One has been to re-municiapalise the region in an ef-
fort to undermine the autonomous communities and reassert the state's power 
to name (Leyva Solano, 2001: 35). More recently there has been a develop-
ment project under the Juan Sabines government of creating 'rural cities'. The 
state government has identified the dispersion of the population as one of the 
greatest problems for the economic modernization of Chiapas and a prime fac-
tor explaining rural poverty. Therefore, in a 5 year developmental project they 
have proposed to construct 27 'rural cities' that congregate populations into large 
communities. 27 Thus far two have been constructed, one at Nuevo Juan Grijalva 
(a community that had previously been destroyed by a natural disaster), and the 
other at Santiago del Pinar (close to the Zapatista caracole of Oventik). These 
cities have been built in conjunction with large Mexican corporations such as Far-
macias del Ahorro, Banamex, Banorte, and TelMex among others. This is a clear 
effort by the state to re-territorialise communities through offering material incen-
tives such as housing, jobs and social services. Drawing from the work of Gilbert 
and Ward (1984; 1985) who investigated similar issues of government interven-
tion, housing policy and community actions programs in the 1980s within Mexico 
City, one can see this is an attempt by the state to re-legitimate itself. The rural 
cities project thus should be interpreted in light of an attempted re-composition 
26The Selva Lacondona is an area of increasing strategic importance to the :Mexican state. It 
contains a huge amount of Mexico's biodiversity, and thus has become essential to projects of 
eco-tourism and bio-prospecting. 
27Information on this project can be found at the state government's webstite -
http://www.ciudadesrurales.chiapas.gob.mx/ciudadesrurales ). 
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of hegemony and through geographical strategies of attempted trasformismo (see 
also Chapter 8). As Gilbert and Ward (1984: 770) put it. 'The aim is less to 
change conditions for the poor than to make sure they cause no problems." In 
this respect one can compare the rural cities project to classic spatial strategies 
of counter-insurgency such as strategic hamlets in Vietnam. 
There are multiple geo-political and geo-economic reasons for these tactics. 
One reason, of course, is the threat to state power that the Zapatista example 
sets. As Hardt and Negri (2004: 334) argue, "without the active participation 
of the subordinated, sovereignty crumbles". The fact that the Juntas function 
everyday is thus a powerful inspiration for others to follow. Whilst not necessarily 
offering a model to copy, it allows people to expand their horizons of the possible. 
Numerous scholars have questioned whether autonomous projects can be viable 
without the conquest of state power, arguing that it does little to affect the 
resources in state hands (see inter alia Brass, 2005: 667; Stahler Sholk et at., 
2007: 9; Callinicos, 2003: 94). However, this argument is misguided in a number 
of respects. For example, it conceives of state power as 'some-thing' that can 
be taken (a ready made machinery), and moreover assumes that it is only a 
central juridical entity. However, as this chapter earlier indicated, the state in 
Chiapas functioned through the control of political communities. Therefore, the 
struggle against state power is something that takes place "first and foremost on 
a daily basis, in communities, ejidos, unions, schools, churches, and many other 
sites" (Harvey 1999: 260). The Zapatistas in other words have not left the state 
intact, but rather they have taken power from it through their appropriation of 
land and production of alternative space. Lefebvre (1991: 383), in identifying 
the intimate connection between capital accumulation and the role of the state, 
argues powerfully that: 
Pressure from below must confront the state in its role as organizer 
of space, as the power that control urbanization ... The state defends 
class interests while setting itself above society as a whole, and its 
ability to intervene in space must be turned back against it, by grass-
roots opposition, in the form of counter-projects designed to thwart 
strategies, plans and programmes imposed from above. 
This is exactly what the Zapatistas have done. If we recall the triad of spa-
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tial practices, representations of space and spaces of representation. outlined in 
Chapter 3, we see that the state has had, and continues to have a yery specific 
representation of space with regard to Chiapas, and the rest of ~ v : 1 e x i c o . . B ~ ' ' yirtue 
of its savoir, the state has claimed the right to reconfigure the space of 1Iexico 
and insert it into transnational productive circuits. However. these attempts 
to modify the spatial practices in one area led to an unanticipated alternatiye 
spatial practice on behalf of some of the indigenous people who have an alterna-
tive cosmo-vision and thus through their representational spaces looked to create 
alternative spatial practices. Arraceli Burguete of CIESAS (2009: personal inter-
view, San Cristobal) describes this as a process leading to a 'communalisation' 
of indigenous struggles and a re-signification of indigenous life (much like the 
discussion of the previous chapter). The Zapatistas in Chiapas now represent the 
most important counter weight to the government in the state of Chiapas. As 
Neil Harvey (2005b: 629) states, even though the Zapatista support base is in 
the North and North east of the country, "the ripple effects of Zapatismo are felt 
throughout the state." 
This can most clearly be seen in the struggles between two very different 
visions of the future. As is the case with Oaxaca, so too is Chiapas a 'spatial 
target' for the expansion of capital in Mexico. Key to this is Plan Puebla Panama 
(re-named Plan Mesoamerica) which seeks to integrate the south of Mexico and 
Central America into a free trade zone, in the same manner as other economic 
blocs that have created economies of scale. Key to this are: agricultural plan-
tations controlled by multinational corporations, transnational road networks, 
inter-oceanic canals and the development of new port capacities linked with com-
mercial corridors (Coronado and Mora, 2006: 26). It has been recognised by 
state planners that since the passage of NAFTA, whilst the Northern parts of the 
country have been able to take advantage of free trade with the US, the south 
has had neither help from the state, nor access to markets, leaving it unable to 
increase its competitiveness in the global economy (see Davila et al., 2002; Har-
vey, 2006c: 212). Furthermore, there has been a realization among some elites 
that the old economic models of development based on extensive cattle rearing, 
petroleum, extraction and agricultural colonization has left both ecological prob-
lems and contributed to political agitation. This has led to the development of 
a new 'ecological' model of capitalism for the southern Mexican states ( H a n · e ~ · . .
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2006c: 205). A tension has also emerged between various fractions of capital that 
seek to utilise the resources of Chiapas in different ways. This is essentialh" a 
conflict between those that seek to extract resources and those that seek to ~ r e e
serve them (albeit for the benefits of commodification). Thus, "in addition to the 
'traditional' economic contradictions in the region, there are now new ones, re-
sulting from pressures to modify the use of territory and its population" (Ceceiia 
and Barreda 1998:, 55-57, 43). 
On the one hand, over 500 thousand of hectares of concessions of land haye 
been granted to mining corporations, and the increasing planting of mono cultures 
such as African balm and Eucalyptus threaten the areas bio-diversity and water 
resources (Castro-Soto, 2009: personal interview, San Cristobal). This has taken 
place alongside the promotion of eco-tourism by the government, with plans to 
construct new 'tourist corridors to place such as Palenque, and the l\lontes Azules 
Biosphere, that will dramatically reduce the time it takes to reach these areas 
(Burguete, Ledesma, 2009: personal interviews, San Cristobal). Indeed this con-
stitutes another part of FONATUR's integrally planned resorts. The aim in this 
case is to transform Palenque into the port of entry into the 'Mayan world'. All 
of these projects imply the necessary dispossession of the peasantry from their 
land. 28 This ecological model is thus a myopic one that does not include the 
indigenous people in its model, or at least claims to know their interests and 
assumes what sort of people they wish to become. As Neil Harvey (2006: 211) 
argues, state planners view Chiapas as "a region without people, without a his-
tory, but supposedly a future." Conflicts over these projects have escalated in 
recent years. 29 In explaining this situation, Mercedes Olivera (personal inter-
view, San Cristobal, 2009) argues "the government is defending its social and 
political project. Whatever group is against that is an enemy of the state." 
The Zapatistas have remained resolute in the face of these processes. Despite 
the military encirclement, the autonomous communities have been maintained 
and remarkable achievements have been made in the face of overwhelming hostil-
ity. According to Tom Hansen (2009: personal interview, San Cristobal), the new 
28This planned road will direct bisect two Zapatista communities. 
29The most recent case has involved the arrest and detention of 8 ejidatarios from San 
Sebastian Bachaj6n (Chi16n). This has taken place in relation to a long r u n n ~ n g g dispute over 
who had the right to control cultural sites such as the famous Agua Azul and l-.hsol-Ha waterfall 
(Bellinghausen, 2009). 
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generation of Zapatistas have "internalised a strong sense of pride in Zapatismo" 
giving them both a greater sense of confidence as well as a better understanding 
of where they want to go. They retain therefore a moral authority and continue 
to occupy a hugely symbolic reference for wider anti-capitalist s t r u ~ g l e s s in :\Iexico 
and beyond. 
7.12 Conclusion 
It has been highlighted that the region of Chiapas has long been a site of politi-
cal contestation through which important spatial developments have taken place. 
Under colonial administration this involved the reorganization of economic actiy-
ity, and the division of space into territorial units of control. Although this mode 
of production did indeed produce its own distinctive space. it was one in which 
things remained produced in space, rather than space itself becoming the object 
for constant transformations for the production of surplus value. In examining 
how capital sought to transform space we explored the development of foreign 
capital investments around the 1890s and its affects on spatial practices within 
the state. It was demonstrated how labour relations begun to be fundamentally 
transformed and space began to be used instrumentally to facilitate greater profit 
returns. The changing dynamics of spatial production were then considered with 
the move towards the state mode of production during lSI. As was highlighted in 
the body of the chapter, all of these projects required a 'clash of spatializations' 
which negated indigenous connaissance through the imposition of a state based 
savoir. The development of capitalism within Chiapas was analysed as taking 
place both rapidly and unevenly, creating social divisions within communities, 
and threatening socio-ecological problems. In terms of how this was resisted, 
the chapter highlighted the consistent struggles of indigenous communities over 
land and territory. The most radical challenge to the logic of capital has come 
however from the Zapatistas who, since 1994 have offered a wholesale alterna-
tive geographical developmental project that has both transformed the reality of 
Chiapas, as well as Mexico and other parts of the world. This has demonstrated 
the importance of collective power over resources and also has had far ranging 
implications for theorisations of strategies of resistance, operating as it does on a 
variety of spatial scales, but without the taking of state power. This has forced 
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those on the left to challenge many long held axioms about the nature of politi-
cal transformation and led to the Zapatistas being interpreted from a yariety of 
standpoints ranging from 'postmodern rebels' (Burbach, 1994), 'new anarchists' 
(Graeber, 2002) to 'radical democrats' (Harvey 1999). However. the commonal-
ity of all these positions is the hope the Zapatista struggle represents for another 
world. In this sense Holloway (1998: 189) is surely correct when he argues that 
the Zapatistas are not a 'they, but a 'we'. In terms of the final question, the yia-
bility of this project, this remains of course an open question. In many respects. 
it will depend upon others accepting their invitation to join their struggle. \Vhat 
is certain is that from facing an existential threat, indigenous subjectivities re-
main alive and well in Chiapas, and remain a national and international reference 
point for the spaces of resistance. 
2010 has however already witnessed increased repression against the autonomous 
communities, with dislodgements and heightened confrontations.3D The Zapatista 
project thus stands at a critical crossroads. With elevated tension in Mexico, re-
sulting from increased militarization (ostensibly to fight the 'war on drugs'), and 
centennial celebrations of the Mexican Revolution, it is ever more vital the Za-
patista struggle reconnects with wider national and transnational movements of 
resistance. When questioned what the future held for the movement in the face of 
mounting state repression, one Zapatista (2009: personal interview, La Realidad) 
replied: "They want to bury us, but they have forgotten that we are s e e d s . ~ ' '
30For more information see recent denouncements by the JBGs of La Garrucha and Morelia 
- http://enlacezapatista.ezln.org.rnx/ 
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Conclusion 
Reflecting upon the rise of fascism in Europe following the Great Depression, 
Lefebvre (1947/2008: 153) wrote: 
one day individualism begins to collapse (and not as a result of a crisis 
of ideas of 'world views', but because of a material crisis, both eco-
nomic and political), and these erstwhile individualists rush headlong 
to form a crowd, a horde, urged on by the most insane, most loath-
some, most ferocious 'ideas' leaving the last vestige of human reason 
behind. 
It would not be hyperbolic to claim that today we are once again living in 
a period of worldwide material crisis. Alongside the economic crisis that has 
engulfed the global economy since 2007, we are also facing an unprecedented 
ecological crisis in the form of climate change (for a discussion see Castree, 2010). 
Adding to this general instability is the ongoing war on/of terror, that shows no 
signs of ending any time soon, and has been interpreted by some as a clear example 
of resource wars, linked to a new imperialism (Chomsky, 2004; Callinicos, 2009; 
Harvey, 2003).1 Mexico, of course, has not been immune to these dynamics with 
IThe New York Times recently revealed that roughly $ltrillion worth of mineral deposits 
have been 'uncovered' in Afghanistan by pentagon officials and a team of American geologists 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/14/world/asia/14minerals.html?pagewanted=l&J=l&::ref 
=afghanistan - date accessed 26/07/10). It is worth pointing out that many of these minerals 
are what is known as 'rare earth metals' essential for use in green technology, as well as mobile 
phones and computers. Hitherto the market for these was almost exclusively monopolised by 
China. 
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record levels of violence connected to the war on drugs and rising unemployment, 
all of which has been used as a weapon against civil society groups demanding 
change.
2 
What connects these issues together is of course the manner in which 
they are related to the dynamics of the capitalist mode of production. As Lefebvre 
(1976: 107) astutely notes "wars and cyclical crises have the same result: they 
liquidate excess (things and men)." Rather than viewing them as anomalies. they 
should instead be interpreted as essential moments in the cycle of accumulation. 
devaluation and a re-starting of accumulation. However, the spectre of climate 
change that is haunting the world is a scenario from which we may not be able 
to rebuild anew. 3 
It is against this background therefore that the 'big questions' are once again 
being asked, even if the answers are not yet known. For instance, we are forced to 
question what 'growth' means, what its affects are, and whether it can continue 
ad infinitum (more on this topic will follow).4 Can global capitalism be reformed 
to become a more benign type of social democracy or new global Keynesianism as 
some are calling for? If not, what alternatives might there be, and how viable are 
these? Whilst not offering definitive answers, this thesis has sought to contribute 
to this debate (albeit in a modest way), not only by highlighting the problems with 
the spaces of capital, but also through an exploration of the spaces of resistance. 
In contrast to the view of Peck and Tickell (2002: 381), it would appear that 
neoliberalism is no longer "the common sense of our time." If crises do indeed 
provide the terrain favourable to the dissemination of certain modes of thinking, 
then it is vital that at this juncture we engage in critical reflection, utilising 'good 
sense' to move towards productive activity and the production of space that is a 
collective oeuvre. At the same time, as the quote at the beginning of the chapter 
highlighted, this must be tempered with the undeniable fact that during periods 
2In 2005, Mexico, together with the United States and Canada launched the 'Security and 
Prosperity Partnership' that in the Mexican case has been formalised though the Merida Ini-
tiative. Thomas Shannon, the U.S Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere affairs defined 
this purpose succinctly when he stated 'We are armouring NAFTA' (quoted in Carlson, 2008: 
17). 
3Some countries are nevertheless using global warming as the melt-
ing of polar ice caps to stake new territorial claims to resources 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/europe/6927395.stm (date accessed - 7/8/10). 
4As David Harvey (2010: 27) has pointed out, the implication ofthis is that a rate ofroughly 
3% growth forever which requires ever increasing profitable investment o p p o r t ~ n i t i ~ s . . For an 
excellent discussion of the issue of growth and alternatives to it see New InternatlOnahst (2010). 
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of material crisis, the potential also exists for the most reactionary form of ideas 
to take hold, which makes the task all the more urgent. 
This conclusion will add some further reflections to these issues whilst relating 
them to the key themes that have been covered in the course of the research. 
namely, the production of space, class struggle, hegemony and passiYe revolution. 
It will be organised in the following manner. Section 1 will outline what the 
contributions of this research have been. Section 2 will recap the arguments that 
have been made in the preceding chapters, before Section 3 moves on to develop 
a number of crucial reflections for future developments, before final concluding 
remar ks are made. 
8.1 Contributions of the thesis 
This thesis has highlighted how struggles over space are an essential feature of the 
global political economy. Through the analysis conducted at a variety of levels 
(abstract, meso, and concrete) that included two detailed empirical case studies, 
it has also furthered an understanding of uneven and combined development, in 
particular its relation to the historical sociology of state formation (extending into 
processes of everyday state formation). Unlike the extant literature on uneven and 
combined development within the historical sociology of international relations, 
the thesis sought to deploy the term both in a way that was attentive to issues 
of the spatial and furthermore, in a manner that was germane to contemporary 
struggles. 
The multi-scalar analysis that the thesis adopted has also been vital to pro-
viding a corrective to perspectives that have hitherto focused solely on macro-
historical structures, or the nation-state level, or conversely, the local area studies 
approaches that have failed to adequately theorise the inter-connections between 
the local, the national and the global. The concept of uneven and combined hege-
mony was deployed in an effort to overcome and transcend these separate follies, 
informed with both an abstract theory as well as empirical evidence that space 
and scale are, always socially produced and subject to change. It was through the 
medium of class struggles that changes were shown to come about, both through 
the efforts to expand space of capital accumulation, and through subaltern strug-
gles resist this and to create counter-spaces, or spaces of difference. The notion 
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of passive revolution - defined as a class stratagem that aims to defuse radical 
subaltern pressure through their 'statisation' and thus (re)absorption _ ,,·as ap-
pealed to in order to help serve as a key explanation in how this occurred though 
processes of restructuring that have served to further the development of capi-
talist social relations. This concept thus can aid our conclusion not so much in 
providing an answer to Lenin's (1902/1987) famous question of 'what is to be 
done?' but rather as a strategic orientation as to what is to be avoided. As the 
idiom goes, forewarned is forearmed. 
8.2 Results and prospects: a space odyssey 
An overarching concern of this thesis has been with space, and class struggles 
to control the production of space (and thus the wider biophysical environment). 
Within Mexico, the existence of a clash between two distinct spatial projects has 
been empirically demonstrated. This is only likely to intensify in the coming 
years, not just here, but also within the wider world. Following the analysis set 
out in Chapter 2, the reason for this is to be located in the inherently expansionary 
logic of capital which remains tied to an ideology of growth controlled by the state 
(Harvey, 2001; Lefebvre, 1975/2009: 105). Capital, as was highlighted, seeks to 
create its own distinct geography. That is, it seeks to transform pre-existing 
spaces into abstract space, functional for further accumulation. However, as 
was made clear, two caveats remain that impede this. First, the pre-capitalist 
landscape on which capital unfolds, influences its trajectory (for instance in the 
form of the existing inter-state system which prevents a global 'law of value' 
being established). Second (and the greater subject of our focus throughout the 
thesis) resistance in the form of counter-spaces also thwarts capital's attempts 
to transform the world in the realization of its own rationality. Capitalism was 
therefore postulated not as a complete totality but rather as a system that aims 
towards totalisation (Lacher, 2006: 103-104). 
This argument was taken a step further by exploring the changes in spatiality 
associated with the process of neoliberal restructuring, in the broad framework of 
the world economy (Chapter 3) and more specifically within the Latin American 
context (Chapter 4). In Chapter 3 the arguments of an influential set of scholars 
were examined in relation to debates surrounding the characterisation of space 
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under the latest phase of capitalism commonly characterised as globalisation. The 
implications this has for a politics of resistance was also critically explored. Key 
problems were highlighted in relation to the transnational thesis that included 
1) a poor understanding of the production of space and scale, 2) the lack of an 
engagement surrounding the problematic of uneven and combined development 
and the role of the 'international' and 3) an inadequate theorisation of resistance 
with regard to key questions of space and place. However, as had been made 
clear in Chapter 1, in the case of the extant literature on uneven and combined 
development within the historical sociology of international relations, these ar-
guments displayed both an overwhelming Eurocentism and also failed to engage 
with wider (largely geographical) literature on spatial theorising and its role in 
producing uneven development. Furthermore, their dominant focus of intellectual 
inquiry was in pre, or medieval history, rather than the modern era. Chapter 4 
thus began the process of responding to this neglect in the existing literature by 
shifting the focus from Europe to the historical sociology of state formation in 
Latin America (while situating the region within the wider conditioning of the 
global economy). In particular this chapter explored the contradictions of lSI as 
a spatial and social project for development and inclusion that led to the rise of 
neoliberalism as the region's new developmental paradigm. This chapter thereby 
gave an empirically informed theoretical analysis of the logic of uneven and com-
bined development that, at the same time, explored the creation of new spatial 
divisions of labour whilst concomitantly highlighting the resistances that this has 
provoked. Key issues that emerged through this discussion were those of pas-
sive revolution and trasformismo as elite class stratagems on the one hand, and 
the politicisation of space as a strategy for resistance movements on the other. 
Chapter 5 then shifted scales to examine these general trends in more empirical 
detail. This is a vital step for capturing both the specific and the general condi-
tions of state formation as Marx (1875/1996: 892) makes clear. In this chapter, 
passive revolution and hegemony were deployed in relation to understanding the 
production of space and scale in modern Mexico. Following the general analysis 
set out in Chapter 4, the contradictory dynamics of capital accumulation tied to 
the spatial projects of lSI were revealed in greater detail and the tensions that 
have resulted from the neoliberalisation of space were briefly discussed. This al-
lowed these tensions to be more fully explored in Chapters 6 and 7. These latter 
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two chapters sought to synthesise all the key theoretical points established in the 
preceding chapters as well as constructing new insights from empirical investiga-
tion into movements of resistance. These chapters thus served multiple functions. 
These included exploring how the shift from one mode of production to another 
alters the production of space, yet at the same time how pre-capitalist spaces 
and social relations alter the topography of capitalism as they unfold in symbio-
sis (the 'combined' part of uneven and combined development). These chapters 
also sought to provide a corrective to studies that have either focused s o l e l ~ ' ' on 
the national scale, or conversely have sought to explore local dynamics without 
attention to shifting national and global scales. This was accomplished through 
considering the dynamics of passive revolution at a sub-national scale and through 
the development of the concept of uneven and combined hegemony. Lastly. these 
chapters responded to the lack of engagement in the historical-geographical mate-
rialist literature with concrete movements of resistance, by conducting a detailed 
discussion of emergent alternative geographical projects that have been formed 
with the loose coalition of movements associated with the APPO in Oaxaca, and 
the struggle of the EZLN in Chiapas. 
8.3 Future orientations 
Many radical intellectuals have borrowed from Gramsci (1971: 175), citing in 
regard to social transformation that they retain pessimism of the intellect but 
optimism of the will. However, this is surely no longer sufficient (if it ever was), 
as what is required is both engaged purposeful (optimistic) intellectual activity, 
combined with an optimism of the will to put ideas into action. As has been 
made clear in Chapter 7, this relies on a break from institutionalised knowledge 
(savoir) and must instead be based upon an embedded, reflective and critical 
form of knowledge (connaissance). 
John Holloway (2002a: 53) has argued that an essential aspect of transforming 
the world is to direct both critical thought and action towards fetishism (a form 
of reification that endows commodities with a life of their own). However. the 
issue of fetishism can be approached in two different ways. The first of these is 
what he calls 'hard fetishism'. On this view, capitalist social relations are treated 
as an established fact that were constituted at some historical juncture and now 
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stand as a 'thing' to be destroyed at some point in time (presumably ,,-hen the 
'balance of forces' allow)_ Given what has been argued in earlier chapters with 
regard to the persistence of spaces of resistance, coupled with the warning not 
to ascribe rigidity or coherence to a category such as 'mode of production' this 
is a view we should clearly reject. A more fruitful approach can be found in 
what Holloway calls 'fetishisation as a process'. This postulates capitalism not as 
having an objective and durable existence, but rather stresses how it is a contested 
set of social relations that must constantly seek to (re)produce themseh-es in new 
(and profitable) ways (Holloway, 2002a: 78-89). This view is helpful for two main 
reasons. First, as was highlighted in Chapter 2, we must defetishise space in order 
to change it. Whereas capital remains tied to blind 'ideologies of growth' social 
criticism must stress how 'growth' is often predicated on the exploitation of labour 
and the destruction of natural resources. This can aid debates as to what growth 
we want (if any), how to link growth to socially useful endeavours, and lastly how 
we then define what is fact is socially useful. Second, viewing fetishism this way 
serves as a more empowering tool for social movements as whatever power-over 
capital contains it is based on a our own power-to (as discussed in the previous 
chapter). This clears the way for enacting collective power to achieve political 
transformation as it recognises that non-alienated forms of labour, fulfilment etc, 
are not things that are to be constructed following some final messianic battle, but 
rather exist in the here and now, albeit often as thwarted tendencies (Lefebvre, 
1976: 16). Fetishisation as a process conforms to the understanding of class 
struggle that has been stressed throughout this work, as a relational category 
rather than a fixed identity. The import of the concept of passive revolution is that 
it points us towards the very dangers of how these class struggles can be absorbed 
and their emancipatory tendencies blocked (see also Morton, 2011). Thus. it is 
precisely when action is informed by this alternative view of fetishisation, and 
cognisant of the dangers of passive revolution that real changes can begin to 
occur. As Lefebvre (1964/2009: 60) elucidates in relation to this point: "once 
social forces begin moving, everything happens, as if under this house, under this 
edifice that seemed solid and balanced, the earth begins to move. And there 
promptly appear fissures where once we saw a vertical rock face." 
How can we best reflect on the future of these developments? Gazing through 
a crystal ball to make concrete predictions is neither possible nor desirable. ~ e \ - -
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ertheless, certain empirical trends can still be observed and challenges theorised. 
In this sense two related issues stand out as perhaps the most significant. The 
first is the challenge that social movements seeking to construct counter-spaces 
face in attempts by the state to reabsorb them through passiye revolutionary 
tactics. The second issue relates to understanding this mode of struggle within 
the broader dynamics of what is occurring in Latin America. 
Within Mexico (as well as worldwide) globalisation has been characterised not 
only by a 'rollback' of welfare measure associated with the 'developmental state'. 
but also a 'roll-out' of new measures involving the active construction and nor-
malisation of neoliberal space (Peck and Tickell, 2002: 384, see previous chapters 
for details of this). However, this effective removal of the subaltern classes from 
'controlled inclusion' is not without its problems as the last two chapters have 
shown. Indeed as Robinson (2008: 280) has aptly noted, the crucial class function 
that the state plays within capitalist social relation has become impeded by its 
perceived lack of legitimacy. However, he is surely wrong when he claims that 
all forms of responsibility, however minimal, have been abandoned (Robinson, 
2008: 320). Rather, as Peck and Tickell (2002: 396) have argued, it has been 
necessary to construct "new modes of institution building designed to extend 
the neoliberal project, to manage its contradictions, and to secure its legitimacy. 
As was detailed in Chapter 2, Robinson (2003, 2004a, 2008) has argued that 
the transnationalisation of capital has also seen the formation of a transnational 
state apparatus - defined as a loose organisation of international and suprana-
tional economic and political institutions that co-ordinate policy.5 However, in 
his urge to see the macro-structures governing the global economy, Robinson's 
analysis elides the micro foundations of what can be called everyday forms of 
(transnational) state formation. This concept will now be briefly explicated and 
its reference to the continuance of passive revolutionary tactics made clear. 
One aspect of this dialectic between neoliberal rollback on the one hand, 
and roll-out on the other, has been the 'outsourcing' of state activities to NGOs 
(Roberts et ai., 2005: 1848; Petras, 1997: 17; Robinson, 2003: 227). Sarah Rad-
cliffe (2001: 22-34) notes that this is not only leading to new geographies of state 
building and state formation, but furthermore, the lines between government 
(state) and non-government are becoming blurred with multilateral agencIes, 
5For a blistering critique of the transnational state thesis see Cammack (2007). 
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NGOs and civil society organisations all contributing to development trajectories 
in new hybrid institutions. In other words rather than seeing state formation as 
simply taking place on a wider spatial scale (as the TNS thesis states) there is 
now a complex process of state formation taking place across a variety of spatial 
scales (see also Radcliffe, Laurie and Andolina, (2002)). 
At a subnational scale this has involved a shift to what is known as 'cul-
turally appropriate development' (see Chapter 7). Nevertheless, this f r e q u e n t l ~ ' '
still takes place with a neo-colonial mentality which views indigenous peoples 
as subjects to be 'developed' by an outside agency (Wainwright 2008). Evi-
dence for the following can be found in an Inter-American Development Bank 
paper which argues with regard to indigenous development: "the virtuous circle 
between culture and development can be achieved only to the extent that devel-
opment experts understand the local culture and create genuine opportunities for 
participation (Deruyttere, 1997: 11, emphasis added). This is clearly an attempt 
to tie subaltern classes firmly to wider transnational networks linked to funda-
mental neoliberal projects. In other words, what is happening is an everyday 
form of transnational state formation, or a passive revolution in everyday life. 
James Petras (1997) documents how NGO activity often leads to a new relation 
of dependency on outside donors who are non-accountable to the population. 
Moreover, NGO activity often (although not exclusively), favours projects 
and micro-enterprises in a particular locale at the expense of social movements 
activism that would look to frame struggles within a wider set of analytics. NGO 
activity can thus be related to the production of scale, in the sense that their 
presence is frequently about establishing the (limited) boundaries of activity. In 
this respect their proliferation can be seen in the broader context of what Stephen 
Gill (2008: 132, 177) has referred to as the 'new constitutionalism', whereby citi-
zenship rights and representation are conferred to capital, whilst insulating them 
from wider democratic debate. NGOs thus serve the social function of putting 
into practise discourses of 'good governance' and 'local participation', essentially 
acting as the local facilitators of trasformismo. Tom Hansen (personal interview, 
Tlaxcala, 2008) points out that even when NGO workers are well intentioned. the 
difficulty that comes with the model of organisation is that it is a professionalised 
bureaucracy governed by its own logic of having to attract money and resources 
as well as needing to demonstrate results to their funders (who are often external 
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bodies). However, he questions whether the construction of autonomy (a central 
demand in both the struggles of the EZLN and the APPO) is something that can 
be quantified and put into facts and figures. 
Mindful of the explication rendered in Chapter 5, which detailed that pas-
sive revolution should serve as a category of interpretation rather a particular 
program, we must remain attentive to the manner in which new forms of state 
formation seek to reabsorb subaltern struggles such as those represented by the 
EZLN and the APPO. Recalling the discussions from Chapter 7 relating to the 
decline of PRI hegemony in Chiapas from the mid 1970s onwards, and also bear-
ing in mind Stephen Gill's (2008: 58) assertion regarding hegemony and passi,"e 
revolution representing two points on a continuum, a convincing case can be 
made that the rural cities project is - in this case quite literally - a concrete 
manifestation of a passive revolutionary initiative articulated at a sub-national 
scale. In other words, it represents precisely an attempt to at everyday form 
of transnational state formation, seeking to re-inscribe recalcitrant elements of 
the population into a development project that would create a historical bloc 
stretched across a variety of spatial scales (e.g. production of agricultural goods 
linked to global commodity prices, through a national neoliberal project, that in 
Chiapas will be manifested in peculiarities of local conditions and history of un-
even development). In the case of Oaxaca, the manner in which to approach the 
danger of passive revolution is somewhat different. At the time of writing (July 
2010) the local state is undergoing a period of historic political transition. Gabino 
Cue Monteagudo, though the efforts of the Coalici6n Unidos por la Paz y el Pro-
greso (CUPP, United Coalition for Peace and Progress), a coalition that spanned 
the whole length of the political spectrum, triumphed in the gubernatorial elec-
tions on July 4th, ending the 81 year dominance of the Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional (PRI, Institutional Revolutionary Party) in the state. The coalition 
also won 90% of the posts in the other state elections held in Oaxaca on the same 
day. In the context of the repression that the state has undergone in recent years. 
this has been a cause for jubilation for much of the population. However, this 
must be tempered with a note of caution. A political revolution does not neces-
sarily translate into a social revolution as Chapter 5 demonstrated. 6 The election 
6The distinction between a political revolution and a social revolution was made originally 
by John Reed (1919/2006: 36) in his discussion of the Russian Revolution. 
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of Gabino Cue was clearly bought about through the power of civil society. The 
question is whether this process of formal democratisation is now used to cdefuse 
social movements seeking a more thorough going process of democratisation based 
and whether civil society retains its initiative. 7 Can they force the governor to 
'lead by obeying' or will sub-national democratisation result in a new local artic-
ulation of passive revolution? The words of Henri Lefebvre are prescient in both 
these cases. Although he never used the term passive revolution, he nevertheless 
usefully points to the dangers of it, warning social movements of ;'the triple trap 
of substitution (of authority for grassroots action) transfer (of responsibility from 
activists to the 'leaders') and displacement (of the objectives and the stakes of 
social protest to the goals set by the 'bosses' who are attached to the established 
order" (Lefebvre, 2003: 99, emphases added). 
In branching out to wider spatial scales, how then can we square the tac-
tics of these Mexican social movements with the wider changes that are taking 
place in Latin America? In a series of polemical responses to John Holloway's 
(2002a) thesis of changing the world without taking power, many have sought to 
point to examples in countries such as Venezuela, Ecuador or Bolivia to highlight 
conversely the necessity of taking state power in order to achieve social justice 
(see inter alia Robinson, 2008: 341-348; Wilpert, 2006). However, far too much 
intellectual energy has been expended on this now relatively stale debate. Far 
more important is the strategic direction in which a movement is heading. This 
requires us to go back to the fundamental Marxist critique of the state as a special 
type of organisation that is super-imposed upon society rather than subordinate 
to it (Marx 1875/1996: 892-893; Lenin, 1917/1987b: 301). Neither Marx nor 
Lenin thought structures of authority would disappear overnight. Rather what 
their critique illustrated was the necessity of extending the participation of the 
subaltern over their everyday lives. What one has to examine therefore is whether 
social struggles are reconstituting society as society or in fact reconstituting the 
power relations of the state (Lefebvre, 1976: 125). Genuine freedom after all 
requires "the exercise of effective power" (Lefebvre, 1947/2008: 172). This again 
is where the concept of passive revolution can aid us, as we need to be attentiye 
7Ellen Meiksins Wood's (1995: 15) argument that extending the remit of democracy beyond 
its current narrowly-defined limits would present the greatest threat to global capitalism is 
pertinent in this regard. 
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to not only to where the initiative for social change comes from. but also as to 
whether this participation becomes a permanent feature of social life or remains 
restricted to privileged moments (see also Morton, 2011). 
8.4 Final reflections: the struggle for utopian 
space 
Through a witty amalgamation of two Greek words, Thomas More (1997) in 
his classic novel Utopia defined the word as the 'good place' that was in fact 
'no place'. With this in mind, one can make sense of Lefebvre's (1996: 151) 
argument that everyone who has plans to change the world must be thought 
of as a utopian. Consider the logic of capital as it has been outlined in the 
preceding chapters. What is it trying to do, if not to create what it deems to be 
a good place (where the conditions for capital accumulation can flourish) from 
not yet existing places (in the indigenous regions of Oaxaca or Chiapas where 
little in the way of capitalist social relations currently exists)? On the other 
hand, resistance movements are not seeking to hold place and space static. nor as 
Chapter 6 and 7 indicated do they simply aim to return to traditional forms of 
community.8 Rather, they are seeking the transformation of their environment to 
something that as yet, is not a reality. David Harvey (1996: 436) has postulated 
resistance as a "living utopianism of process" rather than a fixed and non-dialectic 
utopia that itself did not recognise the transitory nature of its own form. It was 
this aspect of transformation that Lenin (1917/1987b: 330-332) failed to grasp, 
believing instead that with revolution came a withering of democracy. However, 
democracy itself (understood in its true meaning as the rule of the people) is not 
a stable condition but rather a constant process in action (Lefebvre, 1964/2009: 
61). What we can therefore observe in Mexico, Latin America and perhaps the 
world as a whole is a battle over the meaning of utopia, defined as the clash 
between the spaces of capital and the spaces of resistance. 
It is clear that these spaces of resistance face many challenges. Foremost 
among them is the need to 'scale up' their activism whilst avoiding becoming 
8 Although as Marx (1871/1996: 877) noted, "It is generally the fate of completely new 
historical creations to be mistaken for the counterparts of older and even defunct. forms of 
social life, to which they may bear a certain likeness." 
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reinscribed into the state apparatus and neutralised via means of passive revo-
lutionary activity. This will be far from an easy task, and the future of these 
struggles can by no means be assured. However, for now, we can simply say a 
crack has been opened in history. This crack can serve as a window from which 
we may glimpse, if only fleetingly, another world: another world that is possible 
and ever more necessary. 
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Burguete, A (Professor, Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropologia 
Social (CIESAS)), San Crist6bal 07/06/09 (llam) 
Castro-Soto, G (Director, Otros Mundos, member of REDLAR) San Crist6bal 
09/06/10 (3pm) 
Cruz, K (member of Zapoteco community Santa Cruz Yavaila) 14/06/10 (3.30pm) 
Davis, N (author and journalist) Oaxaca City, 20/05/09 (llam) 
Esteva, G (academic, journalist, and Director, la Universidad de la Tierra, Oax-
aca) Oaxaca City, 07/04/08 (llam) and 08/06/09 (2pm) 
Hansen, T (Director, Mexico Solidarity Network) Tlaxcala, 09/03/08 (12.30pm) 
and San Crist6bal, 10/06/09 (4pm) 
Holloway, J (Professor Universidad Aut6noma de Puebla, BUAP) Cholula, Mex-
ico 20/03/08 (11.30am) and 11/05/09 (12pm) 
Junta de Buen Gobierno, La Garrucha 26/04/09 (3pm) 
Junta de Buen Gobierno, La Realidad 23/04/09 (llam) and 25/04/09 (4pm) 
L6pez, C (member of CODEP) Oaxaca City, 21/05/09 (8pm) 
Ledesma, E (Director, CAPISE) San Crist6bal, 10/06/09 (2pm) 
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Maldonado, B (anthropologist and author) Oaxaca City 21/07/09 (5pm) 
Meier-Wiedenbach, J (Global Exchange) San Cristobal 27/03/08 (3pm) 
Morquecho, G (Journalist) San Cristobal, 27/03/08 (5pm) 
Olivera, M (Centro de Estudios Superiores de Mexico y Centroamerica. CES-
MECA, Centre for Higher Studies of Mexico and Central America) 09/06/09 San 
Cristobal (9am) 
Ross, J (Author and journalist) Mexico City 09/04/08 (2pm) and 17/06/09) 
(2pm) 
San Jose del Progreso community member 1, Oaxaca City 30/06/09 (.Jpm) 
Santiago, J (former director Desarrollo Economico y Social de los Mexicanos In-
digenas, DESMI) 05/04/08 (4pm) 
Valencia Nunez, R (former APPO advisor and member of Voces Oaxaquefias 
Construyendo Autonomia y Libertad VOCAL) 23/05/09 (llam) 
Venegas, D (former APPO advisor and political prisoner, member of Voces Oax-
aquefias Construyendo Autonomia y Libertad VOCAL) 17/06/09 (2pm) 
Zapatista Education Promoter, La Realidad (25/04/09) (2pm) 
Zapatista 1 in La Realidad 24/04/09 (4pm) 
Zapatista 2 in La Realidad 25/04/09 (3pm) 
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